What this covers

David Skeel of the University of Pennsylvania Law School joins Russ Roberts for a sustained examination of the 2009 GM and Chrysler bailouts through the lens of bankruptcy law and rule of law. The conversation opens with Skeel's argument that the bailout was not necessary—that ordinary bankruptcy could have restructured both companies, and that the government's chosen method, structured as asset sales rather than reorganizations, violated foundational creditor-priority rules, obscured true costs, and set a dangerous precedent for political favoritism in capital markets. The two speakers range across the mechanics of how bankruptcy operates in the US, why reorganization emerged as the dominant approach, and how the auto deals departed from that framework.

Skeel outlines how the so-called "qualified bidder" rules prevented a genuine auction, allowing the government to override seniority: Chrysler's senior lenders took 29 cents on the dollar while unionized retirees were paid in full. He argues the real taxpayer cost exceeds the headline figures once tax write-offs favored to GM (roughly $12–13 billion) are included, and that such selective rule-bending erodes what he calls "economic morality" and distorts credit markets by signaling that politically connected firms face no real discipline. The pair also discuss whether private financing might have been available, draw parallels to other bailout structures like Bear Stearns, and weigh the tension between crisis urgency and adherence to established law. The conversation moves from technical bankruptcy questions into broader claims about how government intervention in favored industries breeds crony capitalism and perpetual dependence on future rescues.

Sharpest takeaway

Skeel argues the GM and Chrysler bailouts were not the only option: an ordinary bankruptcy could have restructured them, and the government's use of sham 'sales' inverted normal creditor priorities, hid real costs, and violated rule-of-law principles in ways that breed crony capitalism.

  • The auto bankruptcies were structured as sham sales with 'qualified bidder' rules that prevented a genuine auction, allowing the government to favor unions over senior creditors
  • Real costs exceed the headline taxpayer figure once tax write-off favors (~$12-13B for GM) are included
  • Selective rule-bending for politically favored firms erodes credit markets and entrenches perpetual bailouts

The claims · ranked28 claims · weighted by value

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0.86

A company that is financially distressed but not economically distressed — viable and operationally sound but carrying too much debt — is the classic candidate for reorganization in bankruptcy; General Motors clearly fit this profile, while Chrysler was a closer call.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“a company that is financially distressed but not economically distressed its its underlying business is sound and with General Motors in particular that was quite clearly the case”

0.86

The purpose of America's reorganization-oriented bankruptcy system is the perception that failure (filing for bankruptcy) does not mean a business is non-viable; it originated with 19th-century railroads that everyone agreed should be preserved rather than shut down, and it exists to make restructuring of otherwise-viable companies with too much debt possible.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“the reason we have bankruptcy is to make the preservation and restructuring of a an otherwise viable business possible”

0.86

The most obvious beneficiaries of the US reorganization system are the managers of financially precarious companies: in most countries managers are immediately kicked out on default, whereas in the US the baseline assumption is they stay, which makes US managers more willing to file for bankruptcy.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“in the US when a company files for bankruptcy the the baseline assumption is that the managers will not be kicked out that has the effect of making managers more willing to file for bankruptcy in the US than they are in other... countries”

0.80

In an ordinary bankruptcy, the company's managers (the debtor) have the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan for the first several months; the bankruptcy judge acts as a referee calling balls and strikes rather than making business decisions, while creditors vote by class to confirm or veto the plan.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“only the managers can propose a reorganization plan so they're the ones who are making the decisions”

0.80

A successful bankruptcy is one where financial distress is dealt with well — which may mean either reorganizing a viable company or selling off a non-viable one like Lehman; selling a firm is not necessarily a failure of the bankruptcy process.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“a successful bankruptcy is a bankruptcy where the financial distress is dealt with well”

0.80

Bankruptcy operates on a priority ordering: secured priority creditors who took collateral get paid first, general unsecured creditors come next, and this line determines who recovers what — rather than all creditors taking an equal prorated haircut.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“the principle line is between priority creditors and in particular priority creditors who have taken collateral for what they are owed on the one hand and then on the other hand general creditors”

