
Jeffrey Snider: Making Sense And Money Out Of The Global Monetary Madness
What this covers
This is a March 2021 interview from the Hedgeye Investing Summit. Hedgeye CEO Keith McCullough talks with Jeff Snider of Alhambra Investments, and an unnamed second host joins in. The talk moves between the plumbing of the offshore Eurodollar System and the institutions that oversee it. McCullough begins with a technical point: the DXY is roughly 60% euro, so the broad trade-weighted dollar) is the better gauge. Snider's central claim is that the Fed treats itself as a domestic bank regulator and so mishandles episodes of dollar shortage. He says it cycled through reflation and shortage four times in 13 years, and he argues the system persists mainly because no alternative exists to switch to.
The range is wide. On the near-term U.S. side, Snider forecasts trouble when the temporary Supplementary Leverage Ratio) exemption expires. He describes the Fed's refusal to extend it as macroprudential negative rates, with banks pushed to choose between costly safe assets and more risk. He also contrasts Japan's decades of QE), where the society broke rather than the financial system, with the U.S. case.
A long stretch covers China: slowing secondary industry growth), a "quality growth" mandate that rules out more stimulus, and Xi Jinping's return to Mao-era principles. Snider also raises the legitimacy risk if the promise of urbanization and a middle class goes unfulfilled.
The most contested material concerns the Fed itself. Snider accuses Ben Bernanke of winning belief through technical credentials rather than understanding. He says the Fed's policy rests on managing expectations, and he describes the chair as a public figure and expectations manager. The hosts close on nonlinear, fractal analysis of interconnected systems. They expect that shift only after the current system breaks.
Snider argues that the Federal Reserve's domestic mandate blinds it to its role in global dollar system dysfunction, causing repeated dollar shortage cycles that the Fed attempts to manage through inadequate swap mechanisms rather than systemic reform.
- The Fed treats itself as a domestic regulator only, disclaiming responsibility for the offshore eurodollar system despite its centrality to global credit
- Repeated cycles of reflation followed by dollar shortage crises over 13 years show the system is fundamentally broken and unsustainable without structural change
- China's growth slowdown combined with its dollar shortage problem reveals how the dysfunctional dollar system fragments global growth
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The U.S. dollar system offshore is massive and complex, requiring enormous effort, infrastructure, and logistics to support a functioning global reserve currency, which is why it has persisted despite dysfunction—there is no alternative to flip to overnight.
“it takes a hell of a lot of effort and infrastructure and logistics and support to to have a functioning global reserve currency system and that's one reason why the system has remained as it has even though it's dysfunctional for all these years is because there's no alternative it's not like you can flip the switch overnight”
Looking at the broad trade-weighted dollar instead of the DXY index is critical because the DXY is approximately 60% euro exposure, making it primarily a euro-dollar indicator rather than a true broad dollar index.
“that's why i'm using a block that's the broad trade weighted dollar and i think a lot of people get caught up in dxy thinking that's the dollar when it's really just the euro i mean it's it's almost 60 percent 60 of proportion of the euro”
The Federal Reserve is a domestic bank regulator only and explicitly disclaims responsibility for the offshore dollar system, treating it as outside its legal mandate and intellectual framework; this causes the Fed to mishandle global dollar shortage episodes by offering ineffective foreign central bank swaps that mostly recirculate dollars back to the US
“first of all the fed doesn't you know the fed in china are completely separate issues because the federal reserve to me is nothing more than a domestic bank regulator and if you ask them and made them admit to you they would tell you yes our mandate ends at the boundary of the united states border or we don't whatever happens in the dollar system they recognize there is a dollar system outside the united it's somebody st problem that has been their position from the very beginning right so ours is offshore dollars of which china and the rest of the world are apart who is responsible for them well nobody is the federal reserve would say that's not our problem”
Japan has continued quantitative easing for decades without 'breaking' in a financial sense, but Japanese society has been broken as a consequence; the US cannot sustain this indefinitely because the dollar system is global and eventually fractures when it continues to malfunction and misperform
“now japanese society seems to have been really broken and there are all sorts of more social types of consequences for the bank of japan's ineffectiveness but in terms of the us and the federal reserve we have a much bigger problem because this is a global monetary system that everybody seems to think that the fed is in charge of or at least can manipulate at will or easily it will and that's just not the case so it's not like that the federal reserve can continue to kick the can down the road forever because eventually i think what happens is because the dollar system continues to to just to malfunction and misperform that eventually it starts to fracture and segment itself into individual smaller pieces”
When looking at 100-year charts using Schiller's long-term perspective, understanding whether a market or economy is making lower highs locks in mean reversion, which traps policy makers to host to those reversions whether they attempt stimulus or not.
