
The Problem With America’s New Security Strategy
What this covers
This is a conversation between host Pyotr Kurzin and Dmitri Alperovich about the new National Security Strategy (NSS)) and what it does and does not say about American conduct. Alperovich's central caution is that such documents rarely determine policy in any administration, since decisions are made in real time in the situation room. He also argues this one was written by ideological constituencies rather than by the president. The talk moves from the document to Europe's position, then to the Trump approach to deals, tariffs, and finally the fight over Russian assets.
On the substance, the range is wide. On Taiwan, Alperovich notes the shift from "oppose any change in the status quo" to "will not support" one, and wonders whether the wording was deliberate or sloppy. He also points to unusually explicit references to semiconductors and the Second Island chain. He argues that telling Europeans to stay out of the Indo-Pacific is a bipartisan position, because European power projection there is marginal next to Japan and Australia. On Europe, he describes three dependences: energy, the Chinese market, and American protectionism. He cites steep German carmaker sales losses in China, down 70% at Volkswagen, 50% at Porsche and 30% at BMW, and says European leaders should de-risk from China out of self-preservation.
The discussion turns contentious on a few points. Alperovich says that Donald Trump would take Chinese investment in the Western Hemisphere on profitable terms, because he is transactional rather than committed to the Monroe Doctrine. He credits tariffs with raising prices, bringing in revenue and shifting trade deficits, but denies they cause lasting inflation. He also calls the USMCA unequivocally better than NAFTA. The last section covers the proposal to seize Russian sovereign assets. He warns of risks to the euro and the European Central Bank, and of a precedent others could invoke. He observes that Belgium, which holds the assets, has effectively blocked the plan. He ties this to Ukraine's financing needs and to Urals crude falling below $50 a barrel.
Trump's National Security Strategy and foreign policy are primarily driven by transactional business logic and personal relationships rather than ideological commitments, making the official strategy documents unreliable guides to actual policy decisions.
- Trump's personal relationships with European leaders contradict the NSS criticism of European civilization decline, suggesting the document reflects staff ideology rather than Trump's views
- Trump views international relations as business transactions (mergers, hostile takeovers) rather than geopolitical competition, which better explains his approach to tariffs, Ukraine, and great power relations than traditional strategic frameworks
- The NSS does not represent Trump's actual priorities on Taiwan, China containment, or the Western Hemisphere—it reflects hawkish cabinet members while Trump himself is transactionally focused on deal-making and avoiding entanglement
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Wars are harder to end than they appear; there are entrenched interests and historical factors on both sides of conflicts that cannot be easily undone with business deals and economic incentives, as the Trump administration is learning.
“Yeah. Well, look on on Thailand, Cambodia, you know, I think he's finding out and frankly Russ Ukraine as well and Middle East is that wars are a lot harder to end than than it may seem. And there are there's a lot of history, a lot of entrenched interests on both sides of of these conflicts that are not so easy to undo with just business deals and economic incentives. So I think the uh administration is is is learning hard lessons there.”
Tariffs are defined as one-time price increases by nature and therefore do not create systemic inflation, making Trump and Secretary Bessen correct that tariffs raise prices but don't sustain inflationary flywheels.
“I think the administration is actually right that they're not really contributing to systemic inflation because by definition tariffs are a one-time price increase, right? They're not sustaining sort of uh flywheel of of uh price increases. So even Secretary Besson says yes, you know, prices have risen, but they're not going to continue to rise because of tariffs because we're not we're not increasing tariffs continuously.”
German and European workers losing jobs in automotive due to Chinese competition will vote against parties in power, creating political instability that should motivate European leaders to de-risk from China based on self-preservation rather than as a US favor.
“The workers working in those industries are going to lose their jobs. And guess who they're going to vote for? Not the party in power, right?”
Europe does not function as a single unified market despite claims to the contrary; European countries differ radically in language, culture, regulatory approaches, and go-to-market strategies, making cross-national business operations fundamentally different from US domestic market expansion.
“Europe prides itself on calling itself a single market, but it really is not. And and anyone who has done business in Europe, as I have in the technology sphere, can tell you that the way you sell in Europe and the way you sell to America, drastically different, right? If I'm selling a widget in Alabama, the way I sell it in Seattle is absolutely no different. It's the same language, same culture, same go to market approach. America truly is a single market. The way I sell in Finland and Spain, oh my god, right? Different cultures, different languages, different approaches, different goto market strategies.”
European military projection power in the Pacific is very limited, and American allies like Japan and Australia already provide superior coalition capabilities, making European military contribution to Indo-Pacific defense essentially insignificant.
