
What Everyone Needs to Know about Russia Under Putin - FPRI's 2018 Champagne Brunch for Partners
What this covers
This is a Foreign Policy Research Institute partners' brunch talk in which Stephen Cotkin, the institute's 2018 Eurasia Fellow, lays out what he thinks anyone needs to know about Russia under Vladimir Putin. He begins with history and self-image: Russia's long habit of seeing itself as a providential power, and the recurring gulf between that aspiration and its actual capacities. He argues that this gulf has repeatedly pushed the state toward coercive modernization, which produces a cycle of spurts and stagnation. The talk's main line of inquiry is why US-Russian relations are so poor and what to do about it.
The middle of the talk examines the Russian state itself. Cotkin treats personalistic rule as conflating regime survival with national interest, and he resists reducing the system to kleptocracy. He points to a competent central bank and finance ministry, sound macroeconomic policy since the 1998 default, and a military-industrial complex inherited from the Soviet Union. His claims that Putin is as much a symptom as a driver, and that building state capacity in an autocracy can reduce a leader's control, are flagged as contested. So is his reading of 2016 election interference as an intelligence operation to penetrate the Trump campaign rather than collude with it.
The sharpest turns concern policy. Cotkin sets out the clash between American and Russian grand strategy, and between a Russian value on respect for the state and an American value on freedom. He then works through hard cases. A public US commitment to defend Ukraine would require, in his estimate, roughly 250,000 troops, and he cites the Budapest Memorandum as a commitment that went undelivered. Arming Ukraine raises its own escalation dilemmas. He explains why a firmly defended NATO Baltic flank pushes Russian pressure toward softer targets. He also criticizes his own country's pairing of limited government at home with a taste for unlimited dominance abroad.
Cotkin argues that US-Russia relations are structurally adversarial due to fundamental clashes of interests and values, not misunderstandings, and that effective policy requires simultaneously demonstrating strength while engaging in negotiation backed by real leverage, rather than choosing between confrontation or appeasement.
- US grand strategy seeks to prevent any power from dominating its region; Russian strategy seeks to dominate Eurasia—a structural incompatibility
- Russia is both weak (GDP 1/15th of US) and a major power (nuclear arsenal, advanced weaponry, competent state institutions)—policy must account for both simultaneously
- Successful Russia policy requires 'showing strength and negotiating at the same time' with linked leverage, not unilateral commitment-making or pure deterrence divorced from diplomacy
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Russia has always aspired to be a 'providential power' or a power under God, meaning it sees itself as having a special mission in the world, not as a regular country.
“the first and most important piece is that russia has always wanted to be a special country in the world what they call a providential power or a power under god this means that they have a special mission they're not just a regular country”
Bad relations between the US and Russia are not accidental or caused by misunderstanding, but derive from a fundamental clash of interests: US grand strategy seeks to prevent any country from dominating its region, while Russian grand strategy seeks to dominate Eurasia.
“u.s grand strategy looks very complicated but it's not that complicated it could be boiled down as follows do not allow another country to dominate its region... russian grand strategy is dominate eurasia so there's a fundamental clash of interests between u.s grant strategy and russian grant strategy”
The central paradox of Russian power is that it is simultaneously weak and a major power—Russia has a small economy but unique geographic platform for influence projection, no formal allies but a UN veto, and produces world-class weapons despite economic constraints.
“russia is smaller than ever farther from europe than ever since peter the greats time and yet it's still in this geography of eurasia which means it touches on europe it touches on the middle east it touches on east asia and so russia's geography is a great platform for influence projection... russia doesn't have any allies per se and so it looks weak in that regard a lonely power but it's got one of the vetoes in the security council”
In authoritarian regimes, the more you build up state capacity, the less control the leader has over state officials—a counterintuitive pattern because state actors are not as easily controlled as commonly assumed.
“state actors are not as easily controlled in authoritarian regimes and the more you build up the state in an authoritarian setting the less control you have over the state officials ironically enough”
Recourse to the state as an instrument to push society through coercive modernization produces a repeated cycle of economic spur followed by stagnation, not sustained growth.
“this recourse to the state right the state has an instrument the state is a lever to push and kind of bully the society forward towards some type of modernizing project has produced time and time again a spur a kind of economic spurt and then a period of stagnation the spurt is always followed by stagnation”
In Russian personalistic rule, there is a conflation between national interests and personal regime survival, so criticizing the personal regime is treated as criticizing Russia itself.
