
Top-Tier CRE Debt Facing Significant Losses – What You Need to Know
What this covers
This is a roughly twenty-minute Eurodollar University commentary in which Jeff Snider, with an occasional second voice, works through the week's reporting on commercial real estate debt. It begins with how securitization is supposed to work: junior pieces absorb losses first, so a senior tranche that is AAA rated should lose almost nothing. The case then rests on two CMBS losses. One is a note on 1740 Broadway in Midtown Manhattan, where senior investors recovered less than three-quarters of their money. The other is a UK deal reported in June. Both come from Bloomberg coverage, and the talk treats them as a sign that asset prices sit far below what even the top of the structure was built to withstand.
The range is wider than the losses themselves. The talk describes large banks selling their better CRE assets at a discount, and regional banks left with only two options: hand the financing to others or modify and extend loans. Modifications are reported at $22 billion over twelve months and on pace for a record 2024, mostly maturity extensions, which the speaker calls "extend and pretend." CLO delinquency data from May is read as reversing the slight dip in March and April. The talk also traces CLO issuance from its 2022 peak through the 2023 regional banking episode to a Q1 2024 rebound tied to expected Federal Reserve cuts. It then turns to housing, where multifamily permits fell to 382,000 in May, a 20% drop in three months. The speaker puts this down to weak renter demand rather than financing alone.
The more contested claims are interpretive. The speaker argues that falling interest rates partly reflect CRE stress, not just Fed policy. He says spreads keep tightening because of yield-seeking money, especially from Japan, a form of reach for yield) that ignores deteriorating fundamentals. He also holds that strong payroll data feed false confidence, and that modifications, CMBS and debt funds are only "rearranging the deck chairs" while the 2020–2021 bubble unwinds. The closing forecast is that the cleanup will be slow and painful.
The speaker argues that senior-tranche commercial real estate securities are experiencing unprecedented losses, signaling that the underlying distress in CRE markets is far deeper and more systemic than mainstream investors acknowledge, forcing banks to exit quality assets before further price discovery reveals broader insolvency.
- Senior AAA-rated CMBS tranches—designed to be near-risk-free—have suffered losses in both New York (May) and UK (June) transactions for the first time since the 2008 financial crisis
- Large banks are liquidating high-quality CRE assets at discounts, indicating they anticipate continued deterioration and wish to avoid larger losses
- Delinquency rates in CLO portfolios hit 99.74% (up 114 basis points in May alone), multifamily construction permits and starts have collapsed to levels unseen since 2013, and loan modifications have surged to record levels—all signs of a system under severe stress
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Securitization structure is designed so that senior (AAA-rated) tranches should experience near-zero losses because all junior tranches absorb losses first and must be sufficiently thick to protect seniors; when seniors do experience losses, it reveals that underlying asset prices are far below what is needed to protect even the top tranches.
“remember how securitization works if you're in the top level the senior level the triple a top rated part of it you have all of this all of these other tranches above you that are going to take losses first and there's supposed to be enough of these tranches above you enough protection against losses that you'll the chances of a senior piece actually experiencing a loss is supposed to be next to zero nothing is ever zero as we know in this world but as close to as close to nil and trivial as we can possibly get”
Another senior-rated tranche of commercial real estate debt is facing substantial losses, marking the second such loss in as many months, which is unprecedented post-2008 and indicates systemic distress spreading upward through securitization structures.
“another senior top rated tranch of CR debt is facing substantial losses the second one around the world in his many months”
US regional banks have few alternatives remaining: they must either hand off CR financing to other sources and hope it remains robust, or work with borrowers on modifications and extensions, effectively committing to holding the problem on their balance sheets.
“the banking system most of all is heavily exposed as Mr Murray from Pimco was pointing out I mean us Regional Banks really don't have much alternative at this point they can either hand the financing off to somebody else and hope that financing continues to be robust or starts to become more robust or they can work with their borrowers and work out some kind of workarounds modifications whatever the case may be”
Interest rates are declining in part because of fundamental financial stress in CRE markets and senior-tranche losses, which are real factors affecting interest rate levels, not just Fed policy or inflation expectations.
“that potential stress and strain and now losses even up to senior pieces of some of the CR focused Clos is one reason why interest rates continue to go lower it's a factor a fundamental factor in how interest rates are set”
Large banks are selling their high-quality CRE assets first—at discounted prices—not because of immediate need, but in anticipation of further price discovery that will reveal even worse losses in senior tranches, allowing them to exit before losses cascade further.
“likely explains why we keep hearing reports that large banks are selling their high quality assets distress rates”
CMBS is a difficult and problematic financing channel, especially when borrowers are in default or loss situations, creating a 'real nightmare' for all parties involved, yet it has become necessary as alternative funding sources.
