
Russia, China & The Future | Prof. John Gray
What this covers
This is a roughly seventy-minute conversation between John Anderson and the political philosopher John Gray, recorded in the weeks after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It starts with what political philosophy is for, then moves to Gray's claim that academics missed both the fall of communism and the intentions Thatcher had stated outright. From there it turns to China and Russia. Gray argues that the West projected liberal expectations onto Beijing in the 1990s, ignoring Tiananmen as a sign of regime fragility and the absence of the rule of law. He describes a shift from the moderate authoritarianism of Hu Jintao to the totalitarianism of Xi Jinping.
The Russia material is the most detailed. Gray treats Vladimir Putin as driven by the Russian world, a quasi-theological idea backed by an Orthodox Church that now plays a role once held by the KGB. He says this undercuts deterrence theory, and he points to Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal and its military modernization as factors that lower Putin's perception of escalation risk. He also describes Russia as a decayed empire rather than a nation-state, and he warns that fracture could bring a resource war inside a nuclear power. On policy he is blunt: deter without illusions, expect America to prioritize the Pacific, and expect Europe to carry more of its own defense. He is sharply critical of Macron's Gaullist hopes and of European dependence on Russian gas. The talk of genocide in Ukraine centers on cultural destruction, and the discussion also touches on Joe Biden and on hostility toward the West within American politics.
The final stretch widens into history and ideas. Gray contrasts cumulative progress in science with its absence in ethics and politics, citing Norman Angell's The Great Illusion before 1914 and the Bolshevik terror of Lenin and Stalin. He also discusses spiritualism after the First World War, the question of whether history is cyclical, and transhumanism. He is critical of the stance of Western intellectuals on all of these, and several of his claims are openly contested.
John Gray argues that the Ukraine war represents a fundamental breakdown in the post-Cold War international system comparable to 1914, driven by Putin's non-Western worldview that challenges the rational-actor assumptions underlying nuclear deterrence theory, and that Western civilization is endangered by a combination of ideological naivety about authoritarian powers and internal erosion of values.
- Putin operates from a semi-mystical 'Russian world' ideology, not rational cost-benefit calculation in the Western sense, making classical deterrence theory obsolete
- The West systematically misreads authoritarians because it projects liberal reflexes onto them (China liberalization myth, Putin negotiations)
- Western intellectuals willfully ignore history's hard lessons about human nature and evil because they cannot absorb cyclic rather than progressive views of civilization
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Science has made genuine cumulative progress because advances build on previous theories rather than falsifying them entirely, but in politics and ethics there is no such cumulative progress; what is gained in one era is often lost in another.
“in science and in technology in that savings but on the other hand in the covet epidemic itself if you look at human behavior political behavior wasn't really that magnificent we've had the return of paranoid world views of conspiracy world views in a big way”
The Bolsheviks thought the Jacobins in the French Revolution hadn't been 'pitiless enough,' and Lenin and later Stalinism produced tens of millions of deaths in Ukraine and elsewhere, demonstrating that revolutionary ideology claims to perfect society through ruthlessness but produces only endless sorrow.
“bolshevism was a kind of radical version of optimism as long as we kill enough people as long as we're ruthless enough lenin said the trouble with the uh jacobins in the french revolution is they weren't pitiless enough that was the trouble with them didn't kill enough people”
Putin has managed to modernize significant portions of Russia's military, including making great technical progress on battlefield nuclear weapons, contrary to Western assumptions that Russia was simply decaying militarily.
“there's a certain laxity in talk of a long war i mean people say well this could go on a long long time it probably could in terms of um ukrainian resistance as long as they're reasonably well supplied but actually could there be a long war for putin it's not so obvious because his um his uh losing staggering numbers of men an estimated 15000 yeah maybe more or maybe more by by now”
Norman Angell's pre-WWI bestseller 'The Great Illusion' argued that war had been made economically irrational by trade and interdependence; a few years later, World War I occurred, demonstrating that optimistic secular predictions about history's direction are unreliable guides to reality.
“there have been many false storms yeah there have been many periods in which what people think are back back before the first world war there was a bestseller selling book by a writer called norman angel who said that trade had made war uh uh unprofitable and therefore had abolished it a few years later bang the worst global war up till then”
Putin has approximately 2,000 tactical (theatre) nuclear weapons compared to the Americans having far fewer, and these weapons change the risk calculus because they can take out villages or towns rather than requiring the mutually assured destruction logic of strategic missiles, lowering what Putin perceives as the risk of escalation.
