
Kling Credit Default Swaps, Counterparty Risk, and the Political Economy of Financial Regu 11/10/08
What this covers
Arnold Kling and Russ Roberts examine the mechanics and consequences of credit default swaps in the 2008 financial crisis, and the political economy of regulatory responses. The conversation moves from the technical structure of CDS and counterparty risk through their role in the collapse, to the question of how a complex, knowledge-dispersed economy should be governed during and after a crisis. Kling argues that the crisis was not a failure of unregulated markets but of concentrated, centrally-directed housing policy—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the mortgage interest deduction acting as an American industrial policy. He contends that CDS are structurally untenable: unlike futures markets with natural buyers and sellers on both sides, a CDS has natural buyers (risk-averse bondholders) but no natural seller, making it insurance without the reserves or uncorrelated risks that insurance requires. When sellers hedged by shorting troubled firms' bonds and stock, the collective pressure accelerated their downward spiral, amplifying systemic risk.
The discussion ranges across several contentious points. Kling argues that sellers of credit protection believed they could meet obligations through dynamic hedging rather than capital—individually rational but collectively catastrophic. Bear Stearns failed because it funded long-term mortgage securities in short-term repo markets, leaving it vulnerable to haircut demands as confidence eroded. He disputes whether putting CDS on an exchange would help: correlated systemic risks cannot be diversified away the way uncorrelated commodity risks can. Throughout, Kling returns to a Hayekian theme: knowledge in the modern economy is dispersed across millions of specialized minds, yet crisis policy reaches for concentration of power in Washington—a mismatch he sees as fundamentally misguided. The conversation touches on the inadequacy of pre-crisis macroeconomic consensus, the suits-versus-geeks divide in risk management, and whether orderly liquidation (modeled on the dot-com collapse) would have been preferable to bank bailouts.
Kling argues that the financial crisis was not caused by unregulated markets but by a centrally-directed 'industrial policy of housing,' and that credit default swaps are structurally untenable because they lack a natural seller and concentrate correlated systemic risk that no exchange or central planner can manage.
- Credit default swaps have a natural buyer but no natural seller, making them insurance against correlated risk rather than a hedged market
- The crisis occurred in the most centrally-directed sector (housing via Fannie/Freddie/mortgage deductibility), so it was concentrated power, not free markets, that failed
- Knowledge in the economy is increasingly dispersed while crisis policy reaches for concentration of power, which Kling sees as fundamentally Hayekian-wrong
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Knowledge in the economy is becoming increasingly dispersed and specialized (no doctor knows all of medicine, no one knows all of science), yet in a crisis we reach for concentration of power in Washington; this is fundamentally wrong because, as Hayek argued, markets are a way of solving information problems when knowledge is dispersed, so the crisis calls for a Hayekian rather than centralized solution.
“this dispersion of knowledge and yet in this crisis we reach for concentration of power... if we centralized power... then we'll be safer and I fundamentally I think that's wrong... that Hayek is right that markets are a way of solving information problems when information is dispersed and we really ought to be looking for a Hayekian solution”
Bond holders are senior to stockholders in bankruptcy, so a bond is inherently less risky than the stock of the same company; however, many institutions face a distinct risk beyond default — a downgrade from triple-A to a lower rating can put them in violation of investment agreements, which is itself a reason to buy credit protection.
“the bondholders are in the law in the case of a bankruptcy there be some assets for sure and and bondholders would be first in line... the risk that you're worried about isn't isn't just that it could default but that it could slip from Triple A to a and then all of a sudden you're violating some agreement”
A credit default swap is structurally untenable because, unlike a corn futures contract which has a natural long (Fritos) and a natural short (the farmer), a CDS has a natural buyer (a risk-averse bondholder) but no natural seller — making it insurance rather than a hedged market, and insurance requires lots of capital, reserves, and crucially uncorrelated risks.
“in the corn example there was a natural long and a natural short... in the credit default swaps I don't think there's a natural seller... insurance is a very different thing than a market of natural logs and natural Short's hedging each other insurance requires lots of capital it requires lots of reserves and it requires very uncorrelated risks”
Sellers of credit default swaps planned to meet their obligations not through capital and reserves but by short-selling the bonds and stock of troubled companies when bad news appeared; while individually rational as a hedge, this collective behavior puts huge downward pressure on firms the moment they hit trouble, creating and amplifying systemic risk through a self-reinforcing cascade.
