What this covers

This is a 77-minute anniversary presentation for Library of Mistakes in which Russell Napier works through a set of lessons drawn from financial history, followed by audience questions. Two participants, Martin and a listener, push back directly. Napier opens with a critique of econometrics, citing Angus Deaton's argument that historians grasp long-run, multi-directional causality better than economists who study local effects. From there he builds a toolkit: examine supply as closely as demand, think only about incentives, and treat money and credit as perpetually in disequilibrium.

The investing lessons are concrete. He argues that GDP growth has no long-run relationship to equity returns, and he points to the MSCI China index, which is about 50% below its 1992 level despite China's transformation. Markets can fall through crashes or through slow multi-decade deflation of prices, as in 1901-1921 and 1966-1982. A cyclically adjusted PE below 10 is a buy signal only where a central bank can reflate, and Greece in 2008 is his counterexample. Other rules cover overvalued emerging-market currencies, serial sovereign defaulters, and the primacy of property rights, illustrated by the 1998 Thai crisis. Walter Bagehot's remark about savers and 2% returns anchors his account of why low rates push people into speculation.

The more contentious ground is monetary. Napier says monetary policy is the quantity of money, not interest rates, and that commercial banks create most money, so whoever controls the banks holds monetary authority. He forecasts the return of capital controls, which he describes as a democratic tool, and financial repression rather than hyperinflation in developed economies. He also warns that a Chinese break with the West would be the largest supply shock since 1914. Martin disputes the money-supply framing, noting that its link to outcomes broke down in the 1980s, and challenges the claim that corporate profit shares mean-revert, since they have stayed high since 2000. The listener proposes adding Goodhart's Law to the list. Napier also takes a detour through Scotland's free-banking era, which ended in 1842.

Sharpest takeaway

Napier argues that financial history, not econometric forecasting, reveals the structural mechanisms governing markets and economies—including supply-side analysis, incentive structures, monetary system architecture, and long-term reversion patterns—and that understanding these mechanisms is essential for navigating the coming restructuring of the global monetary system.

  • Contemporary econometrics focuses on local effects and misses slow-acting mechanisms that historians and financial historians understand better
  • GDP growth has no relationship to equity returns; structural macro factors like supply, valuations, and monetary independence matter far more
  • The dollar-RMB peg established in 1994 is the cornerstone of the current monetary system and is likely to structurally change as China reflates, requiring investors to understand historical parallels rather than forecast decimal-point precision

The claims · ranked39 claims · weighted by value

This asset isn't compiled yet

You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.

0.80

Stock markets can decline via two mechanisms: crashes (rapid price collapses) or long-duration deflations where prices fall slowly over 15-20 years; the 1901-1921 and 1966-1982 periods show prices falling despite rising corporate earnings, indicating that inflation and rising interest rates destroy equity valuations even without economic collapse.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“if we look at the U sort of measurement of the valuation of equities and we have one that goes back to 1881 there's a period from uh 1901 to 1921 where you didn't lose money in a crash you lost money slowly and there's obviously that period from 1966 to 1982 which you know there was a crash in there but actually we're losing losing money through that entire 16-year period”

0.80

The cyclically adjusted PE ratio (Cape ratio) below 10x earnings is a strong buy signal because such valuations price in such dire deflation or collapse that governments will always intervene to prevent it; however, this rule fails if the country lacks monetary independence, as Greece in 2008 demonstrated—no central bank to reflate, no escape from deflation.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“this is the the cap ratio the famous Chiller ratio it's called the cyclically adjusted PE if you don't know what that is you'll find lots about it uh online historically almost always if it gets to a level below 10 times earnings then you buy equities because historically when equities are that cheap they're discounting such a dire outcome that somebody does something about it”

0.80

Technology does not ultimately defeat inflation; while technology increased digital watch production and lowered their nominal price, UK general prices rose 10x since 1971, keeping pace with money growth despite technological breakthroughs, showing that technology's deflationary effect is overwhelmed by monetary expansion.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“Tech technology never ultimately defeats inflation I used to because I've been doing this a long time for with investment managers it's not that long ago that when I would talk about the forthcoming inflation that people would say to me well we can't have it because Jeff Bezos won't allow it”

