What this covers

This is a conversation between Steve Eisman and Stu Elman of RRE Ventures, who has worked in venture capital since the 1990s. It starts with the origins of RRE. The firm was founded by two young investors who leaned on the Fortune 500 relationships of Jim Robinson III, the American Express CEO and father of Jim Robinson IV. Elman describes a 1997 industry of roughly 200 firms, funds mostly under $200 million, and almost no late-stage investors. He also explains how Mayor Bloomberg deliberately built New York into a technology hub, and why Silicon Valley's experienced, serial CEOs gave it an edge over New York's first-timers.

The middle of the discussion works through the mechanics of the business. Elman covers the law of thirds in fund returns, and how private valuations are only marked when a new round happens, which lets managers delay write-downs. He also covers how a mid-1990s software startup needed $5 million just to buy servers and licenses, against $1-2 million seed rounds today. Both speakers compare the 2001 and 2022-2023 crashes. In 2001 the damage stayed within tech, while the later downturn ran more than three and a half years, well past the typical eighteen months. It exhausted follow-on reserves, produced pay-to-play rounds that diluted non-participating investors roughly 10:1, and left behind funds that kept operating while unable to raise successors. Elman also describes 2021 venture debt whose revenue covenants turned callable when projections were missed.

The more contested material concerns the 2017-2021 period. Elman says some mega-funds decided that fundraising capacity was their advantage and paid extreme prices, such as $100 million for companies he thinks historic metrics would value at $20-40 million, on the bet that one winner would return 100x. He argues this pushes institutional capital toward a few large firms. The closing stretch turns to AI and crypto. Elman would have mega-funds take the foundation-model companies and mid-sized funds back application-layer companies with proprietary data. He also says blockchain is here to stay, pointing to RRE's early stake in Ripple.

Sharpest takeaway

Elman argues that venture capital has undergone a fundamental structural transformation from a merit-based allocation system to an asset-management business driven by mega-fund dynamics, causing the industry to collapse from sustainable returns to zombie funds unable to raise capital or return money to investors.

  • The 2017-2021 bubble created unsustainable valuations that compressed permanently, destroying returns for funds that invested at peak prices and making LP capital allocation shift to debt funds with guaranteed returns
  • Mega-funds ($15B+) destroyed the venture economics model because a single deal can no longer return the fund, fundamentally changing incentives from selection to size
  • Pay-to-play mechanics in down markets created moral hazard where early investors faced washouts, forcing perpetual follow-on capital commitments, causing structural underfunding of existing portfolios

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0.84

Mayor Michael Bloomberg deliberately transformed New York from a finance-dependent economy into the second-largest technology hub in the country by creating the New York City Partnership, Economic Development Council, and tech councils that built relationships between Fortune 500 companies and local startups.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“I give a lot of credit to Mayor Bloomberg here. Because he looked at New York in the late '9s and he said, 'Look, um, New York is financial services. New York is Wall Street. We have the brains, we have the capabilities, we have this, we should be a technology center, right?' So he enlisted the New York City Partnership, created the Economic Development Council, create, you know, created all these different councils and partnerships and tech councils to push forward the agenda of making New York a tax center.”

0.80

Private market valuations are not marked to market in real time; they are only marked when a new financing round occurs, creating accounting opaqueness that allows VCs to avoid marking down positions until forced to by new investor demand, unlike public markets which mark daily.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“the problem is private market valuations are not marked to market correct they're marked when a new round comes in...so the first time it's it's a billion and then if it goes to 10 billion you get to mark up your portfolio to 10 until there's another round.”

0.80

In the mid-1990s, initial software company funding rounds required $5 million or more because infrastructure costs were unavoidable: companies had to purchase Sun Microsystems servers, hardware racks, Oracle software licenses, and other enterprise software with no options to outsource or rent these assets.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“If you were most were software companies, right? So there was no I'm going to do a $2 million round, get my product to market because to do it an initial round to get any product to market, you had to buy hardware, Sun Micros Systemystem servers, you had to buy racks, you had to buy software licenses from Oracle and everybody else that you needed to do. So your initial round was always like $5 million, right?”

0.80

Venture capital fund sizes were historically much smaller and more efficient: in 1997, RRE Ventures raised $94 million and was considered a massive first fund; across the entire industry there were approximately 200 venture firms total, nearly all with funds under $200 million, and there were virtually no late-stage venture funds.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“So we were considered a huge first fund back then. Back then it was $94 million.”

0.80

The 2022-2023 venture capital crash was triggered by a compression of public market valuations, which occurred after the Federal Reserve raised interest rates and the S&P 500 dropped 18% while NASDAQ fell 30%, but growth companies (high revenue growth, no earnings) fell 70-90%, and this public market compression directly collapsed private market valuations because VCs look at public comparables to mark their private investments.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“The Fed starts raising rates. Y and the stock market goes through a correction. Now the S&P was down 18% for the year. NASDAQ was down, I think, 30. But the companies that were public that in the way I think about it that most resemble venture capital companies which is high revenue growth no earnings they were down anywhere from 70 to 90%.”

0.77

By 2017-2021, a new venture capital strategy emerged where some mega-funds determined that if they were in the top deals, valuation did not matter because one company would return 100x, and these firms deployed this logic to justify paying extreme valuations (e.g., $100 million for companies with zero revenue) on the theory they had first-mover and insider advantages that guaranteed participation in unicorns.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“as long as I'm in the top couple of deals it doesn't matter what I pay for it right cuz that company will be such a big success so you one of the questions you thought about asking was what percentage work, what percentage don't work, right?”

0.75

In the mid-1990s, initial software company funding rounds required $5 million minimum because companies had to purchase physical hardware (Sun Microsystems servers, racks, software licenses from Oracle), unlike today where seed rounds are $1-2 million because infrastructure is cloud-based and software is SaaS.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“If you were most were software companies, right? So there was no I'm going to do a $2 million round...you had to buy hardware, Sun Micros System servers, you had to buy racks, you had to buy software licenses from Oracle...So your initial round was always like $5 million, right?”