“he would basically take t might he'd say okay this is a 100 year chart...what is the chart doing over the long term is it doing that is it going is it making a series of lower highs well now you're you're hostage to mean reversion”
Historically top-heavy systems (like China) are inherently fragile; Chinese leadership studied the Soviet Union collapse extensively to learn how to avoid it, recognizing that economic wealth creation and modernization were essential to prevent regime failure.
“any historically top-heavy system is always inherently fragile and the chinese absolutely know this i mean look they studied the the collapse of the soviet union in the eastern bloc to you know to the nth degree they said teams of researchers all across the communist neighbors to say how do we avoid that fate”
The Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) was designed after the 2008 crisis as a gross measure of bank exposure that cannot be gamed through accounting, replacing earlier capital ratios that banks circumvented by making risky assets appear riskless
“in the wake of the first global financial crisis authorities realized that capital ratios were essentially worthless because the banking system had found any number of ways to get around them to stuff their balance sheets full of all sorts of risky assets at the same time maintaining within the guidelines of basal rule you know making risky stuff look uh risky assets look like riskless assets so they could create all sorts of leverage on their balance sheet which of course unwound in a very a messy manner in 2008 so in the wake of the 2008 crisis authorities decided they were going to come up with some other way to mathematically describe what banks are up to except now they wouldn't give them any sort of way to uh to gain their balance sheets or game their assets so that they could you know make them look better than they were and so that's what the supplementary supplementary leverage ratio was was basically a measure a gross measure of a bank's exposure”
The Federal Reserve's actual monetary policy is based on expectations manipulation and lying; they deny equating quantitative easing with money printing but allow the media to promote this misconception because it serves their expectations goals of boosting inflation expectations
“i think the fed's actual monetary policy is to lie now they would say that we don't lie we try to we try to um picture the truth in certain ways we try to fashion it so that's palatable to the public but that's really what expectations based policy is if you don't do money and you do expectations you're down to manipulating people's behavior at least believing that you can manipulate people's behavior which a natural extension of that obviously is at times you have to lie and yes and i think the federal reserve is very good and very crafty about the way it does things like for example the myth of money printing quantitative easing itself i don't believe i've ever heard a central banker equate quantitative easing with money printing because they know it's not but they're perfectly happy to let the media run with that idea because it fits their expectations goals right if they want inflation expectations to rise and the financial media and as well as the financial services industry broadly is willing to say oh it's money printing it's money printing on behalf of the fed of course the federal reserve is never going to correct the error because it suits their purpose”
Ben Bernanke's skill was using technical mathematics, econometrics, DSGE models, and obscure statistical references to create an appearance of scientific credibility that made the public believe him even though he lacked actual understanding of plumbing issues and his policies caused the 2008 crisis
“bernanke i think bernanke was very skilled at the technical aspects of econometrics which um if you start challenging if you started to challenge the guy on some of these plumbing issues he would fall back into mathematical discussions for example right and so it really added to the layperson that it seemed to add a lot of credibility to what he was saying because he could he could say all of these obscure arcane references to statistics and mathematical equations and dsge models and how they operate and things like that and it made it sound like what he was saying was very scientific and objective and put together very well he was really good at that”
The history of kinesics (body language analysis) and political persuasion shows that certain leaders are extraordinarily effective at making people believe narratives; the Fed Chair role is now primarily a public relations position requiring this persuasive skill rather than technical competence.