“he's got a vast number i think he has about i've read in the press that he has that the americans have about and he's got about 2000”
Spiritualism in Britain and psychical research after WWI attracted hundreds of thousands of people trying to communicate with deceased sons killed in the war because the psychological burden was unbearable, but this phenomenon did not recur after WWII possibly because the industrialization of death in the Holocaust was so overwhelming it exceeded the capacity for this kind of denial.
“especially after the first world war lots and lots i mean i mean hundreds of thousands of people in one way or another got involved with movements where they were communicating with their usually sons died in in the war just the burden was just too great”
Russia is not a traditional nation-state but a 'decayed or corroded relative empire' in which only about half the population is ethnically Russian, and most of Russia's natural wealth is in regions where there aren't majority Russian populations, making the Russian Federation potentially more fragile than commonly assumed.
“the russian federation is not i mean only about half of it is russian it's actually a decayed or corroded relative empire rather than a nation state um it's it may be more fragile than we think”
The West must be realistic about Russia: it must deter Russia without illusions about negotiating it away, prepare for the long term, assume America cannot carry everyone and will prioritize the Pacific over Europe, and European powers must therefore prepare to shoulder greater defense burdens.
“we've got to be realistic about russia nato must be realistic or at least so let me narrow that down europe must be realistic and not drop the ball not go to sleep prepare for the unlikely or the unpredictable”
The Ukraine war marks a breakdown in the global nuclear settlement comparable to the end of the first era of globalization in 1914, creating a crisis in the nuclear status quo that halted proliferation but now threatens to restart it.
“the ukraine war marks a breakdown in the global nuclear settlement yes um very clearly now dangerously dangerously so in a number of ways”
The West systematically projected its own liberal assumptions onto China in the 1990s, believing that trade would liberalize Beijing and lead to democracy, when the Chinese state was always structured to prevent both, with no rule of law and judges swearing loyalty to the regime, making democratic transition impossible without revolution.
“the west read its own liberal reflexes into what the chinese were doing which is to say that for the chinese they would say well they won't want to do something like gentleman square again they won't carry on that repression because it looks bad in the world to opinion they don't give a toss for world opinion unless they can manipulate it”
Tiananmen Square (1989) was not merely a television event isolated to one event but the tip of an iceberg of widespread anti-communist unrest across China, and the West's failure to recognize it as a signal of potential regime vulnerability led to subsequent miscalculation about China's trajectory.
“john lee is a very distinguished australian of chinese background who understands very well and he he makes the point that we miss in the west that tinaman square was only the tip of the iceberg that we got on television sets he said it was much more widespread across china uh it was a closer run thing than people realize once it was squashed we should have understood more clearly those are my words”
Putin's propaganda claims that Russia is 'denazifying' Ukraine despite Ukraine's leaders being Jewish, and that Russia is defending against genocide while committing one—specifically a cultural genocide by claiming Ukrainian national culture is 'fake' and planning to eliminate it through depopulation, repression, and forced Russification.
“it gives another element to this bizarre propaganda that they're denatifying a state whose two principal leaders are jewish and uh that they're defending against the genocide when in fact they're committing one”
The Soviet concept of 'former persons' in the 1918 constitution stripped civic rights from priests, small business owners, and their families, and when push came to shove, many received no rations (effectively death sentences), demonstrating that terror was built into Soviet communism from day one.
“in 1918 the new soviet constitution was passed and included as a legal category what were called former persons very interesting concept the concept of a former person and if you were a former person which would be a priest someone who worked in the church someone who had been a capitalist or a small small owner of some kind business owner or their families it was extended beyond the people themselves to their families family guild you were stripped of civic rights”
China has shifted from a moderately authoritarian state under Hu Jintao (where parts of the economy had genuine autonomy) to totalitarianism under Xi Jinping, where every major institution and economic entity is controlled by or subordinate to the state and military, and revolution from within is impossible because Xi has demanded oaths of loyalty and eliminates any potential challengers.
“china from having been totalitarian under mao shifted to a kind of more moderate authoritarian regime where parts of this society were genuinely independent or had a degree of autonomy to being totalitarian again and you just don't have big parts of the economy or big parts of the institution independent of the army isn't isn't independent of it there won't be a revolution from the army in china i don't think because he's she is re-concentrated or made the most swear oaths to him and whenever there's any the slightest whiff the people involved vanish”
If Russia's state fractures (not just regime change), the result could be a resource war and Yugoslav-type situation in the background of Russia still being a nuclear power, which could be worse than the current situation and must be prepared for in the long run.
“if the federation actually fractured you could have a release a resource war and a yugoslav type situation but against the background of it still being a nuclear power”
The West's experience with regime change in Iraq and Libya demonstrates that the regime and state were more deeply intertwined than Western policy assumed, such that removing the regime also removed the state, leading to Islamic State in Iraq and state collapse in Libya.
