
Repo Market Goes NUCLEAR! Fed Unleashes Bazookas. How Will It Affect YOU?
What this covers
George Gammon's March 2020 video walks through the Federal Reserve's emergency response in the repo market in three steps: the numbers from the latest Fed statement, what the underlying problem is, and why the proposed fix makes things worse. It opens with Steve Liesman's CNBC report, in which he calls the trillion-dollar intervention "unprecedented." The figures are laid out in detail: $1.5 trillion in term repos, $60 billion a month in T-bills purchases, overnight operations of up to $175 billion, and $74.7 billion in oversubscribed 14-day and 25-day repos. A simple business-with-receivables example, featuring "Repo Randy," illustrates why losing access to funding can sink a solvent firm.
The middle section is the mechanics. Gammon separates cash from collateral, describes how the Fed buys assets from primary dealers in the hope they relay reserves onward, and explains how falling corporate bond prices push hedge funds to sell assets at a loss to buy pristine Treasuries. A clip from George Goncalves explains on-run versus off-run Treasuries, and Gammon uses the roughly 50 basis point spread to compare the moment with Lehman Brothers in 2008. He also argues that holders of gold and Bitcoin were forced to sell at a discount to get T-bills. Several of these readings are contested, as is his claim that the Fed's shift to buying across the yield curve amounts to explicit quantitative easing, and his skepticism of the Fed's coronavirus explanation.
The last stretch is forecast. Gammon argues only the government can create collateral, through deficit spending or helicopter money, and that this would raise inflation. That would push up the 10-year yield, force the Fed into yield curve control, and expand its balance sheet from $4.5 trillion toward $10 trillion or more. He calls the government the largest subprime borrower in history because of its short-term rollover needs, and he predicts food prices rising, big-ticket items like cars falling, and financial assets other than Treasuries declining further.
The 2020 repo market crisis reveals that the Fed cannot solve the underlying liquidity problem through money printing alone because the real shortage is pristine collateral, not cash; solving this requires government deficit spending that will inevitably trigger inflation and force yield curve control, creating a debt spiral.
- Repo market stress in March 2020 showed $74.7B in oversubscribed demand that the Fed's $1.5T in liquidity injections could not fully address
- The collateral shortage (not cash shortage) is evidenced by the on-run/off-run Treasury spread spiking to 50 basis points, approaching 2008 Lehman levels
- Only the government can create additional collateral through deficit spending, but this creates inflation pressures that force the Fed into yield curve control and unlimited balance sheet expansion
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When corporate bond markets crash and interest rates spike, hedge funds holding corporate bonds cannot trade those bonds to banks for pristine T-bills anymore because banks refuse to accept deteriorating collateral, forcing hedge funds to sell corporate bonds at steep losses to raise cash to buy Treasury bills from the open market to use as repo collateral
“when the corporate bond market crashes meaning interest rates go up prices go down the value of the assets the hedge funds have on their balance sheet collapse to make matters worse if they take those corporate bonds go back to the banks the banks say hell no we're not trading you that corporate garbage for our pristine t-bills the hedge funds have one choice sell their corporate bonds at any price take a big haircut so they can go into the Treasury market and buy the t-bills they need for the repo market”
The liquidity problem in the repo market consists of two separate components: (1) cash availability, which the Fed can address through money printing, and (2) collateral availability, which the Fed cannot create and only the government can create through deficit spending and Treasury issuance
“we know liquidity is the key to keeping the entire house of cards from collapsing in on itself but there's two components of the liquidity problem first is what everyone's focused on including the Fed cash second what nobody is paying attention to is collateral when we look at the repo market we understand there's two assets that are being traded from counterparty to counterparty not just the cash but also the collateral so the Fed could print trillions quadrillions of dollars and deposit those dollars with the primary dealers but if there was no collateral in the system whatsoever there still wouldn't be any liquidity in the system it'd be stuck with the Fed”
If the U.S. government deficit spends to create additional Treasury collateral (via modern monetary theory, helicopter money, or fiscal stimulus), this spending injects money into the real economy, increasing both the nominal money supply and the velocity of money, which when combined produces inflation
“spending all that funny money into the real economy we get into mmm tea and helicopter money but you guys know well from watching my videos inflation equals the money supply plus velocity but there's one thing I haven't talked about and insert the cervesa sickness that could reduce supply dramatically so even if velocity is going down or remaining consistent if the amount of supply is going down at a faster rate we still could see price inflation okay well we've got that now”
A business with $1,000 in customer receivables and a $2,000 debt payment due must obtain liquidity through the repo market by pledging collateral to 'Repo Randy' to bridge the $1,000 gap, and without access to this liquidity, the business will quickly go bankrupt regardless of its underlying assets
“this business has a customer that owes the business called a thousand dollars but it's got a debt payment coming due for two thousand dollars so they go right over to this gentleman who's looking very stylish with his hat double R for repo Randy repo Randy says okay I'll give you the thousand dollars that you need if you give me some of your collateral... if there's no liquidity for the businesses the financial institutions hedge funds or banks they'll go belly-up very very quickly”
