
LIVE: Ian Bremmer State of the World 2025 | GZERO Live
What this covers
This is Ian Bremmer's annual State of the World address, delivered live from Tokyo for GZERO Media. It runs as a single extended speech rather than a conversation. Bremmer first sets aside what he calls the dominant narrative of the last twenty years, in which China rises, America declines and the two collide. He argues that the United States remains the most powerful country and has chosen to leave the order it built, and that this choice is what defines a G-zero world. He also calls American unreliability the central driver of present instability.
The middle of the talk is a comparative history of revolutions from above. Bremmer defines a political revolution as powerful actors seizing a moment when society believes the system is broken and illegitimate. He sets Deng Xiaoping's economic opening, which brought growth of about 10 percent for nearly two generations while political reform was refused, against Gorbachev's reforms, which undermined the Soviet system they were meant to save. He then places Donald Trump alongside them as a contested case: a freely elected leader, in Bremmer's account a symptom and accelerant of American dysfunction, who follows no grand plan and instead applies steady pressure and exploits crises. The examples he gives include purges of the bureaucracy, the use of the FBI, Justice Department and IRS against adversaries, and a 50-year-old emergency law stretched to justify tariffs on 90 countries. He frames the result as a rule of the jungle, borrowing from Thucydides. He contrasts this with the US military, which he says keeps its professional culture and is not hurt by purges the way China's has been.
The last stretch turns to consequences. Bremmer lists four structural advantages of the United States: infrastructure, demographics fed by immigration, tolerance of inequality, and capacity for deficit spending. He treats their erosion as a sign of longer-term decline. He tells allies to build their own capacity, invest in entrepreneurship, and take on diplomatic leadership and multilateral architecture. He closes with a forecast that the US will not return to its earlier political culture and that the next few years will be painful.
The United States has voluntarily withdrawn from the international system it built after WWII, creating a G-zero world of competing powers with no leader, while simultaneously undergoing a political revolution that consolidates executive power and erodes democratic checks and balances, leaving allies vulnerable and global stability uncertain.
- The US under Trump has systematically abandoned international commitments (Paris Climate Accord, Iran nuclear deal, WHO, UNESCO) and uses economic tools arbitrarily rather than through institutional channels
- Trump's political consolidation mirrors authoritarian revolution patterns but lacks strategic coherence—it's opportunistic retribution rather than systematic restructuring
- Allies face a dual crisis: an unreliable security partner AND pressure to build independent capacity, while the erosion of four structural US advantages (infrastructure, demographics, inequality tolerance, deficit spending capacity) signals longer-term decline
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A true political revolution requires powerful actors in a system to seize opportunities created by societal belief that the existing system is broken and illegitimate; revolutions are made, not born, and often combine ideological difference, ethnic and tribal identities, and access to wealth as motivations.
“a true revolution always believes on the ability and willingness of powerful actors in a system to seize an opportunity created by a belief across society that the existing system is broken and therefore illegitimate... revolutions are made, they're not born... motives can be some combination of ideological difference, of ethnic and tribal identities, maybe access to wealth”
Gorbachev's socialist revolution in the Soviet Union was intended to reform and strengthen the system through political openness, economic restructuring, and devolution of power, but these reforms undermined the foundations of the Soviet system itself, leading to its disintegration.
“Gorbachev unleashed radical internal reforms, political openness to encourage opposing political ideas, economic restructuring to inject competitiveness of the free market into the centrally planned economy, and self-accounting to devolve political power from Moscow into the Soviet Republics. They failed. These reforms undermined the foundations of the Soviet system. They let citizens and oligarchs and nationalists question the regime's legitimacy and generate internal opposition, widespread social dissent.”
A true political revolution requires the ability and willingness of powerful actors in a system to seize an opportunity created by widespread belief that the existing system is broken and illegitimate; revolutions are made, not born.
“I'm a political scientist, and I would never use the word revolution lightly. It implies a fundamental change in a country's governance. An attempt to overthrow what exists and replace it with something new. Now, those motives can be some combination of ideological difference, of ethnic and tribal identities, maybe access to wealth, but a true revolution always believes on the ability and willingness of powerful actors in a system to seize an opportunity created by a belief across society that the existing system is broken and therefore illegitimate. And in this sense, revolutions are made, they're not born.”
Deng Xiaoping's economic revolution in China successfully transformed the economy from central planning to state capitalism with private enterprise, foreign investment, and trade, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and sustaining 10% average growth for nearly two generations, while political reform was rejected as too dangerous to the party's monopoly.
“The second revolution was in China, authored by Deng Xiaoping. In the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party leader responded to China's underproductive, inefficient, and stagnant socialist economy by transforming it from central planning to state capitalism, open to private enterprise, open to foreign investment, open to trade...The economic revolution succeeded. China lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. They sustained 10% average growth for nearly two generations, and they became a middle-income economy of 1.4 billion, leading the world in many cutting-edge technologies today.”
The United States is not going back to the political culture that held sway a decade ago before Trump took America's center stage; this is the highest-confidence prediction the speaker can make.
“There is one prediction that I can offer today with the highest confidence. And that is that the United States is not going back to the political culture that held sway a decade ago before Donald Trump descended the Trump Tower escalator to take America's center stage.”
Trump used a 50-year-old economic emergency law that doesn't explicitly mention tariffs to claim unilateral power to impose tariffs on 90 countries, a tactic no previous American president has ever used, and its use is not the intent of the law.