“cnbs is a difficult difficult space to work in especially in less than desirable conditions where you get into defaults and losses and it just it it can be a it can be end up being a real nightmare”
Delinquencies in CRE dipped slightly in March and April, which some market participants interpreted as evidence that the worst had passed, but May data showing a sharp resurgence in delinquencies suggests that the dip was temporary and the trend is deteriorating.
“delinquencies on commercial real estate loans are actually Rising they had dipped a little bit according to certain sources in March and April which suggested that maybe we'd seen the worst of it but the latest data that we got from some some other sources like cred IQ suggest that delinquency soared again in the month of May”
CLO issuance in Q2 2022 was a previous peak, but issuance dried up in mid-2022 as the economy weakened, fell further during the 2023 regional banking crisis, partially recovered in Q4 2023 as rates declined, and then surged in Q1 2024 to the highest level since Q2 2022, showing cyclical sensitivity to interest rate expectations.
“what you see is that funding had dried up in the middle of 2022 as the economy fell off prices sh all of that stuff it came back somewhat in the first quarter of 2023 but then fell off for obvious reasons with the regional banking crisis in the US and credit s can't forget about that the second quarter and third quarter of last year it got it restarted a bit in the fourth quarter again as rates went down and then after the bond rally and then the thoughts about how rates are going to continue to go lower”
Builders are withdrawing from multifamily construction not due to financing constraints alone, but because prospective renters have deteriorating financial condition—no money, weakening job market, and price pressures—meaning demand-side weakness, not supply-side, is driving the slowdown.
“Builders are not looking all that optimistically at the multif family apartment construction again they're thinking they they see from the from all the information they get on prospective renters that renters don't have any money the jobs Market is increasingly difficult they're pressured by prices and things are getting worse not better”
Mainstream economic statistics like strong payroll data create false confidence in the economy, causing investors and policymakers to set aside concerning data about economic weakness and continue aggressive reach-for-yield behavior based on the assumption that the US economy will 'work out just fine.'
“there's a lot of lot of assumptions that the US economy is going to work out just fine because not just the FED but some of the mainstream statistics like payrolls look really good and we're going to set aside all of the concerning data that Su suggest that the economy isn't great because we don't really have any other choice”
Regional banks in particular were heavily involved in financing the 2020-2021 commercial real estate bubble and remain heavily exposed to the resulting distress, making them vulnerable to additional shocks.
“Regional banks in particular over the last four years they were heavily involved in financing this CR bubble”
Multifamily housing construction permits have collapsed to 382,000 on a seasonally adjusted annual rate in May 2024, down from 479,000 in February, representing a 20% decline in three months and reaching levels seen only in April 2020 (pandemic low) and 2013 (early post-crisis).
“according to the census bureau's latest estimates through the month of May permits to to build new multif family units fell all the way to 382,000 that's a seasonally adjusted annual rate down from 407,000 revised in April and it had been 479,000 as late as February”
The $38 million note on 1740 Broadway (Midtown Manhattan) saw AAA-rated investors recover less than 75% (three-quarters) of their original investment, representing losses on supposedly 'safest' tranches—a 'first such loss of the post-crisis era' according to the Bloomberg report and Bank of Barclays analysis.
“buyers of the AAA rated portion of a $38 million note backed by the mortgage on 1740 Broadway in Midtown Manhattan got less than 3/4 of the original investment back earlier this month after the loan was sold at a steep discount it's the first such loss of the post crisis era that's twice we've heard that according to Barkley's”
Housing construction data in the US has been 'a big huge mess,' particularly multifamily/apartment construction data, indicating severe stress in a sector that is a major component of the CRE distress.
“that's why we continue to see really ugly statistics in the housing market it's particularly multif family or apartment construction which is a huge part of this CR distress”
Loan modifications have surged to $22 billion in the past 12 months and $9 billion in 2024 YTD (through May), placing 2024 on track to exceed the 2023 total of $16.8 billion and establish a record year, with the majority of modifications being maturity extensions—a continuation of 'extend and pretend.'
“approximately 22 billion loans have been modified in the past 12 months ending May 31st over 9 billion in loans have already been modified this year through May placing 2024 squarely on a path to a record setting year of loan modifications this compares to a total of 16.8 billion that was modified in 2023”
All the effort, resources, and alternative financing mechanisms in the CRE market—modifications, CMBS, Clos, debt funds—are not addressing underlying distress but merely 'rearranging the deck chairs,' financing workarounds to wind down the bubble that was inflated in 2020–2021 without building anything new.
“all this time effort and even new resources and new funding sources are just rearranging the deck chairs we're not doing anything new or very little new was getting done it's just financing to try to work around the distortions of the past couple years to wind down the bubble period from 2020 and 2021”
The US Dollar exchange value is going higher as other central banks around the world cut interest rates, representing a headwind for US exporters and adding to macroeconomic stress alongside CRE distress.