“the error in western policy and regime change in iraq and um libya was not to understand that the regime and the state were intertwined as deeply as they were that if you get rid of the regime you also get rid of the state then we had an islamic state in in for a while in um in iraq and also now very heavy penetration of iraq by iranian power in various ways and in libya you've got no state at all practically speaking just several different governments”
Without American engagement (military support, logistics, nuclear umbrella), Ukraine would have been absorbed, the Balkans would have suffered worse without American intervention, and the EU is currently a non-existent military power that cannot function as a military actor independently.
“if it hadn't been for the americans if it hadn't been for the american nuclear umbrella if it hadn't been for american logistics if it all turned on the french and the germans as the key powers the baltic states would have been stalwart...what would have happened in ukraine it it would have been sold out would it not”
Most Western academics were completely surprised by the fall of communism in 1989-1991 and by Thatcher's ability to dismantle the social democratic order, even though she had clearly stated what she intended to do, demonstrating that academics had failed to read what political actors explicitly said they would do.
“for most of my academic colleagues nearly all it was a complete bolt from the blue um sacha's own election to power had been a boat from the blue none of these things were because although they attacked capitalism all the time um they um they thought the the world around them the kind of social democratic world of the 1970s would last forever suddenly it's gone gone in a few years”
Classical deterrence theory was based on the assumption that rational actors share similar values—wanting prosperity over poverty, life over death, and wanting to avoid catastrophe—but Putin's worldview differs fundamentally from these Western assumptions, making deterrence theory inapplicable.
“the classical deterrence theory was based on multiple rational actors yes and rational actors meant by that that not just that they would calculate and and work out risks but actually it was assumed that they had rather similar values to each other they wanted prosperity rather than poverty they wanted life rather than death they wanted to avoid catastrophe to their own countries as well as to others”
Putin's intellectual framework centers on a semi-mystical concept of the 'Russian world' that has been damaged by NATO and Western influence, and his goal is to reunify this Russian world—which extends beyond Russia's current borders to include Ukraine, Moldova, Transnistria, and possibly other former Soviet territories—even if it requires escalation to nuclear weapons.
“the more you read about the background the intellectual background to the ukraine war his essays celebrated essay and people he's quoted from uh the writers he's cited from an almost semi-mystical idea of the russian world emerges what he's protecting is the russian world it's been damaged it's been threatened it's been challenged by nato”
The Russian Orthodox Church has acquired tremendous importance within the Putin regime, functioning partially as the KGB once did, with military priests throughout society and in the nuclear complex, and promoting the invasion on a theological basis centered on the 'Russian world' and Orthodox civilization.
“in the case of russia there is there are these old religious traditions of apocalypse and um getting a better society or a better world to cut a catastrophe of some kind and i think they might have been revived um even before putin i mean one of the interesting features of the putin regime is the tremendous importance that the russian orthodox church has acquired within it”
Within American politics, there is a strong element of right-wing opinion (some Republican senators openly, some elements of the Democratic Party from the left) that is openly hostile to the very idea of the West or pro-Putin, which undermines Western unity despite Biden's reasonable handling of the crisis.
“there's a very strong even now even after the invasion even after the um war crimes that are being committed in ukraine there's a strong element of right-wing opinion in the republican party which is not even isolation it's actually worse than that it's actually pro putin in certain respects and they openly say things i don't care what happens in ukraine”
German leaders (Cameron and Osborne in Britain; Macron in France) have acted against European interests through energy dependency on Russian gas and continued engagement with Putin, believing in a fantasy of French diplomatic leverage ('Gaullist' approaches) that has no foundation in current geopolitics.
“it also i mean we're all grateful for example if um that minecraft won in um in france because le pen would have been a great blow around ukraine as well as other institutions but macron's position on russia even up to now um has not really changed from the pursuit of deterrent with russia that many generations of french leaders all the way back to the goal actually have had it made more sense than the time of the goal i don't know but certainly doesn't make sense now in the time i mean he's been to putin he's been humiliated by putin he's been ridiculed and mocked by putin yet he carries on with it”
Free speech does not exist in most American higher education institutions in any traditionally recognized sense, and academics like Stephen Pinker have been attacked at major universities (Harvard) despite their intellectual credentials.