“President Trump used a 50-year-old economic emergency law that doesn't explicitly even mention the word tariff to claim this right for himself. Daring his critics to stop him in court. No previous American president has ever used this tactic. It's clearly not the intention of the law.”
Trump's political choices focusing on retribution include purging America's professional bureaucracy (the administrative state), replacing career civil servants with political appointees personally loyal to the president, and weaponizing power ministries (FBI, Justice Department, IRS) against domestic political adversaries.
“the president has taken and won total loyalty of the Republican Party... President Trump has begun a sweeping purge of America's professional bureaucracy, which he and his supporters have labeled the administrative state and replaced career civil servants with political appointees personally loyal to the president. He has weaponized the power ministries that he says were weaponized against him, the FBI, the Justice Department, the Internal Revenue Service”
Trump believes his return to power allows and demands the end of political checks and balances on his executive authority, replacing rule of law with what Thucydides called rule of the jungle: where the powerful do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.
“President Trump believes his return to power allows, even demands, the end of political checks and balances on his executive authority... replacing rule of law with rule of the jungle. Where the powerful, the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must.”
The US military prioritizes service to the country over loyalty to individuals, maintains professional culture that limits politicization, and Pentagon purges of high-level military officers don't undermine operational integrity the way China's recent purges have.
“There are still US institutions that can check the president's power. The military stands for professionalism. Its culture continues to prioritize service to the country over loyalty to any individual. The Pentagon's purges of some high-level military officers have made headlines in the US, but not like China's of the last week, and they don't undermine the military's core operational integrity.”
Until a new order emerges, all governments, businesses, and individuals must brace for growing turbulence because the old rules don't apply anymore and the new rules haven't been written yet; the next few years will be painful.
“all of us, governments, businesses, individuals, have to brace for growing turbulence because the old rules don't apply anymore and the new rules haven't been written yet. The next few years are going to be painful.”
Allies must also extract and invest in entrepreneurship, assert much more diplomatic leadership internationally, and accept responsibilities in building multilateral architecture.
“Allies must extract and invest in entrepreneurship. You have to assert much more diplomatic leadership internationally and accept responsibilities in building multilateral architecture.”
The structural advantages of the United States compared to other advanced industrial democracies are based on commitments to four fundamentals: a better post-war infrastructure base, strong demographics supported by immigrant inflows, greater public tolerance of unequal distribution of economic gains, and greater tolerance of and ability to engage in deficit spending.
“the structural advantages of the United States compared to other advanced industrial democracies are based on commitments to a few fundamentals that we should remember all here today. A better post-war infrastructure base on which to build, including public and private institutions. Strong demographics supported by inflows of hard-working immigrants. Greater public tolerance of an unequal distribution of society's economic gains. And greater tolerance of and ability to engage in deficit spending.”
The United States is not going back to the political culture that held sway a decade ago before Trump's descent down the Trump Tower escalator to take center stage in American politics; this is a prediction the speaker can offer with the highest confidence.
“there is one prediction that I can offer today with the highest confidence. And that is that the United States is not going back to the political culture that held sway a decade ago before Donald Trump descended the Trump Tower escalator to take America's center stage.”
By deglobalizing the world's most powerful economy, the American president is deglobalizing the global economy, fragmenting international trade and investment networks.
“In all these ways, the American president is deglobalizing the world's still most powerful economy, and with it, the global economy.”
The United States has deliberately chosen to walk away from the international system it built and led for three quarters of a century, not because it is weak or must, but because it wants to, and this represents a historic precedent with no parallel.
“the United States still today, the world's most powerful nation, has chosen to walk away from the international system that the United States built and led for three quarters of a century. Not because it's weak, not because it has to, because it wants to. There is no historic precedent for this.”
Trump is a symptom and principal beneficiary of US political dysfunction rather than its cause, but he is also an accelerant making the process of withdrawal faster.
“Trump himself is a symptom and a principal beneficiary of this conflict, not the cause. He's also, to be sure, an accelerant. He's making it faster.”
Mikhail Gorbachev's socialist revolution attempted radical internal reforms (political openness and economic restructuring) to reverse Soviet decline, but these reforms undermined the Soviet system's foundations by allowing citizens and oligarchs to question the regime's legitimacy, generating opposition and dissent that led to Soviet disintegration.
“Gorbachev unleashed radical internal reforms, political openness to encourage opposing political ideas, economic restructuring to inject competitiveness of the free market into the centrally planned economy... They failed. These reforms undermined the foundations of the Soviet system. They let citizens and oligarchs and nationalists question the regime's legitimacy and generate internal opposition, widespread social dissent.”
Trump's political revolution, unlike those of Gorbachev and Deng, follows no grand strategic plan but instead operates as a relentless pressure campaign testing the limits of what can be done, committing to act opportunistically as crises create opportunities to consolidate more power.
“Unlike the Gorbachev and Deng revolutions, Trump's revolution follows no grand strategic plan. Instead, it's a relentless pressure campaign on every political front. It's meant to test the limits of what can be done. It's a commitment to act opportunistically as the crises that these policies create open new possibilities to consolidate more power.”
Trump was freely and fairly elected largely because he personally embodied the political and cultural disruption that voters wanted; most voters who said they cared about democracy in 2024 voted for Trump because they believed the US political system was already broken and only Trump would create the disruption they wanted.
