
You Can Only Invest in China With This in Mind
What this covers
This is a short Bloomberg Radio conversation from the Surveillance podcast. Bill Lee, chief economist at the Milken Institute, is questioned by hosts Tom Keene and Paul Sweeney about what a foreign investor needs to understand about China. Lee does most of the talking. The hosts mostly prompt him and add a few points of their own. The discussion starts from the gap between official figures and what is visible on the ground, and moves toward what that gap means for companies deciding whether and how to stay.
The first half of the argument is about data. Lee says shopping malls are closing and retail space is empty in Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Quanzhou, and that property sales are depressed. In prime Beijing districts, he says, sellers get opening bids 30-40% below asking price, with few transactions even then. Several of these claims are marked as contested. So is his suggestion that GDP growth is nearer 3% than the official 5%. He ties this to policy, arguing that Beijing is making decisions on falsely optimistic premises. He also links it to Xi Jinping's new productive forces program, which aims to move the economy into high-tech, high-value sectors so that a shrinking population can hold well-paid jobs. Lee argues that this shift cannot happen while the economy is stuck.
The second half turns to business. Lee describes a model in which state-owned enterprises lead and smaller private firms are pushed to merge with them. In that model, currying favor with local authorities becomes the route to new contracts. He says the sanctity of contracts now depends on alignment with Communist Party vision. Contracts are enforced for firms that help state enterprises and are likely to go unenforced for firms that try to build independent market share. He points to Tim Cook and Apple's new Shanghai flagship as executives expanding despite poor conditions. The hosts add a counterpoint: China still depends on American goods and services, which gives Western governments some leverage.
China's economic strategy under Xi Jinping prioritizes state-owned enterprises and high-tech industries to address demographic decline, but the actual economy is weaker than official data suggests, forcing Western businesses to align with state interests rather than operate independently.
- Official Chinese economic data masks weakness in primary cities like Shanghai and Beijing, with property sales down 30-40% and retail vacancies rising despite government claims of booming business
- Xi's 'new productive forces' strategy requires technological advancement that depends on economic revival first, creating a dependency loop that benefits state enterprises over private competition
- Western executives must now prioritize helping state-owned enterprises rather than carving independent market share, as contract enforcement depends on alignment with Communist Party vision
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Contract enforcement in China depends on whether the business is aligned with Communist Party vision and priorities; if a company is helping state-owned enterprises, contracts will be fully enforced, but if a company is attempting to carve out independent market share, contracts are likely to be unenforceable
“The sanctity of contracts in China depends upon who you know is in the judicial system and whether or not you are currying the favor and your policies are in line with those of the Communist Party vision of where China is going. If you're helping Chinese companies promote their activities, your contracts will be enforced full, full force. If you are heading off on your own trying to carve out a share of the Chinese market. Get for yourself without involving the Chinese state owned enterprises, the oil contracts are likely not going to be held.”
Under Xi's new direction, Chinese government policy is shifting toward state-owned enterprises taking the lead role in the economy, with smaller private sector companies being pressured to merge with state-owned counterparts
“The current businesses that are there in China are realizing that President Xi's new China is going to involve a lot more in the way of state enterprises being in the in the driver's seat. The smaller private sector companies are asked to merge with their counterparts on the official side.”
Xi Jinping's strategy to implement 'new productive forces' in the Chinese economy focuses on transforming it toward high-tech industries and high-value-added sectors to ensure that China's declining population can occupy high-salary occupations
“President Xi has a campaign to what he he's trying to put in what he calls new productive forces into the Chinese economy that will push them into the bleeding edge, the leading edge of technology. The most important industries will be the high tech industries, the high value added industries, so that the declining population in China will be having occupations and jobs that are in high salary occupations.”
China cannot achieve technological and productivity change required by Xi's 'new productive forces' strategy while the economy remains in the doldrums with GDP growth closer to 3% than the official 5% figure
“You can't get the kind of technological change and productivity change with an economy that is in the doldrums and with GDP growth. You know, as much as the official numbers are, you know, five plus or the actual numbers are closer to three plus.”
Tim Cook and other U.S. technology executives are opening or expanding operations in China (such as Apple's new flagship store in Shanghai) even as the surrounding retail environment deteriorates, suggesting they are prioritizing access to the Chinese market and state favor despite unfavorable conditions
“I think you're seeing Tim Cook over there opening up a new branch, a new Apple store, probably one of the biggest in Asia, in Shanghai. But at the same time, that same shopping mall is seeing stores closed left and right, you know, in private as private businesses are starving for business.”
China remains dependent on imports from the United States despite tensions, and U.S. and Western governments have significant negotiating leverage over China because China needs American goods and services as much as the reverse
“They know they can't live without the United States, but they want to have the states come to them on their terms.”
Western executives are maintaining ties with China despite unfavorable conditions because they believe they must preserve access to the Chinese market and cannot afford to be excluded
“Yet at the same time, we see leading U.S. executives, Tim Cook, the fellow from Tesla, going over to China and trying to maintain and develop ties there.”
Property prices in prime Beijing districts are declining significantly, with sellers receiving opening bids 30-40% below asking prices and experiencing low transaction volume even at these discounted levels
“I have some friends who are trying to sell property in some of the prime places in Beijing, and they're starting off with bids that are 30, 40% off their asking price. And even there, they're not getting much, much activity.”
Secondary Chinese cities are weaker economically than primary cities like Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Quanzhou, but the narrative that primary cities remain strong is contradicted by ground observations of retail vacancies and business closures
“In fact, the jump condition I'm actually seeing is that for you know, a lot of people say the secondary cities are are not doing so well. But that's okay because the primary cities of Shanghai, Shenzhen Quanzhou, those are the places where businesses are really booming and they're doing fine. And that's what the official story line has been. And every official meeting you see that that the Chinese authorities have held have peddled this story. But the story on the ground, when you look at the shopping malls in these elite places, they're not doing well.”
Official Chinese government data about economic growth and business conditions in major cities like Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Quanzhou contradicts ground-level reality, where shopping malls are closing, retail establishments are empty, and property sales are severely depressed
“For every story that we hear about how the Chinese economy is reviving, there are stories that we also hear that don't match up with the official data. Iconic places on Nanjing Road in Shanghai that have long been establishments that serve the elites of business. Yes, I'm just shocked now because there's no business”
The gap between official Chinese government economic data and ground-level reality affects the credibility and workability of Beijing's policy decisions, as they are based on falsely optimistic premises about economic conditions
“What we are seeing in reality is that they really can't get this stuff in place without first reviving the Chinese economy.”
Western businesses operating in China must prioritize currying favor with local authorities and state-owned enterprises, as that is where new contracts and business opportunities originate under Xi's model
“Everyone that's doing business there knows they have to curry the favor of local authorities because that's where the new contracts are coming from.”