John Bolton Warns: The System Is Breaking Down. The World’s Out of Control And No One's in Charge
What this covers
In this conversation with John Bolton, a former US National Security Advisor and UN ambassador who worked directly with Trump during his first term, the discussion centers on how Trump actually approaches foreign policy and makes national security decisions. Bolton draws on his insider experience to map the decision-making patterns he observed: Trump's reliance on personal relationships with foreign leaders, his tendency to listen primarily to whoever spoke last, and his habit of surrounding himself with advisers who reinforce rather than challenge his instincts. The core argument is that without an overarching strategy or philosophy, Trump processes decisions through a purely transactional lens—asking how each move benefits him personally—rather than calculating what serves American interests or manages long-term risk.
The conversation ranges across Trump's interactions with specific leaders (Putin, Zelensky, Kim Jong-un) to illustrate how personal rapport often misleads his judgment about state-to-state relations. Bolton examines the structural breakdown of the NSC coordination process after Trump cut the National Security Council staff from roughly 400 to 125–130, a reduction that has allowed departments to operate independently—he points to the Department of Defense halting Ukraine weapons shipments without presidential knowledge as evidence. He also addresses the credibility costs of Trump's pattern of big promises followed by non-delivery, the mixed signals sent to NATO about Article 5 commitments, and the damage inflicted by harsh public encounters with allies like Zelensky. On Ukraine specifically, Bolton argues Trump's recent supportive gestures stem not from wanting Ukrainian victory but from refusing personal association with losing, and that his ultimate goal is securing a Nobel Peace Prize rather than achieving a durable strategic outcome.
Trump's foreign policy is driven entirely by personal benefit and transactional relationships rather than grand strategy, making him fundamentally unpredictable and damaging to US alliances through erratic statements that undermine American credibility.
- Trump evaluates all foreign policy through personal benefit ('What does this have for me?') rather than US strategic interests, making him susceptible to personal relationships with foreign leaders who do not reciprocate his view of friendship
- Trump's pattern of making maximalist threats and promises he does not follow through on (tariffs, sanctions, NATO withdrawal) creates transaction costs by introducing massive uncertainty into US commitments, raising the cost of alliance for partners
- The removal of institutional checks (reducing NSC staff from 400 to 125-130, combining Secretary of State and National Security Advisor roles) and preference for 'yes men' over advisors who present alternatives has broken down the policy coordination process that replaced post-WWII anarchy
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There are transaction costs when a leader says one thing and does another; it is not cost-free to take positions and act as though you never said anything about them, even if maximalist bargaining positions are sometimes strategically correct.
“What Trump doesn't understand and doesn't understand, I think, uh, from his career in New York real estate, is that there are transaction costs when you say one thing and do another. It's not costfree to take positions and then act like you never said anything about it before. I'm not saying you don't sometimes take a maximalist bargaining position. May maybe that's the right thing to do, but it ought to be part of a strategy.”
European NATO members are finally increasing defense spending primarily because of Russia's 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine rather than because of Trump's blunt threats, and using crude coercion to get results—rather than reasoned argument about the growing Russian threat—invites more of that destructive conduct in the future.
“I think the bigger effect though was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 followed by the second invasion in 2022... that uh is finally motivating people.”
Introducing massive uncertainty into what an American president says causes the cost of being a US ally to rise as allies become less confident they can rely on the United States and less willing to undertake joint strategic planning.
“And if you introduce massive uncertainty into what an American president says, people find that the cost of being an ally begins to get higher and higher. That may maybe they're not as safe as they might be. Maybe they can't count on the United States. uh and they're less willing to to do things that they undertake as allies because they think there's a strategic plan that all the allies are following.”
Having a single cabinet member (Marco Rubio) double as both Secretary of State and national security adviser undermines the proper NSC process because a national security adviser must be an honest broker outside any other bureaucracy, ensuring all stakeholders are heard; the Kissinger precedent was an exceptional crisis-era exception that Ford soon ended by appointing Scowcroft.