“Trump was freely and fairly elected in large part because he personally embodied the political and cultural disruption that voters wanted. Most American voters who said they cared about democracy in 2024 voted for, not against Trump, because they were convinced that the US political system was already broken, and that only President Trump would create the disruption that they wanted.”
The dominant narrative of the last 20 years—that China is rising, America is declining, and a collision between the two superpowers is inevitable—is fundamentally wrong; the actual story is that the United States, still the world's most powerful nation, has chosen to walk away from the international system it built and led for three quarters of a century, not because it is weak but because it wants to.
“for 20 years now, 20 years we have been warned about China's rise. We've been warned about America's decline. And we've been warned about the inevitable collision between the two superpowers. And I want to say in front of you today, that is absolutely not what's happening.”
President Trump is replacing rule of law with 'rule of the jungle, where the powerful, the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must,' a Thucydidean formulation describing power without constraint.
“In short, President Trump is replacing rule of law with rule of the jungle. Where the powerful, the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must.”
American unreliability has become the central driver of geopolitical uncertainty and instability in today's G zero world.
“American unreliability has become the central driver of geopolitical uncertainty and instability in today's G zero world.”
This targeting is undertaken with the intention of normalizing behaviors that have long been politically taboo.
“All of this undertaken with the intention of normalizing behaviors that have long been politically taboo.”
Deng Xiaoping's economic revolution successfully transformed China from central planning to state capitalism with private enterprise and foreign investment, leading to China's WTO admission in 2001, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty, sustaining 10% average growth for nearly two generations, and creating a middle-income economy of 1.4 billion, while the party rejected political reform as too dangerous after Tiananmen Square and Soviet collapse.
“The second revolution was in China, authored by Deng Xiaoping... transforming it from central planning to state capitalism... Western governments embraced these reforms, and that led to China's admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001. The events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union, all persuaded Chinese leaders that political reform was too dangerous. The party's monopoly on power was non-negotiable... But the economic revolution succeeded. China lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. They sustained 10% average growth for nearly two generations, and they became a middle-income economy of 1.4 billion”
The US has structural bias favoring Republicans: the Electoral College system allows a candidate to win the popular vote but lose the presidency, giving Republicans roughly a 2% electoral advantage; gerrymandering further reduces electoral competitiveness and legitimacy.
“The United States already has a structural bias favoring Republicans because of the Electoral College system by which presidents are elected. A candidate, as you know, can win the popular vote but lose the presidency thanks to demographics and distribution of electors, which gives you like a roughly 2% advantage to Republican candidates. If you add gerrymandering, the redistricting of districts in Congress, both parties rigging district maps, elections become even less representative, less competitive, less legitimate.”
US governors and mayors are largely technocratic, govern independently of Washington, and Trump's attempts to weaken Democratic national powers do not threaten state and city-level governance, providing a buffer against centralization.
“Shifts in political power towards states and cities also offer a buffer. US governors and mayors are largely technocratic. They govern independently of Washington. And Trump's attempts to weaken Democratic national powers do not threaten state and city-level governance.”
Brazil will hedge against American unreliability by expanding and deepening its ties with China, Europe, and elsewhere, even though US tariffs on Brazil may backfire and benefit Lula in the upcoming election, because either way Brazil faces structural incentive to diversify away from US dependence.
“But either way, Brazil is going to hedge against American unreliability by expanding and deepening its ties with China, with Europe, and elsewhere.”
The next few years are going to be painful, but history is not deterministic and trajectories can shift because people keep the possibility of something better alive long enough for an opportunity to appear.
“The next few years are going to be painful. But the good news is that history isn't deterministic. Our trajectories can shift. And they can shift because people keep the possibility of something better alive long enough for an opportunity to appear.”
Trump pledged a $20 billion bailout for Argentina's struggling economy, but only if voters reward President Milei's party in legislative elections, directly interfering in the domestic politics of a friendly democracy using economic leverage.
“He pledged a $20 billion bailout for Argentina's struggling economy, but only if voters reward President Milei's party in this Sunday's legislative elections.”
Brazil is going to hedge against American unreliability by expanding and deepening ties with China, Europe, and elsewhere, as a rational response to US unpredictability despite the risk that US influence might backfire against Lula in the 2026 election.
“But either way, Brazil is going to hedge against American unreliability by expanding and deepening its ties with China, with Europe, and elsewhere.”
Models for ally transformation already exist in Mario Draghi's competitiveness report for the EU and Mark Carney's Canada Strong Plan; Japan's new Prime Minister will need to make a mark at least as ambitious as these.
“Models already exist. We see Mario Draghi's crucial competitiveness report for the European Union. There's Mark Carney's thoughtfully crafted Canada Strong Plan. And Japan's new Prime Minister will need to make a mark at least as ambitious as that.”
Media constrained by profit-driven corporate owners faces pressure to avoid antagonizing the White House, and social media is increasingly controlled by Trump's political allies, which will further concentrate when TikTok is sold to the US, and Trump owns Truth Social.
“The media, constrained by profit-driven corporate owners, faces pressure from above to avoid antagonizing the White House. Social media is increasingly controlled by Trump's political allies even more when TikTok becomes sold to the US, and in the case of Truth Social, Trump owns it himself.”
The US remains the world's most powerful country and considerable damage can be done before structural decline sets in, which the US is not currently in, even though it is seen as unreliable by allies; acceleration of AI development is changing the game with the US and China as the only two real competitors.