0.77

Capital controls are likely to return and should be understood as a tool for democracy, not authoritarianism; the last 40 years without capital controls was an anomaly; historically and structurally, democracies use capital controls to balance labor, capital, and government interests, as shown by their use in Greece, Cyprus, and Iceland in the last 12 years.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“this one's uh controversial because it's to do with capital controls and I've lived uh my certainly my entire investment in a world without Capital controls uh but I have worked in emerging markets that do have Capital controls they are not seen as something that was just a mad part of history but I think they're normal now if you say well we haven't seen them in a de in the developed world for 30 OD years 40 OD years well that's a short blink for a financial historian”

0.75

The government is not a neutral referee between supply and demand; historically, governments rarely accept prices set by markets and will intervene to achieve politically acceptable outcomes, but from 1979 to 2007 markets delivered what governments wanted (low inflation, asset growth), creating the illusion of laissez-faire neutrality.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“there is a myth that the government is a referee and there are two sides playing against each other on this pitch and the government referees and those two sides are supply and demand and the government referees this based upon some laws and rules and the laws of supply and demand determined price well there's virtually nothing in economic history that says that's true simply because the governments very rarely like the prices so if we go into that sort of that Reagan post era post thater Reagan Era the markets delivered what politicians wanted so they could give the illusion that they were referees”

0.75

Walter Bagehot's observation that 'John Bull can stand many things but he cannot stand 2%' (real returns) means that savers have a historical expectation of 5% real return, and when rates fall below that level, rational people pursue speculative investments to recover their expected returns.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“this is famous from Walter badget John bull can stand many things but he cannot stand 2% uh in other words when interest rates begin to decline and you have got your savings so to have savings have to work hard pay tax forego consumption this is frozen desire and most people aren't very good at Frozen desire unless they're Presbyterians uh so this is your Frozen desire and then having made all those sacrifices you believe that you are get you you deserve a return from that and throughout history there's a number that comes up for that it's 5% or more throughout history whether it's the novels of Jan Austin or anything else you find somewhat I want 5% I deserve 5%”

0.75

Never buy emerging market equities if the exchange rate is overvalued; emerging markets with pegged or managed exchange rates run tight monetary policy to defend the peg, causing disequilibrium (overvaluation) and eventual crash; conversely, undervalued currencies imply the central bank is creating money to prevent appreciation, generating profitable imbalances.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“never buy emerging market equities if the exchange rate is overvalued so this is something you kind of learn the hard way when you're an Emerging Market let me give you my experience of the range of valuations for emerging market equities Taiwan 1989 64 times earnings uh Hong Kong 1998 nine times earns it's quite a big range”

0.75

Martin challenges Napier's lesson about money supply as the driver of monetary policy, noting that the relationship between money growth and economic outcomes collapsed in the 1980s with financial deregulation; instead, the level of interest rates relative to nominal GDP growth is the better indicator of monetary stance.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Martin

“BCA the company I worked for that was its business the bank credit analyst we forecast everything based on Money Money numbers and it worked brilliantly until the 80s with financial D deregulation and the relationship between money growth and the economy and the markets evaporated the FED stopped talking about money what 15 20 years ago it doesn't even mention doesn't Target money doesn't mention money quantitative easing if you looked at the money for base you've never seen anything like the explosion in in narrow money during quantitative easing did inflation go up no”

0.75

Serial defaulters identified in Reinhart and Rogoff's research keep defaulting because weak institutions cannot resist populist pressure to prioritize domestic consumption over foreign debt repayment when faced with currency crises.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“most of the people who default actually borrow in foreign currency... do I force my people into low levels of consumption economic contraction run a huge current account Surplus so I earn all this foreign currency and pay it back or do I not pay back the foreigners and they weigh that up for an hour and a half and they come to the conclusion that I'm not getting elected if I force my people into that adjustment and they default”

0.74

A listener raises the possibility that when governments target any specific statistical number (credit growth, M2, inflation), the system bypasses that number and it becomes irrelevant (Goodhart's Law), suggesting Napier should add this to his lessons.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — 10 year anniversary presentation -- Russell Napier on lesso… [V4osiZHKrVY]