“when one cabinet member is also functioning as national security adviser in a properly functioning policy process, other people feel left out”
Trump believes that if he has good personal relations with the head of a foreign government, then the US automatically has good state-to-state relations with that country—a belief that explains why he thought he could resolve the Russia-Ukraine war in 24 hours by sitting down with his 'friend' Putin, even though Putin pursues fixed Russian national interests regardless of any personal rapport.
“He believes that if he has good personal relations with the head of a foreign government, then the US has good state-to-state relations with that country.”
Trump tends to listen to whoever was the last person in the room and seeks out people he expects to agree with his initial hunch; he can sometimes be persuaded primarily by arguments that he will personally benefit in prestige, public approval, or stock market reaction, rather than by normal policy debate.
“sometimes you could persuade him usually by saying that he would benefit personally in terms of prestige or public approval or uh the the approval of the stock markets”
Trump's pattern of making big promises and big threats that he then fails to deliver on (the 'taco' / Trump Always Chickens Out phenomenon) reflects a failure to understand transaction costs: taking positions and then abandoning them is not cost-free, and a maximalist bargaining position only works as part of a coherent strategy, which Trump lacks.
“What Trump doesn't understand... is that there are transaction costs when you say one thing and do another. It's not costfree to take positions and then act like you never said anything about it before.”
Putin does not view himself as Trump's friend and is pursuing Russian national interests independent of Trump's personal feelings, meaning Trump's belief in their friendship is not reciprocated.
“Well, that didn't turn out to be true because whatever Putin thinks of Trump, and I don't think he sees him as his friend, Putin knows what he thinks Russian national interests are. And that's what he's pursuing. He's not pursuing a deal uh to make Donald Trump happy or to make him happy. He's got a completely different set of objectives than Trump does.”
Marco Rubio serving as both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor—the only time this has happened since Henry Kissinger in the Nixon administration—represents a dangerous institutional breakdown because it creates conflicts of interest and excludes other departments from the policy process.
“You know, the only other time besides Marco Rubio that that has happened is when during the Nixon administration when Henry Kissinger uh for about a year and a half filled both roles. That was an extraordinary period obviously in American history. Uh as Nixon was being forced out of office, people saw Kissinger as a real source of stability. Uh but Gerald Ford decided fairly soon after he became president that while he obviously wanted to keep Kissinger as Secretary of State, he needed a separate national security adviser and he promoted Skraftoft who had been Kissinger's deputy. So with all due respect to Marco Rubio, he's not a Henry Kissinger and we're not in a crisis situation.”
Trump's assertion that he will do one thing or accomplish something he is not truly serious about undermines American influence globally rather than expanding it, despite drawing media attention to Trump personally.
“the assertion that he's going to do one thing or he he will accomplish something that he's not not really serious about when he says it undercuts American influence. It doesn't expand it. It draws attention to Donald Trump, that's for sure, which he likes, but it doesn't necessarily lead to a more cohesive or better led alliance.”
Trump cut the National Security Council staff from about 400 to roughly 125-130, a dramatic reduction that sets the structure back 30-40 years and has caused the NSC coordination process to break down, allowing departments to act independently—exemplified by the Department of Defense halting weapons and ammunition to Ukraine without the president knowing.
“he took the the staff size from about 400... down to between 125 and 130. That kind of dramatic reduction uh really puts you back 30 or 40 years”
If the US genuinely wanted to stop Russia earning hard currency from oil and gas, it should have prohibited Russian exports outright rather than using a price-cap mechanism, which was adopted only because politicians feared higher gasoline prices if Russian oil left the international market; Trump's sanctioning of India but not China—which buys far more Russian oil—shows he is not serious about shifting the war's direction.
“we just should have prohibited their export and not tried this price cap mechanism because because politicians were afraid that uh consumer prices at the gasoline pump would go up”
When an American president introduces massive uncertainty into what he says, allies find the cost of being an ally rises because they can no longer rely on or predict US behavior, which ultimately undercuts rather than expands American influence.