0.75

Between 2017 and 2021, a fundamental shift occurred in venture capital strategy: instead of doing rigorous due diligence and valuing companies conservatively, large mega-funds decided their competitive advantage was fundraising capacity; they would raise multi-billion dollar funds and invest at ultra-high valuations (e.g., $100M for companies that historical metrics suggested should be $20-40M), betting that if they got into the top-tier deals they would make returns regardless of entry price.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“So, what was really fascinating was that a couple of firms did a big did an analysis and they said, 'Well, my competitive advantage is fundraising.' And by the way, if you're in that one deal, it doesn't matter what you pay for it, right? This is the antithesis of you as a value investor...If you're in that one deal that returns 100x, it actually doesn't matter what you pay. So, you had a couple of firms saying, 'You know what? If this is a great deal, we want in it. So, we're going to raise a lot. We're going to raise multi-billion dollar funds.'”

0.75

Application-level AI is a viable investment opportunity for mid-sized VC funds; the key requirement is that companies must have proprietary data and domain expertise (e.g., medical billing AI cannot just be built by ChatGPT or Claude because they lack proprietary medical billing data and institutional knowledge).

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“what funds that are you know that are I think smart about AI are doing is they're looking for application level AI and physical AI right so application AI is you go to a specific vertical and by the way the competitive advantage in the specific vertical you have to have proprietary data and some proprietary knowledge and you can build a very very interesting company at AI okay right so it's like if you're the medical billing expert in AI it's not like chat or the other guys can go in and understand all of the medical billing records and they don't have the proprietary data for that, right?”

0.75

CEOs in Silicon Valley in the 1990s were typically 'third-time CEOs' (experienced operators), whereas CEOs in New York were predominantly 'first-time CEOs', giving Silicon Valley firms an experience advantage in operational excellence and capital efficiency.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“because we were a firm that had already been around already had an institutional sized fund and but we also already had the experience of investing a lot of the first fund in Silicon Valley and Silicon Valley was just it was it was leagues more sophisticated right because the valley the CEOs there were third time CEOs all the CEOs in New York were first time CEOs and there's a big difference”

0.75

Venture capital firms die slowly rather than quickly: funds with poor portfolios don't shut down immediately, they continue to exist managing underwater positions while unable to raise successor funds, creating 'zombie funds' that tell LPs they're still investing while actually deploying minimally or zero capital.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“venture firms don't die quickly, they die slowly. Why is that? Because it's not like boom, you're out of business. You're in business. Your fees go down. What happens is you end up having a fund that doesn't put any money to work or puts dimminimous amounts of money to work, but still tells people they're in business.”

0.75

The 2022-2023 venture capital crash lasted 3.5+ years, far longer than most previous crashes (18 months was typical), which forced venture funds to survive multiple down rounds and pay-to-play rounds; most funds that had reserved 20-30% of capital for follow-on investments were exhausted by the second year, unable to support their portfolio companies through the extended downturn.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“nobody thought this would last three and a half years. I remember speaking at one of my LP meetings. They said, 'How long do you think this is going to last?' I'm like, 'This definitely is two two two and a half years.' And everybody was like, 'It was one of these, right?' Because we're really good at like always setting aside money and making sure we have it.”

0.75

Many venture-backed companies raised significant debt in 2021 with covenant structures requiring them to meet 80% of revenue projections, and if covenants were breached, the debt became callable; when revenues fell short during the crash, equity holders were forced to repay debt with new equity capital, which was economically infeasible and caused numerous otherwise viable companies to fail.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“a lot of the companies open their debt spots uh in 2021. So they took on debt and they took on debt with revenue covenants. So they took on I'll take on 20 million of debt but there's a covenant that says you have to meet 80% of your revenue projections. and if you don't debt's callable and when the debt's callable there's not enough equity to put in. So then equity holders are saying I have to put in twice my equity just to pay out the debt and the company would still have no money.”

0.75

Mega-funds are now positioned as the preferred vehicle for institutional LP capital because they offer stability and lower risk even if returns are lower; smaller venture funds must compete by demonstrating track records of getting through difficult markets, meaning institutional consolidation is pushing venture capital from a diversified ecosystem of 1,500 firms toward a concentrated system dominated by established mega-funds.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“if you're an institution, you're like, I can invest in these big names that have very big funds that are very stable and I probably won't lose money. I may not have as much risk appetite as investing in some of the smaller ones, but it's a much lower risk way of doing it.”

0.75

Silicon Valley venture managers in the 1990s were on their second or third startup, making them experienced navigators of company building, whereas New York venture managers at the same time were first-time CEOs, explaining why Silicon Valley ecosystem compounded advantages and talent sorted toward the valley.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“the CEOs there were third time CEOs all the CEOs in New York were first time CEOs and there's a big difference you know just having had the experience of having done it out there gave you a big leg job.”

0.75

AI investment in venture capital should be bifurcated: foundational model companies (Claude, Perplexity, ChatGPT) are raising hundreds of billions and require mega-fund capital that smaller funds cannot access; but smaller funds should focus on application-layer AI in specific verticals where proprietary data creates defensible advantages that the base models cannot replicate.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“you actually need to bifrocate this right. So the LLMs right claude you know perplexity chat J those guys are raising billions and billions hundreds of billions of dollars. Right. Funds like mine are a couple hundred million. We can't play in that game. Right. we we don't have nearly the amount of capital.”

