
Xi Jinping’s Economic Plan: Let China Struggle | The Big Take
What this covers
This Big Take episode has host Wes Kosova talking with Bloomberg reporters Rebecca Cheung Wilkins and Tom Hancock about China's slowdown. It draws on their feature on why Xi Jinping is declining a big stimulus package. The backdrop is an $18 trillion economy with falling exports, record youth unemployment (north of 20% in urban hubs), debt-laden local governments, and foreign investors pulling money out. The conversation asks how long the slump might last and whether it is a policy choice or a loss of control.
The property sector gets the most attention. The three red lines of 2020 capped developer leverage and pushed many into default. Wilkins describes the shrinkage as intentional reform rather than market failure, though the episode flags that framing as contested. Hancock lays out the numbers: sales fell from about $2.3 trillion in 2021 to $1.9 trillion in 2022, the downturn is 2.5 years old, and earlier calls for a turnaround proved wrong. It has now reached state-owned builders, 18 of 38 of which reported first-half losses. With roughly 70% of household wealth in property, the discussion turns to how falling values hit consumption and investment, and to buyers boycotting mortgages on homes that may never be finished.
The episode also covers broader ground. It contrasts China running "cold" with a US running hot, and it notes that the Biden administration now treats China's slowdown as serving US interests. It weighs China's weak labor market against America's tight one. It also asks whether the Chinese social contract of jobs, homes, and families can hold under demographic and housing pressure. Hancock argues that China still has room for catch-up growth since per capita GDP is about one-sixth of the US level. He also describes a self-reinforcing cycle in which uncertainty makes households save and firms hold back. Beijing's "extraordinary tolerance for pain" has a floor, he says, at roughly 4–5% growth.
China's government is deliberately running its economy 'cold' by restricting debt-fueled stimulus and property sector growth to create a more sustainable long-term model, but this strategy risks a prolonged confidence crisis as consumers and businesses pull back spending in response to uncertainty about economic recovery.
- Xi Jinping's government is withholding massive stimulus packages and implementing structural reforms (three red lines, property deleveraging) despite near-term growth pain
- This contrasts sharply with the US running its economy 'hot' with expansionary fiscal policy, creating opposite trajectories for the world's two largest economies
- The critical bottleneck is property sector stabilization—already 2.5 years into decline, now spreading to state-owned developers, with no clear endpoint in sight
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The US Biden Administration has reframed China's growth from a positive global development into a competitive threat, shifting from viewing China's development as beneficial to framing China's slowdown as beneficial to US interests, and implementing policies that actively slow China's growth.
“it used to be that China's economic growth was broadly considered a good thing because China was driving Global growth and prosperity and there was also some feeling that development in China was good because it was previously a poor country and this has really shifted I guess post Donald Trump to a competition frame and you've got politicians saying isn't it great now we're doing better than China or isn't it great that China's slowing and you've also got Biden Administration rolling out restrictions on technology microchips and so on investment in China and those things slow China's growth”
The three red lines policy, implemented in 2020, set strict debt and leverage limits for property developers, fundamentally disrupting their traditional business model of using debt to acquire land and build projects, forcing many developers into default.
“we have seen many private property developers defaulting in China over the last three years and it's really by design by this sort of principle of the three red lines which came in to force back in 2020 now the three red lines are these guidelines around just how much debt or how much leverage a property firm can carry if it wanted to continue borrowing and that was a big issue for many property developers because this model is really built on the principle of using debt to grow its business to continue to buy land to then build more projects and so on”
When people become concerned and confused about the future, they save more and spend less, and companies reduce investment in growth, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of declining economic activity even without policy changes.
“a lot of things that people didn't expect to happen in the past based on their experience of how China's economy worked and how China's political system worked have happened in recent years and I think that's left a lot of people feeling quite confused about the future and obviously if you're concerned and confused about the future you're not going to spend quite as much you're going to save a bit more and we're seeing that behavior playing up amongst households and amongst companies”
The Chinese social contract has historically involved people accepting fewer personal freedoms in exchange for the promise of a job, a home, and a family, but this dynamic is being scrutinized and challenged as demographic pressures and real estate decline make these promises harder to deliver.