“the thing that's the thing about the history of you know whether you study kinesics or not you know the the the study of people's body language and whether somebody is or is not telling the truth i mean there is a long history of political types that have been unbelievable tremendous at having you to believe certain things right”
The temporary SLR exemption expires in about two weeks and when it does banks will face pressure to sell assets or reduce reserves, potentially causing disruption in treasury and liquidity markets as the banking system absorbed both treasury issuance and Fed balance sheet expansion during pandemic stimulus
“as the banking system absorbed both of those things the authorities including the fdic and occ decided that we have to we have to suspend the slr otherwise this could cause adverse effects because it will make banks balance sheets expands too far therefore causing all these these uh negative harmful liquidity side effects now that that temporary slr exemption is scheduled to uh expire in about two weeks so the idea is that with the slr coming back into effect all of these treasuries that had that banking system has bought all of these bank reserves that the banking system has added to its balance sheet because of quantitative easing that's going to cause some sort of some sort of response on the part of the banking system they're going to have to sell some assets to get underneath slr thresholds or anything something like that which is going to cause some sort of a lot of disruption in these marketplaces”
Fed staff members are more interested in technical plumbing and monetary system issues than top Fed leadership; staff express disbelief that central banks focus on public expectations and appearances rather than understanding how monetary systems actually work
“it's my sense that there's there's a lot more interest and probably capabilities at the staff level in these central banks than there is in the top position the top positions are all about these you know policy appearances whereas down in the in the trenches so to speak a lot of the staffers at least a few that i have talked i've talked with they say the same thing they can't believe this is what a central bank does really this is we don't really know about anything much about the monetary system but we what we we tell everybody we do and we're good about we're good at telling everybody we know we're talking about when they really do have a more uh concerted interest in some of the more plumbing and technical issues”
The global interconnected market system with nonlinear functions means that similar sets collide and multiple phenomena happen simultaneously rather than sequentially; investors who use linear analysis miss these simultaneous regime shifts
“it's a again it's this is a non-linear system like anything else in in in in natural space you know these similar sets collide and then stuff happens you know it's not like you just take this one thing evaluation of that thing fed said this saying that's not the way it works it's not the way that a globally interconnected market system uh with n with nonlinear functions works anyway”
Structural economic risks (demographics, leverage, deficits) only matter when growth is slowing; when growth is accelerating with rising dollar and falling foreign currency, dollar shortage problems don't cause deflation, but when growth slows and dollar strengthens, these structural risks reveal themselves like 'the tide rolling out'
“when you look at conditional factoring of market risk you know you have these big pillars of risk which include many of them we've talked about including demographics leverage deficits when you look at the country level how we've built the model and again you you can sit there and read zero edge all day long about these topics you know since 2008 by the way uh where the beginning of the end was supposed to end every year since then well unfortunately it doesn't you know for people that are purveying that view it only starts to really matter these structural issues matter when when growth is slowing when growth is accelerating uh news flash dollars going down other currencies are going up your dollar shortage problem isn't going to cause deflation but when you start to slow and the dollar starts to rise you see like old warren buffett taught us you know you see that tide rolling out and you see who's got their shorts on or not”
The future of macro analysis requires moving from linear thinking to fractal/nonlinear thinking about interconnected institutional systems, but this transition will only happen after the current system breaks down.