The Fed's mechanism for injecting liquidity works by buying pristine collateral (Treasuries or mortgage-backed securities) from primary dealer banks and depositing newly created reserves into their accounts, with the expectation that these primary dealers will then lend those reserves into the broader repo market to other financial institutions
“the Fed has the primary dealer bank accounts the primary dealers are right here in the banks under the feds umbrella the Fed buys Treasuries or the pristine collateral or mortgage-backed securities from the banks and deposits the funny money they print out of thin air into their reserve accounts the Fed is hoping those primary dealers take the funny money the additional reserves and lend that into the repo market to other banks financial institutions and hedge funds”
On-run Treasury securities are newly issued bonds at auction that are highly liquid because they are actively traded daily by hedging and macro traders, while off-run securities are older outstanding Treasuries held in private portfolios with lower trading volume; on-run bonds therefore command a liquidity premium resulting in higher prices and lower yields than off-run bonds of the same maturity
“when the Treasury issues new bonds at auction those are considered on the run everything else outstanding is off the run”
During the March 2020 liquidity crisis, entities that held liquid assets like gold and Bitcoin were forced to sell them at sharp discounts to acquire Treasury bills, because those T-bills provide superior collateral characteristics (flexibility, acceptance in repo markets) compared to the raw cash from gold and Bitcoin sales, even though a naive analysis would suggest cash is preferable
“let's take it a step further to try to explain to a lot of you that I'm sure wondering why the price of assets like gold and Bitcoin liquid assets have completely tanked the last few weeks... they take the Bitcoin the gold they go into the market they sell it off in exchange for cash they take the cash go into the Treasury market to buy the tea bills they need for repo why don't they just take the cash that they receive from selling the gold and the Bitcoin to make their debt payment because it's not as flexible believe it or not as the tea bills themselves they go into a negative equity position and with the tea bills they don't really have to send that into the repo market”
In 2008 when Lehman Brothers failed, the basis point spread between on-run and off-run Treasury bonds spiked above 60 basis points, indicating a massive liquidity premium for the most liquid (and repo-eligible) Treasuries; in March 2020, the spread reached 50 basis points, approaching 2008 Lehman crisis levels, despite official claims that this crisis was about coronavirus disruptions rather than financial system stress
“back in 2008 when Lehman Brothers failed we can see the basis points spread between the two types of bonds spiked all the way above 60 basis points that tells us that there was a huge premium for the Treasuries that were most liquid why because they can be used as collateral in the repo market I'd like to point out that the average spread is about 14 basis points the next question becomes what was the spread yesterday when we had all these problems it got up to 50 basis points almost as high as the spread was when Lehman Brothers collapsed”
Overnight repo transactions were $103 billion yesterday with the Fed committed to doing overnight repos up to $175 billion, while 14-day term repos had $45 billion in actual transactions against $87.1 billion in demand (oversubscribed by $42.1 billion), and 25-day repos had $50 billion in transactions against $82.6 billion in demand (oversubscribed by $32.6 billion), for a total of $74.7 billion in oversubscribed repos across these tenors
“overnight repos yesterday a hundred and three billion... the Fed committed to doing overnight repos up to a hundred and seventy five billion... the fourteen day forty five billion in transactions were done but there was demand for eighty seven point 1 billion so it was over subscribed on the 14 day repos by forty two point 1 billion going onto the twenty five day repos fifty billion of transactions eighty two point six in demand so thirty two point six oversubscribed giving us a total of seventy four point 7 billion of oversubscribed repos”
As crap collateral gets repriced lower during a market crisis, repo market participants are herded out of lower-quality collateral and forced to buy pristine collateral (Treasury bills) at any price, as quoted from Jeff Snyder's analysis of the March 2020 repo dysfunction
“let's go to a tweet from Jeff Snyder yesterday as crap collateral that infected the repo system gets repriced as crap that herds repo participants out of the crap and into the pristine at any price”
The Fed's transition from buying only T-bills to buying all maturities of Treasuries constitutes explicit quantitative easing because the Federal Reserve's own definition of quantitative easing is that they are buying the long end of the yield curve
“they're transitioning per their website yesterday from buying tea bills to all maturities of Treasuries so this transition not really an operation twist like an operation caitlyn jenner the big deal here is since they're now buying and admitting to buying all maturities they can't say this isn't QE because the definition their own definition of quantitative easing is that they're buying the long end of the yield curve so this is an explicit QE”
The Fed's actions in March 2020 demonstrate they are extremely worried about collateral shortage, not just cash shortage, as evidenced by their purchase of $60 billion per month in short-term T-bills (parking pristine collateral on their balance sheet and removing it from the repo market) and their subsequent shift to buying the entire yield curve rather than only short-term T-bills
“if we look at the feds actions we can see they're also extremely worried about a lack of collateral going back to step number one you recall they're buying sixty billion dollars per month worth of short-term t-bills this is in addition to what they're doing in the repo market the repo market transactions are supposedly short-term overnight or term repo but the purchases of the t-bills they're parking on their balance sheet in other words they're taking all the best collateral out of the repo market they finally realized the unintended consequences so they came out with the report or with the announcement yesterday that said they were Caitlyn Jenner from short-term t-bill purchases to the entire yield curve this shows us that not only are the guys on real vision worried about this macro voice is Jeff Schneider but the Fed is as well it's not just about cash the liquidity problem is most likely even more so about a lack of collateral”