“the problem with that is a conflation between the national interests and the survival of the personal regime so to criticize the personal regime is to criticize russia right there's this conflation between national interest and personalistic rule survival”
Russia's state apparatus cannot be simply characterized as pure kleptocracy; it contains many competent people, including a well-run central bank and finance ministry that has implemented excellent macroeconomic policy over the past 20 years since the 1998 default.
“we think of the russian state as a pure kleptocracy it's a bunch of crooks and gangsters and thieves and they steal everything in sight that describes a large part of russian reality but not all... many competent people in the state their central bank is competently run their finance ministry has a tremendous number of competent people their macroeconomic policy over the last 20 years has been excellent since the 1998 default”
There is also a fundamental clash of values between the US and Russia: the highest value in Russia is respect for the state, while the highest value in the United States is freedom, often understood as freedom from the state.
“there's also even below that a fundamental clash of values right the highest value in russia is respect for the state the highest value in the united states is freedom often understood as freedom from the state”
The US does not fully recognize Russian incorporation of Crimea, just as it did not recognize Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics, and the US Ambassador to Moscow was unable to visit Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania because the US did not recognize their incorporation into the Soviet Union.
“it's one thing to not recognize russian incorporation of crimea right russian annexation of crimea not recognize that we didn't recognize soviet annexation of the baltic republics either as you know so the our ambassador in moscow couldn't go to estonia latvia in lithuania because the americans didn't recognize their incorporation into the soviet union”
The Versailles Treaty was an anomalous period in which both Germany and Russia were flat on their back simultaneously, an unstable condition that could not last because either Germany or Russia would again become a great power.
“the versailles treaty was an anomalous period it was the only time since 1870 that germany and russia were both flat on their back and this was not going to last either germany or russia was going to be a great power again”
Putin is as much a symptom of the structural condition of Russia as he is a driver of the current state—meaning the systemic patterns would recur even with a different leader.
“in some ways putin is as much a symptom as he is a a driver of the current state of russia”
The persistent bad relations between the US and Russia have occurred across multiple administrations (Trump, Obama, Bush) because they reflect structural interests and values, not failures of any particular president to understand or respect Russia.
“we saw president trump discover this before president trump president obama went through this cycle and problem president bush before him went through this and on it goes... it's not only putin and it's not even primarily putin there's something deeper going on there”
Effective policy requires 'linkage of strength and negotiation' but not 'linkage of all the issues'—the US can continue negotiations while increasing pressure on specific issues like journalist murders without breaking off all negotiations.
“it was during reagan's presidency... this goes back to reagan and schultz and it's it's not rocket science but it is uh shows him strength and negotiate at the same time and then linkage of the strength and the negotiation but not linkage of all the issues so that if russia for example murders a journalist you break off negotiations no you make a statement about how this violates core principles of the international community and you increase the pressure but you keep the negotiations going because increasing the pressure gives you more leverage in the negotiation process”
The US has a tradition of limited government at home but paradoxically cherishes unlimited global dominance in foreign policy, which violates its own principles since excessive power of any institution or group leads to tyranny.
“we're very proud of our tradition of limited government at home... but paradoxically while we cherish the tradition of limited government at home we sometimes forget about this when we talk about foreign policy so if our idea is that too much power of any one institution or group leads to tyranny how could it be that we want the united states to do everything alone and to dominate the whole globe isn't that a violation of our own principles”
The Russian strategy toward the Baltics is similar to choosing the easier target: if NATO Article 5 and NATO membership make the Baltics well-defended ('wallet in pocket with zipper up'), Russia will pursue destabilization elsewhere where it is easier ('wallet on table like a stick of butter').
“let's imagine that i want to steal your wallet... your wallet is in your pocket and your pocket is zipped up that's going to be tough for me to get that wallet out of your pocket with the zipper up right let's call that nato article 5. but let's imagine that you put your wallet on a table and you just leave it there... am i going to take the approach of the wallet that's in the pocket all locked up or am i going to take the approach of the wallet that's sitting on the table like a stick of butter that's russia with the baltics”
Despite economic weakness, Russia has a competent military-industrial complex inherited from the Soviet Union that has been revived under Putin and produces world-class weaponry of multiple types, allowing it to conduct military modernization even under budgetary austerity.
“they obviously they have a military-industrial complex yes it's been inherited from the soviet union so a lot of it is not credited to the current regime but nonetheless it has been revived under the current regime and they're able to produce world-class weaponry of all different types and they're able to do that even when they have budgetary austerity”
If the US makes a public commitment to defend Ukrainian sovereignty against Russia, it must be prepared to send approximately 250,000 American military personnel to Ukraine for a sustained period, because Russia has a real army while Ukraine does not.