“if you introduce massive uncertainty into what an American president says, people find that the cost of being an ally begins to get higher and higher”
Trump has no overarching philosophy or national security grand strategy and does not engage in policy in the conventional sense; he is episodic, ad hoc, and transactional, making the move directly in front of him rather than playing a complex long-term game.
“He doesn't have an o overarching philosophy. He doesn't have a national security grand strategy... He's very episodic, ad hoc, transactional”
The manner and tone in which statements are made often matters more than the content of what is being said—Europeans might agree with the argument that Europe needs to stop freeloading and pay for defense, but the way it's phrased causes significant damage to US standing.
“it's often less about what the Donald Trump or other people from administration are saying, but about how they're saying it. For example, a lot of Europeans would agree with the arguments they're making about the fact that Europe needs to stop freeloading and we need to start paying for our own defense. But it's often the way of how it's phrased is that what's making quite a lot of damage to the United States standing.”
Trump sees everything solely through the prism of how it benefits him personally—not necessarily financially but in terms of his presidency—rather than asking what is in the US strategic interest, what the risks are, or what the opportunities are.
“like all one-year-olds, they see everything solely through the prism. How does this benefit me?”
Trump's relationship with NATO behaves like ocean waves—appearing favorable at the crest when he says nice things, but not durable—and he continues to suggest the US should not defend NATO members that fail to meet spending targets, a stance the Russians find very interesting.
“it's like the waves of the ocean with Trump. So, today it looks pretty good. We're at the crest of a wave... that's not going to last.”
The 2019 Trump-Zelensky phone call—in which Trump pressured Zelensky to investigate alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election and to find Hillary Clinton's server—left Zelensky with little stored goodwill in Trump's personal esteem, contributing to the hostile February 2025 Oval Office encounter that JD Vance worsened.
“this really goes back to the summer of 2019 and Trump's famous phone call with Zalinski about whether the uh government of Ukraine at the time had interfered in the 2016 US presidential election”
Zelinsky had 'not a lot of capital built up in Trump's personal esteem' coming into their February 2025 meeting due to the 2019 impeachment fallout over the Ukraine security assistance withheld during Trump's investigation into election interference claims.
“this really goes back to the summer of 2019 and Trump's famous phone call with Zalinski about whether the uh government of Ukraine at the time had interfered in the 2016 US presidential election uh which Trump thought was the case. and he wanted Zalinski to investigate uh to find Hillary Clinton's computer server, which he thought was hidden somewhere in Ukraine, to find out what the previous Ukrainian government had done to help Biden get uh reelected. Uh and and he believed this and he believed that Zilinski hadn't given him satisfaction. Now, he did in 2019 turn the security assistance to Ukraine back on, but his his association uh with that that whole affair really was tainted by his first impeachment, which was all about uh whether he had tried to blackmail Zilinski in that call. So, Zilinsky didn't have a lot of capital built up in Trump's personal esteem.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and subsequent events have finally motivated European defense spending increases, which is 'a bigger effect' than Trump's aggressive rhetoric in motivating European NATO members.
“I think the bigger effect though was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 followed by the second invasion in 2022. Uh and and everything that's been happening since then that uh is finally motivating people.”
Trump believed during the 2019 call with Zelenskyy that the Ukrainian government had interfered in the 2016 US presidential election and wanted Zelenskyy to investigate Hillary Clinton's computer server which Trump thought was hidden in Ukraine.
“Trump's famous phone call with Zalinski about whether the uh government of Ukraine at the time had interfered in the 2016 US presidential election uh which Trump thought was the case. and he wanted Zalinski to investigate uh to find Hillary Clinton's computer server, which he thought was hidden somewhere in Ukraine”
The NSC was established after World War II because Congress recognized the US was in a different, much more complex world and the president needed coordination mechanisms to replace the 'basically anarchy' that had existed before where different departments did their own thing.
“The whole point of setting up the NSC process was that Congress recognized after 1945 that we were in a different much more complex world and that to help the president make critical decisions, he needed something uh to replace the basically the anarchy that had existed before.”
