
Mike Munger on Private and Public Rent-Seeking (and Chilean Buses) 08/23/2010
What this covers
This EconTalk conversation pairs Mike Munger with host Russ Roberts. It opens with Munger's trip to Chile and the fate of Santiago's buses, then moves to a general question: when both private firms and lobbyists spend resources and mostly lose, what separates the two kinds of competition? Munger illustrates rent-seeking with a classroom all-pay auction for a $20 bill, where every bidder forfeits their bid. The money moves around, but the real resources spent bidding are destroyed, so the game is negative-sum.
The Santiago material is the most concrete. Before 2007 the city had more than 3,000 private bus companies choosing their own routes. Munger recounts the government's objections, including a common pool problem in which drivers paid per passenger raced one another to full stops. He then describes the replacement: drivers paid for timeliness, bendy buses, and hub-and-spoke routes. Average commutes rose from 40 minutes to 1 hour 40 minutes. Half-full buses skipped crowded stops, and Munger and Roberts discuss whether the private routes duplicating the Metro were wasteful or useful redundancy.
The wider range includes theft as negative-sum and the limits of Coasean bargaining). It also covers Stigler's argument that banning cash payments to legislators pushes influence into wasteful in-kind favors, and lobbyists whose talents could produce something real. Prize contests are weighed too. The longitude prize looks like a bargain, while titles of nobility and HUD grants look wasteful. A listener's challenge is that the MP3 shakeout, won by Apple, looks like private rent-seeking. Munger answers with the knowledge problem: winners cannot be known in advance, so market waste is the price of discovery. Whether that answer fully dissolves the objection is the contested part.
Munger and Roberts argue that both government-created rents and private markets involve wasteful competition, but they differ because market competition produces accurate feedback about value and discovers knowledge that could not be known in advance. Rent-seeking contests lack that feedback. Santiago's 2007 bus nationalization shows how ignoring incentives and local information turns a working emergent system into a costly failure.
- Santiago's Transantiago reform paid drivers for timeliness, used oversized bendy buses and imposed hub-and-spoke routes. Commutes rose from 40 minutes to 1 hour 40 minutes, the Metro became overloaded, and a $60M annual profit became a $600M annual loss.
- Rent-seeking dissipates the value of an artificial prize because competitors spend real resources on lobbying, which works like an all-pay auction, and get no feedback beyond the awarding party's decision.
- Private profit-seeking also destroys resources (Betamax, failed MP3 makers, Corfam), but the prize is set by consumer willingness to pay and the process discovers products that no planner could have known about in advance.
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Coasean bargaining, though valuable in profit-seeking settings, is dangerous when applied to theft. If a would-be burglar offers to 'split the difference' and not break in for $1,500, paying him would invite a line of extortionists. The Coase solution only works when property rights are clearly specified, and with theft they are: the stuff belongs to the owner, and theft is simply not allowed.
“the Coase theorem which I'm a big fan of in profit-seeking settings is actually dangerous when it comes to theft”
Economists often wrongly describe theft as zero-sum (one less TV for the victim, one more for the thief). It is actually negative-sum. Potential victims invest in locks, weapons and hiding valuables, and thieves invest in burglary skills, and all of that defensive and offensive spending is the net social cost of crime.
“the problem with that analysis is it's not a zero-sum game it's a negative sum game”
Paying drivers for timeliness backfired through a chain of effects. Longer commutes pushed people into private cars and illegal taxis, which increased congestion and made drivers late. A late driver then has an incentive to skip stops full of passengers who have waited an hour, because stopping makes him later still. So half-full buses speed past crowded stops.
“you see ahead of you a whole bunch of people waiting at the bus stop and they've been there for an hour do you stop no absolutely not because you've already missed your timeliness”
Rent-seeking works like an all-pay auction, which Munger illustrates with a class exercise. He auctions a $20 bill, and every student forfeits their bid whether they win or not. With 30 students bidding $1 each, he collects $30 to give away $20. As a money game, that is still zero-sum, a transfer among the class and the auctioneer. Real rent-seeking adds a second element: bids are paid in resources that get destroyed or used for low-value purposes ('I burn the cookies'), so it becomes negative-sum.