“russia has an army ukraine doesn't really have an army so are you going to defend the sovereignty of ukraine are you going to make a statement publicly that you're going to defend the sovereignty of ukraine because if you make that statement you're going to have to send a quarter million american boys and girls to ukraine for a long period of time to defend that sovereignty”
While American weaponry is superior to Russian systems on average, this does not mean Russian weapons are not good—the question is not whether to trade US weapons for Russian weapons, but whether Russia has formidable capabilities across air, sea, and land domains.
“you could say that yes the f-16 is a superior plane and then you could go down all the whole arsenal which is superior this is superior would you trade american weaponry for russian weaponry the answer would be no of course you wouldn't trade it... that's not the issue the issue is uh just because your fighter jet isn't necessarily superior to the latest american fighter jet doesn't mean you don't have a good fighter jet and that's what they do have so if you look across the capabilities air sea and land right there are gaps between u.s and russian capabilities but those gaps are less than the gaps between russian capabilities and other european partners”
The US failure to deliver on its Budapest Memorandum commitment to defend Ukrainian territorial integrity shows the costs of making commitments without the will or capability to follow through.
“we had a problem in 1956 in hungary there were ways in which we encouraged the uprising against communism behind the iron curtain in hungary and then when the hungarians rose up we all said oh you know who's responsible for helping the hungarians uh did i say anything i didn't say anything right so you're right if you make a commitment as we did to ukraine's territorial sovereignty we were a signatory to that when they give up the nuclear weapons we need to uphold that commitment or we shouldn't have made that commitment in the first place”
If the US arms Ukraine to defend itself and Russia responds with escalation (like bombing the Kiev train station), the US becomes implicated in the escalation and in civilian casualties, creating a dilemma about whether to continue the policy.
“we can arm the ukrainians to defend themselves and then the train station in kiev blows up and whole bunches of people die one day and the russians say oh we had nothing to do with that we don't know how that happened and the ukrainians in their capital are afraid to take mass transit because somebody set bombs in their mass transit in response to arming of eastern ukraine to defend itself against russia right so that's the kind of escalation one could get into”
Effective US policy toward Russia must understand that differences are fundamental yet manageable, recognize that Russia is simultaneously weak and a major power, and employ intelligent application of strength combined with diplomacy to extract concessions.
“if we were to get a russia policy if there were to be a russia policy it would involve understanding that the differences are not superficial but fundamental yet they can be managed it would involve understanding that russia is weak but also a major power and it would involve an understanding that we need to show our strengths in intelligent fashion not over committing while also using diplomacy negotiation right to get those concessions and to pocket those concessions”
There is a persistent gap or 'gulf' between Russia's aspirations to be a greatest power and its actual capacities, which has repeatedly led the Russian state to employ coercive state-directed modernization as an instrument to try to close this gap.
“russia has never been the greatest power in the world... the result has been a gap actually a gulf between the aspirations and the wherewithal the capacities of the russian state so this has led russia time and time again while holding these aspirations and while not fully having the capacities to live up with them to live to the the aspirations it's led russia time and time again to have recourse to the state the state as an instrument to push the society”
Russia's 'forward policy' means pursuing offense as the best defense by destabilizing the outside world, with the strategy being to 'make the West more like Russia' since Russia is not going to become part of the West.
“russia's forward policy as we might call it in these places forward policy meaning right offense is the best defense they understand their security as being on the offensive destabilizing the outside world right russia is not going to become part of the west so let's make the west more like russia right that's that's the strategy in a nutshell”
Russia's interference in the 2016 US election was an intelligence operation designed to penetrate and compromise the Trump campaign, not to collude with Trump, because Russian intelligence is sophisticated enough to achieve its goals without needing the Trump campaign's help.
“what the russians did was they compromised the trump campaign and the trump people they entangled them in criminal activities and they penetrated them with surveillance to find out what was going on on the inside it was a russian intelligence operation... the idea of collusion is ridiculous”
The 1991 settlement that ended the Soviet Union was imposed when Russia was flat on its back and could do nothing about it, creating an anomalous power distribution that was always going to be unstable when Russia recovered.
“in 1991 the 1991 settlement was imposed when russia was flat on its back and could do nothing about it and we think it's inviolable we think you know the the world inherited with the collapse of the soviet union with the borders that were there and all the agreements that that's forever well guess what in the 1990s russia couldn't do anything about it now they can and they are and they will do more”
Getting tough with Russia without negotiations is a dead end, and negotiating without leverage is also a dead end—effective policy requires combining strength and negotiation.