“the minute the government uh targets an individual statistic number you know be it you know credit growth or M2 or whatever it might be that number immediately gets bypassed by the system and becomes completely irrelevant that's good Hearts law isn't it”

0.74

The MSCI China index is 50% lower today than in 1992 despite China's massive economic transformation, demonstrating that understanding supply dynamics was critical to avoiding the trap of extrapolating demand growth into equity valuations.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“the index that was created when these companies were listed is not a very representative index but it exists it's called the msci China index okay I'm sure there are people in this room who know the answer to this but 1992 where is the index today 50% % lower than it was in 1992”

0.74

The rule of law and property rights are the ultimate determinants of investment returns; without legal recourse and protection against expropriation, equity valuations are meaningless, as demonstrated by the 1998 Thai currency crisis when investors discovered they had no understanding of Thai bankruptcy law.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“the rule of law is and property rights are ultimately what offend you as an investor and if you don't have those you don't have anything and I think we forget it all the time so I trained as a lawyer so I've maybe got too much of a respect for this but people are investing money all over the world in places where it really isn't clear whether they have any protection can you sue the government could I as an investor in China take an action against the Chinese Communist party and hope to win well these are questions you have to ask”

0.74

Private-sector currencies (like crypto or free banking) are not new; Scotland had successful free banking until 1842 with private bank notes that worked as long as the public trusted the issuer's solvency; governments eliminated private currencies because they preferred monopoly control, not because free banking was inherently unstable.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“this uh library has lots of uh examples of private sector currencies so Scotland would be perhaps the best example of a private sector currency we had I think it was up until 1842 something called Free banking so I could walk out into Prince of Street and I could say I'm a bank and I could issue my own bank notes so you'd walk in to borrow a100 pounds and I'd put the bank of Napier on it you'd walk out into that High Street the question was would anybody take Bank notes with the bank if they appear on it uh but as long as they had confidence in me and confidence in my balance sheet they would and that happened spectacularly particularly in relationship to thing called the bank of air”

0.73

When evaluating investments, never think about anything except incentives; management stock options are often cited, but the true incentive structure of a company—particularly whether it is family-run versus agent-managed—determines whether the company will allocate capital wisely or pursue self-interest.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“you could have 21 lessons from Financial history just quoting Charlie Munger uh and Munger of course was a was a vicious a voracious reader uh never ever think about anything else when you should be thinking about incentives now that seems to me so obvious but I've read spent my early part of my life reading lots of investment reports on companies and nobody ever told me what the incentives were of the management sometimes it said stock option but actually there's much more going on in a corporation than stock options and it seems to be really peculiar to be offered in an investment where you don't know the incentives of the management or at least there's not four pages written about you know the the incentives of a family run company are probably radically different from one run by agents agents and principles have different incentives we need to think about that when we make an investment”

0.72

If China stops trading with the West due to geopolitical conflict (e.g., military involvement in Ukraine), this would represent the biggest supply shock since 1914, larger than 1939, because China's oversupply of goods has depressed inflation and held down interest rates for 30 years, and this dynamic underpinned financial asset returns globally.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“what happens if we wake up tomorrow morning and we're not trading with China so that would have been an incon conceivable thing to say five years ago for many people it's still an inconceivable thing but actually it's reality that just one Chinese tank in the Ukraine and we're not trading with China the CIA say and not everything the CIA say is true but the CIA say that if you look at Russian Munitions in the Ukraine 80% of all the chips have come from China either from or through China”

0.72

Commercial banks create 80% of all sterling ever created in history, not central banks or governments; the monetary authority is therefore whoever controls the banks, and in the 1945-1979 period, governments directly controlled bank balance-sheet growth through quantitative credit controls rather than interest rates.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“commercial Banks make money I say that all the time nobody believes me but fortunately the bank of England just written a little article on it stuck it on their website so now people believe me according to the bank of England 80% of all the stering ever made in history has been made by the commercial Banks not by the government not by the Central Bank”

0.71

There is no relationship between GDP growth and equity returns when measured over long periods; this has been verified by plotting equity returns against GDP growth dating back to 1900, and yet investment professionals waste enormous amounts of time analyzing growth forecasts that play virtually no role in long-term equity returns.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“my day job ADV ing financial institutions about macro macro matters you might think well this guy is is just destroyed his entire business here with this proposition there is no relationship between GDP growth and the return from equities and there isn't and we run a course as David said and we can plot off return from equities against GDP growth really dating back to about 1900 and there is no relationship it just doesn't exist”

