
#129: Forest For The Trees
What this covers
This is a conversation between Max Gagliardi, host of the Talk.Energy podcast, and Luke Gromen, founder of Forest for the Trees, a macro research firm. It begins with the Fed's rate hikes and what they do to sovereign credit. Gromen calls the present setup the scariest in 27 years. He combines high Western sovereign debt, peak cheap energy, and an economy that depends on rising asset prices for consumption and tax receipts. He describes a series of bubbles (equities, then housing, then sovereign debt) that were each papered over by the next, and says that nothing is left to absorb the next transfer except the currency.
Much of the middle is historical comparison. Gromen sets 1946, when the Fed used yield curve control and let inflation run to deleverage debt-to-GDP, against today, and argues the same playbook no longer works under free capital flows. He also contrasts the 1970s, when debt-to-GDP was 25-30%, with 125% now. He cites Japan as the only developed country to hold at 130%+ without default, and notes strain at the Bank of Japan. The Fed's choices are framed as a trilemma: print, stand aside, or cut entitlements. Gagliardi adds a point about oil field services firms, whose thin margins make them sensitive to borrowing costs, so that rate hikes may be inflationary for energy supply.
The conversation then turns to geopolitics, and this is where it becomes most contested. Gromen treats the Russia conflict as a Balance Sheet Contest and argues that Russia holds the stronger position. He says energy demand is inelastic, that sanctions and price caps ignore China and India, and that Europe's dependence on Russian gas left it exposed. He also raises China's water constraints. He closes with the investment implications: Treasuries likely lose real value over 5-10 years, and real assets such as commodities, energy, gold, and Bitcoin look better placed. He also argues that policy has favored the bond market over the US industrial base for decades.
Gromen argues the US faces an unprecedented sovereign debt crisis stemming from a combination of peak cheap energy, unsustainable debt-to-GDP ratios, and policy choices that have made the economy dependent on rising asset prices, which will ultimately force the Fed to resume QE and allow sustained inflation despite rate hikes, while energy constraints and geopolitical realignment will reshape global power dynamics.
- The US has reached 125% debt-to-GDP with no way to 'kick the bubble upstairs' except through currency debasement, unlike previous crises
- Energy is the true discount rate of the economy; peak cheap energy combined with sovereign debt bubbles creates an unprecedented macroeconomic crisis
- Rate hikes into supply-chain constraints and asset-dependent consumption create a debt doom loop where Fed tightening forces government spending cuts that are politically impossible
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In 1946, the last time US debt-to-GDP exceeded 100%, the Fed used yield curve control and allowed its balance sheet to expand, permitting inflation to reach 12-16% and real rates to fall to -14%, which deleveraged debt-to-GDP from 110% to 50-55% by 1951, but current conditions make replicating this strategy impossible due to free capital flows and global financial integration.
“And what the Fed did then was they kept treasury yields with yield curve control and they let their balance sheet go. Um you had a high rates of inflation. You saw US real rates bottom at I think -14%, which is just your your nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation. And you saw US debt to GDP shrink from 110% in 1945 to uh 46 to uh roughly 50 55% by 1951.”
Raising rates into a supply-chain crisis makes sense only in a cyclical short-term framework (choke off demand, supply chains rebalance), but policy makers lack second-order thinking and fail to recognize that recession triggers debt insolvency crisis, and strategically it makes no sense because supply chain investment requires low rates and inflation to incentivize reshoring—the opposite of what the Fed is doing.
“there's the cyclical supply chain problem, which is I think the only way the Fed's looking at it because the Fed, Washington, all of them, they think like 3 ft in front of their faces. And I think some of it's just out of the political reality of it. Some of it's just dogma. Um but they think on this short-term election cycle, right? So, we've got this this short-term cyclical supply chain issue. And in a vacuum if you want to get that down, then yeah, inducing recession makes perfect sense because if it's just cyclical, you choke off demand, the supply and demand the supply chains will be able to get back into balance.”
The current macroeconomic setup is the scariest in 27 years due to an unprecedented combination of high sovereign debt centered in Western developed markets, peak cheap energy (rising marginal costs despite no shortage of reserves), and policy choices that have made the US government and economy dependent on rising asset prices for marginal consumption, GDP growth, and tax receipts.
“I think right now is probably the scariest macro setup I've seen in my 27 years in finance. Due to a combination of factors, you've got an unprecedentedly high level of sovereign debt, particularly centered in the Western developed markets.”