“we're about to have a new dawn in terms of our profession because you just can't stay with linear assumptions linear thinking you know these institutions that do uh that do both and and that is really the opportunities conversations like this but unfortunately for mike green and i and and all the glory that could be uh the future state of looking at things fractally yeah shit's gotta blow up again before that happens”
China's secondary industry (manufacturing) growth has peaked and is now making a series of lower highs over a long-term secular decline, indicating the industrial sector is well past peak and facing another cyclical slowdown within a secular picture loaded with demographic and production growth headwinds
“you know we just had a big rip in everything growth globally including chinese growth i'm showing secondary industry growth which you're obviously familiar with but old china now our our our estimate or an outcast is that we've seen another lower high in the growth rate china's industrial economy has p is well past peak and now we're going to have another cyclical slowdown within a secular picture that's fully loaded with demographics and industrial production growth um that's not good”
China's political risk is severe because the Communist Party has not completed its promise of urban transformation and middle-class creation; hundreds of millions of rural peasants accepted hardship with the expectation their children would benefit, and if that promise fails the regime faces existential legitimacy crisis
“there's a couple hundred million peasants in china that are nothing more than subsistence farmers who are saying look we put up with a lot of crap over the last 30 years with the promise that you know even if we didn't get to end up in these brand new cities that are beautiful and modern and middle-class lifestyle then maybe our children would and now you're telling me that we put up with all this stuff and we don't neither us or our children actually get to go and go off into these cities you know there's it's not just an economic issue for the chinese it's absolutely a political issue as well”
Repeated cycles of reflation followed by dollar shortage have occurred four times over the last 13 years; these are not separate phenomena but a single broken system cycling between illusion of recovery and crisis, and the pattern will repeat unless the monetary system fundamentally changes
“because of the the the underlying global dollar shortage this dysfunction in the euro dollar system because we never get any further than reflation we just move from one shortage to the next to the next to the next and that's that that process was repeated four times already over the last 13 years and unless something meaningfully changes in the monetary system which is nowhere near on the horizon we're just simply biding our time until the next dollar shortage shows up something provokes the banking system to put to tuck its tail between its legs and run back into its risk aversion position which manifests in many different ways including a rising dollar exchange value but also prominently lower and lower global bond yields”
Global trade blocks are emerging as countries recognize globalization is slowing; the monetary system dysfunction is another expression of how this fragmentation manifests, with historical pattern showing rapid globalization followed by fragmentation as the system searches for a new organizing principle
“i think we're already seeing that with the you know global trade blocks starting to emerge where countries are are keenly aware of the fact that globalization is not is not proceeding the way it used to and i think the monetary system and the financial system is another way another expression of how this dysfunction can manifest in bigger ways so i don't know if it's necessarily something breaks but as a system continues to break down and historically that's what happens you have a period of rapid rapid globalization rapid global growth that brings things together and then as it starts as so as it sort of dissipates all of those things begin to fragment again and then we search for a new way to combine everything in something new”
Xi Jinping's recent policy pivot represents a return to Mao-era governance principles after recognizing that Deng's 30-year globalization and export-driven model has reached its logical end and cannot sustain the growth rates the system needs
“i think that's why xi jinping in particular said we're going to go back to mao we're going to go back to the way you things used to be done because this 30-year trend under deng's version of chinese socialism and chinese characteristics has reached its logical end at least i think that's the chinese position”
China's authorities have explicitly shifted to a 'quality growth' mandate rather than quantity growth and will not stimulate further because they recognize the economy cannot achieve the growth rates it once did; this represents a strategic acceptance that stimulus would only create asset bubbles and wasteful spending