0.71

Corporate profits to GDP mean-revert in free societies because competing interest groups (labor, capital, creditors, government) fight over the allocation of wealth, and no single group can permanently dominate without authoritarian control; the U.S. data from 1926 onwards shows clear mean reversion, and this should be a warning signal when profits are at elevated levels.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“the ratio of corporate profits to GDP must mean revered in a free Society now there is a thing I'm not a mathematician but there's a thing called the aie dicky Fuller test for mean reversion and the most mean reverting series we can find in economic history is Us corporate profits to GDP which is quite a thing because if you can find something at mean reverts you can probably make some money out of it”

0.68

Monetary policy is not interest rates but the quantity of money in the economy; central banks are fixated on interest-rate policy (the accelerator pedal) while ignoring money supply, which led to the creation of 40% of all dollars ever created in the 2019-2022 period followed by massive inflation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“monetary policy uh is not about interest rates now we have a fixation the Press not just the press the central Bankers themselves have a fixation that interest rates are monetary policy and interest rates are like the accelerator in a a car the monetary policy is the supply of money now not everybody is going to agree with that but the central Bankers are fixated on this pedal that they push up and down and really it seems sometimes disinterested in the quantity of money in the economy”

0.68

Hyperinflation will not occur in developed economies because governments can seize or control savings to fund deficits before resorting to the printing press; the alternative to hyperinflation is financial repression—forcing savers to fund government at low real rates, inflating away debt slowly rather than catastrophically.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“I don't think we're going to have hyperinflation uh because we haven't stolen everybody's savings yet so when you look at countries that go to hyperinflation I they basically they print money hand it to the government and the government government spends it lots of circulation of money goes up not surprisingly prices go up that's hyperinflation these are countries that weren't in a situation where they could seize coo or control the savings of their people”

0.68

Money and credit are always in disequilibrium; the world is full of equilibrium models but markets never reach equilibrium; instead, money and credit fluctuations create disequilibria that assets oscillate around, and profitable opportunities exist when disequilibrium can be identified.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“money is almost always in dis equilibrium uh the word is full of equilibrium models uh and certainly in markets which is my business not economics I think you know we reach equilibrium once every 30 to 40 years sadly your career is dealing in slightly shorter time periods than that equilibrium”

0.68

Spend as much time analyzing supply as demand; investment professionals spend 95% of time discussing demand and ignore supply, which is why China's overbuilding of glass capacity was missed despite overwhelming demand forecasts being too conservative.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“I've been in the industry since 1989 I've been in any number of meetings with professional investors and 95% of the time is discussing demand for any given product... Supply is not working out whether it's chips or cement plants or anything who's building new capacity where they're building it how competitive it is”

0.68

Angus Deaton (Nobel Prize winner) argues in his 'rethinking my economics' speech that historians understand causal mechanisms better than economists because they study long-term, multi-directional causality rather than local effects from randomized trials.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“The credibility revolution in econometrics... the currently approved methods randomized control trials... have the effect of focusing tension attention on local effects and away from potentially important but slow acting mechanisms... historians who understand about contingen and about multiple and multi-directional causality often do a better job than economists of identifying important mechanisms”

0.63

During the Q&A discussion on mean reversion of corporate profits, Martin challenges Napier's claim by noting that profit share of GDP has moved permanently higher since 2000 and is now several standard deviations above its historical mean, suggesting the mean has shifted rather than will revert.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Martin

“historically it was literally one of the most shares of income labor share profit share going to profits were the most me reverting shes you could find y in the year about 2000 in the US that's what I've looked at completely changed standard deviations away from the mean for all kinds of reasons globalization blah blah blah uh and it has not been reverted over over two decades”

0.63

Monetary systems collapse approximately every 30 years; the current system (established in 1994 with the dollar-RMB peg) is due for structural change and investors should prepare for a new monetary order, similar to how the Bretton Woods system (1944) collapsed in 1971 and was replaced by floating rates.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“monetary systems feel about every 30 years 30 years is a very uh sort of madeup number but I think the last time we set up a new monetary system was 1994 with the devaluation of the renom B and linking it to the dollar that established a new monetary system prior to that we it had collapsed in 71 with the r and woods agreement”