“everyone who's sold these credit default swaps I think has this contingency plan in their minds that they're going to go out and short the bonds and stocks of companies that start to get into trouble now you can see we're individually that might make sense but collectively the effect of that is to put huge downward pressure on firms the minute they get into a little bit of trouble that's what's called systemic risk”
The great man theory of politics — that you just need the right person in power (e.g., Bernanke as the Great Depression scholar, or the right Treasury Secretary) — is mistaken; public choice theory and Kling's framing argue you should design a system that does not require picking the right person, because relying on the great wisdom of one or two officials to steer a crisis is extremely unlikely to work.
“what I've learned from you is this nice way of putting it... that you really don't want to rely on picking the right person you you want a system that doesn't require picking the right person... here's of all the people you'd want he is probably the guy you'd pick ex ante”
There are two distinct levels of ignorance to keep separate: (1) what institutional structure or policy might make things better, and (2) whether the knowledge to build a financial system from scratch even exists at all — nobody knows how to design a central plan for the financial system, just as 'creating' markets in post-Berlin-Wall Eastern Europe proved far harder than assumed because the supporting institutions cannot simply be assembled.
“nobody knows how to how to put together a central plan for the financial system and yet that's what everyone's insisting that we... need a new financial architecture... this is what we tried to do in Eastern Europe... creating markets as opposed to letting them sort of stumble forward... it's a cake that we don't have the recipe to”
Bear Stearns likely failed because it funded long-term mortgage-backed securities in short-term repo markets, and once counterparties became even slightly skeptical of those securities' value they demanded ever-larger haircuts or punitive interest rates, since in a one-week repo even a 1% default risk would require absurdly high interest to compensate, causing Bear's funding to evaporate.
“Bear Sterns was trying to trade everything in the short-term markets including its mortgage-backed securities... if all of a sudden people are starting to get... the slightest bit skeptical that these mortgage-backed securities are going to come through... they're gonna require what's called a large haircut”
An organized futures exchange eliminates the counterparty risk present in a private forward contract because both parties' counterparty becomes the exchange itself, which manages defaults through margin requirements, suitability requirements, and capital requirements while taking a premium for the insurance it effectively provides.
“so if if you as a farmer for some reason default on your futures contract the exchange is going to have to take the loss so the exchange has to manage all this counterparty risk and that's why an organized exchange is said to eliminate counterparty risk”
The consensus in macroeconomics before the crisis (exemplified by Bernanke and Blanchard's 'state of macro is good') was that inflation targeting alone — keeping inflation modestly above zero — was sufficient to avoid a Great Depression, yet the same policymakers suddenly invoked Depression risk to justify bank bailouts that have no basis in any textbook or graduate course.
“Bernanke basically says at the end well all you really need to do is inflation targeting... that is the absolute consensus in macroeconomics today... that in consensus would tell you that there's no way you would have a Great Depression as long as you did inflation targeting now of a sudden everybody's talking about a Great Depression”
Aggressive, rule-changing government intervention by Paulson and Bernanke has itself become the disease it purports to cure, because their unpredictable, ad hoc actions create a rule-of-men rather than rule-of-law environment that forces private investors and banks to sit on the sidelines, unable to make long-term commitments — which then leads officials to wrongly blame banks for not lending.
“I'm actually more nervous about about Paulson and Bernanke being the disease that they purport to cure”
The futures markets in Chicago (spontaneous, chaotic, many shouting market-makers) are more efficient than the managed, single-specialist New York Stock Exchange, which is why the most advanced trading (stock indexes, Treasury bills) occurs in Chicago and New York follows behind — an illustration of spontaneous order outperforming managed order.
“the markets in Chicago are so much more efficient than the markets in New York that most of the real most of the more advanced trading takes place in Chicago and then New York kind of follows behind so it's an interesting illustration of the the spontaneous order versus the managed managed order”
The bank executives who drove their firms into ruin did not knowingly loot their shareholders while disguising risk; rather they genuinely believed they were taking on far less risk than they actually were — exemplified by Freddie Mac CEO Richard Syron, who dismissed internal warnings believing the conservative culture overstated subprime danger.