Oil field services companies operate with tight margins (month-to-month cost management) and are therefore highly sensitive to credit availability and borrowing costs, meaning that rate increases make it materially more expensive for them to finance operations and reduce their ability to ramp production.
“these oil field services companies, they're not like strong balance sheet companies. These are companies that are often month-to-month trying to pay their expenses, trying to buy steel, trying to buy pipe, trying to get workers in to get to work on these wells. When things go bad, they go bust. They're like skeleton companies and guess what? Their lines of credit that they desperately need to ramp up to bring more oil on, it's getting more and more expensive for them to finance that.”
During WWII, the US rationed goods in addition to letting inflation run high and maintaining yield curve control, which helped contain inflation while achieving wartime spending goals without defaulting on debt.
“of course they rationed goods so that helped contain some of the inflation but but the point is is if if it's as much of an emergency as they're telling us it is, you can't tell me in the next breath that we have to preserve the bond market.”
Energy is 'nature's discount rate'—a physical constraint that cannot be circumvented by policy tools—and the current combination of peak cheap energy (rising marginal costs) with a leveraged financial system creates an unprecedented constraint that will depress asset valuations across the board.
“energy in my view and in our work we've highlighted is effectively just nature's discount rate. It's it's the discount rate you can't get around.”
The real conflict in current geopolitics is fundamentally a balance sheet contest between the West and Russia, with Russia's balance sheet being superior because it is 'full of gold' while the West faces unsustainable debt, giving Russia structural advantages.
“what we're really talking about at its core is a balance sheet contest between the West and Russia. And Russia's balance sheet's just way better. They've balance sheet's full of gold and um they still have some currency reserves, but then they're adding more every month with with oil.”
Russia's economic leverage is far greater than its GDP suggests because each barrel of oil contains approximately 25,000 man-hours of work, which at $20/hour represents ~$500,000 in economic value per barrel, making Russia's GDP-weighted influence disproportionately large relative to its official economic size.
“I've seen estimates that in every barrel of oil there's 25,000 man-hours of work. And so, if you say, 'Okay, a man-hour of work is worth 20 bucks.' The value of a barrel of oil to the global economy is an estimated $500,000.”
Net capital gains plus taxable IRA distributions alone account for 200% of annual growth in US personal consumption expenditures (PCE), meaning if stocks decline, mathematical impossibility of rising PCE makes GDP growth impossible, and with debt-to-GDP at 125%, a recession forces shrinking denominator while debt remains fixed, triggering insolvency crisis.
“net capital gains plus taxable IRA distributions alone are about 200% of the annual growth in US personal consumption expenditures, which is just consumer spending. It's like a $15 trillion line item. It's broadly defined. And that's not to say people are selling stocks directly to buy boats, cars, and healthcare services, etc. But it does mean They do sometimes. that They They'll No, they absolutely do sometimes. No question. But it does mean mathematically if stocks start going down, you mathematically cannot have PCE rise.”
In the 1970s when the US last experienced sustained high inflation, US debt-to-GDP was 25-30% (vs 125% today), US deficits were 1.5-2.5% of GDP (vs 6-7% or 12% today), demographics were younger, and the economy was less financialized, meaning the Fed cannot run the same monetary playbook to fight inflation as it did then despite economists suggesting it can.
“you go back to the 1970s when we last had sustained high inflation in the US. There are elements of that that I think are very similar. However, um the US demographics were much younger. The US was much less financialized economy. The US debt to GDP was 25 to 30% not 125% like it is today. US deficits as a percentage of GDP were 1 and 1/2 to 2 and 1/2% not 6 to 7% or 12% where they came into the year at.”
For 35-40 years, US policy has consistently prioritized protecting the bond market over the US middle class, working class, and manufacturing base, leading to outsourced supply chains and geopolitical vulnerability (e.g., COVID masks from China), and this prioritization contradicts actual national security interests which would require reshoring and domestic investment.
“40 years, 35 years, the US government has effectively done whatever it takes with policy to support the US bond market. It has consistently made choices that benefited the US bond market to the detriment of the US middle class, the US working class and by extension in the long run the United States itself.”
Capping Russian oil prices assumes China and India don't exist or will comply; given their political imperatives (preventing starvation/freezing = preventing riots), they will continue buying Russian oil regardless of price caps, and the West is effectively admitting gold is a valuable reserve asset by sanctioning Russian gold while weakening the dollar system that underpins Western financial dominance.