0.63

China must eventually adopt a flexible exchange rate and independent monetary policy to reflate its deflationary economy and maintain social stability; pegging its currency to the dollar is economically irrational and unsustainable.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“if x wants to Ru his country he needs to control the mechanism which sets the price and the quantity of money and currently he has a restriction or a Fetter on that so I put this to say that if we look to the future of China it's a country that is going to have an independent exchange rate”

0.63

Governments will face a temptation to return to direct control of commercial bank credit (like the 1945–1979 period) both because interest rate policy has failed to control inflation and because governments will need to direct credit to specific investments (build, build, build agenda).

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“The Temptation for governments to get back into the banking system will be overwhelming because it will allow them to steer credit to all these Investments they need build build build but also to have a more direct control over the quantity of money”

0.59

Extrapolation is the opiate of the people—straight-line projection of past trends into the future is the primary error in forecasting and was made worse by spreadsheet software; real forecasting requires understanding a range of possible outcomes and identifying which are plausible given historical patterns, not projecting the most recent trend forward.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“I'm going to end on number 21 with a a misquote from Karl Marx because you can't talk about financial history without talking about Karl Marx oh way I went there it is Marx famously said that religion is the opiate of the people uh well I think he's wrong on that but this is what the op to the people is extrapolation is the OPI of the people”

0.55

Gordon Pepper's rule for identifying market peaks is: estimate how long the unsustainable can be sustained, double it, and take off a month—a heuristic that acknowledges that unsustainable conditions persist far longer than rational analysis suggests, making precise market timing impossible.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“Gordon was then U uh approached by Margaret Thatcher to become one of his monetary advisers and teach used to teach on the course and he was standing up one day much as I'm doing now and someone said to him well Mr pepper you've been in the market since 1961 she has how do I know when a market is peaked and this is what what he came up with oh I think it's the best one I've seen yet and it's completely subjective because I don't think there is an objective way to say when a Market's overvalued”

0.55

When investors observe actual purchasing behavior of poor people (e.g., buying consumer goods in Japan/China and reselling in their home country), they get more truthful information about exchange-rate overvaluation than from economic models, because poor people are making real allocation decisions with scarce resources.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“the easy one in Emerging Market is get off the airplane go to the baggage reclaim if you start seeing toasters and rice cookers and televisions coming down guess what the exchange rates overvalued because those people have found it more profitable to go over uh somewhere else and buy these very basic Commodities and bring them back there's a ship that leaves from from China to Japan and back every day people take little rooms and they come back full off consumer goods much cheaper to buy your consumer goods in Japan and China and yet one of them is an Emerging Market what does that say potentially about the Chinese exchange rate for the people who have to make basic decisions the best people to make decisions about value are poor people not rich people”

0.55

When determining the valuation of an asset or currency, study principals with their own money rather than agents; principals have real consequences for wrong decisions, whereas agents are insulated by principal-agent misalignment; the Malaysian crisis showed Malaysians (principals) fleeing equities while foreign institutional investors (agents) bought, and the principals were correct.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“one slightly tongue and cheek but when you want to work out the value of anything stick with the principles and and ignore the agents now agents managerial capitalism has taken over the system and the incentives of agents are very different”

0.55

Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) will not become large-scale because they concentrate power in the central bank, making it the monopoly holder of retail deposits and eliminating commercial banks; August Carsten at the Bank for International Settlements has written against this for good reason—the concentration of power would be unprecedented.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“the man who runs the Central Bank Union which is called the bank of international settlement it's called August Carston and he's written the paper explaining why we can't let the cbdc get too big but maybe it could be a relatively small thing so I really I don't fear Bitcoin as a citizen but I absolutely fear the Central Bank digital currency in terms of the concentration of power in in in the hands of one man or one woman”