“I think they actually thought that they were not putting on as much risk as they were... I detest the Freddie Mac CEO Richard siren but I don't believe for a minute that he knew that he was radically endangering the company... if you had told him in a convincing way... he would not have done it”
Putting credit default swaps on an exchange would not solve their core problem because the risks are correlated — many firms can turn bad at once (a universal event), so an exchange of small traders cannot diversify away systemic risk the way it can for a corn futures market where each trader's default probability is small and independent.
“with credit default swaps there was I think the potential for lots of firms to turn bad at once and in fact that's what happened... I don't see how the exchange can solve that problem... the exchange cannot manage its risk just with a bunch of small people offering these credit default swaps”
Macroeconomics has been exposed as having little to say about the crisis: there was no consensus on what should replace the bailout if it was a bad idea, none of the competing narratives are testable in such a complex system, and the only useful level of analysis remaining is micro — understanding how a policy creates incentives for particular actors.
“what I found striking was how little consensus there was about what might replace it... none of these narratives are very testable it's such a complex system how would you ever begin to adjudicate between the different theories... it seems to me the only thing left is micro”
The U.S. housing finance system was effectively an American industrial policy — analogous to Japan's coddled manufacturing export sector — combining government, quasi-government banks (Fannie/Freddie), and private firms; therefore the crisis represents the failure of concentrated, centrally-directed power rather than a failure of free markets.
“what I call the American industrial policy of housing... just as Japan coddled and combined government and banks and companies and assembled them together to make a man during export sector the u.s. combined government quasi government banks and private firms to support the housing sector this was our industrial policy”
There is a 'suits versus geeks' divide in which the technical modelers low in organizations understood the risks in mortgage securities (e.g., Freddie Mac economists who warned about California and Massachusetts home prices in the late 1980s), but their voices were overwhelmed by the hubris of non-technical executives at the top who did not understand the products.
“that's why I keep referring to the suits versus geeks divide I think there were some people at lower levels who saw this... back when I was at Freddie Mac in the late 1980s the economics people wrote a memo saying that California and Massachusetts had experienced high home prices and we should take steps to limit our exposure and we did”
Wage and price controls worked well enough in World War II (administered partly by Galbraith) because the economy was simple enough to manage, but the 1971 Nixon controls were a decade-long disaster because the economy had grown too complex for bureaucrats to administer — demonstrating that increasing economic complexity makes centralized management progressively infeasible.
“in World War two we had wage and price controls and John Kenneth Galbraith was actually part of the bureaucracy... you had a simple enough economy that you could have wage and price controls... whereas with the Nixon wage and price controls it... reached that point where the bureaucrat said hey we don't even have the knowledge to do this”
Recovery requires the dispersed-knowledge sorting in which insolvent firms that made mistakes go broke and well-run firms scoop up undervalued assets, but because Paulson and Bernanke are now such big and aggressive players, everyone else must sit on the sidelines, crippling the capital markets and preventing the necessary reallocation.
“there are financial institutions that need to go broke and there are others that need to grow because they didn't make these mistakes and they should be scooping up these undervalued assets... but in the short run they are such big players and such aggressive players that everyone else has to go on the sidelines”
The 1971 Nixon wage and price controls were imposed straight out of the prevailing textbook view that inflation was caused by people fighting over income shares — a market-failure externality requiring controls — yet they were a disaster that took ten years to recover from, showing that confident textbook-driven policy can fail badly.
“John Connolly sort of the Henry Paulson of his day imposed wage price and controls and that was right out of the textbook... the textbook view is that inflation was caused by people fighting over income shares... long story short they were a disaster took ten years to recover from them”
The dot-com / internet stock collapse is a better model for handling the financial crisis than bailouts, because we let the firms involved fail and recovered; the key challenge with investment banks is finding an orderly way to liquidate them (as the FDIC routinely does with banks) rather than injecting capital into insolvent institutions.
“we recovered from that I think that is actually a better model for how we should be handling this this situation... there are orderly ways to liquidate banks I mean the FDIC does it all the time and the what's missing in this crisis to me is lots and lots of banks being liquidated”
Some real-business-cycle macroeconomics holds that the financial sector doesn't really affect the real economy — there is no demonstrated transmission mechanism — implying you could let banks fail just as the internet sector collapsed without major real consequences; this view may be valid since severe unemployment had not yet materialized.