“if you've got China, if you've got India, they have political imperatives. This is for them is all about realpolitik, which is to say if people start to starve or freeze, there will be riots. And that's an that they do not need the threat to to to political stability in either of those places given that they're whatever they are uh 20% of global population just in those two countries.”
The endgame of sovereign debt crises historically and in this case specifically is a period of sustained high inflation that drives negative real interest rates, which is 'normal for the spider' (policymakers/bond issuers) but 'chaos for the fly' (bond holders receiving nominal payments that are worth much less in real terms).
“there's a great saying it's, you know, what's normal for the spider is chaos for the fly. So, um if you're a bond holder, you got paid usually every time you were owed. It just, you know, you the dimes got valued they got devalued significantly against real things. There was secular inflation, uh very high inflation in some cases in almost every one of these instances.”
The only developed nation that has not defaulted at 130%+ debt-to-GDP is Japan, but Japan is currently experiencing strains in its JGB market with the Bank of Japan struggling to maintain yield caps.
“The one that has not had problems or that has not defaulted yet has been Japan. And of course, Japan is we're seeing strains there at the JGB market, the Bank of Japan struggling to keep the cap on JGB yields.”
A chronic problem in US policy is that politicians lack willingness to implement policies that contradict their stated campaign positions, making it politically difficult to support oil industry production when campaigns have promised to oppose it.
“I think a lot of it it just comes down to constituents and the way the politicians work. I mean, you get elected to do a certain thing uh and that's to you know, to support the industries and the constituents of the states that elected you and that backed your campaign and just to pivot and tell those people that were wanting you to push for whatever that thing is that they want you to push for that actually we're going to do the opposite of that. We're going to go and we're going to back the oil industry whenever they said they were going to kill it. Like it just doesn't make sense for them politically.”
Europe has backed itself into an energy corner by becoming dependent on Russian gas supplies over decades, creating leverage for Putin that Western policymakers severely underestimated, as evidenced by Europe's current energy crisis.
“Europe really took out a lot of debt... Europe has backed itself into a corner by taking on Russian energy supplies.”
China faces serious water issues that are fundamentally problematic because water is as important or more important than energy for economic production, and water shortages constrain energy production (can't produce energy without water), creating a bottleneck in Chinese growth.
“I think the US is best positioned... I think Europe uh is right now looking like it's in a very tough spot. Japan in a tough spot. China in a tough spot... China has some serious water issues we've written about over the last 6 to 9 months in our uh in our research and and that's problematic on a number of levels cuz water is arguably everybody is fundamental if not more fundamental than even energy cuz there's a lot of energy you can't produce without enough water.”
Rate increases make it more expensive for oil field services companies to finance operations (since they can't pass costs to customers), reducing their ability to bring online new production and making rate hikes inflationary rather than deflationary on the energy supply side.
“they're not going to charge you more to drill that oil well because they can't get a line of credit uh to buy the materials that they need. Um you know, so example like they could go in and do things fiscally like you said on the semiconductor side that would support industries here.”
US Treasuries will likely lose significant real value over 5-10 years because if the US doesn't default, it must inflate away the debt, and this dynamic points to real assets (commodities, energy, gold, Bitcoin) as better positioned than nominal assets.
“I don't know that the US is exceptional going back 220 years relative to this debt to GDP. They inflated away. It's happened to the US before. We inflated it away multiple times. So, like again I think it really comes out. I think the US is best positioned, but don't think that that carries forward to US Treasury holding the real value. They they almost by definition if the US government is not going to default Treasuries have to lose money on a real basis for a pretty sustained period of time Right. over the next five five to 10 years.”
The US faces the scariest macro setup in 27 years because unlike previous crises, there is nowhere left to 'kick the bubble upstairs' except the currency itself, and the combination of sovereign debt, peak cheap energy, and policy-driven asset dependence creates an endgame where sustained high inflation and negative real rates are nearly inevitable.
“there's nowhere else to kick the bubble upstairs to, right? Unless the Martians come down and and start printing Martian bucks. Um The there's nowhere else to kick a sovereign debt bubble up to except the currency.”
The US government should maintain sustained inflation and a weak dollar for 5 years to incentivize domestic industrial investment and supply chain reshoring, requiring explicit commitment to investors and entrepreneurs that policy will not reverse, but debt levels are now so high that bond markets will rebel within weeks if this strategy is announced, forcing earlier Fed intervention.