“the way in which the social contract may be if not changing in China but at least being scrutinized and for years and people have sort of exchanged or accepted fewer freedoms in exchange for the promise of a job a home a family but when you consider sort of some of the demographic challenges as well as some of the challenges around real estate no longer being a sort of reliable assets to acquire you can see that Dynamic is changing too”
At least six investment banks have downgraded their growth forecasts for China in recent weeks, with most now predicting growth below the government's 5 percent target, representing a significant shift in consensus away from viewing China's growth miracle as a given.
“in the last couple of weeks we've had at least six investment Banks downgrading their forecasts for the year most of those are actually below the five percent Target but what feels like a big change is this shift in consensus that China's growth miracle that has once fire had so many portfolios around the world is no longer a given”
Local governments in China are burdened with debt they cannot afford, and some foreign investors have pulled money out of the country as a result of economic uncertainty.
“local governments in China are burdened with debt they can't afford all this uncertainty has led some foreign investors to pull their money out of the country”
The property sector was previously estimated to contribute 30-40% of China's economy, but has now been substantially scaled back as a growth driver while the government seeks alternative industries to replace it.
“the property for a long time has been one of the really the main or one of the main growth engines for China's economy previously contributing about estimated 30 sometimes people say 40 of the economy that's really now paired back”
Approximately 70% of Chinese household wealth is tied up in property, representing a critical vulnerability as property values decline and creating a wealth effect that depresses consumption and business investment.
“we estimate that about 70 percent of Chinese household wealth is tied up in property so that's a big contrast to other countries like the US where people own more in the form of the stocks and other Financial assets”
Homebuyers in China have been paying mortgages on properties that haven't yet been built or delivered, and some are now paying mortgages on projects that may never be completed because developers have defaulted, leading to mortgage boycotts.
“homeowners were paying mortgages on properties that they hadn't yet deemed delivered but also that may not be delivered because that particular firm had default on its debt and was running into trouble and so they were paying mortgages on buildings that had not even been built... we did see at one point when there was a lot of worries about whether or not projects would be delivered we did see these sort of sporadic protests where people boycotted payments on their mortgages”
Xi Jinping's strategy is to deliberately run China's economy 'cold' by withholding jumbo stimulus packages and instead prioritizing long-term structural reforms: reducing unproductive debt, tackling property oversupply, and deliberately shrinking the property sector to prevent bubble formation.
“when we talk about China running its economy cold what we mean is holding back from any kind of jumbo stimulus package for example fueled by raising a lot of debt and building a lot of infrastructure but the term is also relative so it's less than perhaps it may have used in the past to deal with these type of economic woes but also comparatively to the US and to other large peers season ping has laid out these longer term priorities for the economy so cutting down unproductive or less productive debt field spending trying to reduce the risks in real estate tackle the issue of oversupply reduce the risk of a market bubble appearing and creating other sorts of disorder in the economy”
Xi Jinping's decade of managing China with consistent economic growth and his vision of the 'China Dream' is being tested more severely now than at any point in his leadership, with simultaneous challenges: sustainable growth transition, thorny international tensions with the US, Taiwan conflict risks, and a shifting power balance in the Indo-Pacific.
“for a decade he has overseen China with economic growth and so his vision of what he's called the China dream that he set out when he came into that top job the Rejuvenation of the Chinese people both at home and abroad was in a sense you could argue an easier path uh we had growth rumbling on behind him we also had an easier International diplomatic landscape too and now he's juggling with these sort of really thorny issues that he is trying to tackle in the economy albeit to create a more sustainable type of growth as well as this thorny issue of increasing tension with the US The Perennial risk that's raised over a Taiwan conflict as well as this shifting balance of power in the indo-pacific”
Despite both economies growing, most economists still expect China to grow faster than the US in absolute terms because China is a much poorer country with significant room for catch-up growth—Chinese per capita GDP is only about 1/6 of US levels.