In his second term Trump deliberately selected yes-men and yes-women rather than advisers who would present alternatives, facts, and cost-benefit analyses, because in his first term he came to see such advisers as trying to obstruct him; this advisory structure explains much of what has happened in the second term.
“he wanted in the second term yes men and yes women. He didn't want advisors who said well Mr. President have you considered the following alternatives”
Gerald Ford decided that despite wanting to keep Kissinger as Secretary of State, the NSC needed a separate national security adviser, and he promoted Brent Scowcroft who had been Kissinger's deputy.
“Gerald Ford decided fairly soon after he became president that while he obviously wanted to keep Kissinger as Secretary of State, he needed a separate national security adviser and he promoted Skraftoft who had been Kissinger's deputy.”
During the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger filled both the national security adviser and Secretary of State roles for about a year and a half, during an extraordinary period when Nixon was being forced out of office and Kissinger was seen as a source of stability.
“The only other time besides Marco Rubio that that has happened is when during the Nixon administration when Henry Kissinger uh for about a year and a half filled both roles. That was an extraordinary period obviously in American history. Uh as Nixon was being forced out of office, people saw Kissinger as a real source of stability.”
Trump applied the same personal relationship framework to Kim Jong-un after their Singapore meeting, claiming 'We fell in love' despite Kim Jong-un not reciprocating this view.
“after after Trump met Kim Jong-un for the first time in Singapore, he said to the press, "We fell in love." Well, I I I I don't know what Kim Jong-un felt about that meeting, but I can tell you he didn't fall in love with Trump.”
Trump administration officials largely don't care about the negative second-order consequences of how they deliver messages (an ends-justify-the-means attitude), but the harsh delivery—seen in the Oval Office Zelensky clash and Vance's Munich speech—does real damage to US standing, even when the underlying argument (Europe must pay for its own defense) is one many Europeans accept.
“I think they really don't care and I think it's a kind of ends justifies the means. If they get to what they want, they don't care how much turmoil and unhappiness they cause”
Charles Krauthammer said about 10-12 years ago that he had misjudged Trump, originally thinking he was 11 years old in his thinking but realizing he was 10 years off—Trump is actually a one-year-old who sees everything solely through the prism of personal benefit.
“There was an American political commentator now deceased named Charles Krauthammer, very very astute man uh who 10 or 12 years ago began watching Trump and uh he later said uh told me I think he said it publicly said you know he had misjudged Trump. He originally thought he was an 11 year old, but he realized he was 10 years off. He's a one-year-old.”
At the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, Trump had not decided whether to withdraw from NATO until the very moment his microphone was turned on, asking Bolton just minutes before whether to do it, and neither Bolton, Pompeo, nor Mattis knew what he would say until he said it.
“literally just a few minutes before his microphone got turned on, he called me up to the conference table and said, "What should we do? Should we do it or not?"”
Trump's recent supportive statements toward Ukraine (saying they could win, continuing weapons sales to NATO members for transfer, and providing intelligence) stem not from a desire for Ukraine to win but from his desire to get out of a situation he is not winning, because he divides the world into winners and losers and refuses to be associated with losing; his ultimate motivation is the Nobel Peace Prize.
“He wants out of this situation... he divides the world into winners and losers. He is a winner... and he's not winning now in the Ukraine Russia situation.”
The 2025 televised moment between Trump and Zelinsky in the White House burned through decades of goodwill that the United States had built around the world.
“Talking about the moment with Zalinski in the White House, you said previously about that moment that it being televised on television, it burned through decades of goodwill that the United States have built around the world.”
Trump's primary cognitive framework is evaluating everything through the prism 'How does this benefit me?' rather than asking what is in US strategic interest, what are the challenges, risks, and opportunities.
“He had misjudged Trump. He originally thought he was an 11 year old, but he realized he was 10 years off. He's a one-year-old. And like all one-year-olds, they see everything solely through the prism. How does this benefit me? Uh not necessarily in financial terms, but in anyway, so here's here's X. Well, that's very interesting. What does X have for me? Uh he doesn't ask what's in the US strategic interest? what what are our uh what what are what are the challenges we face? What are the risks? What are the opportunities? He just says what how is this going to benefit the Donald Trump presidency?”