“European powers have very very limited projection powers in the Pacific. um and um you know their limited military resources needs need to be focused in the view of America on their own issues that we might be less uh willing able uh to help them with and and not um to help us vis uh on the military side”
Seizing Russian sovereign assets as proposed by some European leaders poses serious dangers to the euro and the European Central Bank's stability, and sets a dangerous precedent that other countries could use to justify seizing assets of nations they consider hostile.
“A lot of dangers there for for the euro, the stability of of the European uh central bank. If you set this precedent that you're going to seize sovereign assets, how you would define that without triggering lots of other people coming in and and saying well you know this country is al also Ron me why don't we seize their assets as well is very very difficult”
German automotive companies have lost 70% of Volkswagen's sales in China, 50% of Porsche's sales in China, and 30% of BMW's sales in China over the last three years, with losses driven by Chinese EVs being better quality, cheaper, and more popular than European alternatives.
“Volkswagen lost 70% of its sales in China in the last three years. Porsche lost 50%. BMW lost 30%. And that's going to zero because the Chinese cars uh Chinese EVs BY and others are better. They're cheaper and uh um people just like them a lot more both in China and outside of China.”
Trump's tariffs have accomplished three things: they have raised prices, collected substantial government revenue (though contested in Supreme Court under AIPA statute), and adjusted US trade deficits with major trading partners.
“they have risen prices. No question about that... they have um you know in the administration's view they have accomplished some things you know President Trump very much focused on revenues so they have collected more revenues right yes it's mostly tax on American consumer but nevertheless you know you you've had more money coming into the US treasury... It has adjusted some of the trade deficits that we've had with nations.”
The NSS changed language on Taiwan from 'oppose any change in the status quo' to 'will not support the change in the status quo,' representing a weakening of US commitment to preventing forceful Chinese unification of Taiwan, with concern about whether this was intentional or sloppy wording.
“the change in the NSS was that we will not support the change in the status quo. So quite a bit of a sort of watering down of the position. Unclear if that's intentional or if someone was just sloppy with the wording there, but um certainly there's there's some concern in in Taiwan about that.”
The NSS contains unusual explicit language about Taiwan's importance in semiconductor production and strategic location on the Second Island chain, which is more direct Taiwan discussion than previous administrations' national security strategies.
“there's quite a bit on Taiwan and and more than you've seen from traditional national security strategies in there. It talks about the importance of Taiwan in terms of semiconductor production, the importance of Taiwan because of the direct access to the Second Island chain. So there there's quite a bit of stuff in there that you have not seen previous administrations discussed so directly.”
National Security Strategy documents should not be read as determining actual policy because decisions get made in real-time based on evolving situations in the situation room, not by consulting the NSS document, and this has been true across all administrations.
“policy does not get decided by saying, you know, in the situation room, let's go back to the NSS and see what it said and guide our view on on the decision-m. That's just not how things ever work. And things get decided in the moment based on the situation as it unfolds.”
Ukraine does not matter as much to American interests as it does to Russian interests, as demonstrated by Obama's 2014 observation that Ukraine matters more to Russia, which represents a rare realist assessment of American strategic interests that has been maintained by both Democratic and Republican administrations.
“You know, President Obama, you know, said back in 2014, a post invasion of Crimea that Ukraine just matters a lot more to Russia than it does to America. It was sort of a rare realist description of American interest in that particular part of the world. Um that but it but it actually um you know continued fairly well under you know future administrations and even President Biden right at the outset of the war said American troops will not be sent to fight for Ukraine. America unkine just does not matter that much to American interests.”
Political divisions within Europe are preventing unified response to challenges (as exemplified by Hungary's obstructionism), making collective European action difficult regardless of the size of European population or GDP.
“It is that exact collectivist approach that seems to be the problem, right? When you've got the Hungaries, the the different countries that don't want to be dictated by Brussels. There's a problem there.”
Europe faces dire structural problems created by its three dependences: high energy prices from reduced Russian gas reliance, lost Chinese market access that was previously crucial, and increasing American protectionism, leaving Europe with very limited options for forward movement.
“Europe doesn't really have many options, right? It's stuck between high energy prices because of reduced reliance on Russian gas, reliance on the Chinese market that is now going away, reliance on the US market which is becoming more protectionist. So Europe is stuck between a rock and a hard place. And more than ever, I think it it is in in really really dire shapes and without uh great answers for how to move forward.”
Biden stated on five occasions that American troops would not be sent to fight, highlighting that Taiwan is much more important to American interests than Ukraine, as Biden explicitly differentiated Taiwan's strategic importance on multiple occasions.
“famously he said quite quite the opposite on five occasions about Taiwan. So it's a reflection of how American estab political establishment on both sides of the aisle really see Ukraine.”
The Trump administration's view that European troops won't contribute meaningfully to Indo-Pacific strategy is not just Trump's opinion but represents the view of both Trump and Biden administrations, both of which told Europe to stay out of the Indo-Pacific and focus on their own backyard and Russia.