“this is in economics it's called an all pay auction”
Rent-seeking contests can be justified when the public benefits of a discovery are hard to internalize. The British government's longitude prize of £20,000 (equivalent to more than $1 million now) addressed ships running aground. Whoever solved it, by star sightings or accurate clocks, couldn't patent and capture the benefits of this public good. People worked on it for more than 40 years, and the money was awarded several times for important innovations. Most research was wasted, but the result was a genuine public good. Such contests are warranted only when the research itself has big public benefit, not just for the sake of giving away a prize.
“the British government set up a bounty of twenty thousand pounds which is the equivalent of more than a million dollars now”
Titles of nobility in England, France and Spain cost governments almost nothing yet were very highly valued, so governments could use them to get people to do almost anything. The competition for these titles was tremendously wasteful because creating myriad titles produced no social benefit, unlike longitude. The problem there is that the underlying benefit is small, not that the prize is too big.
“titles of nobility really weren't worth very much but they were very highly valued”
Consumer sovereignty means consumers direct where resources go through countless small daily choices about quality, reputation and price. The common metaphor 'voting with dollars' is misleading. An election produces one outcome for everyone, whereas markets produce many outcomes at once: rich people get Lexuses and poor people get Hyundais that work well, and in Chile richer riders got nice expensive buses while poor riders got convenient cheap ones on routes they actually wanted.
“when you vote an election you get one outcome we don't just get rich people getting cars though we get rich people getting Lexuses and poor people getting hyundais”
When a regime hands out goodies arbitrarily, favor-seekers spend resources flattering, cajoling and befriending those in power. Summed across all favor-seekers, this spending can exceed the value of the prizes, especially the more corrupt (and violent) the regime. The prizes themselves produce no social benefit and just redirect money to the regime's friends, so the whole process is purely wasteful.
“those resources when summed up across all the favor seekers could actually exceed the amounts that are handed out”
Lobbyists are talented, educated people who could produce something real and can earn $500,000–$600,000 to $2 million a year. For them lobbying is privately rational and no different from profit-seeking, but the self-interest is perverse from society's perspective: giving people incentives to spend on rent-seeking wastes resources, and both sides of legislation spend.
“they can make five six hundred thousand a year two million dollars a year being a lobbyist so from their perspective this is no different from profits”
The most important missing piece is Hayek's knowledge problem: we don't know in advance which technology is best (iPod, VHS). Amazon lost money year after year, and its investors bore that risk voluntarily; it is now profitable. Failed rival e-retailers' investors simply lost their money and need no compensation.
“what's called the knowledge problem that Hayek identified we don't know in advance which the best technology is”
What separates a good prize contest from a wasteful one is the size of the prize relative to its social benefit. The longitude prize was almost certainly a bargain, while HUD grants likely built underused tennis courts and odd museums (e.g., a North Carolina teapot museum). Even a prize for something genuinely good can be set so large that the losers' combined expenditures offset the benefit.
“the only thing that's different between the two is is the incentives about the size of the prize and that's extremely important”
What the government saw as inefficiency (private bus routes duplicating Metro routes) was actually valuable redundancy. If the Metro was disrupted there was backup, and anything you want to work reliably needs backup and redundancy. The government instead wanted a hub-and-spoke system in which buses fed neighborhoods into Metro stops.
“there's a lot of redundancy in the system and if you want something to work you want to have backup and redundancy so what the government wanted is forcing a more efficient system and they wanted a hub-and-spoke system”
Roberts suggests the private bus routes duplicating Metro lines supplied excess capacity at rush hour. Munger agrees that private companies added routes when they were needed, which solved the peak-load problem. Now that load falls entirely on the Metro and on surface roads, as more people drive.
“the duplication of the bus systems along the Metro routes allowed for it an excess capacity capacity that was needed during rush hour”
Markets set implicit prizes accurately. Someone who invented a battery lasting 10 times longer at a tenth of the weight would become extraordinarily wealthy, because the prize is sized by how much consumers actually value it. Competition would erode prices, and the inventor wouldn't capture the full value (consumer surplus), but captured value is correlated with social value, so the feedback is accurate. In government rent-seeking contests, officials must guess the prize size without enough information (it may be unknowable), sometimes setting it too low and sometimes too high, often wasting resources.
“the magnitude of the prize as you pointed out earlier is set by how much consumers really want it more or less accurate feedback”
Listener Robert Eaton's challenge: when MP3 players emerged, several firms competed and Apple's iPod won while others went out of business. It is not obvious that Apple's gains outweighed the losers' wasted research and resources, so private competition for an implicit prize like portable music looks like rent-seeking. Wouldn't it have been better for government to pick one standard?