Trump does not have an overarching philosophy or national security grand strategy; instead he is episodic, ad hoc, and transactional, making moves right in front of him without longer-term strategic planning despite supporters' claims he plays 'three-dimensional chess'.
“He doesn't have an o overarching philosophy. He doesn't have a national security grand strategy. He basically does not understand or engage in policy the way we normally define that term. He's very episodic, ad hoc, transactional uh are words that have been used to describe him. But it's uh you know many of his supporters will say he's actually playing a complex game of three-dimensional chess when in fact he's not. He's making the move right in front of him and that's it.”
Trump was literally uncertain about whether to withdraw from NATO until minutes before speaking at the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, calling Bolton to ask 'What should we do? Should we do it or not?' and Trump ultimately put his foot 'over the line and then pulled it back' without fully withdrawing.
“I was with him at the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels. We had been talking earlier in the day about uh what he was going to say and would he withdraw from NATO. And literally just a few minutes before his microphone got turned turned on. He called me up to the conference table and said, "What should we do? Should we do it or not?" And I said, "I would go up to the line and not go over it." Went back to my chair and Mike Pompeo and uh Jim Mattis were sitting there and they said, "Well, what did he say? What's he going to do?" And I said, "I don't know." And I didn't know. And none of the three of us knew until Trump actually said it.”
Putin showed 'close to contempt' for Trump up to and including at the Alaska summit where 'Trump got nothing out of that' and Putin concluded Russia had 'a free hand in Ukraine' thereafter.
“At the same time, Putin was showing close to contempt for Trump uh up to and including at the Alaska summit where Trump got nothing out of that. and Putin I think concluded that Russia had a free hand in Ukraine thereafter.”
Trump reduced the National Security Council staff from 400 (even which Bolton considers somewhat large) to 125-130, a dramatic reduction that puts the US back 30-40 years before the modern national security structure was established, breaking down coordination among departments.
“uh he took the the staff size from about 400, which even I would say is a little bit large, but from about 400 down to between 125 and 130. That kind of dramatic reduction uh really puts you back 30 or 40 years uh well before the kind of contemporary version of the national security structure was put in place.”
In his second administration, Trump deliberately surrounded himself with 'yes men' and 'yes women' who would agree with him rather than advisors who present alternatives, facts, and cost-benefit analysis, because he viewed such advisors in his first term as attempting to obstruct him.
“he wanted in the second term yes men and yes women. He didn't want advisors who said well Mr. President have you considered the following alternatives A B C D have you looked at these facts? Have you weighed the pros and cons of one course of action versus another uh because he he came in his first term to see people who did that uh as trying to obstruct him.”
Trump's stated support for Ukraine is not because he wants Ukraine to win the war but because he 'divides the world into winners and losers,' considers himself 'always a winner,' realizes he is 'not winning now in the Ukraine Russia situation,' and therefore wants to 'get out of it and go do something else' and pursue a Nobel Peace Prize.
“but that's not because Trump has now decided he really wants Ukraine to win the war. He wants out of this situation. Uh he divides the world into winners and losers. He is a winner. He is always a winner and he's not winning now in the Ukraine Russia situation. So the answer is don't don't wait around for things to change. Get out of it and go do something else. Uh and hope that that will produce an outcome maybe in the Middle East that will finally winning the Nobel Peace Prize, which is what he's really after here,”
Trump makes both big promises that he doesn't deliver on and big threats that he also doesn't deliver on, illustrating that his statements in both directions are unreliable, as evidenced by the Wall Street joke about 'TACO' (Trump Always Chickens Out) regarding tariffs.
“it really goes in both directions. Number one, he promises great results that he doesn't deliver and he makes big threats that he also doesn't deliver on. Uh the tariffs are a good example of that. I mean, he he was uh at one point proposing really extraordinary tariffs and has backed off to a significant degree, not entirely, but but somewhat anyway, which led to the famous joke about on Wall Street about taco, the Mexican food, which also stands for Trump always chickens out.”