“what you need is a supply chain problem to spur the investment to uh begin to reshore things uh and and deal with all these issues uh to reshore the demand, right? So, you need this inflation, you need these supply chain problems. And then you need to stand back and let bond holders lose as the inflation picks up and and let the domestic um let the domestic let domestic industry broadly defined invest um to rectify those supply chains. And then the problem is this is a a multi-years process and it means you have to commit to as the Fed and as US policy makers saying, 'Listen, industrialists in America, capital markets, uh entrepreneurs in America, we are going to let inflation run hot for the next 5 years.”
The US has pursued a policy of continually 'kicking the problem upstairs' by creating successive bubbles: an equity bubble (2000) that burst and was papered over with a housing bubble (2008), which burst and was papered over with a sovereign debt bubble centered in the West, with no remaining asset class to absorb the next transfer.
“you go back to 2000, we had an equity bubble, it popped, policy makers decided to kick the problem upstairs effectively by creating a housing bubble to paper over the lost demand from equity bubble. The housing bubble popped, policy makers made the decision to effectively kick that problem upstairs, paper over it, the lost demand from the housing bubble by creating a sovereign debt bubble.”
The Fed faces a trilemma: either print money to cover the gap between spending obligations and falling tax receipts, or stand aside and let the US government crowd out global dollar markets (sending the dollar up, everything else down, and creating a debt doom loop as higher rates reduce tax receipts further), or cut spending/entitlements which is politically impossible.
“there's there lead you to one of two conclusions. Either the Fed's going to have to come in and print the difference as rates rise, as receipts fall, um or the Fed is going to stand aside and let the US government crowd out uh global dollar markets, which is going to send the dollar up, it's going to send basically everything else down, it's going to send US rates up over time. Um and that makes things worse cuz the higher rates go, the more expensive it is for you for the US government to borrow, the lower US tax receipts will be. And that gets you into the same sort of debt doom loop.”
Western policymakers attempting to cut Russian energy supply are economically illiterate because demand for energy is inelastic—Russia has maintained all-time high revenues despite reduced shipments due to price increases, proving that sanctions are ineffective at reducing Russian revenues while damaging Western economies.
“it seems like most of these politicians skipped the the economics 101 class day of of the inelasticity of demand of energy as well, right? I just saw a chart last week show that uh, 'Well, we're going to cut off Russian revenues by cutting off Russian energy.' Russia's shipments are down of I think it was oil by by pretty significant amounts and their revenues are at all-time highs. Cuz guess what? Price makes up the difference.”
Post-WWI, the six major industrial powers (US, UK, Germany, France, Russia, Japan) all devalued their currencies 75-100% over the following decade, with Germany and Russia hyperinflating and the US devaluing the dollar 75% versus gold from $20 to $35 in 1933.
“all six of them ultimately um devalued their currencies by anywhere from 75% to 100% um uh ultimately over the next 10 years with the Germans hyper-inflating famously, the Russians hyper-inflating famously, and the other three uh devaluing by some other measure, including the the the the incumbent reserve currency issuer, the UK, and the up-and-coming reserve currency issuer, the US, when excuse me, 1933, we devalued the dollar 75% versus gold by from $20 to $35.”
The mortgage bond market experienced a 'no bid' event on an inflation print two Fridays before this episode, indicating growing market dysfunction and symptom of eventual Fed forced return to QE.
“the last two sad two Fridays ago, the mortgage market went no bid for a period of time on that inflation print. So, you're already seeing some disruptions there, you know, the some of the liquidity metrics of the Treasury market have been sub-optimal in the last several weeks.”
In scenarios of sustained high inflation and negative real interest rates, investors should own gold, Bitcoin, real assets, and commodities/energy, which perform well in inflation; bonds will experience multi-year real losses and should be avoided.
“in negative real interest rates, you want to own gold, you want to own Bitcoin, you want to own assets that are um that do well in sustained inflation. I think commodities do well. I think energy does very well.”
Credit underwriting standards for residential and commercial real estate have tightened dramatically from the pre-2008 era (now requiring 30% down, 750+ credit scores, full financial documentation) versus historical leniency, suggesting housing market is on sounder fundamental footing than 2006-2007.