“it's not obvious to me that the gains by Apple more than offset the losses suffered from the other two companies”
Losing competitors' efforts are not pure waste: they pushed Amazon to find the most effective methods. As Buchanan argued in his piece on the market process, the winning ways were discovered, not specified in advance. They were not merely unknown but unknowable. No algorithm, survey or government manual could have determined beforehand that the iPod's interface was what people wanted.
“not only were they not known but they weren't knowable”
Munger's summary conclusion: private markets and rent-seeking do not differ in whether there is waste. Private markets clearly waste (VHS beat Betamax and was soon replaced by DVD and Blu-ray). The difference is feedback: in markets the value is correlated with the size of the social benefit, in rent-seeking it is not, and information about future products is unknowable in advance. In 1980 no one could have skipped VHS-versus-Betamax and gone straight to Blu-ray.
“the difference is feedback not the difference is not the absence of waste in in private markets”
What distinguishes rent-seeking from profit-seeking is that rents are artificially created and the only feedback is the creating party's decision to award them, so competition is likely to dissipate more than the prize's total value. In private competition, even with losers, society gets real gains: a better overall level of play in the NBA, and technological advances no one could have dreamed up. If government had picked one standard, new entry would have been foreclosed. Encouraging new entry and new products is the justification for markets.
“rents are artificially created and the only feedback that you get is the creating party's decision to award it”
Following George Stigler's 'Theory of Economic Regulation' question about why we don't just make direct transfers to legislators: direct cash payments to members of Congress are illegal as corruption, but they would at least be pure transfers. Instead, influence is bought in-kind (trips to Vail, sailboat outings, drinks, attractive companions), and those resources are used up in low-value ways that can't be given back. Banning direct payment thus makes rent-seeking more wasteful.
“if we could give them money directly it would be horrible it would be corrupt but it would just be a transfer instead we have something that we can't give back”
Complaints about the harms of competitive systems should be checked for prevalence ('one a day, one a week, one a month?'). Bus drivers have their own incentive not to wreck their capital, so the frequency of harms like bus accidents shouldn't be assumed from anecdotes.
“a bus driver would want to avoid yes they'd like to hurry and get to the stop but they don't want to wreck their capital”
The government's first objection to private buses was driver 'greed', which Munger reframes as a common-pool resource or overfishing problem. Drivers were paid per passenger, so they raced each other to bus stops full of waiting passengers ('Ben-Hur chariot race'). The first to arrive captured all the fares, and the racing caused injuries and fender benders.
“we would recognize it now as a common pool resource problem or call it overfishing so a driver might see two or three blocks ahead 50 people waiting at a bus stop”
Before 2007, Santiago (a city of about 5 million) had a fully private, competitive bus system of more than 3,000 separate private bus companies (companies, not buses). Each chose its own routes wherever it thought it could make money picking up passengers, rather than following routes assigned by a planner.
“they had more than 3000 different private bus companies I'm not saying 2,000 private buses 3000 private bus companies all competing with each other”
After the February 2007 reform, the average commute for mass-transit users immediately rose from 40 minutes to 1 hour 40 minutes. This surprised everyone, since the planners had the best intentions, though they did not actually know whether their design was good.
“the average community immediately goes from 40 minutes to an hour and 40 minutes”
A 'rent' is an artificially created prize handed out by government, such as above-market wages, below-market rents or grants. Rent-seeking is competition for that prize. Because competitors spend real resources competing, they dissipate some, most or nearly all of the prize's value. So the government gives away much less than it thinks and wastes resources by creating an incentive to compete.
“a rent as an artificial amount a prize that's going to be given away”
A unifying theme of the episode is that competition is not always beneficial. Whether it is destructive depends on whether incentives align individual pursuits with social outcomes.
“one of our themes today I think is going to be is competition always sometimes never destructive”
In market innovation, the risks are borne mostly by capital and investors, not consumers. Early adopters bear small risks, but the process is mostly for consumers' benefit.
“isn't it interesting that the risks that are actually being taken by capital not by consumer”
Judging market waste against a hypothetical costless ideal commits what Demsetz called the Nirvana fallacy: the idea that we could somehow reach an ideal outcome at zero cost, for example jumping straight to the best technology without the costly competitive discovery process.