“still most economists expect that China will grow faster than the us and one reason why that is is because China is just a much poorer country and it has bigger room for catch-up growth so Chinese per capita GDP is around 1 6 of the U.S level so we're talking about a country that has still a huge number of people who buy U.S standards will be considered very poor”
Investors' expectations for China have shifted from viewing it as a growth miracle to being uncertain about its future, with institutional investors downgrading forecasts and reassessing long-term views, representing a fundamental change in how markets value China.
“what feels like a big change is this shift in consensus that China's growth miracle that has once fire had so many portfolios around the world is no longer a given and people are really changing there's a longer term and fundamental view of China”
Chinese property sales peaked in 2021 at about $2.3 trillion and fell to $1.9 trillion in 2022, with further expected declines in 2023, though underlying demand for housing remains fundamentally sound due to urbanization, rising wages, and desire for better living standards.
“Chinese property sales peaked in 2021 at about 2.3 trillion dollars and then last year they fell to about 1.9 trillion dollars and people think they'll fall a bit more this year but we know that there is demand in China for housing fundamentally because like everyone else Chinese people because the rest of the economy is growing and their wages are growing they would like to live in bigger and better houses and also you've got an ongoing urbanization process in China”
China's government is committed to economic growth as its 'top task' and will intervene with stimulus if growth falls below approximately 4-5%, but has demonstrated 'extraordinary tolerance for pain' in allowing growth to slow in service of longer-term structural sustainability.
“you've got to remember that the Communist party is really committed to economic growth said last year that that's basically its top task and so we will see the government stepping in to boost growth if things start going below probably the four or five percent range in the next few years the thing is apart though we've seen that the government has also demonstrated this quite extraordinary tolerance for pain you know it's trying to roll out these policies ultimately to make the economy more sustainable more robust to shift its growth model”
Chinese exports are declining this year primarily because pandemic-era demand surge from Europe and the US is normalizing, resulting in double-digit drops in exports to those regions as global demand patterns revert.
“the world just isn't buying as many products from China as it once did this year Chinese exports are declining and that's mostly about the fact that there was a surge in demand for Chinese Goods during the pandemic coming from Europe and the us as people stayed at home and now that demand is normalizing and so you've got exports to those countries Falling by double-digit rates”
China has experienced youth unemployment at record highs, with north of 20% of young people in China's urban hubs unable to find jobs, and estimates suggesting the nationwide figure could be significantly higher.
“this has been a quite a remarkable level of youth unemployment we've had that at a record high north of 20 one in five young people in China's Urban hubs cannot find jobs some estimate that could be quite significantly higher when we look at the Nationwide figure”
The property downturn has spread from private developers to state-owned developers, which were previously shielded due to government backing—18 of 38 listed state builders reported losses in the first half of 2023, indicating even the state sector is now under stress from falling property prices and demand.
“we are seeing some of that stress spread from China's private developers to its state-owned developers now they so far have been quite shielded from this but simply by the fact that people aren't buying properties anymore and that prices are declining we had 18 of 38 listed State Builders reporting losses in the first half of this year that is highly unusual for China”
China's 18 trillion dollar economy is decelerating after years of rapid growth, with exports falling and young people struggling to find well-paying jobs as the nation's long real estate crisis deepens.
“the nation's 18 trillion dollar economy once growing fast is decelerating exports have fallen off young people are having trouble finding good jobs China's long real estate crisis is deepening with major property developers who borrowed too much now facing to fall”
Concerns are growing that the consequences of China's structural reforms and property sector contraction may turn out to be severe and long-lasting, not just for China but across the global economy.
“concerns are growing that the consequences May instead turn out to be severe and long-lasting and not just for China but across the global economy”
Property sector shrinkage is deliberate policy by Xi's government through the three red lines framework, designed to deliberately shrink the size and debt-carrying capacity of the property sector—this is not a market failure but an intentional structural reform.
“this is a sort of crafted policy for example to deliberately shrink the size and the debt carrying capacity of the property sector in China”
The property sector decline has already lasted 2.5 years, much longer than expected, with repeated false signals of turning points (e.g., forecasts last year that recovery was imminent proved incorrect), making it impossible to predict when stabilization will occur.