“The US remains the world's most powerful country and there's a lot of damage that can be done before America finds itself in structural decline, which it's not in now... the accelerating development of artificial intelligence, first time I've mentioned it, is changing the game. And the US is not the only game in town, but it's one of two. The other one being China.”
When dealing with the leader of the world's most powerful country who ignores counsel and acts on impulse, governments are wise to avoid making Trump unfriendly headlines; the logic led Canada to surrender on a digital services tax and motivated Japan to make unilateral concessions on automotive tariffs.
“When you're dealing with the leader of the world's most powerful country who ignores counsel and acts on impulse, most governments are wise to avoid making Trump unfriendly headlines. This is the logic that led Canada to surrender on its plan to impose a digital services tax earlier in the year, and it's why Japan was wise to make unilateral concessions on automotive tariffs.”
Governments sign trade deals with Washington and it unilaterally changes terms; the US suspends intelligence sharing, cuts foreign aid, intervenes in domestic politics of friendly democracies, and threatens territorial integrity of allies like Canada and Denmark, even with a smile and wink.
“Governments sign trade deals, and Washington unilaterally changes the terms. The US suspends intelligence sharing, cuts foreign aid, intervenes in the domestic politics of friendly democracies, threatens the territorial integrity of allies like Canada and Denmark, even if the threats come with a smile and a wink.”
While unreliability does not imply absence of American leadership, Trump can claim genuine foreign policy victories like the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, but his strategy for ending the war in Ukraine or getting a trade deal with China is difficult to discern because his tactical approaches often contradict one another and shift in real time, and he frequently does not follow through on threats when he believes he lacks leverage, making American unreliability the central driver of geopolitical uncertainty and instability in today's G-zero world.
“Unreliability does not imply that there is an absence of American leadership. The Trump administration can claim genuine foreign policy victories. The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, for example, still tenuous, but shows that Washington can provide leadership for the benefit of other countries and other people. And I expect that Trump is going to stay focused on trying to keep that deal together. But what is the president's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine? Or for getting a trade deal with China? And those questions are hard to answer, not because Trump doesn't have ideas, but because his tactical approaches often contradict one another, and they shift in real time. And because Trump frequently doesn't follow through on his threats when he believes he lacks leverage to get what he wants. American unreliability has become the central driver of geopolitical uncertainty and instability in today's G zero world.”
Trump has instructed trade hawks in his administration that the US should avoid direct conflict with China until Washington develops a hedging strategy for critical minerals, which will take longer than Trump imagines.
“President Trump has made clear to trade hawks in his own administration that until Washington has developed a hedging strategy for these all-important minerals, which will take longer than Trump imagines, that the Americans should try to avoid direct conflict with China.”
The development of artificial intelligence is changing geopolitical dynamics, with the US being one of two major players (the other being China), and if forced to choose between the US and China on unreliability, rule of law, and independent judiciary grounds, the US is a much better bet than China.
“the accelerating development of artificial intelligence, first time I've mentioned it, is changing the game. And the US is not the only game in town, but it's one of two. The other one being China. And if you have to make a choice between the US and China on the basis of unreliability, on the basis of lack of rule of law, on the basis of lack of an independent judiciary, the US is a much better bet than China.”
American willingness to lead is now buckling under a politics of grievance that has taken hold inside the United States, where voters increasingly feel that US institutions and elected leaders no longer represent them, causing the United States to lose commitment to international rule of law, global institutions, and American allies.
“American willingness to lead is now buckling under a politics of grievance that has taken hold inside the United States. Voters increasingly feel that US institutions and many of the nation's elected leaders no longer represent them. And as a result, the United States is no longer as committed to international rule of law, to global institutions, or to American allies.”
The United States has historically been unpredictable (on elections, trade deals, war and peace) but rarely unreliable, and leaders understood this; today, most leaders outside the United States, including in Japan, see the United States as both unpredictable and unreliable.
“The United States has always been unpredictable, elections, trade deals, even war and peace. But the United States has rarely been unreliable. And Winston Churchill knew that. But today, most leaders that I know outside the United States, including right here in Japan, both in government and in business, see the United States as both unpredictable and unreliable.”
Many US allies have moved to proactively limit damage from any future fight with the White House by offering non-reciprocal trade deals, throwing money at the US, or aligning with like-minded governments, but these strategies cannot work for all countries and will not work universally.
“Many US allies have moved to proactively limit damage from any future fight with the White House. The UK, the European Union, Southeast Asian countries have offered non-reciprocal trade deals. Other countries have thrown lots of money at the US, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE. Some countries with like-minded governments like Argentina and El Salvador.”
Washington approved an easing in export controls on certain semiconductor chips in exchange for Chinese easing of new critical minerals licensing agreements, a move previously considered an absolute no-go area for both Trump and Biden administrations.
“earlier this year, Washington approved an easing in export controls on certain semiconductor chips in exchange for a Chinese easing of new critical minerals licensing agreements. Don't underestimate the importance of that. Until recently, this move was an absolute no-go area for both President Trump and President Biden before him.”
Trump's political retribution and revenge against those he believes wronged him manifests in accusations that the Biden administration weaponized the DOJ to imprison him, promoted cancel culture through deplatforming, and that 'the left' demonized Trump and his allies as fascists, which Trump claims promotes political violence against him.
“Trump has accused the Biden administration of weaponizing the Department of Justice to imprison him. Of promoting a cancel culture approach to right-wing descent, including by deplatforming President Trump himself from social media after the January 6th insurrection in the capital. President Trump says that the left in America has demonized Trump and his allies as fascists.”