“what's called the nerve I think it was dem sets the Nirvana fallacy the idea that we could somehow at zero cost get get to some kind of outcome”
Private competition is self-regulating because of feedback. Corfam, a synthetic leather that never needed shining but didn't breathe, flopped (Munger thinks it was DuPont's). The market quickly told the firm to stop putting money into it, and it survives only on military shoes. Ventures that produce no net benefit shut down fast. Rent-seeking generally lacks such feedback: if goodies go to politically attractive recipients regardless of merit, the waste continues, which is hard to sustain in the private sector.
“if it doesn't produce those net benefits at all it shuts down very quickly because there's feedback”
As James Buchanan argued about the market process, the best ways of doing things are not merely unknown in advance but unknowable. They are discovered through competition, and no algorithm, survey, or government manual could have revealed beforehand that the iPod's interface was what people wanted.
“as Buchannon has argued in a nice piece on the market process they weren't specified advanced... not only were they not known but they weren't knowable”
The Transantiago reform moved Santiago from private to public buses and bought large articulated 'bendy buses' from Volvo, on the theory that one big bus is more efficient than four or five small ones. It removed per-passenger incentives and paid drivers for on-time performance instead, and replaced the emergent routes with a hub-and-spoke network.
“they moved from a private to a public bus system they bought these enormous bendy buses from Volvo”
The reform 'solved' two problems in perverse ways. Metro usage jumped from 80% to 120% of capacity, with desperate riders hanging on straps. And the profits problem disappeared because the system now loses $600 million per year, a subsidy of at least $100 for every Santiago resident just to have the bus system.
“the Metro was operating at 80% capacity it immediately went to a hundred and twenty percent capacity”
The new policy launched in February 2007, Chile's summer vacation month when streets are nearly empty, which hid its problems at launch. The average mass-transit commute immediately went from 40 minutes to 1 hour 40 minutes.
“February of 2007 they implement the new policy and the average community immediately goes from 40 minutes to an hour and 40 minutes”
The third objection was profits. Politicians saw the private system's $60 million USD in annual profits as extortion or exploitation of poor riders. Munger counters that a major metropolitan transit system operating in the black is highly unusual, and that fares were in fact low under competition.
“a public what should be a public bus system was making 60 million dollars us in profits per year now I look at that and I say you mean a major metropolitan mass transit system was operating in the black that's pretty unusual”
Munger relays that Chávez and others in Latin America (e.g., in Peru) dismiss Chile's success by claiming Chileans are culturally different 'like the Swiss' and that free-market institutions don't travel. Munger counters that Chile had no particularly free-market institutions until Chicago-school ideas arrived in the 1970s, and those ideas were absent from 1950s–60s Chile. So institutions can change, and Chile serves as a laboratory for the wealth created by free markets in an open economy.
“Chile didn't have particularly free market institutions until the introduction of the ideas of the Chicago stirring the 70s”
Following Dan Klein and co-authors' book 'Curb Rights', Munger argues the passenger-overfishing problem can be solved without nationalization. The ingredients are private bus stops (Santiago police already restrict pickups to real stops), licensing to ensure buses don't pollute, and a ticketing system with monthly-pass discounts honored only by the issuing company, so it isn't profitable to poach rivals' passengers.
“the main thing you need to prevent the overfishing of passengers is private bus stops”
Planners decided to 'live in the world they wanted to live in' rather than use available information about the routes people actually wanted and the buses that could operate efficiently on them. You can't plan a system like this without using that information.
“if you can't plan this without using information so the IRAs decided they were going to live in the world they wanted to live in”
A central puzzle is how to tell whether someone investing effort to get better at something, and on average making money from it, is profit-seeking or rent-seeking. The invisible hand doesn't always serve society, certainly not in rent-seeking and possibly not in some private cases.
“is it profit seeking or rent seeking”
Munger deliberately makes homework a small share of the grade and refuses to regrade homework, even though he admits grading errors and it seems unfair. Allowing regrades invites lobbying that wastes time and has a distributional effect: it rewards the least dignified students, the 'growlers'. With many homeworks, random grading errors average out under the law of large numbers, so regrading is extremely costly for little gain.