“just to get strong and tough with somebody and then what you're tough with them you impose some punishment on them and then what happens next right what happens next is you need a diplomatic negotiation so that if you're strong and they make concessions you're ready to pocket the concessions... getting tough without negotiations is a dead end and just negotiating without having any leverage is also a dead end”
When the Obama administration announced that it wanted Russia to help in Syria and announced that it needed Russia for the Iranian nuclear deal, it pushed all its leverage onto Russia's side of the negotiating table before negotiations opened, resulting in concessions from the US without corresponding Russian concessions.
“for example we wanted russia to help in syria so we announced that we wanted russia to help in syria now this put all the leverage on russia's side of the table we announced that we wanted to do a deal on the iranian nuclear program and we needed russia for that deal once again we pushed all our chips all our leverage onto the russia side so while there were some negotiations in the obama case they were negotiations not from strength but from weakness”
Russia has unique geographic position in Eurasia that allows it to project influence across Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia simultaneously, which is a geopolitical advantage despite Russia's economy being smaller than ever.
“russia is smaller than ever farther from europe than ever since peter the greats time and yet it's still in this geography of eurasia which means it touches on europe it touches on the middle east it touches on east asia and so russia's geography is a great platform for influence projection”
In response to questions about his Russia policy proposal, Cotkin distinguishes between making fewer commitments and upholding all commitments made—the US should reduce the number of commitments but honor those that are made, as opposed to making grand commitments like defending Ukraine and then not following through.
“the second point you raised which is make fewer commitments but uphold all the commitments you make if you're not going to uphold the commitment you got to keep quiet”
The Trump campaign's internal polling on the Friday before the 2016 election showed they expected to lose, bragging about potentially earning as many as 250 electoral votes, making it absurd that Russia would have conspired to help Trump when no one, including Trump's own campaign, believed Trump would win.
“the friday before the tuesday election the trump campaign polling operation sent out an email bragging that is a few days before the election the trump campaign sent out an email bragging that they would get as many as 250 electoral votes... so the idea that the russians knew what they were doing on the one hand and and therefore bet on trump right but didn't know what they were doing on the other hand and therefore they needed to collude with trump right there's been an absurd discussion”
Russia's geopolitical position allows it to touch on Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia simultaneously, giving it influence capabilities that would not be predicted from its small GDP alone.
“it's still in this geography of eurasia which means it touches on europe it touches on the middle east it touches on east asia and so russia's geography is a great platform for influence projection”
Rather than try to preserve the unraveling 1991 settlement in place, it would be in US interests to lead and stabilize the process of revision by extracting advantages rather than letting Russia continue to revise 1991 while the US holds to an impossible situation.
“we can if we want try to hold 1991 in place even as it's unraveling and has unraveled in many places or we can recognize that it was an anomalous situation in 1991 when russia was flat on its back that anomaly has passed we must deal with the fact that they are able to revise the 1991 treaty and are doing that and it would be in our interests to take the lead and stabilize that process by extracting advantages”
As a concrete policy example, the US could grant Russian recognition of Crimea's annexation over a 30-year period conditional on Russia withdrawing from eastern Ukraine (Donbas and Luhansk), abkhazia, South Ossetia, Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and changing its behavior regarding Assad and Syria.
“you will grant russian recognition of annexation of crimea over a 30-year period and during those 30 years they would have to perform certain tasks for example they would have to give up eastern uk they would have to pull out of eastern ukraine the donbas and lugansk they would have to pull out of abkhazia and south of session georgia they would have to pull out of transnistria in moldova and then they would have to do the following with assad and syria”
Overpriced real estate is inherently a money-laundering business because only people with stolen money want to buy luxury condominiums at vastly inflated prices per square foot.
“overpriced real estate is ipso facto money laundering that's the business you're in if you're selling overpriced real estate if you're selling a a quote luxury condominium with one one thousandth of a millimeter thick walls a hundred million dollars or right or how much per square foot you can do the calculation there's only certain kind of people who can buy that property who would be interested in that property people who have stolen big amounts of money”
The Trump Organization did not exercise due diligence regarding the sources of money from real estate purchasers and in many cases did the opposite, deliberately avoiding scrutiny of suspicious money sources, making the organization particularly vulnerable to money laundering charges.