Social media is increasingly controlled by Trump's political allies, and this control will increase when TikTok becomes sold to the US, while Trump owns Truth Social himself, limiting information plurality.
“Social media is increasingly controlled by Trump's political allies even more when TikTok becomes sold to the US, and in the case of Truth Social, Trump owns it himself.”
The Supreme Court is aware that Trump could refuse to accept decisions he doesn't like and is limiting the scope of its rulings to preserve its own legitimacy, while lower courts are less restrained but can have their decisions overturned, giving Trump more leeway to consolidate authority.
“The Supreme Court, aware that Trump could refuse to accept decisions he doesn't like, is limiting the scope of its rulings to preserve its own legitimacy. Lower courts aren't as restrained, but their decisions can and often are overturned, and that gives Trump more leeway to consolidate authority.”
The United States is now seen by most foreign governments and leaders outside the US, including in Japan, as both unpredictable and unreliable, whereas historically it has been unpredictable but rarely unreliable.
“But today, most leaders that I know outside the United States, including right here in Japan, both in government and in business, see the United States as both unpredictable and unreliable... the United States has rarely been unreliable. And Winston Churchill knew that.”
The Trump administration has claimed genuine foreign policy victories, such as the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, which shows Washington can provide leadership, but Trump's strategy on Ukraine and China is unclear because his tactical approaches often contradict one another and shift in real time, and he frequently does not follow through on threats when he lacks leverage.
“The Trump administration can claim genuine foreign policy victories. The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, for example, still tenuous, but shows that Washington can provide leadership for the benefit of other countries and other people... But what is the president's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine? Or for getting a trade deal with China? And those questions are hard to answer, not because Trump doesn't have ideas, but because his tactical approaches often contradict one another, and they shift in real time. And because Trump frequently doesn't follow through on his threats when he believes he lacks leverage to get what he wants.”
Trump has secured executive impunity from the rulings of an independent judiciary by making the judiciary aware that he could refuse to accept decisions he dislikes, causing the Supreme Court to limit the scope of its rulings to preserve its own legitimacy.
“He's secured executive impunity from the rulings of an independent but no longer coequal judiciary. The Supreme Court, aware that Trump could refuse to accept decisions he doesn't like, is limiting the scope of its rulings to preserve its own legitimacy.”
China has moved toward a more stable negotiating position with Trump by using its dominance of the global market and supply chain for critical minerals and rare earths, combined with strategic patience, to force Trump to climb down from threats of full trade war and show him that China has real bargaining power.
“the United States and China continues to lurch from mini crisis to mini crisis on trade and export controls. But the big picture is that they are moving towards a more stable place. And this has happened because Beijing has forced Trump to climb down from threats of a full trade war by using its own dominance of the global market and supply chain for critical minerals and rare earths. They've also used a healthy dose of Chinese strategic patience, and they've persuaded Trump that China has real bargaining power.”
The US has long-term structural advantages compared to other advanced democracies: a post-WWII infrastructure base, strong demographics supported by immigration, greater public tolerance of economic inequality, and ability to engage in deficit spending; all four of these advantages are now eroding.
“historically, the structural advantages of the United States compared to other advanced industrial democracies are based on commitments to a few fundamentals... A better post-war infrastructure base on which to build, including public and private institutions. Strong demographics supported by inflows of hard-working immigrants. Greater public tolerance of an unequal distribution of society's economic gains. And greater tolerance of and ability to engage in deficit spending. All four of these fundamental advantages for the United States are now eroding.”
We are now living in a post-American order where no one is willing or able to fill the vacuum; China has its own problems and is not prepared to bite off more than it can chew, choosing caution, leading to a deeper G-zero world with more conflict, more impunity, and damage that lasts longer.
“We're now living in a post-American order and no one is willing or able to fill the vacuum. China has its own problems and is not prepared to bite off more than it can chew, very cautious. All of this means a deeper G0 world. More conflict, more impunity, causing more damage that lasts for longer.”
The geopolitical trajectory of a post-American G-zero order is not sustainable; during the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis convinced leaders that armed confrontation would be catastrophic and drove new communication and agreements; a crisis of comparable or greater severity is coming and will force new order-building.
“This geopolitical trajectory is not sustainable. During the Cold War, it took the Cuban Missile Crisis to convince leaders that armed confrontation would be catastrophic and that new communication channels and agreements were essential. Now, we don't know what form the crisis that we need to build a new post-G0 order will take this time. But we know that crisis is coming.”
The American president is deglobalizing the world's most powerful economy and with it, the global economy through tariffs, political interference, and withdrawal from international institutions.
“In all these ways, the American president is deglobalizing the world's still most powerful economy, and with it, the global economy.”
The media, constrained by profit-driven corporate owners, faces pressure from above to avoid antagonizing the White House, reducing its capacity to check executive power.
“The media, constrained by profit-driven corporate owners, faces pressure from above to avoid antagonizing the White House.”
For weak countries like Japan, the need to stay on a positive track with Washington remains a fact of life, but all countries must invest in building long-term capacity and reinforcing own stability independent of US.
“For Japan, the need to stay on a most positive track with Washington remains a fact of life. All countries, though, whatever your current relationship with the White House, have to invest in building your own long-term capacity and reinforcing your own stability.”