“the alternative is that you will lobby me you will beg”
Even after the administration publicly apologized, neither obvious fix was made. Drivers now get more pay as a lump sum, but pay at the margin is still based on timeliness, and the bendy buses remain because officials still consider them more efficient and had already bought them. Expensive capital and admitting mistakes are both hard to reverse.
“they pay the bus drivers more now and a lump sum but everything at the margin is based still on how long time they are and they still have the bendy buses”
The City of Charlotte had a whole floor of its municipal building staffed with people whose job was pursuing HUD grants. A study found that almost half of the HUD money Charlotte received was spent on the salaries of those grant writers, with relatively little reaching the citizens it was meant to help.
“almost half of the amount of money they were getting from HUD was being spent on paying the salaries of those people who were writing grants”
Three years after the reform, Munger rode the buses daily for about three weeks. He often waited more than an hour to board and saw eight to ten half-full buses pass large, furious crowds. He describes social capital breaking down, because the exchange has changed: riders now pay a small amount for a chance to push their way on, rather than paying for a ride.
“social capital is breaking down because the incentive is you don't get to exchange your money for a ride what you what you do is you exchange a small amount of money for a chance to push your way on”
A friend of Munger's who worked in the Michigan Legislature in the 1970s reported that at the start of each session about 20 bills were put in the hopper, each proposing new taxes or regulation on a particular industry. Each bill was withdrawn as soon as that industry made a campaign contribution. Munger notes this was relatively 'efficient' rent extraction: because it was sector-specific and paid as direct contributions, it was closer to a pure transfer than in-kind lobbying. Roberts labels it extortion.
“they would put maybe 20 bills in the hopper each of which proposed specific new taxes or regulation on a particular industry and as soon as they received the contribution from that industry the bill would be removed”
For government grant competitions, such as $25 billion spread across 250 congressional districts, the fundamental question is whether it matters who gets the grants. If it literally doesn't matter, the whole competition is pure waste. If it does matter, there is a countervailing benefit, as with private-market innovation.
“the fundamental question there is does it really matter does it really matter who gets the grants”
The discussion has glossed over magnitude. The iPod's delightfulness doesn't prove that rival firms' investments didn't outweigh its benefits; that has been assumed rather than shown.
“we've kind of glossed over the issue of magnitude”
Munger says the Bachelet administration and the Concertación had about a dozen policy failures following the same pattern. When a well-intentioned policy failed, they concluded they hadn't done it enough and did more, and it failed again. They lost the election to Piñera's center-right coalition, which also holds a congressional majority.
“had a dozen policy failures like this where with the best of intentions they said let's try this and when it was a failure they said we just didn't do it enough let's do it more and it failed again so they lost”
Riders Munger interviewed in Spanish wanted more buses and better drivers, and none wanted a return to the private system. Their memories of its accidents and pollution were horrific. That makes a 'non-marginal quantum leap' back to privatization politically impossible, so reform must happen at the margin.
“they thought that what was needed was more buses and better bus drivers”
As a marginal reform, Munger would expand Santiago's existing shared-taxi hybrid jitney system, in which taxis carry up to four passengers to different destinations, to minivans of six to eight passengers (like SuperShuttle). This would 'take all of the pressure off' the overloaded transit system.
“what I would do at the margin is expand that to minivans that could six or eight passengers that would take all of the pressure off”
The NBA is another apparent rent-seeking contest. Huge numbers of kids practice basketball instead of studying, even with accurate odds, yet very few play even a single NBA game. All those hours look like a giant social waste.
“think of all the kids bouncing basketballs instead of studying economics”
Sony took an enormous hit by insisting on its own Betamax standard. When Betamax lost to VHS in a network-economy fight, many consumers were left with useless players, and Sony's engineering hours went 'all for nothing'. This is a concrete example of waste in private competition.
“when that lost out in a network economy fight a an awful lot of people he had cassette players video cassette players that were useless”
Even winners fail and are superseded. Apple's Newton handheld was a total flop ('perfect except nobody wanted to buy it'), the Palm Pilot later did the same job, and Palm was in turn superseded by the BlackBerry, iPhone and iPad. No one knows in advance how innovation will turn out, and some paths are dead ends that current technology cannot solve.
“Apple tried the Newton which was a handheld device to help you run your life”
Since a non-marginal, discrete jump back to a private system has no political support, the real policy choice is how to improve the current system at the margin rather than comparing it with an idealized private alternative.