“there isn't free speech in most in any traditionally recognized sense in most american higher education doesn't exist anymore so actually i think what's happened is not a i don't think the move to post-modern relativism was all that real when it happened let's put it like that it was really the switch of one ideology um um to another um so for the benefit of um people who mightn't have followed stephen pinker amongst my friends in australia he of course is very optimistic academic he's very optimistic um i love him when he's critical of cynical theory yes yes yeah he's good on that stuff he poses the question how did this intellectual flimflam ever take off and now infests everything critical race theory or critical gender theories just but is it weaker now than it was five years ago i'd say it was stronger yeah well the question is more pervasive yeah it's more pervasive than even more pervasive”
The West's post-modern turn was never as real as intellectuals claimed; it was really a switch from one ideology (Enlightenment optimism) to another ideology (anti-Western, anti-capitalist), and what we see now is that ideological zeal never actually declined but only changed form.
“i think ideological zeal um didn't turn into post-modern relativism or skepticism as much as into uh um an anti-western um ideology which in its own way was as absolute as what it claimed it was replacing”
Knowledge and power—the ability to control the physical world—are ethically ambiguous and can enslave as much as emancipate, following the Genesis myth interpretation that knowledge is the fundamental problem because humans gained knowledge before gaining the wisdom to use it properly.
“my reading of that inexhaustible myth is that knowledge knowledge of the sciences knowledge of the physical world knowledge of how to control and gain power over the physical world knowledge is ethically ambiguous it can it can enslave as much as it can can emancipate”
If one person (or each competing 'god' entity) believes they are god with no moral constraints, but also believes another person is a god with the same lack of constraints, you have a power struggle with no common rules, making cooperation impossible and making conflict inevitable.
“i don't think it doesn't happen already it might happen we all choose to be god over our own lives and when i decide i'm good if you decide you're good yeah well we've got a problem yeah we have a serious problem because who controls the the relations between gods and then it becomes a struggle over power it becomes a power struggle yeah because i'm one of seeking cooperation and also because there are no common rules there yeah”
If societies do not maintain common moral and legal rules grounded in shared vulnerability (mortality), they descend into power struggles; societies based on the Geneva Convention and similar frameworks work because all parties are mortal and vulnerable, but post-human entities would lack this basis for restraint.
“i mean you can have common rules if you're mortal humans in other words you say well we need common rules we need we need the geneva convention we need uh we need these restraints because otherwise it's going to be absolutely nightmarish but if you if you're the nazis or if you're if you're putin in a way you have no time for these restraints because paradoxically in his case because of a perverted type of christian maybe if it's genuine uh christian uh of orthodoxy”
The West's historical memory is weak partly because lessons of history are 'chastening' and painful, and when people drop optimistic humanism they often don't become skeptical or historical but rather become 'frenzied in some other way,' leading to ideologies like Nazism and Bolshevism.
“one of the reasons that people both young and old have a weak historical memory is that the lessons of history are usually quite chastening yes there have been many false storms yeah there have been many periods in which what people think are back back before the first world war there was a bestseller selling book by a writer called norman angel who said that trade had made war uh uh unprofitable and therefore had abolished it”
The West has a short attention span and repeatedly fails to remember the long history of communist deception and repression, making it vulnerable to repeated deception by Putin and other authoritarian leaders who rely on this Western forgetfulness.
“one of the lessons that the totalitarian powers have learned which is unfortunately a well-founded lesson and genuinely true which is that the um the west can't keep in its public attention or even in the intention of the policy makers and the politicians can't consistently keep in mind the long history of communist deception and repression”
Philosophy has become an intra-academic discipline where philosophers mainly follow cues from other philosophers rather than engaging with the world, but it should be applied to understanding public affairs and the underlying logic of events, combining philosophical rigor with knowledge of diplomacy, history, and policy.
“philosophy in my time has become an intra-academic discipline by that i mean that the cues that most philosophers now follow are those given by other philosophers”
Western intellectuals willfully avoid studying the Russian Civil War, Bolshevik terror, and the catastrophic outcomes of communism because these histories are deeply disillusioning and contradict the belief in progressive improvement, so they study Western oppression instead because it's ended or diminished and allows them to feel virtuous.
“very very little being done for example on um comparatively speaking on for example the russian civil war a friend of mine the military story is has done a new history of um uh russians millions of people killed extraordinary cruelty”
Ray Kurzweil and transhumanism represent an unconscious secularization of Christian religious themes (immortality, resurrection, eschatological transformation) without recognition that these are religious concepts, and the singularity idea itself comes from American fundamentalist theology.
“singularity is actually a term excuse me which comes from within american fundamentalism it's connected with the second coming which they think obviously unlike augustine as a phys as a temporal event the end of the world really happens jesus really in other words it's not that there are two there's a city of god in the city of man and the two sort of”
Germany has failed to follow through on its declared historic shift in foreign policy, backing away from defense spending commitments and continuing to depend on Russian energy while funding Putin's war machine through energy payments that far outweigh the weapons Germany sends to Ukraine.