American allies in the EU, UK, Canada, and Japan are lagging in productivity, investment, defense spending, and technological innovation, making their security and prosperity more dependent on the United States precisely at the moment when Americans want their government to do less, not more.
“The European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and yes, Japan, are lagging in productivity. They're lagging in investment. They've underspent on their own defense. They're producing fewer genuine technological breakthroughs. And this makes their security and their prosperity more dependent on the United States precisely at the moment that Americans want their government to do less, not more.”
US governors and mayors are largely technocratic, govern independently of Washington, and Trump's attempts to weaken Democratic national powers do not threaten state and city-level governance, creating a buffer against federal consolidation.
“Shifts in political power towards states and cities also offer a buffer. US governors and mayors are largely technocratic. They govern independently of Washington. And Trump's attempts to weaken Democratic national powers do not threaten state and city-level governance.”
The United States has a structural bias favoring Republicans due to the Electoral College system, which provides roughly a 2% advantage to Republican candidates through demographics and distribution of electors, allowing a candidate to win the popular vote but lose the presidency.
“The United States already has a structural bias favoring Republicans because of the Electoral College system by which presidents are elected. A candidate, as you know, can win the popular vote but lose the presidency thanks to demographics and distribution of electors, which gives you like a roughly 2% advantage to Republican candidates.”
Gerrymandering and redistricting of congressional districts by both parties make elections less representative, less competitive, and less legitimate, compounding the structural Republican advantage.
“If you add gerrymandering, the redistricting of districts in Congress, both parties rigging district maps, elections become even less representative, less competitive, less legitimate.”
China's current approach is to become more economically dynamic and competitive while doubling down on support for existing international institutions, calculating that if the US steps back, China can have more control over them.
“That is China's current approach. Beijing has also doubled down on its support for existing international institutions in part because it calculates that if the United States steps back from these institutions, China can have much more control over them.”
America's allies—the European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan—are lagging in productivity, investment, defense spending, and producing fewer genuine technological breakthroughs, making their security and prosperity more dependent on the United States precisely when Americans want their government to do less.
“the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and yes, Japan, are lagging in productivity. They're lagging in investment. They've underspent on their own defense. They're producing fewer genuine technological breakthroughs. And this makes their security and their prosperity more dependent on the United States precisely at the moment that Americans want their government to do less, not more.”
Even if Democrats retake control of the House, they can impeach Trump and conduct oversight, but without the Department of Justice's cooperation, any investigation appears partisan and lacks enforcement power.
“Even if Democrats retake majority control of the House of Representatives... they can impeach Trump, they can conduct oversight, they can appear partisan, but with no enforcement power since the Department of Justice's cooperation with any investigation is no longer plausible.”
The near-term politics of making transformations is daunting: the EU needs consensus rule-making, weak governments face pushback, the Reform Party opposes in Britain, provincial governments oppose in Canada, and Japan's coalition faces a more multi-party system.
“The near-term politics of making these transformations is daunting. The EU is far from a state and Europe needs consensus rule-making. The get pushed back from weak governments makes it an enormous challenge. There's opposition from the fast-rising Reform Party in Britain, provincial governments in Canada. And this government coming in in Japan, a coalition itself, is facing a more multi-party Japanese system.”
Legislative functions now operate much less independently from the executive under Trump because of his total control over the Republican Party and the Democratic Party's weakness and division.
“Trump's grip on the Republican Party and the Democratic Party's weakness and division means that legislative functions now independently, much less so from the executive.”
The United States has backed away from countless institutional commitments: Obama forged an Iran nuclear deal that Trump renounced; Clinton abandoned TPP support despite Obama's diplomatic effort; Obama joined Paris Climate Accord which Trump reversed, then Biden reaffirmed, then Trump renounced again; Washington abandoned WHO and UNESCO.
“A decade ago, Barack Obama forged an Iranian nuclear deal, which Donald Trump later renounced. In 2016, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton abandoned Democratic Party support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership...President Obama brought the US into the Paris Climate Accord. Trump reversed that decision. President Joe Biden then reaffirmed US climate commitments, and then Trump renounced them all over again. Washington has washed its hands of the World Health Organization and UNESCO.”
Trump's tariff decisions reveal arbitrary decision-making with economic and diplomatic consequences: he applied 25% tariffs on India, then doubled them to 50% because Prime Minister Modi would not credit Trump with mediating a ceasefire with Pakistan; tariffs include bathroom cabinetry and vanities classified as essential to US national security, a classification that is patently false.
“To demonstrate the arbitrary nature of decision-making on trade, decisions with economic and diplomatic implications all over the world, look at what the US president did on India. Then in August, Trump slapped 25% tariffs on them. A few weeks later, he doubled them. Why? Because Prime Minister Modi wouldn't give Trump credit for mediating a ceasefire with Pakistan.”
President Trump considers the greatest threat to the United States to be members of the opposite political party, their supporters, their fundraisers, and voters, not Beijing, Moscow, or terrorists.
“The President of the United States says the greatest threat to his country is posed not by Beijing or Moscow, not by terrorists. The true enemies, he warns, are members of the opposite political party, their supporters, their fundraisers, and even their voters.”
Trump has taken and won total loyalty of the Republican Party and reliable support from Republican lawmakers for legislative and executive agendas to undo checks and balances on the presidency.
“the president has taken and won total loyalty of the Republican Party and the reliable and consistent support of Republican lawmakers for legislative and executive agendas to undo checks and balances on the presidency.”