“that non marginal quantum leap that discrete change is politically impossible no support at all”
Munger's research found relatively few serious automobile accidents in Santiago in the pre-reform period, but minor pedestrian accidents were as high as in Mexico City. Many were caused by buses, with both time-series and cross-sectional differences, so there was some evidence supporting the accident concern. Rising affluence and car ownership were also adding to congestion before road habits adjusted.
“there were relatively few serious automobile accidents in Santiago during this period but the number of minor pedestrian accidents was as high as Mexico City so there actually is some evidence in favor of the thesis”
Schumpeter called it creative destruction for a reason: there is a great deal of destruction in profit-seeking. If you look only at the destruction, it's easy to conclude we'd be better off with regulation.
“there's a reason why to Peter called it creative destruction there is a lot of destruction and profit seeking”
Despite the abuses of the Pinochet era, the period did not poison the Chilean public against its economic policies. Chileans remain predisposed toward free-market economics, at least on trade.
“that era did not poison the public against those the economic policies to the contrary they're basically predisposed towards at least free market economics when it comes to trade”
Despite the human-rights atrocities of the Pinochet era, which Munger explicitly does not defend, that era's association with free-market policies did not poison the Chilean public against them. Chileans remain predisposed toward free-market economics, at least on trade.
“it is interesting that that that era did not poison the public against those the economic policies to the contrary”
The Piñera administration sees itself as offering Latin America an alternative to Hugo Chávez's claim that the region can only be organized along socialist lines. Chávez and voices in Peru dismiss Chile as exceptional, saying Chileans are 'like the Swiss' and work too hard, so their free-market institutions don't travel.
“you Chileans you like the Swiss you're just different those institutions don't they don't travel well”
The second objection to private buses was pollution. Because buses were not properly licensed, it was hard to find and fine those lacking pollution-control equipment. Santiago sits in an enclosed valley (like Denver) that gets temperature inversions, especially in winter, so pollution was worsening rapidly.
“pollution was getting rapidly bad in the basin of Santiago because like Denver and some other places you get a ton inversion particularly in the winter it's an enclosed valley”
Santiago's was a rare case: very few major cities of its size have had anything like an almost purely private bus system.
“there are very few major cities in the world of that size that had anything like a private system”
The old private bus system ran on considerable informal trust. Passengers boarding at the back would pass their peso notes forward hand to hand to the driver, who made change at the next stoplight and sent the ticket back, 'like a hotdog at a baseball game'.
“it would be hand like a like a hotdog at a baseball game so there was a lot of trust present in that system”
The Chilean administration was publicly embarrassed by Transantiago and admitted and apologized for its mistake, which is very unusual for a government.
“the administration in Chile was very embarrassed by this and publicly admitted that they messed up apologized and which is very unusual”
Auctioning a $20 bill once in class is an educational exercise. Doing it every day would make you a congressman. Government is structurally in the position of a professor who continually auctions prizes and collects bids, and willingness to overbid (e.g., a $100 bid for $20 by a student hoping for a good grade) shows how quickly the process can become corrupt.
“if you do it every day you're a congressman”
Santiago's old streets are too narrow for bendy buses, which can only turn from the middle lane. So accidents, if anything, increased under the new system; Munger personally saw a bendy bus shear the bumper off a small car.
“the streets in Santiago which is an old city are not really wide enough for those big bendy buses so accidents if anything went up”
HUD grants probably funded many underused projects of questionable public benefit, such as dog museums, tennis courts and a teapot museum in North Carolina.
“the HUD grants which probably built a lot of you know dog museums and tennis courts that underused”
HUD grants probably funded many low-value projects, such as dog museums, underused tennis courts and a North Carolina teapot museum, so their public benefits are doubtful, unlike the longitude prize.
“the HUD grants which probably built a lot of you know dog museums and tennis courts that underused”
Santiago's Metro is excellent: cheap, fast, always on time, and crowded but not impossibly so outside rush hour. Regular workers, however, cannot avoid rush hour.
“very cheap very fast always on time and crowded but not impossibly crowded except right at rush hour”
Driving in Chile around 1977 was frightening, and people drove extremely differently from Americans, except perhaps in New York or Washington.
“it was really frightening to be in a vehicle there”
Once you get used to mass transit in a city like Santiago it is really fun; Santiago is a beautiful place.
“once you get used to a mass transit system in a city like that it's really darn fun”