“what we're seeing what i see from china is that last year wasn't as good as maybe people are expecting or have been talking about and there's no real appetite to make it any different policy wise the communist party stance monetary policy fiscal policy has all has all turned neutral and we're told it's going to remain neutral because the chinese authorities have said this is it this is the economy that we have we're not going to go nuts trying to trying to create economic growth that we don't think is legitimate and sustainable”
Powell's position is that the Fed does not want to extend the SLR exemption; instead the Fed is implementing negative interest rates in a macroprudential way by forcing banks to choose between expensive safe asset holdings and taking on more risk
“i think that powell's position is i don't think the fed wants to extend it i think in some ways they're enacting something like negative interest rates in a macroprudential way what i mean by that is they're forcing the banking system to face up to the slr and say look if you want to hold only safe liquid assets then pay the surcharge if the surcharge is too high you have to hold too many high quality liquid assets against your balance sheet then go out and lend i think that's you know what the fed has always tried to do is say look we want we want portfolio effects we want to create policies that make banks take on risks what better way to do that than to increase the balance sheet cost of holding safe assets so i think the fed is kind of saying look we want that we want the banking system you don't like low returns on treasuries and it's going to cost you more in your balance sheet then go out and do some more risky stuff with it i think they're trying to do sort of a backdoor nerp kind of macro credential way of forcing risk onto the bank's balance sheets”
Ben Bernanke devalued the dollar to a 40-year low in 2011, yet never publicly discussed the dollar system or its impacts; this is ironic because he led a dollar-denominated global macro market system while seemingly ignoring his role in devaluing it, allowing commodities (86% dollar-settled) to hit all-time highs
“you know it's super ironic about a dollar denominated global uh macro market system is that he would never talk about it he wouldn't he didn't he didn't have any impact on the dollar why would he why would he do that and he devalued it to a 40-year low in 2011. that's the you know commodities hit an all-time high in dollars because 86 percent of those settle in dollars”
The media narrative and mainstream economic narrative tend to swing between two extremes: during deflationary periods claiming 'this is the end, collapse is coming,' and during reflationary periods claiming 'we're entering 1970s stagflation or Weimar hyperinflation,' when the reality is the system oscillates between these poles without reaching either extreme.
“it's funny how we go between two extremes right when we go into the deflationary period the media narrative tends to be or the mainstream narrative tends to be oh th this is it this is the final end it's going to all collapse and crash and everything like that then we go into the reflection and everybody immediately goes into the opposite direction where oh we're going to we're going to turn into 1970s the u.s if not 1920s weimar germany and really we go back and forth in between”
Central bankers and economists gamed the question of who would be responsible for the offshore dollar system in the 1960s and 1970s when it emerged, and simply decided during the 'Great Moderation' of the 1980s-90s that it didn't matter; 2008 disproved this but nothing fundamentally changed in Fed approach
“this is one of the things that uh you know economists and central bankers even treasury market or treasury department officials had talked about in the 1960s and 1970s when this euro dollar system first showed up they kept game planning at least in their minds what would happen if the system breaks down who is going to step in and be responsible for all of these dollars that are floating around offshore and all these dollars that are floating around nowadays in all sorts of different formats there's no actual currency here these are all derivative transactions so who who is responsible for that and they simply just decided over the 80s and 90s this so-called great moderation that it didn't matter so nobody ever stepped in and said look we'll be responsible for the global banking system we'll just hope that the basal rules construct useful measures and we can we can head off any crisis before it happens of course 2008 came along and showed that was a ridiculous assumption to begin with but nothing has changed since then”
China has a dollar shortage problem that creates internal economic drags and is distinct from their economic growth issues; Chinese retail sales performance has been markedly worse than industrial sectors, suggesting consumers are the weakest link beneath the industrial rebound
“part of the reason i would add that we have the secular underlying thesis which is negative is that they have a monetary problem they have a dollar shortage problem that they can't seem to get around right which creates all sorts of internal drags as well and i would also add that you know the chinese internal economy hasn't performed well at all in fact you know you look at retail sales for example chinese consumers over the last year have performed markedly worse than any other parts of the chinese economy so if the industrial sector the tertiary or the secondary industries represent the high high water mark of the uh of the most recent rebound what are we looking at underneath all that which might might be where the chinese economy eventually reverts to and retail sales”