0.79

The auto bankruptcies were structured as sales rather than reorganizations — assets were 'sold' to a new entity (new GM, new Chrysler) and proceeds distributed to old creditors — and while sales do happen in bankruptcy, applying this technique to firms as large as GM and Chrysler was highly unusual, as large firms have almost always been restructured via the normal route.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“what the government did in each case is purported to sell all of the assets to a a new entity new Chrysler in the Chrysler case new GM”

0.79

The auto sales would have been legitimate if they were wide-open auctions paying full value, but they were sham auctions: the 'qualified bidder' requirement meant no one could bid unless they agreed to do exactly what the government wanted — pay off the employees and trade creditors — which is not a real auction and amounts to the government deciding who gets what.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“it was structured so that nobody could make a bid unless they agreed to do everything the government wanted to do which was to protect the employees and protect the trade creditors which obviously is not a real auction at all”

0.78

Government do-overs for favored companies harm innovation and competition because rivals cannot effectively compete against a firm that will be helped no matter how it performs, and they distort capital markets because lenders to politically sensitive industries fear their entitlements may be reshuffled by the government.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“if you have to compete against a company that is is going to be helped out no matter what it does it really is impossible to compete so one effect of this is you really interfere with innovation and competition in the marketplace”

0.78

The more developed an economy's markets and the more buyers exist for any kind of assets, the less necessary old-style reorganization bankruptcy becomes, because viable assets can be sold rather than restructured — though bankruptcy still plays an important role in such sales.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“the more the better developed your markets are and the more you have buyers for any kind of assets the less the old-style bankruptcy on scene or it starts to seem a little bit less necessary”

0.75

Even if the officials genuinely believed they faced catastrophe, that panic is not a good reason to violate rule-of-law principles; the way the bailouts were carried out shows why those rules matter, because decision-makers may be wrong and there is a real cost to violating the rules even in a crisis.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· David Skeel

“the way they went about doing what they did shows just how important rule of law principles are know that they may be wrong about about what they're doing there's a reason those particular rules are in place and there's a real cost to violating them even in a crisis”

0.74

The true cost of the bailouts exceeds the headline taxpayer figure because the Treasury adjusted tax rules to let General Motors keep tax write-offs worth as much as forty-five billion dollars in losses — saving GM roughly twelve or thirteen billion dollars at corporate tax rates — an indirect transfer that should be counted but usually is not.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 2/4· David Skeel

“the Treasury basically adjusted the tax rules to give General Motors a special break with respect to its taxes that is a break that could be worth as much as forty five billion dollars in tax write-offs”

0.73

The car companies could have been restructured through something much closer to an ordinary bankruptcy rather than the bailout approach that was used; the claim that there was no alternative is false.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“one point you made which is a very common argument is that the the car companies could not have been restructured in any other way it had to be done the way it was done I don't believe that's true”

0.73

The pattern of government partnering with the biggest firms in a few key industries, doing reciprocal favors, is best described not as socialism but as corporatism or crony capitalism — for example, Chrysler's deal gave Fiat strong incentives to roll out green cars, a case of mutual back-scratching beyond mere bailout.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“much as what's often referred to as corporatism yeah crony capitalist crony capitalism... a situation where there's a partnership between the government and the biggest firms in a handful of really key industries and they do favors for each other”

0.73

The bailout outcomes inverted normal bankruptcy priorities: in Chrysler senior lenders received only 29 cents on the dollar while unionized retirees were paid in full or close to it; in GM senior creditors were paid in full but junior unsecured creditors got 10-12 cents on the dollar while union retirees got much more.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“in Chrysler senior lenders were paid only a small portion of what they were owe they were paid 29 cents on the dollar and yet the the employees particularly the Chrysler retirees got a much much bigger percentage”

0.73

The Bear Stearns rescue parallels the auto bailouts: over a weekend the government arranged a sale to JPMorgan Chase (initially $2, raised to $10 a share) and guaranteed ~$29-32 billion in toxic assets on the grounds there was no time for an auction, structured so no other bidder could come along — a 'trust us' sweetheart deal that bent corporate-law rules just as the auto deals bent bankruptcy rules.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“with Bear Stearns corporate law rules corporate law corners were cut that transaction was structured in a way that it made it impossible for another bidder to come along”