For 20-30 years, the US and traditional Republican conservatives tried politely to get NATO allies to increase defense spending, and 'it didn't give uh sort of traditional Republican conservatives much satisfaction that after being polite for 20 or 30 years and not getting results that it took Trump to uh to get people's attention.'
“but it doesn't it doesn't give uh sort of traditional Republican conservatives much satisfaction that after being polite for 20 or 30 years and not getting results that it took Trump to uh to get people's attention.”
Zelenskyy did not wisely handle the February 2025 meeting with Trump by getting into a televised discussion in front of TV cameras before they had a chance to sit down privately to discuss necessary matters.
“I I think he now realizes it was not the wisest thing to do to get into a discussion with Trump in front of TV cameras before they had had a chance to sit down privately to talk about what was necessary.”
Trump's administration doesn't care about the negative consequences and turmoil caused by aggressive statements on Europe and NATO; they operate on an 'ends justifies the means' principle where they don't care how much unhappiness they cause if they get what they want.
“Well, I think I think it's a combination of both. I think they really don't care and I think it's a kind of ends justifies the means. If they get to what they want, they don't care how much turmoil and unhappiness they cause in getting there, but it does have an effect. And uh uh and it's and it's primarily negative for the United States.”
European leaders could have achieved NATO defense spending increases without 'the sound and fury' of Trump's threats if they had sat down with the US and said 'we all know that the Russian threat is growing. What are you going to do to spend more?'
“I I think on the European side, people ought to think about that because because it's inviting more of that kind of conduct in the future when if we just sat down and said, "Look, we all we all know that the Russian threat is growing. What are you going to do to spend more? We we might have been able to get there without the without the sound and fury."”
Trump can sometimes be persuaded on issues by telling him he would benefit personally in terms of prestige, public approval, or stock market approval.
“sometimes you could persuade him usually by saying that he would benefit personally in terms of prestige or public approval or uh the the approval of the stock markets and that sort of thing.”
Trump still says that if NATO members don't meet spending targets, the US should not defend them, which 'is something the Russians must find very very very interesting.'
“He still says, you know, if if you don't meet the NATO spending target, I don't think the US should should defend your country, which is something the Russians must find very very very interesting.”
Zelinsky worked hard to develop a personal relationship with Trump and has done 'a very good job of regaining lost ground' in restoring Trump's personal goodwill toward Ukraine.
“But as I said, Zalinsky worked hard to develop the personal relationship and I think he has done a very good job of regaining lost ground.”
Trump has not imposed new sanctions on Russia for oil and gas sales despite having 'perfectly valid reasons' to do so, and has selectively sanctioned India but not China despite China buying more Russian oil and gas than India, indicating he will not shift US policy on Russia.
“he has, despite any number of perfectly valid reasons, not sanctioned Russia yet for its uh uh its uh its its sale of oil and and gas. Now, that's in part because the US and EU sanctions on Russia in that regard are badly written. If we wanted to stop Russia from earning hard currency by international sales of oil and gas, uh we just should have prohibited their export and not tried this price cap mechanism because because politicians were afraid that uh consumer prices at the gasoline pump would go up if we took all Russia's oil off the international market. uh uh he Trump sanctioned India but not China which has bought a lot more Russian oil and gas than India has.”
Trump said 'with all due respect to Marco Rubio, he's not a Henry Kissinger and we're not in a crisis situation,' arguing that Rubio serving as both secretary of state and national security adviser is only acceptable in extraordinary circumstances.
“So with all due respect to Marco Rubio, he's not a Henry Kissinger and we're not in a crisis situation.”
The breakdown of the NSC process has resulted in departments acting independently without coordination, such as the Department of Defense unilaterally halting weapons and ammunition supplies to Ukraine months before the President became aware of it.
“the whole NSC process has broken down that there's not adequate coordination among the different departments. You see uh the department of defense for instance on its own basically deciding some months ago to halt the supply of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. President didn't know anything about it.”