0.75

Lavago (a diabetes health company) was acquired by Teladoc for approximately $12 billion, but Teladoc itself was trading at a higher valuation than the deal price, and after the acquisition, Teladoc's market cap compressed from the high valuation to $7 billion or lower, creating a valuation compression that reset expectations for the entire health services sector.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“Lavango was a a diabetes health company. And Lavango was bought for I believe and I'm not always perfect on the numbers but I believe they were bought for $12 billion by Teldoc. Okay, which was trading at a much higher valuation. So what you had is you had all these health services companies saying okay that's the multiple that's my mark right my mark is 20x revenues okay so post them buying Levango Teldoc which was the acquirers market cap I believe traded down to 7 billion or 6 billion maybe even 5 billion right so there was a huge huge compression of valuation”

0.74

Venture capital returns follow the law of thirds: one-third of investments lose 100% of capital, another third return only 10-80 cents on the dollar, and the final third generates all profits, with typically one deal per fund of ~25 companies returning the entire fund and the rest contributing marginally.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“So, it's the law of thirds. A third lose 100% of their money. Gone. Another third which gets to two-thirds will not even get your capital back. You'll get some you know 10 cents to 80 cents on the dollar back. Right? So those are not successes. So it's all down to the last third.”

0.74

Startups typically raise 12-18 months of cash between funding rounds; if the funding market dries up and no new rounds are available, startups face bankruptcy even if the underlying business model is sound, which was especially acute in 2001 when venture funding completely froze.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“Generally, when you're a startup, you raise between 12 and 18 months worth of cash because it's considered if you raise more than that, you're overly diluting yourself...The problem is when the money dries up like that like when the because everybody looks at the public markets as so just so viewers understand these startups don't make money no they have negative cash burn yes”

0.74

'Pay-to-play' rounds occur when a company needs capital and requires existing investors to choose: (1) invest fresh capital at the new lower valuation (dragging down their prior investment at the old valuation), or (2) don't invest and get 'washed out'—diluted 10:1 and converted to common stock (worthless senior to preferred).

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“So if I put in 5 million at a 200 million valuation, right? And now the company's worth 50. I will say I will put in another five. But dollar for dollar you take down my previous five and all 10 goes in at 50 now...what choices are given to the existing investors? Everybody can play. It's a paytoplay. That's what these are known as.”

0.74

In the 2001 crash, bank and financial stocks generally did well and did not crash alongside technology stocks, meaning the crash was sector-specific to technology rather than a systemic financial crash, and workers outside tech generally kept their jobs and didn't experience broad economic pain.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“It wasn't as bad because in 2001 the market itself didn't crash. It felt like just the technology crashed. Well, that is actually correct. I mean, I remember 2001 bank stocks actually did very well.”

0.74

The principle that 'markets go up, markets go down, you have to build great companies and make investments through all different types of markets' was taught to Eisman early in his career by Neil Brownstein of Bessemer Venture Partners, establishing that venture capital requires counter-cyclical discipline and continuous investing regardless of market sentiment.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“one of the first guys first sort of gentleman I knew from uh in venture capital was sort of the one of the you know eminence grace guys of Bessemer venture capital's name was Neil Brownstein Neil if you're listening to this I say hi he told me when I was 27 he's like markets go up markets go down you you know you have to build great companies and you have to make investment through all different types of markets”

0.74

Jim Robinson III (James Robinson III), CEO of American Express and investor in technology companies, was the father of Jim Robinson IV and provided the initial connections and credibility that enabled RRE Ventures to be founded by two 27-30 year old inexperienced venture capitalists; he had relationships with Fortune 500 boards and personally made tech investments.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“Jim, who was my best friend, was very techfocused... And 1994 was just this incredible year. It was basically the year that the internet came into the worldwide web sort of came into being... So Jim and I looked at each other... we said, you know what, this is the right time to do something in technology. I was 27 and he was 30, right? So it's not like people were uh about to shower money on us and say, 'Oh, you guys have two years of, you know, two years out of business school. Here's a bunch of money. Go spend it on an industry we don't really know anything about.' But fortunately his dad was uh James Robinson III who had won American Express who had been the CEO of American Express”

0.74

Henry Blodget worked at Oppenheimer, wrote about internet bubbles while maintaining a 'Buy' rating on Amazon at $260 when Amazon was crashing to $40, and later founded Business Insider; Eisman was a board member and investor in Business Insider during its Series A.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“Henry Blah I was in found not founding I was one of the larger investors in Business Insider right by the way Henry Blahid got his start at Oenheimer he had the office right across the hall from me so I love Henry Henry was great man and and and we did really well on Business Insider because that was the first you know I didn't realize you you invested in I was a board member you know the whole thing series A. Um, but it was interesting cuz Henry was writing about, remember the bubble? He got issues with Meil Lynch cuz he was writing about the bubbles, uh, you know, that he had a a buy on Amazon at like 260 when it went down to like 40.”

0.74

Blockchain and cryptocurrency are here to stay, and RRE Ventures was an early investor in Ripple, DCG (Grayscale and Paxos parent), and has benefited from being early in the crypto space, with Jim Robinson IV showing prescience in identifying these opportunities before mainstream VC adoption.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“Blockchain is is blockchain is here to stay. Right. Blockchain is big. We we're really lucky. We were early investors in Ripple. early investors in DCG which is Grayscale and Paxo. So like we've seen the crypto uh you know and I I my partner Jim Robinson the fourth I give him all due credit. He really saw this stuff earlier than everybody else and he's uh he's he's done some great investments in that space”

0.73

Elman and his partners who had experienced both the 2001 and 2008 crashes recognized the 2017-2021 market as 'worse than the bubble in 2000' when they analyzed what would happen if they re-funded their historical winners at current (2020-2021) valuations—the returns would be 'terrible,' indicating extreme overvaluation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“we looked at this and said this is worse than the bubble in 2000...we we looked at our companies that had returned the whole fund and we did an analysis this and and looked at them and said, 'If we funded them at current valuations rather than the valuations we funded them at, what would the return on our fund be?' And it was terrible.”