The underlying driver of bond yield increases is not the SLR cliff itself but the combination of accelerating growth and inflation expectations beginning in early January when fiscal stimulus visibility improved, with the SLR being a technical excuse overlaying this reflation trade
“yeah i think underlying underneath all of this slf stuff i think the sls stuff is real i think there is actual selling going on but you're right the the underlying the underneath premise is the fact that the economy is getting better things are looking up and the the the real meat of the sell-off goes back to early january which is when we got more more concrete of visibility on fiscal stimulus and fiscal approach and things like that so there has definitely been an uptick in optimism especially that has come out in the same way of of reflationary trades that we've seen time and time again that the market is adjusting to how last year was really bad and maybe moving forward it won't be so bad and that's really what the reflation trade is i think it's an adjustment an upward adjustment to outlook of as you said keith both growth and inflation”
China is entering Quadrant 3 (stagflation: rising inflation with slowing real growth) rather than Quadrant 2 (reflation: rising growth and inflation) that characterizes most other G20 economies, representing a leading indicator that global reflation may be ending
“but china is the first one and you called it inflation tour stop number one china um so i wanted to you know when you tweeted that i'm like okay i got a yellow light there that's a three that's not a quad two that's uh that means that the real growth rate in china is starting to slow it's more like stagflation uh one do you agree with that”
The host's team recently hired a Fed staff member who wanted to leave the Fed and has many questions about how certain Fed things are done, indicating deep institutional dissatisfaction among career staff.
“we just hired a fed staffer so uh you know proof is in the pudding on a very impressive young man who's you know wanted to get the hell out obviously but he also he he had quite a few questions i i let's just leave it at that about how certain things are done”
The world needs excess growth from China and cannot prosper without it; China's failure to deliver that growth is incompatible with the reflation narrative that supports current equity and credit valuations.
“i think the rest of the world is saying we need china we need excess growth we can't go without china”
The Fed has historically shown a pattern of initially appearing tough on policy enforcement ('bad cop') but then capitulating once market stress becomes significant, suggesting the current SLR cliff enforcement may not stick if treasury yields rise too far.
“of course as you not as you're just alluding to the federal reserve will act tough in the beginning and say yeah we want you guys to do this but as soon as it becomes any sort of even minor problem they have a tendency to turn into marshmallows and say okay okay sorry we will give you what you want”
The China does not want to become the global reserve currency because managing the role is an 'enormous problem'; China would prefer to transition out of the eurodollar system altogether, but that requires a legitimate plan that cannot be designed or implemented overnight.
“it's not like you can flip the switch overnight and say you know there's a lot of people say the chinese are going to take over why it's going to be the reserve currency well no they don't i don't i don't think they want that job it's an enormous problem i think they would they would the chinese would argue look we would we would absolutely love to transition out of this euro dollar euro dollar rut that we're in but you know it's not something that you can just design overnight and implement in in a relatively short period of time”
The transition from Bretton Woods to the eurodollar system in the 1960s was a messy but prolonged period that didn't cause depression-like conditions, suggesting that the current system transition doesn't necessarily have to be a sharp violent crash but could be a 'messy' period of prolonged uncertainty.
“you think about the transition period to the euro dollar system from bretton woods two euro dollars took place over a prolonged period mostly the decade of the 1960s right it wasn't it was a messy transition but it wasn't something like it didn't repeat the great depression for example we went into the opposite way with the inflationary extremes but you know transitions don't have to be short sharp violent destructive uh destructive events they can be you know high degree of uncertainty sure in the uh messy to begin with”
Without a legitimate, comprehensive plan for transition away from the eurodollar system, the world remains locked in the dysfunctional current system, and the path forward begins with understanding exactly how the current system works and fails.