“I actually don't think that any administration in recent years, whether it's the Biden administration or the Trump administration, really thought that Europe would contribute much if anything on the Taiwan issue. In fact, the opposite has been the case where both the Trump administration and the Biden administration before that were telling the Europeans, look, why don't you stay out of the Indoacific? We are the Indopacific power.”
Trump does not value the relationship with Europe, nor does he want to ditch it—he believes the relationship is sustainable as long as European NATO members increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, which is Trump's primary condition for maintaining the NATO alliance.
“he doesn't want to ditch Europe. I think he actually values the relationship that we have with Europe. He hasn't pulled out of NATO. He's convinced himself that, you know, as long as Europeans step up and as long as they pay up as as he sees it into into NATO, the the famous 5% goal that there's nothing wrong with staying in NATO.”
Belgium has refused to budge on Russian sovereign asset seizure (as of the recent week), effectively closing the door on this proposal since the Russian assets are stored in Brussels, giving Belgium veto power over the proposal.
“we've discussed this a number of times. I've always thought it was very unlikely that they would move on those assets... But I think we've seen the door more or less close on it this week with Belgium basically refusing to budge there of course a critical piece of this because you are clear where those funds are stored is is in Brussels. So, as much as the many European leaders would love to have this uh uh this savior, financial savior, if you will, of uh grabbing the Russian assets”
Ukraine needs financial support as much as it ever has, with winter 2024/2025 being the toughest period of the war since 2022, and European nations are showing divisions in willingness to provide military aid, weapons, and financial support to sustain Ukrainian government operations and social systems.
“Ukraine needs money as much as it ever has. this winter is going to be the toughest uh period of this war since 2022. increase and I think you're seeing divisions within Europe, not just with Hungary, but even with others of being willing to write checks, uh, being willing to not just supply weapons, but uh, pay the the military, the Ukrainian military, pay the government that is not really taking many revenues right now, sustaining the social system in Ukraine at the time when the economic situation in Europe is is not going great either.”
Russian oil prices have dropped below $50 per barrel (specifically the Urals crude that Russia sells), creating severe budget pressure because Russia cannot bring significant money into the federal budget at this price point to fund military spending in Ukraine.
“And and uh things are getting particularly dire right now with the oil prices dropping. The price of the Urals uh the type of oil that Russia sells is now below 50 $50, which is uh not a price at which they can really significantly bring money into the Russian budget um to pay off for all this military spending.”
Trump would embrace Chinese investment in the Western Hemisphere if offered profitable business terms (such as a 50/50 equity split on a Panama facility) because his worldview is fundamentally transactional rather than ideologically committed to the Monroe Doctrine.
“Imagine the situation where President Xi calls President Trump and says, you know, I'm thinking about an investment project in, I don't know, let's say, Panama, where I'm going to put up uh money to finance support facility and I'm g give you 50% of the equity. Do you think Donald Trump says absolutely not stay out of the Western Hemisphere? I think he would embrace that uh and say let's go into business together.”
Trump USMCA (replacement for NAFTA) was a better deal for America unequivocally than the previous NAFTA agreement.
“Donald Trump believes that everyone's been screwing us and we needed to redo all these trade agreements. He did that in the first term with NAFTA and getting USMCA done, which was a deal that uh was better for America unequivocally than than NAFTA was.”
Trump used military force once in his current term against Iran, but it was a limited one-time bombing strike with no American troops on the ground and very limited danger to American pilots because Iranian air defenses had already been degraded by Israeli strikes.
“he's used, of course, military force once this year with Iran, but that was a one-time bombing strike with no American troops on the ground and really very limited danger to to American pilots at that point because the Iranian air defenses have been pummeled by the Israelis by the point that we came in.”
Trump has good relationships with President Macron and the Finnish president, texting regularly with Macron, and does not spend much time thinking deeply about Europe or picking favorites among European leaders.
“I've been told that President Mcronone and President Trump like text very very frequently, right? Have a good very good relationship. He has good relationship with the Finnish president, you know, and and others across Europe. I don't think he's like picking favorites. He likes Maloney, but you know, he likes lots of these folks and I don't think he actually spends much of his time thinking deeply about Europe.”
The Trump administration's National Security Strategy does not represent President Trump's actual views because it was written by ideological constituencies within the administration rather than reflecting the president's transactional approach to foreign policy.
“I actually don't think it represents the president's view. I think it's been written by various constituencies within the administration that are ideological on these issues and this president is anything but ideological.”
Informal trade deals achieved through tariff leverage may be more enforceable than formal trade agreements because they rely on Trump's credible willingness to immediately impose high tariffs on violators, whereas formal trade agreements rely on dispute mechanisms that take years and have limited deterrent effect.