“many people in the real estate business will not cross lines they will do due diligence they will look where the money comes from they will decline some buyers because of the suspect nature of the money that's after all what the law requires but in this case that organization did not do its due diligence and in many cases did the opposite”
Trump's public statement that investigation of his business operations is a 'red line' shows that Trump understood his business was criminal and feared scrutiny.
“president trump himself announced at the beginning that it was a red line to look into his business operations you'll recall that right”
A traditional balance-of-power approach to foreign policy would mean preserving alliances and consulting allies before unilateral actions, such as avoiding trade wars with US allies even when the target (like China) is cheating on trade.
“what it would look like in practice is what should be familiar to this audience traditional a balance of power notion about the world you'd want a lot of friends and you'd want to consult those friends so you wouldn't want to engage in a trade war with somebody who's cheating a trade not because that person is innocent or that country is innocent no the chinese are cheating a trade but a trade war between the u.s and china has very adverse effects on all of those countries that also trade and are us allies”
The investigation that began as a counterintelligence operation into Russian penetration of the Trump campaign has shifted to examining the Trump Organization's criminal business practices, including money laundering, using a 'pincer movement' where investigators work from campaign manager to lawyer to son-in-law to family members until someone breaks.
“that's why this all started as a counterintelligence investigation which then morphed into a criminal investigation but the origins are a counterintelligence problem... the campaign manager and then you move to the lawyer and then you go go for the son-in-law and then the son and the daughter until finally people break i mean this is right this is a standard operating practice people break”
A back-channel to Russia for direct communication is not necessarily a crime and might even be a good idea, so the collusion focus has obscured the actual criminal exposure, which is money laundering and Trump Organization business practices.
“for example a back channel to the russians communicating with them i don't think that's a crime in the united states opening a back channel to another government that you want to talk to i actually think that that's maybe even a good idea let alone a crime right so we're in a kind of crazy situation now where what's happening behind the scenes an investigation of the business criminality”
The Obama administration's 'reset' with Russia failed because it was based on the assumption that bad relations stemmed from misunderstanding, not structural interests.
“think about the obama administration first it wanted to get nice with russia because it thought there was this misunderstanding that made the relations bad this turned out to blow up in their face the reset didn't work”
Russia possesses 7,700 nuclear weapons with intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of exiting and re-entering the atmosphere without burning up, giving Russia the ability to accurately strike anywhere on Earth including a ballroom in the United States.
“they have seven thousand seven hundred nuclear weapons... moreover russia has intercontinental ballistic missiles that can exit earth's atmosphere and re-enter without burning up we don't think north korea has such a capability... russia could hit this ballroom could hit this brunch if they so decided accurately right”
Attempts to build a strong state in Russia produce personalistic rule rather than institutional strength, and Vladimir Putin himself complains that only about 20 percent of his orders are actually implemented, with the rest circumvented, ignored, or buried in bureaucratic red tape.
“one of the things you probably don't know is that vladimir putin goes on russian television and complains endlessly that only about 20 percent of his orders are implemented the rest are circumvented ignored right buried in bureaucratic red tape because personalistic rule is not as strong as we think it is”
The fundamental problem with Western analysis of Russia is that analysts 'paint it one way or the other way rather than both ways at the same time'—treating Russia as either weak or powerful, when it is simultaneously both.
“we can't seem to be able to manage this the paradoxical nature of russia we paint it one way or the other way rather than both ways at the same time”
Russia's foreign ministry is of high quality, staffed with people who speak foreign languages, have experience of other countries, and are fully briefed before meetings.
“they also have something we don't have they have a state department their foreign ministry is excellent it's full of people who know foreign languages have experience of other countries and go into meetings fully briefed and fully on their brief right”
Russia's unique attribute is 'daring'—not recklessness but calculated risk-taking—which is useful for a weak major power as it allows it to surprise stronger opponents and maintain influence beyond what raw power metrics would suggest.
“it has some unique attributes one of the unique attributes is daring not recklessness but daring russia does stuff constantly surprising us right daring it's no use being a superpower if you behave like a wussy or an idiot and it's quite useful if you're a weak major power but you have a certain amount of daring and calculated risks right”
When measured by GDP at current exchange rates, Russia's economy is approximately 1/15th the size of the US economy, down from the Soviet Union's peak of approximately 1/3rd the size of the American economy.
“if you look at russia's gdp it's only a little bit more than 1 15 the size of the u.s gdp one-fifteenth... the soviet union's gdp at peak was one-third the size of the american economy”
Currently, Washington is paralyzed and incapable of conducting a coherent Russia policy.
“washington right now is is just not really capable of a russia policy we're sort of paralyzed for all the reasons that you understand”