The Fed committed to $1 trillion in term repos ($500 billion in 3-month repos and $500 billion in 1-month repos on the initial day), with an additional $500 billion in 3-month term repos committed the following day, for a total of $1.5 trillion in term repos, plus $60 billion per month in T-bill purchases, representing the largest single monetary intervention in Fed history
“the Fed comes in in the morning sees the market falling out of bed and says whoa timeout fine fine fine we'll give you more liquidity we'll print up more funny money how about five hundred billion in three months term repos and we'll give it to you this afternoon additionally we'll do another five hundred billion in one month term repos tomorrow so one trillion dollars in total”
The Federal Reserve can only create bank reserves and monetary base; it cannot create additional collateral, which can only be generated by the U.S. government through deficit spending and Treasury issuance
“remember the Fed can only create reserves they can't create additional collateral the only entity that can do that job is you know it the government you're in solvent Uncle Sam that's right he can create all the additional t-bills needed to go into the repo market by deficit spending like a drunk sailor”
There is a critical threshold interest rate on the 10-year Treasury that the Fed and government cannot allow to exceed without catastrophic economic damage (excluding supply-side constraints), which creates a 'no bueno zone' where the yield curve becomes destabilized
“the yield curve is what the Fed and the government has to pay a lot of attention to because there's a distinct line in the sand they can't allow the 10-year Treasury that interest rate to exceed that line it gets into what I call - no bueno zone if the ten year goes that high it wreaks havoc on the economy and this is excluding what's going on with the survey so sickness”
As government deficit spending increases to solve the collateral crisis, inflationary pressures will push the 10-year Treasury yield upward, which the Fed will be forced to counter by purchasing long-end Treasuries to maintain yield curve control, requiring the Fed to expand its balance sheet from $4.5 trillion toward $10 trillion or infinity
“how would the 10-year interest rates start to creep up and up and up because of the inflation that's created by you're drunk insolvent Uncle Sam spending money into the real economy through mmm tea and helicopter money but that's not all you're insolvent Uncle Sam is also the largest subprime borrower in human history and he doesn't have a 30-year fixed-rate loan it's an adjustable rate mortgage so most of their debt is very short-term meaning they have to roll it over and over on a yearly basis so if they have 23 trillion in debt and their deficit spending the deficit goes from 23 trillion to 30 trillion to 40 trillion who knows how high it would go and it would require the Fed to keep rates at the short end of the yield curve as low as possible so the government can continue to roll over the debt without imploding the takeaway is the Fed would not only have to buy the short end of the curve they'd have to buy the entire yield curve taking their balance sheet from 4.5 trillion to 10 trillion to infinity and beyond”
The Federal Reserve's official explanation attributed the Treasury market disruptions to 'highly unusual disruptions associated with the coronavirus outbreak,' but senior officials at disaster banks told the Fed that financial system stress, not pandemic logistics, was the root cause of market dysfunction
“I'll quote from the release Scott they're saying these changes are being made to address highly unusual disruptions in Treasury financing markets associated with the corona virus outbreak and and we had heard earlier today that there were pretty bad disruptions in the Treasury markets... I was talking to several senior officials at disaster banks and they were saying the Federal Reserve needed to come in in some way”
The U.S. government is the largest subprime borrower in human history because most of its $23 trillion debt does not have 30-year fixed-rate terms but rather requires annual roll-over, meaning rising short-term interest rates directly threaten fiscal solvency
“you're insolvent Uncle Sam is also the largest subprime borrower in human history and he doesn't have a 30-year fixed-rate loan it's an adjustable rate mortgage so most of their debt is very short-term meaning they have to roll it over and over on a yearly basis so if they have 23 trillion in debt and their deficit spending the deficit goes from 23 trillion to 30 trillion to 40 trillion”
In the months to come, the most likely outcome is that prices of consumer goods (food) will rise due to inflation from deficit spending and liquidity injections, while prices of higher ticket items (cars) will fall due to credit contraction, and prices of financial assets (excluding Treasuries) will fall further due to forced deleveraging and collateral hoarding
“the bottom line for every one of you watching this video right now is most likely and again there are no certainties only probabilities but in my opinion what you'll most likely see in the next couple months or next six months prices of the things that you buy such as food going up prices of higher ticket items like cars going down and prices of assets excluding Treasuries going much much further down”
The repo market processes over $2 trillion in daily transactions, so the $74.7 billion in oversubscribed repos discussed represents a partial slice of systemic dysfunction across the entire market
“remember this is just a slice of the overall repo market it's over two trillion a day so we're using this number as a proxy for the oversubscribed or the repo fails in the broader market”
Steve Liesman of CNBC reported the Fed's announcement with audible fear in his voice, describing the trillion-dollar intervention as 'flooding the zone' with liquidity and stating this was 'unprecedented' in his experience
“you gotta remember this is totally unprecedented and you could see you could hear the fear in his voice as the entire market was like crumbling around him it was unbelievable”