0.71

Endowments and institutions increasingly prefer to invest in mega-venture funds ($10-15B) from brand-name firms (Sequoia, Andreessen Horowitz) rather than smaller funds, believing it's a 'safer' bet; this trend toward concentration destroys the industry because mega-fund economics don't work for venture returns.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“back in the day, you'd say you never get fired for investing in IBM. If you're in an endowment, right, and you're like, I want to have some venture exposure. Take a small piece of one of these bigname funds. Now, the the issue is when you're investing in a $15 billion venture fund...The smaller the fund, the more multiple you can get...when you're investing in a $15 billion venture fund, the odds of making a 10x fund are low just because the size of the numbers”

0.70

Companies that go 'public' via SPAC or IPO become the valuation mark for private market companies in the same vertical; if a company goes public at low multiples (e.g., 1x revenues), it becomes impossible to raise private capital at high multiples (e.g., 50x revenues), forcing massive mark-downs across an entire category.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“as soon as there's a compression of valuation in the public markets people don't want to fund those private deals at what was you know if you were like okay it's 50x revenues on a direct to consumer company and now that same exact direct to consumer company went public either as a you know company or a spa and it's trading at less than 1x revenues you're not going to fund that thing at 10 or 20x revenues”

0.70

In the late 1990s, the competitive advantage of venture capital firms was relationship access: knowing the Fortune 500 CEOs and being able to provide introductions to startup founders; RRE explicitly built their strategy around Jim Robinson III's relationships with Fortune 500 boards, which gave portfolio companies distribution and partnership access.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“we became very good at helping our companies access the people in the Fortune 500 that we knew, right? So, you had connections actually to help your companies, right? And so our firm sort of partially built up around developing these connections and relationships with the larger companies.”

0.70

Companies were publicly listed in the late 1990s with only 'idea.com' names (no real business model, no revenue, no rights to their content), and their IPO shares would trade up from $6 to $200 on the first day, before all eventually collapsing to zero, exemplifying how investors were purely bidding up narratives rather than valuations.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“I remember there were companies going public that had I was looking at the perspectuses I was like wow these guys really have nothing right they have like an idea they're writing the word.com and internet and they were going public and you remember this they were I mean you know I think Oenheimer took a couple of them public they were they traded up I mean I it's it's like the names I can't even remember um but they were trading up from like 6 to 200 on the first day and everybody was just getting out and they had zero revenues and then they all crashed”

0.70

Most AI companies being pitched in venture capital are simply adding 'AI' or using base LLMs without proprietary data or vertical knowledge, creating 'chatbots' that the foundational model companies can replicate themselves, and these companies have no defensible competitive advantage and will be displaced by improvements to base models.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“everybody slaps AI on their thing right now and it's like, geez, I I really I I need another chatbot in this in this space. No, I absolutely not. half the companies you see will be done by the existing LLMs without you know any changes to them.”

0.69

Mayor Bloomberg's initiatives starting in the late 1990s—including creation of the NYC Partnership, Economic Development Council, and tech councils—transformed New York from a financial services-dependent city into the second-largest technology center after Silicon Valley, with major companies like Cornell Tech, Microsoft, and Google establishing presence in the city.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“I I give a lot of credit to Mayor Bloomberg here. Because he looked at New York in the late '9s and he said, 'Look, um, New York is financial services. New York is Wall Street. We have the brains, we have the capabilities, we have this, we should be a technology center, right?' So he enlisted the New York City Partnership, created the Economic Development Council, create, you know, created all these different councils and partnerships and tech councils to push forward the agenda of making New York a tax center.”

0.69

SPACs (special purpose acquisition companies) became prevalent in 2020-2021, offering attractive valuations to private companies seeking liquidity (often 3-4x higher than private valuations), incentivizing VC-backed companies to pursue SPAC mergers rather than traditional IPOs.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“we had all the everybody coming to us saying, 'Raise us back. Raise us back. Do us back. Do us back.' You know, and we did a couple just because it was so financially attractive, right? They were we had companies that were, you know, we thought were probably worth 500 million that were going to get got taken out got taken out as spaxs for 1.5 billion or$2 billion.”

0.69

RRE Ventures' specialty became enterprise software and software that sells to Fortune 500 companies, with a particular focus on financial services software, leveraging the founding partners' connections to large enterprise clients to help portfolio companies gain access and generate early revenue.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“So, we were uh enterprise software and software that sells to the Fortune 500. So, we a lot of financial services software. We became good, we became very good at helping our companies access the people in the Fortune 500 that we knew, right?”

0.68

RRE Ventures, founded in 1994 by Elman and Jim Robinson IV, was one of the original New York venture capital firms; the firm raised its first institutional fund of $94 million in 1997, which was considered a very large fund at that time when the NVCA handbook listed only ~200 venture firms in the entire country with almost none bigger than $200 million.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“So, um, RE, we're actually one of the, uh, OGs in, uh, New York venture capital...the year was 1994...So we were considered a huge first fund back then...it was $94 million...There were basically 200 firms. That was it in the entire country.”

0.68

Anyone who became a senior venture capitalist by 2015 built their entire track record by investing between 2016-2021, the bubble years; this cohort now faces zero distributions to LPs and cannot raise new funds, creating a crisis of experience among newer VCs who have never managed through a full cycle.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“Everybody who became relatively senior by 2015 created their entire track record by investing in companies between 2016 and 2021. Right. So, and yet a bunch of people raised their own first funds because it became very easy to raise a fund because it was a go-go time. Right. So, everybody raised a seed or a 50 or $70 million fund and their DPIs, right? What's DPI? They're money back. the ba basically you know cash handed back per investment distribution per investment are almost zero right they haven't handed any money back”

0.68

The internet came into practical use and broader consciousness in 1994, specifically with the release of Netscape as a browser, which made the World Wide Web accessible to non-technical users and created the conditions for venture capitalists to recognize a once-in-a-decade opportunity to invest in internet infrastructure and companies.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“it was basically the year that the internet came into the worldwide web sort of came into being not existence, but being, right? So literally, it was we decided to start our fund the month that Netscape was released as a browser.”