“the scrutiny to get these loans is pretty high. I mean like they want 30% down uh for commercial stuff for these vacation places. They want 750 credit scores. They want a history. Uh they want you to show them every financial metric, you know, all your stuff. I mean it's not like and I wasn't old enough to buy a bunch of homes in 2008, but some of the stories I heard, I just think that there's a lot higher level of financial scrutiny on the buyers uh these days.”
Interest expenses are rising for the US government as the Fed raises rates, but the more critical issue is that 70% of record-high tax receipts are spent on entitlements (Social Security, HHS) growing 5-6% annually well above GDP growth, and Treasury discretionary spending has also increased, meaning the combined entitlements plus Treasury spending plus interest now consumes ~90% of tax receipts before accounting for defense or any other government function.
“the bubble the everything bubble the Fed uh and and policy makers generated uh to get us out of the COVID crisis generated a bubble in tax receipts that is now rolling over as well. Uh Uh, so your receipts are falling, but number two, nobody ever mentions that 70% of tax receipts and and and and record high bubble inflated tax receipts are spent on entitlements.”
The US is best positioned among developed nations due to natural resource endowments (energy, water, food, waterways), but faces a leadership/management problem analogous to having a good business with bad management, while Europe faces the inverse (bad energy business with bad management).
“I think the US is best positioned. Now, I think within the US uh I think sort of the Midwestern US and the oil patch are probably better positioned than a lot of places because I do think you know, China has some serious water issues”
The US, Canada, Mexico, and South America have significant natural resource endowments (energy, water, food, waterways) and favorable geopolitics relative to Europe, China, and India, positioning North America better for the emerging multi-polar world.
“we do as a country produce a lot of energy... and we've got a ton of energy. Uh you know, Canada's got a lot of energy. We've got politicians that don't have the political will in either country today to extract the maximum value I think for that and foster that type of growth that we need. And then we've also got, you know, Mexico and South America um that I think have a growing population demographic that could really be leveraged to our advantage.”
Reinhart and Rogoff's research shows that over 220 years, 98% of countries that reached 130% debt-to-GDP have defaulted on sovereign debt, with most doing so through sustained high inflation that creates negative real interest rates.
“Reinhardt Rogoff's work on sovereign debt crisis show that over the last 220 years, 100 and any country that has gotten to 130% debt to GDP, 98% of those countries have defaulted on their sovereign debt.”
Neoliberal economists advise policymakers to 'do whatever it takes to protect the bond market,' but this advice is misguided because it reflects bond-market-first thinking that damages national interests, and historically (WWII) the US was willing to sacrifice bond market interests to achieve strategic goals.
“I think part of it is the economic advice they get from sort of these neoliberal economist economy neoliberal economists um uh is you know, do whatever it takes to protect the bond market. You have to protect the bond market. Well, to be blunt, they didn't give a crap about the bond market during World War II. They they pinned the bond market. They printed the money and they let inflation go”
The US could instead invest $50-100 billion in LNG export infrastructure and pipelines (rather than spending on overseas initiatives or interventions) to supply allied nations with energy and displace Russian leverage, which would be more deflationary and strategically effective than current green energy policies that depend on Chinese supply chains.
“I mean like if you know, don't turn to Moscow turn to the US for energy. They did just put that 50 billion. I'm not saying we shouldn't aid Ukraine in any way, but if they did just put 50 billion into LNG infrastructure and pipelines uh we could have supplied a ton of gas for the world. You could even invest in other countries to get them to switch from coal to gas and put some LNG import terminals and pipelines and uh and get long-term 30 40 50 year contracts in place with allies and they could reduce a ton of emissions globally more than EVs and all these other renewable initiatives.”
Western central banks, particularly the Fed and ECB, will likely be forced to stop raising rates, start cutting rates, and return to QE within the next 3 months due to disruption in either the mortgage or Treasury bond markets that they don't want to see.
“probably in the next 3 months, at least the next step of it is is Western central banks and in particular the Fed ECB have to effectively you Fed's got to return to they've got to stop raising, they start cutting, and then they probably get back to QE as a result of some disruption in a bond market that they do not want to see a disruption in.”
Sovereign debt crises are highly political processes that create sustained volatility, and investors should not lever up to play the endgame because political reversals and policy pivots (as seen in Weimar and recent crypto crashes) wipe out leveraged positions before structural outcomes fully materialize.