“if germany had really stepped up if it looked like they were instead stepped up yeah they would have been the third largest spender on defence in the world after america and china with the size of their economy they won't do it because of their energy dependency on on on well they're funding the war yes they're sending arms yes at one level underneath some arms yes uh another another one yeah”
The concept of a 'long war' in Ukraine may be unrealistic for Putin because his military is experiencing massive casualties (estimated 15,000+ personnel losses, possibly more) and desertion, raising questions about how long he can sustain military operations without significant territorial gains.
“there's a certain laxity in talk of a long war i mean people say well this could go on a long long time it probably could in terms of um ukrainian resistance as long as they're reasonably well supplied but actually could there be a long war for putin it's not so obvious because his um his uh losing staggering numbers of men an estimated 15 000 yeah maybe more or maybe more by by now and we don't know how many are desertions and i mean not just casualties deaths or yeah um but others who are out of action”
Stephen Pinker and others who argue for scientific progress are themselves expressing a moral panic in Western intellectuals unable to tolerate the stress and anxiety of an uncertain world where nuclear war is possible, so they reassert belief in reason as a psychological defense mechanism.
“i think there's a kind of moral panic at work in the west which is that having rejected religion which gives a picture of the world in which it has meaning people turn to a kind of um beerus um in the past communist and then kind of liberal views in which the whole world was being converted to reason and liberal democracy would spread and that didn't happen they then um have reasserted their belief in in reason and in technology”
America's military and economic predominance is stronger than it appeared two or three years ago, but internally the crumbling of certain values and worldviews is happening faster than before, creating an unstable equilibrium that is vulnerable to political change.
“although in one sense i think the america's predominance in the world through its weaponry its capacity to wage financial warfare and so on is stronger than it looked two or three years ago it's much stronger internally in america the um crumbling of certain values and certain a certain kind of outlook on the world is still is actually faster than before and that's unstable it's an unstable equilibrium”
Secular Western intellectuals have replaced religious theodicy with a secular theodicy in which reason and technology will gradually solve problems, but this belief is a form of religion without being recognized as such, and it cannot psychologically handle the reality that reason cannot prevent catastrophe.
“because it means that they're secular being religious you know the term theodicy the their secular theodicy they have their own theodosis things will work out we'll do this we'll do that people educate everybody like it doesn't work like that”
Kurzweil is attempting to build a virtual simulation of his deceased father to have a relationship with him, which is psychologically tragic because without consciousness and sentience the simulation is just a computer program, revealing the underlying problem: people cannot bear bereavement and loss.
“he's been trying to build a virtual model of his uh father who who died so that he could communicate with this model and establish a kind of relationship with this model now his father's not there of course unless you are a christian believer which he isn't it's just it's there's no sentient consciousness behind it it's just a computer simulation”
Harari represents another version of transhumanism where humans can become gods by linking with AI and creating post-human species, but this vision is naive about the political reality: if such technology works, it will be deployed by states and organized crime for their own power purposes, resulting not in one artificial god but in multiple warring gods.
“transhumanism it affects even thinkers of interest like uh uh harare because humans is the human species can become gods by um uh by linking up with ai and creating these post-human this post-human species well let's have a bit of realism here um if that happens if there are new species post-human species there won't be one there'll be several because again you look back in history stalin was interested for a while in pseudoscientific experiments being carried on between apes”
The British government's appointment of figures like Cameron and Osborne—whom Gray characterizes as 'the two posh boys'—to positions of economic and foreign policy responsibility led to disastrous China policy based on naive assumptions about market-driven liberalization, demonstrating the dangers of class-based selection of elites without subject-matter expertise.
“as recently as 10 years ago in britain we had uh uh a prime minister uh we had um david cameron um um [Music] george osborne who by the way when i visited beijing i found them referred to as the two posh boys really with contempt open contempt this is why they were still in power”
The next American presidential election is critical and unpredictable; the likely Republican winner (even if not Trump) might be 'an American version of Orban'—a tough professional politician, disciplined and intelligent, who could be worse than Trump because more effective at implementing anti-Western policy while appearing respectable.
“i fear that whoever the next president is looks more likely than not to be a republican and if it's a republican even if it's not trump it could be someone as bad or worse than trump but also more intelligent more self-disciplined if you had an american version of orban a tough professional politician very disciplined not way musical not capricious not narcissistic the way trump was you could be in a very bad situation in america”