“it seems like we're still quite far away from the end of this property shrinking era and I don't think anyone can really tell you how much longer that's going to go on it's already gone on for two and a half years and that's much longer than anyone expected and for many months last year for example people were saying we were at the turn just about to turn the road when it comes to the distressed property cycle in China and yet here we are again”
China's labor market remains weak post-pandemic relative to pre-pandemic levels, with particularly severe youth unemployment (20%+) and low job mobility due to lack of labor market tightness, contrasting sharply with record low unemployment and high wage growth in the US.
“we talked about China's very high youth unemployment overall the labor market is a bit better than it is for young people but it's still quite a poor labor market relative to pre-pandemic and so we're seeing a big contrast there with the US where you've got record low unemployment and you've got people changing jobs because the the labor market is tight and that's driving up wages we're not seeing that Dynamic to the same extent in China”
The debate about sustainability applies to both economies: whether US growth (driven by stimulus) is sustainable long-term is contested, just as whether China is running its economy too cold (risking spiral of collapsing expectations) is contested.
“so I think the thing about running the economy heart versus running it cold U.S stimulus has put growth in the US economy on a faster trajectory... and in China maybe you're in the economy too cold right and so if you're running the economy too cold people's expectations start falling and once that begins that process is hard to stop that's the risk there so I think there's sort of two elements to that the first is that the type of growth”
If China's structural reforms are successful, it will emerge with a more sustainable growth model less dependent on debt and property; if they fail, the near-term pain (unemployment, wealth destruction, confidence collapse) will have been incurred without achieving long-term gains.
“the idea is that the pain will be temporary and China will emerge stronger for it but concerns are growing that the consequences May instead turn out to be severe and long-lasting”
The volatility in China's economy and markets is extraordinary, as illustrated by Bloomberg's coverage of uncertainty metrics, reflecting deep pessimism about China's economic prospects and lack of clear strategic direction from leadership.
“you really need to be able to stun like the volatility in China right Bloomberg's strange band so it tells you just the level of uncertainty that's in the market and the pessimism still around China's economy and no no clear clear strategy out of that malays either”
US tech restrictions on chip sales and semiconductor investment in China have the practical effect of slowing China's growth, even though the White House claims that is not the main stated aim of those policies.
“you've also got Biden Administration rolling out restrictions on technology microchips and so on investment in China and those things slow China's growth it's not just words I mean there are also policies that the US is implementing that actively slow down China's growth to some degree even though the White House says that's not the main aim of those policies”
US and China are pursuing opposite economic strategies: the US is running its economy 'hot' with massive stimulus and investment to accelerate growth, while China is running its economy 'cold' with deliberate restraint, both haunted by different lessons from the 2008 financial crisis.
“Tom one interesting thing you write that if XI and China are running their economy cold the U.S is running the economy hot with Joe Biden putting billions of dollars into U.S manufacturing and jobs and trying to boost the economy... both administrations in China and the US are a bit haunted by the past and they're trying not to repeat the mistakes of the past so in the U.S the consensus amongst the Biden Administration was that Obama didn't do enough after the financial crisis and so you had a decade of disappointing growth and we don't want to do that again whereas in China the lesson from the financial crisis is the complete opposite... China did too much and they ended up with too much housing and so on”
US fiscal stimulus under Biden has put American growth on a faster trajectory than pre-pandemic, while China is now on a slower trajectory than pre-pandemic (down from 6% pre-pandemic to roughly 4% expected in future), creating a historic divergence in growth rates.
“U.S stimulus has put growth in the US economy on a faster trajectory than it was pre-pandemic and China is now on a slower trajectory as we said than it was on pre-pandemic pre-render it grew six percent now we're looking in the future what's happening like four percent”
China's new economy (electric vehicles, green industries, high-tech sectors) is growing at roughly 7% annually and accounts for about 17% of GDP, making it roughly equal in size to the traditional property sector (20% of GDP), but the property sector is shrinking faster than new economy is growing.
“the property sector we're thinking around 20 of GDP if you throw in related Industries what China calls the new economy is a bit smaller it's about 17 of GDP and new economy according to Chinese official statistics grew about seven percent in the first half of the Year property investment shrunk 8”
The US and China are experiencing opposite inflation dynamics: the US has experienced inflation surge due to stimulative 'bidenomics' policies, while China has entered deflation due to weak domestic demand relative to supply capacity.