Trump believed Putin was his friend during his first administration, as evidenced by how they interacted with one another and Bolton could see it in their interactions.
“Uh he did think Putin was a friend. He thought when I started Putin was a friend. And I could see it in the way they interacted with one another.”
Trump says he would continue to sell weapons and ammunition to European NATO members, which could then pass them to Ukraine, and would continue providing military intelligence to Ukraine, which is very important for Ukraine.
“He would continue to sell weapons and ammunition to European NATO members that could pass it in turn along to Ukraine and that he'd continue to provide military intelligence which is very very important for Ukraine.”
If Trump wanted to meaningfully shift American policy on Russia, he would impose new tariffs and new sanctions on Russia, which he has not done and 'frankly I don't think will do'.
“if if he really wanted to shift the uh the effect of American policy he would impose new tariffs new sanctions on Russia which he has not done and frankly I don't think will do.”
Trump's stance on NATO is like 'waves of the ocean': appearing positive today (crest of wave) but not expected to last, with unpredictability that requires ongoing reassessment in coming months.
“Well, I think it's like the waves of the ocean with Trump. So, today it looks pretty good. We're at the crest of a wave. He says nice things about NATO. Uh but that's not going to last. Let's talk about this in another couple months. We'll see what he's saying about NATO at that point.”
The televised Oval Office confrontation with Zelensky burned through decades of goodwill the United States had built around the world.
“you said previously about that moment that it being televised on television, it burned through decades of goodwill that the United States have built around the world”
The proper National Security Council structure, established after WWII by Brent Scowcroft, requires a dedicated National Security Advisor who is not part of another bureaucracy to serve as an 'honest broker' ensuring all departments' voices are heard, all information is gathered, options are fairly presented, and the president is informed before deciding.
“the National Security Council uh the best structure that it uh it ever had and the kind of ideal structure it should strive for was what Brent Skraftoft came up with first when he served President Ford and then later when he served for uh George HW Bush's presidency and that is a way of uh coordinating all the different departments and agencies that deal with national security, the defense department, the State Department, the intelligence community, Homeland Security, the Treasury Department, uh the the Department of Justice, a whole a whole range of uh people have interest and uh uh making sure that everybody who has an interest uh has their voice heard, that all of the pertinent information is gathered, that the options are presented fairly to the president, and and he has a chance to to probe and ask questions, and and make a decision”
Trump said after meeting Kim Jong-un in Singapore that 'we fell in love,' but Kim certainly did not reciprocate, illustrating the mismatch when Trump is in the room with such leaders.
“after Trump met Kim Jong-un for the first time in Singapore, he said to the press, "We fell in love."”
Trump made a notable commitment to end the Russia-Ukraine war, claiming he could do it in 24 hours, and also prioritized tariffs and immigration control, but was very difficult to pin down on most other foreign policy issues beyond vague statements about wanting a strong military.
“He did say during the campaign he had certain priorities. He wanted to end the Russia Ukraine war. Thought he could do it in 24 hours. He talked a lot about tariffs, although he was not really specific about how he would go about it, but that was clearly going to be uh signi significant. Uh and he talked a lot about uh immigration and the the effect of trying to close uh US borders to illegal immigrants. Uh beyond that, it was very hard to kind of pin him down on many things.”
Bolton was the longest-serving national security adviser in Trump's first administration, with several others serving shorter tenures.
“you were, I think, if I'm correct, the longest serving national security adviser in his first administration because there have been several and most lasted quite a short time.”
Trump genuinely thought Vladimir Putin was his friend, both at the start of Bolton's tenure and visibly in the way the two interacted with one another.
“he did think Putin was his friend. He thought when I started Putin was a friend. And I could see it in the way they interacted with one another.”
Trump has considered sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine, a decision that appears close but has not yet been made.
“I hope he decides to send Tomahawk cruise missiles as well. That decision close apparently but not yet made.”
VP JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference threw 'gasoline on the whole thing' regarding Trump-Zelinsky tensions and made the situation worse.
“And I think Vice President Vance threw gasoline on the whole thing in the middle of it and just made it worse.”