0.68

Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Salomon Brothers collapsed in 2008 despite being prestigious, long-established financial institutions with employees who had accumulated significant wealth over 20+ year careers; this undermined conventional wisdom that scale and history guaranteed institutional survival.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“My very very first job was a cold callering broker assistant at Bear Sterns on 55 Water Street. So, yeah. No, it's uh I'm like these these f you know Lehman Brothers was like wow it's a really prestigious firm that I you know would have you know loved working for when I was a kid. watching people that I'd known, you know, sort of because now I was a little older, right? But people even older than me that had, you know, spent 20 years, you know, creating significant asset value at firms like Bear and Leman and Solomon and this and that go to basically zero”

0.66

The 2001 internet bubble crash was sector-specific and devastated technology companies but spared other sectors; stock prices like Yahoo collapsed from $260 to $3, but bank stocks performed well because the broader market didn't crash alongside tech, unlike the 2008 financial crisis which affected all sectors.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“And I'm going to pick I may be wrong on the number but stocks like Yahoo went from 260 to three right I mean the numbers...But that wasn't a tech story. Wasn't a tech story and it didn't hit us as hard and tech was was not nearly as big. You know the I'll tell you what the harder part was”

0.66

Neil Brownstein, a senior partner at Bessemer Venture Partners, gave Elman career advice that 'markets go up markets go down, you have to build great companies and you have to make investment through all different types of markets'—the principle that VC firms cannot stop investing during downturns because they will miss deals that won't generate returns for 5+ years anyway.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“I remember one of the first guys first sort of gentleman I knew from uh in venture capital was sort of the one of the you know eminence grace guys of Bessemer venture capital's name was Neil Brownstein Neil if you're listening to this I say hi he told me when I was 27 he's like markets go up markets go down you you know you have to build great companies and you have to make investment through all different types of markets”

0.66

In venture capital, the law of thirds governs returns: one third of portfolio companies lose 100% of investor capital, another third return less than the original investment (10-80 cents on the dollar), and only the final third generate returns, with typically one deal per fund returning the entire fund.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“A third lose 100% of their money. Gone. Another third will not even get your capital back. So, it's all down to the last third.”

0.66

Private market valuations in venture capital are not marked to market in real-time like public securities; they are only marked when a new funding round occurs, creating an accounting mechanism where valuations can increase with each round but can also be frozen at unsustainable levels indefinitely unless a new investor appears.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“private market valuations are not marked to market they're marked when a new round comes in”

0.66

Startups need to raise 12-18 months of operating capital as a target, and if they need more than that, they risk over-diluting themselves; if they raise less, they need a functioning capital market that will provide follow-on rounds on a predictable 18-month cycle, which means private market freezes create time bombs for underfunded companies.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“when you're a startup, you raise between 12 and 18 months worth of cash because it's considered if you raise more than that, you're overly diluting yourself. I see and you should be able to raise another round after what's normally 12 and sort of on the outside 18 months of cash.”

0.66

When a venture-backed company's valuation drops significantly across multiple funding rounds (e.g., from $1 billion to $10 billion to $500 million), existing investors face a 'pay-to-play' situation where they must either invest new capital at the lower valuation and mark down all previous investments retroactively, or face massive dilution that effectively washes them out of the company.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“the problem is private market valuations are not marked to market right so the first time it's it's a billion and then if it goes to 10 billion you get to mark up your portfolio to 10 until there's another round. So, There are two ways to do it. If you're a good venture capital firm... You you mark it down voluntarily... and if you're newer fund and you don't have a lot of powder and you need to raise your next fund, you don't want to be showing a negative 80% IRRa on your fund.”

0.66

Fred Wilson was an early New York venture capital investor with his firm Flat Iron Partners, one of the very few early-stage VC firms in New York in the late 1990s alongside Edison Ventures and RRE Ventures, helping seed the NYC technology ecosystem.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“There was a small firm called Edison. There was Fred Wilson's first firm which was called Flat Iron Partners. Uh and there was us.”

0.66

'Zombie funds' are venture funds that have no capital to deploy, cannot do new deals, but continue to exist and claim they are investing because they must manage existing portfolio companies; they appear on Reddit where junior staff complain about being told to look at deal flow while knowing the fund has no money.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“It was interesting. If you go on like Reddit and under venture capital, you see all these like analysts and associates saying, 'I'm really upset. I'm working for this fund, but we're a zombie fund. We're not putting any money to work.' But they tell people we're putting money to work, and we look at we they want us to look at deals, but we're not I can't develop a Why aren't they doing any deals? I don't have any money. They don't have any money. because they already they already invested it in stuff that's down 80%.”

0.65

Startups in the 1990s raised software from free or near-free distributions to create user eyeballs for advertising revenue, with the business model of 'losing money per user but making it up on volume,' a model that failed because the advertising revenue never materialized at scale required to compensate for negative unit economics.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“you were giving away PCs for free back in the late and I I can't remember the name of it, but you gave away everything for free in order to get eyeballs so that you could advertise to these people. I mean, just think about that as a a business model, right? It's like we lose money, but we'll make it up on volume, right?”

0.64

RRE's first fund returned the entire $94 million in approximately 18 months without having fully deployed the capital, demonstrating the exceptional returns during the late 1990s tech bubble when valuations were extreme.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“I think we we like returned the whole fund in 18 months or something. It was just a great time to do it...Means this is your first fund. It's our first fund. If we if the fund was $95 million, we return $95 million of capital within 18 months without even having probably drawn down more than half of it at that point.”

0.64

Many companies went public in the late 1990s with zero revenue, trading on the .com suffix and the word 'internet' alone; some were taken public by firms like Oppenheimer and traded up from $6 to $200 on the first day, then crashed to zero when the market realized they had no business model.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“I remember there were companies going public that had I was looking at the perspectuses I was like wow these guys really have nothing right they have like an idea they're writing the word.com and internet and they were going public and you remember this they were I mean you know I think Oppenheimer took a couple of them public they were they traded up I mean I it's it's like the names I can't even remember um but they were trading up from like 6 to 200 on the first day and everybody was just getting out and they had zero revenues”

0.64

Early-stage companies that achieve negative cash flow and scale revenue must eventually reach a point of cash flow positivity, and Amazon was iconic example of a company that lost money for approximately 20 years before achieving profitability.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“Amazon, if I'm not mistaken, lost money for like the first 20 years... Right. They seem to have built a huge businesses... And they were just fine. They're just fine.”