“there's macro that says there's real business cycles and the financial sector doesn't really affect the real economy that would tell you you can just sit back... there's no transmission mechanism that's been demonstrated between the financial sector and the real and the real economy that that's one point of view and that may be valid”
The regulatory tools needed to prevent the crisis already existed — government could have imposed tough capital requirements, required down payments, or forced Fannie/Freddie to hold capital against a home-price drop — so the failure was not a lack of regulatory authority but a lack of foresight and the will to use existing tools.
“all the regulatory tools were there we don't need more regulatory tools what you needed was you know better foresight and will to use them and that's that's not something you can always assume exists”
Throwing a major investment bank like Bear Stearns into bankruptcy court would immediately destroy every other Wall Street firm and counterparty by freezing all their interlinked transactions, which reveals that the financial system as of March 2008 was not robust — any single investment bank's failure could collapse the whole system.
“if you do you mean throwing them onto bankruptcy courts so that all their assets and liabilities get tied up in court then I think you immediately destroy every other Wall Street firm and every firm that has a transaction with them”
Sitting back and waiting is the best available investment strategy in the current environment because no one has a better idea — there is no obvious choice when the government is unpredictably making up the rules — which is exactly the paralysis that explains why recapitalized banks are not lending.
“I'm taking I think the edge view that most people are taking which is sit back and wait don't know what to do... the sit back and wait is exactly what banks... Paulson has the nerve... to say gosh we're injected all this capital in banks ooh and you're not lending well what are they supposed to do”
Alan Greenspan publicly admitted that his 40-year market-oriented worldview was flawed — though what he actually said, as opposed to the media interpretation that 'markets can't regulate themselves,' was the more limited and challenging point that he had wrongly assumed banks would look out for themselves sufficiently to prevent the derivatives-and-mortgage cascade.
“Alan Greenspan filleted himself publicly... said you know I just my whole worldview my ideology was wrong for 40 years... what he did say... is that you know I thought banks would look out for themselves and that that would be sufficient to prevent this kind of mess”
The Treasury's reversal — abandoning the original $700 billion plan to buy mortgage securities within a week in favor of directly capitalizing banks — proves that policymakers did not actually know what they were doing, because if they had genuinely believed those assets were undervalued and that buying them would cure the problem, they would not have completely reversed course days later.
“it completely to me it shows that they didn't know I mean it if they knew three weeks ago that these assets were undervalued and that buying these assets was going to cure the problem then why did they completely turn around and choose a different policy today”
Robert Merton's calculation puts the loss from the housing decline at roughly five trillion dollars (US housing reached ~$20 trillion and lost about a quarter), which against a US capital stock of perhaps sixty to seventy trillion is a bad year but survivable — implying the systemic panic was disproportionate to the underlying real loss.
“this is Robert mertens calculation that the value of housing in in the US had reached something like 20 trillion and then it lost a let's say a quarter of its value so that's a five trillion dollar loss... what would you say is the size of the US capital stock sixty trillion yeah seventy... five trillion is you know it's a bad year”
A repo (repurchase agreement) is a way to carry securities for very short periods — a dealer sells a Treasury bond and agrees to repurchase it in a week — and it is the primary market through which the Fed intervenes to change the Fed Funds rate.
“there's something called the repo market where I sell you a Treasury bond and I agree to repurchase it in a week and it's a way of carrying these securities for very short periods... it's actually the market when the Fed intervenes we say that the Fed changes the Fed Funds rate they typically intervene in the repo market”
Both the skeptics who urged delaying the bailout (hold hearings, gather information) and the actors who insisted intervention was urgent illustrate a Great-Depression-style dynamic in which 'even a bad solution is better than no solution at all' prevailed because skeptics never had a moment to rally around a compelling alternative.
“those of us who were who were skeptical... argued just wait let's just take our time... but the consensus spread by a lot of political actors... was we can't wait it's urgent... even a bad solution is better than no solution at all very akin to the Great Depression”
The government guarantee of roughly $29-30 billion of Bear Stearns' toxic, unknown-value assets that made the JP Morgan acquisition attractive shows how small that number now appears in retrospect — and it was not enough to prevent the broader cascade of failures.
“made this sale of Bear Stearns attractive by guaranteeing thirty twenty nine or so billion dollars worth of assets that were of unknown value... how small that number is by the way right compared to... but that wasn't enough that did not save this”