0.73

The more politically sensitive an industry is, the less able its companies will be to obtain private funding, which creates even more pressure for future government intervention — potentially creating perpetual bailouts for publicly favored companies.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“the more politically sensitive and industry is the less likely it's companies will be to able they'll be less likely to obtain private funding which is going to create even more pressure for the government to come in again in the future so what we may be doing in cases like this is creating perpetual bailouts for publicly favored companies”

0.73

Countries with more draconian bankruptcy regimes — where default means shutdown rather than a chance to restructure — tend to produce a business world with more prudent firms, an advantage for established companies, and less innovation and risk-taking; any innovation link may relate more to personal bankruptcy (discharge encouraging entrepreneurial second chances) than corporate bankruptcy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“it tends to be a business world where companies are more prudent established companies have a leg up there tends to be less innovation less risk-taking”

0.68

When the rules are applied differently for different people, it erodes 'economic morality' and feeds the impression that Wall Street is bailed out while the little guy is not — an erosion that has effects everywhere in the economy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· David Skeel

“when you you start suggesting that the rules applied differently for different people I think it really erodes the economic morality in and it roads it in a way that that really has effects everywhere”

0.65

As conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government has declined to enforce contractual provisions that would hold mortgage originators liable for fraudulent or non-compliant loans, effectively letting originators off the hook — a parallel example of bending contractual relationships to favor friendly institutions.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“now that the government is the conservator... they've said well you know we're not gonna really try to collect that there because we're... because the banks are our friends it's mind-boggling what this has done to contractual relationships”

0.62

In a normal bankruptcy GM likely could have borrowed from private creditors even in late 2008-2009, confirming a reorganization plan quickly (months, not years); if it could not, the government should have acted as an arm's-length lender rather than micromanaging the process.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· David Skeel

“it would have made more sense for the government to lend the money without without micromanaging the process the way they did and simply acting more as an arm's-length lender”

0.57

The opacity and complexity of bankruptcy serves the government's interest because the details make people's eyes glaze over, so most simply conclude the government saved the companies and had no choice.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“one of the virtues of this I think from the government's perspective... is it's real complicated bankruptcy eyes glaze it over yeah I guess the government saved the companies that's it the details very very few people follow them”

0.56

The bailouts were not nearly cost-free; even the administration acknowledges they are likely to cost at least fourteen billion dollars, and that figure leaves out significant indirect costs not in the form of direct funds.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· David Skeel

“even the administration now acknowledges that they're likely to cost at least fourteen billion dollars and this is leaving out some very significant cost that were we're not in the form of direct funds”

0.51

It is mystifying why the government made it a sham rather than a real auction, since the government's deep involvement made it unlikely anyone could have outbid it; the likely explanation is they felt they had to dictate terms and could not risk losing control, and were willing to abuse the bankruptcy rules to do so.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· David Skeel

“they just felt like they had to dictate the terms and they couldn't take any chances that they would lose control of the process in any way and they were they were willing to abuse the bankruptcy rules to do that”

0.34

The US reorganization system creates ambivalent innovation incentives: it encourages risk-taking because managers likely keep their jobs and can reorganize if things go badly, but it also dampens the discipline of abandoning a failed idea and moving to the next.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“on the one hand it says take chances because in the worst-case scenario you probably get to keep your job and you can always reorganize if it doesn't turn out so well on the other hand it says if you make a bad choice don't worry”

0.31

Being a government-favored firm carries disadvantages as long as not all firms are favored; Ford, which received no bailout, has likely been both hurt (not getting handouts) and helped (customers may favor a non-bailed-out American carmaker over GM or Chrysler).

causalspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· David Skeel

“I have to imagine folks who are thinking about buying an American car are going to be a little more positively disposed towards Ford then towards Chrysler or General Motors”

0.26

The Federal Reserve's mission does not include ensuring that creditors of large financial institutions who made bad bets get all their money back.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“I look at the feds mission doesn't really say anywhere that the feds job is to make sure that creditors of large financial institutions who made bad bets should all just get all their money back that just really bugs me”

0.25

The Washington Post ran an unsigned editorial wondering whether politics might have influenced the decision to intervene in the auto bankruptcies.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Russ Roberts

“a washington post unsigned editorial where they wondered whether politics might have had something to do with the decision to intervene in this way”