0.63

RRE Ventures has been early investors in crypto and blockchain through positions in Ripple, DCG (which owns Grayscale and Paxos), and other blockchain infrastructure; Jim Robinson IV (third generation of the Robinson family in VC) was ahead of the industry in recognizing crypto's potential.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“Blockchain is is blockchain is here to stay. Right. Blockchain is big. We we're really lucky. We were early investors in Ripple. early investors in DCG which is Grayscale and Paxo. So like we've seen the crypto uh you know and I I I my partner Jim Robinson the fourth I give him all due credit. He really saw this stuff earlier than everybody else”

0.61

Jim Robinson III (Jim Robinson IV's father) passed away approximately two years before this interview (approximately 2022-2023), after having been the senior partner at RRE Ventures for many years and having shaped the firm's investment philosophy around interest rate sensitivity.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“Or had great relationships. Unfortunately passed away uh two years ago.”

0.60

In 2022, the Federal Reserve began raising interest rates, causing a market correction where the S&P 500 fell 18%, the NASDAQ fell ~30%, but high-growth, no-earnings companies (which resemble venture capital investments) fell 70-90%, signaling severe distress in the VC portfolio.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“So now, so this go- go time lasts basically through COVID and then 2022, I'll talk about it from my perspective. The Fed starts raising rates...the stock market goes through a correction. Now the S&P was down 18% for the year. NASDAQ was down, I think, 30. But the companies that were public that in the way I think about it that most resemble venture capital companies which is high revenue growth no earnings they were down anywhere from 70 to 90%.”

0.60

Venture capital must be classified as distinct from asset management; traditional asset managers operate on 2% management fees, whereas venture capitalists primarily earn 'carry' (20% of profits) when companies exit, creating fundamentally different incentive structures.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“it was venture capital at its at its really at its core which is not asset management fees but you get carry when the deals cash out and they cash out and you know then you you make money when your your LPs make money and so you take you make a percentage of the profit right you take a carry you take 20% carry 20% carry”

0.60

The period between the 2001 crash and the 2008 financial crisis (roughly 2002-2007) was favorable for venture capital because stock markets recovered and public comparables showed strong valuations, and for New York specifically it was a boom period as the NYC tech ecosystem flywheel kicked in

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“So that was really for me the New York world right because that was when New York tech started to you know things came back from the bottom...The stock...venture capital as much as you don't want to say it's related to the stock market you're always looking at the stock market right because what happens is you take you you invest in a company right you start to grow it and then what do you do you you eventually generally either go public and if you don't go public you sell. So people look at what the public comparables are trading.”

0.60

The 1990s internet boom came from 1994-1999, during which the year 1999 was the absolute peak of market exuberance ('bubble 1.0'), and the market began to correct or crash starting in 2000-2001.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“So like I had my first AOL, you know, I had the CD ROM... The year was 1994... 96 like 96 to9 was fantastic. Like the I was... I used to think to myself cuz I didn't have kids yet then. I used to think to myself my kids are going to be like where were you during the go-go years of the internet... I was in Silicon Valley making investments”

0.60

Yahoo's stock price collapsed from $260 to $3 during the dot-com crash, illustrating the magnitude of the technology sector's decline

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“stocks like Yahoo went from 260 to three right I mean the numbers...like the Henry Blahid”

0.60

Amazon lost money for approximately 20 years while building its business, demonstrating that long periods of negative cash flow are compatible with building exceptional companies and value if the business model is sound

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“Amazon, if I'm not mistaken, lost money for like the first 20 years...Right. They seem to have built a huge business...And they were just fine.”

0.57

The 2017-2021 venture capital bubble was worse than the 2000-2001 internet bubble from a valuation perspective because RRE's analysis of their best historical exits (companies that returned the whole fund) found that if those companies had been funded at 2021 valuations instead of their actual funding prices, the returns would have been terrible, whereas in 2001 the fundamentals were still good even if sentiments had turned negative.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“we looked at our companies that had returned the whole fund and we did an analysis this and and looked at them and said, 'If we funded them at current valuations rather than the valuations we funded them at, what would the return on our fund be?' And it was terrible.”

0.57

Venture capital managers who became senior by 2015 built their entire track records during the 2016-2021 go-go period, and many new managers raised their first venture funds during this era based on outsized returns that were paper gains rather than realized cash returns; when the crash arrived, these managers had zero distributions (DPI near zero) and could not raise successor funds because their LPs saw no actual cash returns despite reported high paper returns.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“Everybody who became relatively senior by 2015 created their entire track record by investing in companies between 2016 and 2021. Right. So, and yet a bunch of people raised their own first funds because it became very easy to raise a fund because it was a go-go time. Right.”

0.56

Outside of artificial intelligence and blockchain/crypto, the broader venture capital market is severely constrained, with most non-AI/crypto investments either stalled or unprofitable, and only three sectors (AI, crypto, blockchain) absorbing meaningful new capital, while 'everything else' is essentially frozen.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“There's AI, there's crypto, and there's blockchain and then there's everything else.”

0.56

Interest rates are a crucial factor driving venture capital returns because when alternative investments (like debt funds) offer 2-3% returns, LPs are incentivized to accept the illiquidity and risk of venture capital for 15-20% return potential; but when debt funds return 7-8%, venture capital becomes less attractive

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“when the alternative was to put in a debt fund and get 2 or 3%, people were like, you know what? I'm going to put money into venture capital. It's illquid. Yes. But if it works, I can get 15 or 20%. Right? And if it doesn't, you know, it's not as good, I get eight, right? I get maybe more and probably won't lose that much money. And it's always being handed back. Now when you can do a distressed debt fund and look to get seven or eight% and then you look at venture capital which has kind of not done particularly well over the last six or seven years people aren't allocating right”

0.55

RRE Ventures made a deliberate decision in 2017-2021 not to match mega-fund valuations and instead deployed only 7% of their 2021 fund capital (versus the normal 30-40% annual deployment rate), choosing to preserve capital and accept zero returns rather than participate in unsustainable valuations.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“we looked at this and said this is worse than the bubble in 2000 and we actually and it was worse than the bubble in 2000 in your view back then from a valuation perspective because you know what we looked at we we looked at our companies that had returned the whole fund and we did an analysis this and and looked at them and said, 'If we funded them at current valuations rather than the valuations we funded them at, what would the return on our fund be?' And it was terrible.”