The near-term politics of making economic, political, security, and diplomatic transformations is daunting: the EU is far from a state and needs consensus rule-making, the UK faces opposition from Reform Party, Canada faces provincial government pushback, and Japan faces a multi-party coalition government challenge.
“The requirement is urgent. The near-term politics of making these transformations is daunting. The EU is far from a state and Europe needs consensus rule-making. The get pushed back from weak governments makes it an enormous challenge. There's opposition from the fast-rising Reform Party in Britain, provincial governments in Canada. And this government coming in in Japan, a coalition itself, is facing a more multi-party Japanese system.”
The US has backed away from institutional commitments including the Iranian nuclear deal (Trump renounced Obama's deal), Trans-Pacific Partnership (Clinton abandoned it), Paris Climate Accord (Trump reversed, Biden reaffirmed, Trump renounced again), and withdrawn from WHO and UNESCO.
“A decade ago, Barack Obama forged an Iranian nuclear deal, which Donald Trump later renounced. In 2016, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton abandoned Democratic Party support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, despite years of diplomatic effort when she was Obama's top diplomat. President Obama brought the US into the Paris Climate Accord. Trump reversed that decision. President Joe Biden then reaffirmed US climate commitments, and then Trump renounced them all over again. Washington has washed its hands of the World Health Organization and UNESCO.”
Corporate and financial leadership looks weak because they are uncomfortable with political upheaval, want to avoid political debate while protecting interests, and focus on regulatory influence rather than political engagement.
“Corporate and financial leadership looks weak. They're uncomfortable with political upheaval. They want to avoid political debate while protecting their interests and their shareholders. Most are focusing on regulatory influence over any engagement that could generate political headlines.”
Key questions about Trump's revolution success are how much more he can accomplish before midterm elections or by election day 2028.
“Will political revolution succeed? How much more can President Trump accomplish before next year's midterm elections or by election day on 2028? These are the most essential political questions to be answered in the world today.”
Trump's political revolution is not a formal ideological program with strategic restructuring (unlike Gorbachev's reform of the Soviet Union or Deng Xiaoping's transformation of China), but rather a relentless opportunistic pressure campaign meant to test the limits of what can be done and exploit crises to consolidate more power.
“Unlike the Gorbachev and Deng revolutions, Trump's revolution follows no grand strategic plan. Instead, it's a relentless pressure campaign on every political front. It's meant to test the limits of what can be done. It's a commitment to act opportunistically as the crises that these policies create open new possibilities to consolidate more power.”
This geopolitical trajectory is not sustainable, and during the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis convinced leaders that armed confrontation would be catastrophic and new communication channels and agreements were essential; now we don't know what form the next crisis will take, but it is coming.
“This geopolitical trajectory is not sustainable. During the Cold War, it took the Cuban Missile Crisis to convince leaders that armed confrontation would be catastrophic and that new communication channels and agreements were essential. Now, we don't know what form the crisis that we need to build a new post-G0 order will take this time. But we know that crisis is coming.”
US tariffs are now at the highest levels since the 1930s and cover sectors defined as essential for national security including steel, aluminum, semiconductors, aircraft, pharmaceuticals, upholstered furniture, cabinets, and bathroom vanities, with bathroom cabinetry notably not representing an actual national security vulnerability.
“We are at the highest we have seen from the United States since the 1930s. They cover a range of economic sectors and products that the Trump administration has defined as essential for US national security. You've seen them. Steel, aluminum, semiconductors, aircraft, pharmaceuticals. Oh, and don't let me forget, upholstered furniture. Cabinets, bathroom vanities, because nothing says national security vulnerability like an insufficiently domestic supply of bathroom cabinetry.”
US tariff rates are at the highest levels since the 1930s, covering a range of economic sectors and products including steel, aluminum, semiconductors, aircraft, pharmaceuticals, and upholstered furniture, which the Trump administration defines as essential for US national security.
“But high tariffs stay in place. We are at the highest we have seen from the United States since the 1930s. They cover a range of economic sectors and products that the Trump administration has defined as essential for US national security. You've seen them. Steel, aluminum, semiconductors, aircraft, pharmaceuticals. Oh, and don't let me forget, upholstered furniture. Cabinets, bathroom vanities, because nothing says national security vulnerability like an insufficiently domestic supply of bathroom cabinetry.”
Beijing has doubled down on support for existing international institutions in the calculation that if the US steps back from these institutions, China can have much more control over them.
“Beijing has also doubled down on its support for existing international institutions in part because it calculates that if the United States steps back from these institutions, China can have much more control over them.”
The 'no kings' rallies this past weekend, with 7 million Americans demonstrating, represented the largest social dissent in the US since 1969 Vietnam War protests.
“7 million people demonstrating in the no kings rallies across the country this weekend, the largest social descent that the US has seen since 1969 in Vietnam.”
Trump has used two assassination attempts against him during the 2024 election campaign (one that narrowly missed) and the murder of conservative activist Charlie Kirk as evidence supporting his claim that the left's demonization of him and allies as fascists and promotion of cancel culture promotes political violence against him.
“He can point to two attempts to assassinate him during last year's election campaign, one that missed by this much. Every person in this room would be affected by that for every day of their lives if that happened to you, if that happened to me. He's got the recent murder of conservative activist Charlie Kirk as well helping him make that point.”
Corporate and financial leadership look weak; they're uncomfortable with political upheaval, want to avoid political debate while protecting interests and shareholders, and most focus on regulatory influence over engagement that generates political headlines.