“we're kind of stuck with this until we we put together a legitimate plan of action and which starts with understanding exactly what things are how things work right now or how they don't work right now”
The dollar has stopped signaling lower lows in price/volume/volatility fractals despite continuing to decline; this signals a transition point where the dollar is no longer declining the way it was and the reflation trade may be ending, visible in strengthening against Asian currencies which signals shadow dollar shortage conditions
“i measure and map the dollar daily and fractally uh using price volume and volatility and and the damn thing is done signaling lower lows that's important that you know it's not signaling that it's going to crash it's signaling that it's done you know it's it's not done going down but it's done like going down the way it was going down”
The transition from Quadrant 2 (growth + inflation rising) to Quadrant 4 (growth falling + inflation falling = deflation) is the expected path; the 10-year yield will likely go to zero before 2.5-3% because the next dollar shortage episode will trigger deflationary dynamics including rising dollar and falling yields
“you know for whatever it's worth is that you have you know we have the last three months of quad two and then we're going to hit slide 20 again we're gonna hit quad four quad four has got the only rising and high expected value of the dollar going you know it's a dollar up quadrant and quad 4 is also called deflation so yeah so i do think it's i mean it's going to be the beginning of the end”
As a macro investor, the dollar is the one thing you must get right; most investors use prehistoric analysis like the 50-day moving average when they should use long-term broad trade-weighted dollar analysis with mean reversion perspective, recognizing it has peaked and will collapse toward 90 from 92
“so to me that's a dollar you know how am i going to be a global macro guy without getting the dollar right and and i think a lot of people sit there um with these views of what the 50-day bloody moving average of the dollar is doing i mean give me a break i mean that talk about prehistoric analysis but if you guys if you look inside 92 the broad trade weighted dollar you could look at if you're looking at this from schiller's perspective you'd say oh mean reversion that thing is going to collapse it's it started it started to go down um and every time it starts to go down off a mega cycle peak like it did in 1999 2000 it's the beginning of the end and that thing's going at least towards you know 90”
Janet Yellen's 'deer in headlight' expression undermined expectations manipulation because it telegraphed doubt and uncertainty rather than conviction, making it harder for the public to believe her Fed policy narrative
“whereas janet yellen had had her patented deer in the headlight stare at any kind of tough question it really didn't really didn't lend itself to expectations manipulation because you you kept looking at her and thinking does she even believe what she's saying”
Jay Powell sometimes appears competent but sometimes shows signs of fidgeting and uncertainty that suggest he may not fully understand what he's saying, placing him between Bernanke's confident rhetoric and Yellen's transparent doubt
“and jay powell i think falls somewhere in the middle whereas sometimes he can appear competent and and uh it's worthwhile listening to but other times he has that sort of look on his face where he starts to fidget and and kind of messes around where you think well maybe he doesn't really know what he's saying either”
China's announced 2021 GDP growth target of over 6% is actually a significant challenge and lower than many expected (8-9% or double digits), which reflects political management of expectations downward.
“lee ki kang the pride the premiere for china came out recently and said look our growth target for 2021 is over six percent and i think a lot of people were thinking more like eight nine maybe even double digits in gdp growth this year whereas six percent following a year where they where they barely got two percent represents a really big challenge for the rest of the world”
The purpose of conversations like this summit is to educate the public about how the global financial system and monetary mechanics actually work, so they can eventually demand change—because real change requires public understanding of the problem.
“that's what we're trying to do when we're having conversations like this and by the way you know on the thing about looking good on tv you you did take you look yeah you look you look like him a little bit we started that and you were damn good today on hedgehog tv so thank you uh thank you for that thanks for the education i'm sure many many others are also quite appreciative”
The 2008 financial crisis was the point where the Fed should have fundamentally reformed its understanding and approach to monetary policy and the global dollar system, but it failed to do so, and instead maintained the same flawed framework afterward.
“i think we already reached that point didn't we to me 2008 was the breakage point that was the you know it was not a one-off event the fed looked the other way ben bernanke said to milton friedman's face yeah we'll never do it again and then they proceeded to do it again”
We should not evaluate monetary policy or economic leadership based on television performance or communication skills; instead, we should focus on whether policies actually work—but in the 'modern age,' rhetorical skill has replaced policy efficacy as the evaluation metric.
“that's not really how we should be evaluating monetary policy nor economic and financial performance whether or not they're good on television but that's the modern age which we live in”