“These are very political processes once you get into a sovereign debt bubble that starts bursting. Very political. And because they're very political, they are going to be very volatile in terms of We've seen it year-to-date, right? The Fed's going to tighten. The Fed's going to tighten. They're going to run the They're going to run the Volcker playbook.”
Even owning the best home builder in 2006-2008 resulted in 90% losses because the sector was fundamentally impaired, whereas understanding the macro bottleneck (housing bubble) would have suggested avoiding home builders entirely, illustrating the power of macro-level sector analysis over stock selection.
“a perfect example is if you owned the best home builder in 2006, 2007, 2008, you only lost, say, 90% of your money instead of all of your money for the worst home builders. Versus understanding what was happening in from a sector standpoint meant, 'Hey, you shouldn't own any home builders.'”
Europe and Japan may face a choice within 6-12 months where they either demand the US supply more LNG/QE to buy their bonds, or turn to Russia and negotiate to buy energy in euros/yen, potentially creating a complete geopolitical realignment without formal policy change.
“I think it's going to be really interesting over the next 6 to 12 months to watch and see how energy realpolitik drives geopolitics. And by that I mean uh right now we're all just looking at this going Europe's screwed, myself included. Europe's screwed... I'm not so sure that over the next 6 to 12 months we're not going to get Europe and Japan saying, 'America, you either sell us a lot more gas or you start engaging in QE to buy our bonds.' Uh which is something the Fed can do uh of foreign sovereign bonds. Or else we're going to call Moscow and we're going to say, 'All right, it's a deal. Will you take yen and will you take euros for your gas because we can't have people freezing in the dark.'”
Housing market will slow but not crash due to boomer wealth effect, where generation with $35+ trillion in net assets and 'long money, short time' orientation will continue supporting housing through direct down-payment assistance to children and capital deployment, unless Fed crashes stock market, which would trigger a housing halt.
“A wild card this time in the housing market that I think is greatly under appreciated is that the baby boom generation has Last year the Wall Street Journal said it was $35 trillion in net assets... The other thing boomers have is uh they're they're long money and they're short time.”
In Weimar Germany during hyperinflation, the price of gold in Reichsmarks rose from near zero to a trillion marks, but there were 4-6 separate counter-moves when monthly gold prices fell, allowing leveraged long gold positions to be liquidated, showing that even in extreme scenarios policy pivots create volatility that can trigger stop-outs before the endgame.
“there's a chart that I've used multiple times uh from my friend Dan Oliver at Mercant Capital. I think it's super instructive and it shows the price of gold in German Reichsmarks as the Reichsmark was hyper inflating after World War I. And everyone's sort of at least tangentially familiar with with some of this story I think in economics. Um gold went from basically zero to a trillion marks, right? So, the currency basically disappeared, collapsed against gold. But even then, four or five or six different times when you look at the monthly moves, there were counter moves where if you were levered long gold in uh in in Weimar Germany as the currency was being hyper inflated to zero, you lost all of your money because there were Powell pivots effectively.”
Biden administration visited Saudi Arabia to attempt to negotiate lower oil prices, providing political cover for the Fed to claim victory against inflation, similar to Chamberlain's 'peace in our time' or Bush's 'Mission Accomplished' banner in Iraq.
“You're seeing Biden go to Saudi in a couple of weeks to go talk to the Saudis. Does he come back with, you know, peace in our the equivalent of Chamberlain's peace in our time from from, you know, from from Germany in '37 or whatever it was and say, 'Look, I got lower lower oil prices. They're going to pump more.' You know, maybe we get oil down for a little bit and then that gives the Fed the political cover to say, 'Okay, we we won against inflation.'”
Boomer generation experiencing COVID has shifted psychological orientation toward spending now rather than saving, viewing remaining lifespan as shorter than previously expected, creating 'devil-may-care' spending attitude that will support asset prices and consumption.
“COVID I think has introduced to the boomers a very much a oh gosh, spend it now, you know, devil-may-care attitude uh for those that have money... However, just by nature of their lifespan, they're getting up there in age. Uh COVID I think has introduced to the boomers a very much a oh gosh, spend it now... COVID has introduced a level of mortality shorter than however long that was.”
When boomers die, $35 trillion (or more likely $25-30 trillion after recent market declines) in assets will transfer to millennials largely without taxation, creating another inflection point in wealth dynamics and potentially another asset price support mechanism.
“when the boomers die, that 35 trillion um a lot of it probably not tax affected is going to flow to the millennials. And so then then things get really interesting for the Fed.”