0.52

Stable coins are likely to proliferate and be accepted by governments because they combine crypto technology with high-quality asset backing (short-term government debt), allowing governments to use them for funding while maintaining monetary control.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“there leaves the other form of digital currency which is the stable coin now I think there's a great future for the stable coin I think governments will love the stable coin what a stable coin is is is is all the technology of crypto but behind it there are high quality assets and the ultimate high quality asset is short-term government debt and why wouldn't the governments like that as a form of crypto so in terms of you and I transacting and buying things I can see a time when that might be a fungible currency that the government likes because ultimately it's part of their funding model”

0.52

Bitcoin and private cryptocurrencies will not be allowed to become fungible with fiat currency because the monetary volatility would be uncontrollable for governments; if crypto became as usable as traditional currency, governments would have to regulate it heavily or ban it entirely.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“if that is his fungible as the pound in my pocket or my uh my debit card the government could not conceivably cope with a massive change back to Martin's discussion we just had on the the impact of the supp money they really couldn't leave that up to let's call it an unregulated part of the economy so it would the very least have to be regulated so that's the first reason I don't think ultimately we'll have them because they would be too destabilizing if they were indeed fungible”

0.52

Xi Jinping's incentives are the most consequential for the 21st century because he will decide China's growth policy, confrontation with the West, and currency float; his incentive is social stability rather than electoral success, so he will reflate the economy whatever the cost.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“there's the incent for one man in this world will determine the rest of the 21st century and that is xiangping Xi Jinping has got some huge decisions to make not just about the growth of the Chinese economy how confrontational further confrontation he wants to be with the West will the currency float and it's the nature of China that those will be made by one man and what are that one man's incentives well I wish I knew I mean lots of people spend their lives trying to work out the incentives that Xi Jinping has”

0.52

Never trust forecasts with decimal points because they falsely imply precision and knowledge that the forecaster does not possess; decimal-point precision is either a result of academic training (economists defaulting to convention) or a deliberate attempt to mislead (selling false confidence); 30 years of forecasting experience shows it is hard to get direction right, much less decimal-point precision.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“never trust the forecast with a des point so I have been forecasting for 30 years now and I've never used a decimal point I'm not saying that that that's that's a good thing or a bad thing but I've never used one uh because I think I'd be fooling my clients I think I'd be fooling my clients to walk into a room and say well I have this forecast for next year for 2.5 or 3.2 and the reason I'd be fooling them is I would be pretending to have a level of precision and knowledge which I frankly don't have”

0.52

Financial history teaches you what is on the other side of the hill (referencing the Duke of Wellington), giving investors a better idea of what outcomes are possible and how to react to them, even though it cannot tell you precisely what will happen next.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“I just want to finish I'm I'm sure I've run way over on a quote from the the Juke of Wellington who was asked about Warfare and he said all the business of warfare and indeed all the business of Life Is Knowing what's on on the other side of the hill so if you study Financial history you've got a better idea of what's on the other side of the Hill uh you got a better idea of what's going to happen you have a better idea of how you should react to it but you still don't know what's on the other side of the hill”

0.49

Napier responds to Martin's challenge by citing the Herfindahl Index, which shows monopolistic concentration, but argues that prior episodes of high monopoly (1901) were broken up by Teddy Roosevelt; therefore, current high profit persistence is structural only if one assumes governments will not intervene, but they will if they need to control capital flows.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“we have the herfindal index which proves that uh we've been here 1901 I mentioned 1901 a time when equities were grossly overvalued one of the reasons that after that maybe they didn't do so well is we had uh Tedy Roosevelt busting up trusts I mean they they these these things this is trust busting these things are insurmountable they'll last forever well a democracy decided that they wouldn't and did something about it”

0.10

David (the moderator) announces upcoming events: an October 10 session featuring Charles Dallara (former US Treasury official and restructurer of Greece's debt) and a new podcast featuring a woman who is critical of banks and will provide 'feisty' contrarian perspective.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 0/4· David

“on October the 10th could I ask is there another great session in our 10 year celebration where you'll be interviewing uh someone interesting yeah we make a great team don't we we do the event on the 10th will be well we have the exhibit please go and look at it 10 years of Livy mistakes from kind of from nothing to to what it is uh today uh the 10th of October Charles darara now Charles is an incredible man he was assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the United States of America uh ran the uh ifif which is the sort of the the trade body for the whole global banking system”