0.53

Tokenization—the process of converting asset ownership (real estate, cash flows, security rights) into blockchain-based tokens that can be divided, sold, and traded—is the next major frontier in finance and securities; real estate tokenization allows for fractional ownership and slicing of cash flows (similar to historical CDOs and CMOs but on blockchain).

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“there's another fascinating part that I'm really focused on right now which is tokenization...the tokenization of assets and cash flows based on what goes on the blockchain really is going to be the next big thing in terms of you know securities.”

0.52

RRE Ventures responded to the 2017-2021 bubble by selling positions at high prices and cutting back investment significantly, deploying only 7% of their 2021 fund to work (vs. the typical 30-40% annual drawdown), which was conservative but proved to be 'the smartest thing we could do'

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“So, we did the only smart thing you can do, which was we sold as much as we could at the high prices, right? And we just cut way back. Normally, you know, if you've got a uh we we had a new fund in 2021 and instead, you know, normally you'd spend your draw down's 5 years, you bulk of the investing happens over three years. So, generally you spend, you know, 30% of your year fund a year. But since the market was so hot, people wanted to put money faster because things were going up more and more. So you had all these people putting like 3540% of their funds to work at the high prices. We actually put 7% of our fund to work. It was the only thing we could do and it was the smartest thing we could do.”

0.52

The 2021-2024 venture capital crash forced 'pay-to-play' rounds where existing investors had to write additional capital checks to avoid washout, and the crash lasted 3.5 years instead of the expected 2-2.5 years, exhausting reserves of funds that had only set aside 20-30% for follow-on investments

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“the problem was pay to plays get really ugly because most people don't have enough in reserve and particularly in the go- go years everybody's like I don't need reserves because more and more money is going to come in and more and more money is going to come in and usually you set aside 20 or 30% you know max of all follow-on investments but the problem was this crash lasted longer than any others. So what happened was this crash happened and then 18 months later nobody thought this would last three and a half years.”

0.52

The mega-fund strategy of paying $100M valuations on one day of outsourced diligence (rather than thorough due diligence) used consulting firms (KPMG, Bain, BCG) whose 25-year-old junior consultants would hire these firms to conduct a single day of analysis and write a vanilla term sheet without even taking a board seat

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“It wasn't even diligence. It was outsourced diligence. So maybe it was outsourcing... Our kids, our kids are 25 who our kids were friends. All their friends work for consulting firms, KPMG, Bane, BCG. These firms would all hire those firms to do actually do the due diligence to do one day of diligence. One day, one day do a write up of diligence, send in a term sheet, a completely vanilla term sheet with, by the way, no board seat.”

0.52

During the 2008 financial crisis, RRE Ventures was fundraising for a new fund and traveled to Europe to meet potential LPs; while in Europe, the NEMAX (NASDAQ equivalent in Germany) shut down, which significantly damaged fundraising momentum and made it much harder to raise capital during the subsequent months.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“We were raising a fund and I remember we went to Europe and by the time we came back a much bigger crash had happened and in Germany we had all these people that were interested in investing and the newer mach which was the NASDAQ of Germany back then had closed shut down while we were on the road. That did not help fundraising.”

0.52

Senior VC Jim Robinson III understood the importance of interest rates to venture capital returns and repeatedly emphasized it, but Elman dismissed this as an old man not understanding modern markets—until interest rates rose and Elman realized Robinson was right

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“the my the senior partner Jim Robinson the third would always talk about interest rates, interest rates, interest rates. And I'd be like, old man, you don't know what you're talking about. Interest rates. But you know what was interesting? When the alternative was to put in a debt fund and get 2 or 3%, people were like, you know what? I'm going to put money into venture capital.”

0.51

The decreasing cost of starting a software company due to cloud infrastructure and AI coding tools has created a new dynamic where seed funding rounds require less capital than they did in the 1990s, but ironically, seed rounds in the 1990s actually required MORE capital than today

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“seed this is ironic in the sense that seed investing back then requires more money than it does today, right? But the other thing is now and it's even less now. It's even less money is needed because of AI and cursor and the ability to you know utilize AI for coding.”

0.51

Physical AI—integrating sensors and AI decision-making based on sensor data (e.g., detecting foot traffic in a building and automatically controlling electricity/heat)—is an emerging frontier that is very early but potentially significant for venture investment.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“Physical AI is going to be data built into sensors and have da and have decision making based on the data that comes from sensors. That's sensors. It's really early but something we're looking at...It's like you have a sensor and you you're able to determine how many people are walking into a building and using an AI algorithm you're able to control the electricity and or the heat based on right.”

0.49

There are three major sectors in venture capital today: (1) AI—where mega-funds dominate the LLM layer but mid-sized funds can do application-level AI and physical AI, (2) Crypto/Blockchain—which requires specialized expertise and early-stage positioning, and (3) Everything else—which is in severe distress due to overvaluation and collapsed exits.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“There's AI, there's crypto, and there's blockchain and then there's everything else.”

0.49

Tokenization of assets and cash flows on blockchains represents the next major structural change in securities markets, similar in scale to the development of CMOs and CBOs in mortgage securitization, allowing buildings and other assets to be fractionally owned through blockchain-enabled trading of specific cash flow streams rather than whole assets.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“the tokenization of assets and cash flows based on what goes on the blockchain really is going to be the next big thing in terms of you know securities. So I'm really focused on looking at These are really interesting spaces, right, where you don't have to be putting, you know, $250 million.”