“inflation because biodynamics as some people call it is about growing the economy heart you've seen inflation surge in the U.S but it's coming down a bit now and China has recently entered a period of deflation because domestic demands relative to supply is very weak”
Private property developers have been defaulting on debt over the last three years, with state-owned developers beginning to face losses as well, indicating that the stabilization challenge extends beyond the intended target of constraining private leverage.
“we have seen many private property developers defaulting in China over the last three years... we are seeing some of that stress spread from China's private developers to its state-owned developers”
The economic divergence between US and China reflects not just different current policies, but fundamentally different lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis: the US concluded it under-stimulated, while China concluded it over-stimulated.
“the consensus amongst the Biden Administration was that Obama didn't do enough after the financial crisis and so you had a decade of disappointing growth and we don't want to do that again whereas in China the lesson from the financial crisis is the complete opposite Siege of opinion his advisors think that China did too much and they ended up with too much housing and so on and that was the problem and they don't want to repeat that again”
Debt-fueled infrastructure and construction stimulus, while boosting short-term growth numbers, does not produce sustainable or productive long-term economic benefits compared to organic demand-driven growth.
“the type of growth that we see in China does impact the knock-on effect through the rest of the world if we see just sort of massive depth fueled stimulus infrastructure field stimulus that's not necessarily the type of growth even if it were to even for example exceed that five percent Target it's not necessarily the type of stimulus that would have sort of longer term benefits for the rest of the world”
China's strategy of moving household wealth allocation from property (70% currently) toward financial assets and stocks (more like the US model) is a fundamental and lengthy structural transition requiring asset class rebalancing across the entire population.
“China wants to move its wealth system more towards that kind of U.S model”
The core bottleneck preventing recovery is confidence: even with positive messaging and regulatory support, changing sentiment is one of the toughest things a policymaker can do, because once expectations shift negative, the messaging can only last so long before behavior follows.
“I think that the confidence issue in China and changing sentiment is really one of the toughest things that a policy maker can do because even as we've seen this really big sort of push this positive messaging Blitz that we've had from various Regulators authorities with this drip stream of positive news promising to support various parts of the economy without much follow through can only last for so long”
The risk of running China's economy too cold is that falling expectations become self-perpetuating: once people expect slower growth, they adjust behavior (save more, invest less), making slower growth actually occur, creating a difficult-to-reverse cycle.
“in China maybe you're in the economy too cold right and so if you're running the economy too cold people's expectations start falling and once that begins that process is hard to stop that's the risk there”
If the property and export sectors (approximately one-third of the economy) are both declining substantially, the growth drag is severe, though high-tech industries and domestic services are surging, keeping the overall economy growing albeit more slowly than before.
“if you add that up you know you could say that's at least a third of the economy that is experiencing quite a large decline if you imagine that the Chinese economy is like an airplane with two engines we can say that one engine is property and exports and then the other engine is all the rest... the property and exports part is currently sort of on fire and it's really interfering and slowing down the entire plane on the other hand the rest of the economy so if you're talking about high-tech Industries and also domestic services for people traveling around the country going to restaurants and so on that's really surging”
China's current situation is unprecedented: the economy is recovering and growing faster than last year, but the property sector is simultaneously shrinking—this has never happened in recent Chinese history and creates confusing signals about the true state of economic health.
“it's also an unprecedented situation we're in this year where China's economy is recovering it's grown faster than it did last year because of the end of lockdowns but the property sector is shrinking and we've never had a recovery like that in China that isn't driven by the property sector in recent memory”
The critical uncertainty for China's economic future is determining when property demand and prices stabilize—this stabilization does not require growth but must occur to arrest contagion into other sectors.
“the big question I think hanging over China's economy is how long does this downtime in the property sector last for and when do we reach a point where the government and where residents in China who ultimately drive this Market get back into buying again and so this Market stabilizes it doesn't have to grow again but it has to at least stabilize”