Gagliardi's observation is that boomer purchasers of vacation rental properties are motivated by fear of stock market and desire for tangible assets that can produce cash flow if rented or be enjoyed personally if not rented.
“what we found is that a lot of the buyers are these boomers with a lot of cash that they just don't want it in stock market right now cuz they're spooked. And they're like, 'Hey, I want to buy something nice that can cash flow if people rent it. If not, I can enjoy it and it's an actual asset that I can own.'”
Bitcoin will eventually separate from tech stocks and trade more like gold with additional upside ('some juice to the upside'), as investors reassess its role as an inflation hedge rather than a tech asset.
“I ultimately think Bitcoin will separate from tech and and trade much more like gold with with with some juice to the upside.”
Forest for the Trees (FFTT) research firm identifies developing economic bottlenecks by aggregating large amounts of publicly available data in unique ways, with the core finding that sectors impacted by these bottlenecks dramatically outperform or underperform, making macro-level bottleneck analysis more predictive than stock picking.
“I'm the founder and president of FF TT, which stands for Forest for the trees, which really uh describes what we do. We try to see the forest for the trees for our clients. So, and what that means in practical terms is we aggregate a large amount of publicly available data in a unique manner to try to identify developing economic bottlenecks. And so, what we're looking for is basically we as some of our clients have said that we we have a PhD in dot connecting. So, we're trying to put together different dots and we're trying to find what I called economic bottlenecks, which are just areas where supply and demand are are mismatched.”
The Fed's year-to-date policy outcomes show dollar strength, everything else weakness, energy and gold holding up, and Bitcoin trading with tech, creating a pattern that Gromen expects to continue until US tax receipts fall enough to force Fed to return to QE.
“to be clear I think the US is best positioned. Now, I think within the US uh I think sort of the Midwestern US and the oil patch are probably better positioned than a lot of places because I do think you know, China has some serious water issues we've written about over the last 6 to 9 months in our uh in our research and and that's problematic on a number of levels cuz water is arguably everybody is fundamental if not more fundamental than even energy cuz there's a lot of energy you can't produce without enough water.”
Oklahoma and Texas are experiencing 'huge wealth effect' from higher oil and gas prices, with capital flowing into Midwestern states that have oil and gas production.
“I'm in Oklahoma, which I think is getting a huge wealth effect and Texas from the higher oil and gas prices. You're just seeing so much wealth flowing into those Midwestern states that have oil and gas production.”
Gagliardi founded a real estate investment firm that previously engaged in residential real estate investing but exited that sector last year due to excessive price appreciation, and now focuses on short-term vacation rental destinations in places like Broken Bow, Oklahoma.
“I've got a real estate investment firm that we founded a few years ago. And we did a lot of residential stuff and then kind of exited it last year just because the prices had gone up so much. It was just like this is crazy and and it's just a lot of work and not very fun. Uh so but uh so we we still see that being strong and I'm in Oklahoma, which I think is getting a huge wealth effect and Texas from the higher oil and gas prices.”
Gromen has been in finance for 27 years with approximately 20 of those years in investment research, giving him deep historical perspective on market cycles and policy responses.
“I've been in on in finance for 27 years and investment research for the first roughly 20 of those years.”
Forest for the Trees has been in operation long enough and has sufficient client base that clients describe the firm as having 'a PhD in dot connecting,' indicating market recognition of the analytical approach.
“we as some of our clients have said that we we have a PhD in dot connecting.”
The podcast host Max Gagliardi has been following Gromen's work on Twitter for about a year and has listened to multiple previous Gromen podcast appearances, indicating Gagliardi's familiarity with Gromen's analysis.
“I've listened to your stuff for a while now. I've been following you on Twitter for the last probably year or so. I've seen some of your other podcasts.”
Blockware Solutions is a Bitcoin mining firm that has sold over 250,000 ASICs, hosted over 200 megawatts for clients, and mined over 1,000 Bitcoin in their pool, and is the episode sponsor.
“This episode's sponsored by Blockware Solutions. If you're interested in mining Bitcoin, you should check out Blockware Solutions. They've got a ton of great research. They do an awesome podcast. I recently made an appearance on their show, you should check that out. Blockware sold over 250,000 ASICs. They've hosted over 200 megawatts for their clients, and they've mined over 1,000 Bitcoin in the Blockware pool.”