“it's not just that interest rates are going down the US Dollar exchange value is also going higher as other central banks around the world at least are cutting interest rates”
Credit spreads in CRE and CMBS continue to tighten despite rising delinquencies, driven largely by yield-seeking capital from Japan, indicating that investor appetite for credit risk is divorced from fundamental deterioration and is being forced by carry-trade incentives.
“as delinquencies rise we still see credit spreads across the CR landscape including cnbs as I'll go over in just a moment they continue to Titan Clos in general continue to tighten thanks in large part to our friends over in Japan as I talked about with norn Chen bank and what they're actually up to with their carry trade”
Price discovery is rare in the CR market because few transactions occur, but the transactions that do occur reveal asset prices are much lower than the values implied by hold-to-maturity accounting, creating a gap between marked-to-market prices and book values.
“when there is price Discovery the very few transactions that take place the prices that are being discovered are wholly insufficient to offer protection to even the senior parts of the securitization structur”
The historical track record of cleaning up financial bubbles is 'not necessarily a good one,' and initial returns from the current CRE cleanup show disappointing recoveries even for top-rated structures, suggesting the 2020–2021 CRE bubble cleanup will be painful and prolonged.
“at the end of the day we're talking about cleaning up after a bubble and historically speaking the track record of each cleanup is not necessarily a good one and so far as we've gone into this one the initial returns are not returning much to even the top rated structures of these financing Arrangements”
Commercial banks have historically been the primary source of CRE funding, alongside life insurance companies, debt funds, and CMBS, but as banks have withdrawn or reduced involvement, CMBS has re-emerged as a 'last resort' alternative source, with large banks (Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citi) originating and warehousing CMBS loans themselves.
“normally when you look at c commercial real estate there's four primary sources of funding there are life insurance who are huge funding huge buyers of all of this stuff there's commercial Banks as we've been talking about all along Regional banks in particular over the last four years they were heavily involved in financing this CR bubble there are debt funds and there is cmbs”
Homebuilders are not included in the group of 'sanguine investors' and are increasingly content to sit on the sidelines to see how the macroeconomy and CRE debt/leverage/financing rollover situation develops before committing new capital to construction.
“the thing is that group of sanguin investors does not include us home builders they are increasingly content to sit this one out to see where the macroeconomy goes as well as all of this stuff in commercial real estate to debt leverage funding financing rollovers all of that delinquencies”
Investors who have been funding a 'mini Revival' in structured credit markets and keeping the system from falling apart are 'sanguine' (optimistic) about risks, but they will face 'some real tough discussions and decisions' as macroeconomic conditions worsen and CRE distress accelerates.
“sanguin investors who've been funding a mini Revival through alternative means of the structured credit markets and just keeping it from all falling apart they're going to be facing some real tough discussions and decisions and that's even before we get to the harsher macroeconomic climate as the US slides further into recession”
The revival of CLO and CMBS issuance in 2024 is predicated on expectations that the Federal Reserve will cut interest rates and reduce financing costs, but this is based on assumptions about Fed action rather than genuine improvement in underlying borrower fundamentals or real economy conditions.
“there has been a Revival or a mini Revival in funding in the space in 2024 and a lot of it was predicated on interest rates going lower first with the bound rally last year that did bring Market interest rates lower and then the perceptions that the Federal Reserve is going to cut rates and therefore cut financing costs for a lot of people over the months or at some point this year”
The notion of extend-and-pretend is 'totally understandable' given the challenging interest-rate environment and high delinquency levels, indicating that lenders are responding rationally to constraints but this strategy is fundamentally unsustainable.
“the notion of extend and pretend is totally understandable as loans reach maturity in this challenging environment”
John Murray, PIMCO's Head of Global Private Commercial Real Estate, manages a division within Goldman Sachs' $173 billion Alternatives business, providing institutional context for his analysis of CRE distress and bank deleveraging.
“John Murray pimco's Head of global private commercial real estate as he said in an interview his his division sits Within Go's 173 billion Alternatives business”
The webinar 'Anniversary Sale' on interest rate fundamentals on June 28 at 6:30 PM Eastern is being promoted because understanding rate determination is critical given current CR distress and price discovery dynamics.
“that potential stress and strain and now losses even up to senior pieces of some of the CR focused Clos is one reason why interest rates continue to go lower it's a factor a fundamental factor in how interest rates are set and that's something that we're going to talk about on Friday June 28th next Friday June 28th at 6:30 p.m. eastern time euro dollar University is holding a webinar launching our anniversary sale with rates moving again toward recent lows it's important to understand where they are actually coming from”