“in many ways they're probably even more at least under the pro Trump administration more important and more enforcable than an actual legal trade agreement because in legal trade agreement you sort of set up these dispute mechanisms where you go to court or arbitration to mitigate issues of concern which can take many many years and has you could argue because of that time frame quite limited deterrent effect for parties to to not violate them. here because you have Donald Trump in office who will immediately institute credibly so high tariffs on a country that violates the agreement. You could argue that they're actually more enforcable than the trade treaties of the past.”
Trump views the world as composed of great power leaders (Xi, Putin) with which he deals on equal footing, and weaker nations like Venezuela that he can bully around or execute hostile takeovers against.
“Xiinping and Vladimir Putin to some extent are seen as leaders of strong countries with which you uh need to deal on a more equal footing and and others much less so and you can bully around”
Trump's stated goal of containing China within the first island chain reflects the views of hawkish cabinet members rather than Trump's own foreign policy preferences, as evidenced by Trump calling Xi Jinping a good friend and great leader.
“everything in the document around containing China within the first island chain is a representation of some people administration that are very hawkish on China... I don't actually think it represents the president's views... he says uh Xiinping is a good friend of his a great leader of China.”
Trump wants to end wars globally (Ukraine, Middle East, Thailand-Cambodia) primarily because he hates wars, sees them as wasteful, believes those who fight them are 'suckers and losers,' and wants to get credit for achieving peace through deal-making rather than because these conflicts directly threaten American interests.
“he's been very clear, not just Ukraine, but really all these conflicts around the world. He wants them to end, right? I think he wants them to end instead of both because he hates wars and thinks that wars are dumb and you know people that fight them are suckers and losers and why can't we just do business deals instead. Um and uh he also I think is very interested in in potentially getting a Nobel Peace Prize for all these conflicts that he's trying to end.”
Trump does not genuinely care about European civilization collapse as stated in the NSS because he personally enjoys Europe, visits his UK golf properties, was a fan of the Queen, celebrates Bastille Day in France, and this concern is actually a JD Vance ideological position rather than Trump's.
“he's quite a big fan of Europe. He, you know, likes to visit the United Kingdom and his uh golf properties there and was a big fan of the Queen. He likes the pompom circumstance in the history of Europe... I think it's a JD Vance issue, but not it's not a Donald Trump issue.”
European leaders would prefer to use seized Russian sovereign assets to fund Ukraine rather than drawing on their own taxpayer base, but this option is no longer viable due to Belgium's veto.
“as much as the many European leaders would love to have this uh uh this savior, financial savior, if you will, of uh grabbing the Russian assets to keep financing Ukraine as opposed to using their own taxpayer base to do so. Um I don't think it's likely.”
Trump's approach to Venezuela appears designed to achieve regime change through blockade and oil asset seizure without military ground operations, though it's unclear whether Trump ultimately wants to risk an actual military engagement with ground forces on Venezuelan territory.
“his preference obviously is not to go to war, but to get Maduro to flee and have some sort of takeover of um Venezuelan oil assets, I guess that that they're saying maybe belong to America somehow and were stolen from us... Venezuela could be quite different if this is actually a military engagement, not just a bombing strike on Maduro. if we actually put forces on land there. Not sure he wants to really do that, but but we'll see.”
The NSS described four particular European nation states (Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria) that the Trump administration wants to target, but this may not reflect Trump's actual priorities.
“The NSS described four particular nation states in Europe that the Trump administration wants to target. Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, and I think Austria, right?”
It is uncertain whether Russia is doing well or poorly in the Ukraine war, and 'things are not going well on the Russian side either,' suggesting both sides face difficulties rather than clear Russian military advantage.
“You know, things are not going well on the Russian side either. And and uh things are getting particularly dire right now with the oil prices dropping.”
The host is 'less pessimistic' than Demetri about Europe's future prospects, believing that a continent of half a billion people with huge GDP rivaling the U.S. and significant innovation capacity can collectively move forward despite current challenges.
“Interesting. I'm less pessimistic. Maybe that's cuz I'm rose tinted European, but I like to think that with a continent the size of half a billion, half a trillion people, huge GDP rivaling that of the US and the capacity to demonstrate innovation that we can that Europe can collectively move forward.”
The host asked whether Trump prioritizes Taiwan by pointing out the Trump administration recently announced a huge support package for Taiwan, interpreting this as evidence that Trump does prioritize Asia despite the NSS's apparent criticisms.
“there was very little mention of Taiwan. I think the American administration had sort of emphasized that it was basically continuation of what had preceded. But with this new huge support package or however you want to frame it, that shows a sign that sort of the Trump administration does still prioritize Asia or let me reframe the question.”