0.47

Venture capitalists' lack of willingness to discuss their losses is a running joke in the industry—VCs will claim they 'sold everything just before' crashes even when they clearly held positions throughout declines

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“every venture capitalist is like, 'No, I sold everything just before. No, I don't have any of those companies.' But you look back, you know, from the pets.com to, you know, in every space, every single vertical had gone from bricks and mortar to online”

0.45

The venture capital market is entering a 'survival of the fittest' phase where funds that have not demonstrated ability to generate returns during difficult markets will be unable to raise follow-on funds and will be forced to close or become zombie funds

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“I think the next couple years are going to be, you know, it's definitely going to be a survival of the fittest, right? It's going to be have people been around, if people show that they have a track record of getting through hard times.”

0.44

'Physical AI' refers to AI systems built into sensors that make real-time decisions based on sensor data, such as using occupancy sensors to control building temperature and electricity, and represents an early-stage but promising investment area

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“Physical AI is going to be data built into sensors and have da and have decision making based on the data that comes from sensors...It's like you have a sensor and you you're able to determine how many people are walking into a building and using an AI algorithm you're able to control the electricity and or the heat based on right.”

0.43

Venture capital fundraising during market downturns is extremely difficult; when RRE was fundraising a new fund during the 2008 crisis, they traveled to Europe and lost investor interest when Germany's NASDAQ equivalent closed while they were traveling, and the fund they raised was smaller than it would have been in normal times.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“because when you're a venture capitalist, you raise funds every three years, right? We were raising a fund and I remember we went to Europe and by the time we came back a much bigger crash had happened and in Germany we had all these people that were interested in investing and the newer mach which was the NASDAQ of Germany back then had closed shut down while we were on the road. That did not help fundraising...We raised the fund. You have to raise a fund or you don't continue on. But it was smaller.”

0.43

Livongo (a diabetes health company) was acquired by Teladoc (a telehealth platform trading at higher multiples) for $12 billion; after the acquisition, Teladoc's market cap traded down to $5-7 billion, creating a massive valuation compression that signaled to the market that 20x revenues was no longer the appropriate multiple for health services companies.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“Lavango. What's the number? Lavango was a a diabetes health company. And Lavango was bought for I believe and I'm not always perfect on the numbers but I believe they were bought for $12 billion by Teldoc...Okay...so post them buying Levango Teldoc which was the acquirers market cap I believe traded down to 7 billion or 6 billion maybe even 5 billion right so there was a huge huge compression of valuation”

0.43

When measuring which venture capital firms are actually active, a useful filter is to look only at firms that have done one or two new deals in the past year, which dramatically reduces the apparent number of active firms

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“when my companies go raise money. You know, I look at this big list and I'm like, 'Okay, let's let's focus on only those venture funds that have done a new deal or done two new deals in the last year.' And it actually calls the list tremendously.”

0.41

Henry Blodget (founder of Business Insider) was an early investor in Business Insider via Oenheimer; he had famously taken a 'buy' rating on Amazon at $260 when Amazon crashed to $40, which damaged his credibility as a sell-side analyst.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“Henry Blah I was in found not founding I was one of the larger investors in Business Insider right by the way Henry Blahid got his start at Oenheimer he had the office right across the hall from me...and and we did really well on Business Insider...Henry was writing about, remember the bubble? He got issues with Meil Lynch cuz he was writing about the bubbles, uh, you know, that he had a a buy on Amazon at like 260 when it went down to like 40.”

0.39

The recovery from the 2001 crash was faster than from the 2022-2024 crash; 18 months after the 2001 crash, markets felt 'normalish' again and people had regained optimism, whereas the recent crash has lasted 3+ years with no sign of normalization.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Stu Elman

“I think the last crash the crash that we've most recently had and that one was 18 months after that crash things seemed kind of normalish right people think people were coming back people felt renewed optimism people thought okay this is going to be okay”

0.39

RRE Ventures and other VCs saw companies that had been valued at $500 million that went public via SPAC for $1.5-2 billion, making it financially attractive for VCs to pursue SPAC liquidity even though the valuations were inflated

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“They were we had companies that were, you know, we thought were probably worth 500 million that were going to get got taken out got taken out as spaxs for 1.5 billion or$2 billion. So it's kind of hard to you're like, 'Okay, I'm taking in 300 million of capital.' It's kind of hard to turn that down.”

0.34

Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were prestigious financial institutions that collapsed during the 2008 financial crisis, destroying decades of accumulated value for employees and shareholders, which shocked Eisman (who had worked at Bear Stearns early in his career).

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“I literally remember waking up, I'm like, 'Wait a minute. Bear Sterns... My very very first job was a cold callering broker assistant at Bear Sterns on 55 Water Street.'... Lehman Brothers was like wow it's a really prestigious firm... people that I'd known... spent 20 years... creating significant asset value at firms like Bear and Leman and Solomon... go to basically zero.”

0.26

RRE Ventures has been managing investments for 31 years and has experienced three complete market crashes (2001, 2008, 2022-2024), giving Elman a rare institutional memory of multiple cycles and how different crash structures affect portfolio companies and fund returns.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Stu Elman

“we've now been around for 31 years. Uh we've 10 institutional funds. Uh I've lived through uh three full crashes now.”

0.26

In the late 1990s, Elman had the first experience with internet adoption (AOL CD-ROM, requiring 16 attempts to get dial-up modems working), which made him recognize both the tremendous potential of the internet and the friction in early adoption—a pattern that informed his understanding of when technologies were truly becoming mainstream.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Stu Elman

“I had my first AOL, you know, I had the CD ROM. It made the, you know, it took me 16 times to get the dialup modem to work and blah blah blah. But the world was incredible. The world was incredibly open.”

0.24

Bear Stearns (where Eisman started his career) employed Eisman as a 'cold caller broker assistant' on 55 Water Street in Manhattan.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Steve Eisman

“My very very first job was a cold callering broker assistant at Bear Sterns on 55 Water Street.”