“Corporate and financial leadership looks weak. They're uncomfortable with political upheaval. They want to avoid political debate while protecting their interests and their shareholders. Most are focusing on regulatory influence over any engagement that could generate political headlines.”
Trump's trade tariff implementation represents an unprecedented constitutional violation: Trump used a 50-year-old economic emergency law that does not explicitly mention tariffs to claim executive power traditionally reserved for Congress, a tactic no previous American president has used, and he is daring critics to stop him in court.
“The implementation of duties, trade duties, is traditionally a power reserved for Congress. President Trump used a 50-year-old economic emergency law that doesn't explicitly even mention the word tariff to claim this right for himself. Daring his critics to stop him in court. No previous American president has ever used this tactic. It's clearly not the intention of the law.”
From governments with more bargaining leverage like China and India, standing up for yourself and a willingness to absorb punches can create needed space, and Putin has also benefited from this approach with Trump.
“From governments that have more bargaining leverage like China and India, we've seen that standing up for yourself and a willingness to absorb punches can create needed space. By the way, Putin has benefited from that approach with Trump as well.”
In foreign policy, the United States remains committed to existing norms, treaties, and agreements only insofar as they serve the interests of President Trump and his political allies.
“In foreign policy, the United States remains committed to existing norms, treaties, and agreements only in so far as they serve the interests of President Trump and his political allies.”
Trump is a symptom and principal beneficiary of deep political conflict inside the United States, not the cause of it, though he is acting as an accelerant by making the shift toward reduced international commitment faster.
“Trump himself is a symptom and a principal beneficiary of this conflict, not the cause. He's also, to be sure, an accelerant. He's making it faster.”
Trump's plan began by targeting the most vulnerable and least organized of his opponents (undocumented immigrants, green card holders, transgender people, elite universities) before moving into broader political categories (funders, supporters, enablers of political opponents).
“This plan was launched by targeting those of Trump's opponents who are most vulnerable and least organized, like undocumented immigrants, green card holders, transgender people, elite universities, and the Trump administration has since moved into the broader political categories of funders, supporters, and enablers of his political opponents.”
American willingness to lead is buckling under a politics of grievance that has taken hold inside the United States, where voters increasingly feel that US institutions and elected leaders no longer represent them.
“American willingness to lead is now buckling under a politics of grievance that has taken hold inside the United States. Voters increasingly feel that US institutions and many of the nation's elected leaders no longer represent them.”
Trump imposed 25% tariffs on India because Prime Minister Modi wouldn't give Trump credit for mediating a ceasefire with Pakistan, and then doubled them, demonstrating arbitrary decision-making on trade for political rather than economic reasons.
“To demonstrate the arbitrary nature of decision-making on trade, decisions with economic and diplomatic implications all over the world, look at what the US president did on India. It's a country that Trump, like every US president, has courted as a counterweight to China. Then in August, Trump slapped 25% tariffs on them. A few weeks later, he doubled them. Why? Because Prime Minister Modi wouldn't give Trump credit for mediating a ceasefire with Pakistan.”
The US and China are moving toward a more stable relationship because Beijing forced Trump to back down from full trade war threats by leveraging its dominance of global markets and supply chains for critical minerals and rare earths, using strategic patience and convincing Trump that China has real bargaining power.
“they are moving towards a more stable place. And this has happened because Beijing has forced Trump to climb down from threats of a full trade war by using its own dominance of the global market and supply chain for critical minerals and rare earths. They've also used a healthy dose of Chinese strategic patience, and they've persuaded Trump that China has real bargaining power.”
Is it right to call what's happening in the United States a political revolution? It's early to say, but increasingly, the speaker believes the answer is yes, based on the pattern of revolutionary intent and action.
“Is it right to call what's happening inside the United States a political revolution? It's early to say, but increasingly, I believe the answer is yes.”
Trump was freely and fairly elected partly because he personally embodied the political and cultural disruption that voters wanted, and most voters who cared about democracy in 2024 voted for, not against Trump, because they believed the US political system was already broken and that only Trump would create the disruption they wanted.
“Trump was freely and fairly elected in large part because he personally embodied the political and cultural disruption that voters wanted. Most American voters who said they cared about democracy in 2024 voted for, not against Trump, because they were convinced that the US political system was already broken, and that only President Trump would create the disruption that they wanted.”
Washington has unilaterally changed trade deal terms after signing them, suspended intelligence sharing, cut foreign aid, intervened in domestic politics of friendly democracies, and threatened the territorial integrity of allies like Canada and Denmark, demonstrating systematic unreliability rather than isolated incidents.
“Governments sign trade deals, and Washington unilaterally changes the terms. The US suspends intelligence sharing, cuts foreign aid, intervenes in the domestic politics of friendly democracies, threatens the territorial integrity of allies like Canada and Denmark, even if the threats come with a smile and a wink.”
Democratic control of the House or flipping the Senate can conduct impeachment and oversight but with no enforcement power if the Department of Justice refuses to cooperate, making legislative checks on the president ineffective.
“Even if Democrats retake majority control of the House of Representatives, and the flipping the Senate looks very unlikely no matter what, they can impeach Trump, they can conduct oversight, they can appear partisan, but with no enforcement power since the Department of Justice's cooperation with any investigation is no longer plausible.”
The US remains the world's most powerful country and there is substantial damage that can be done before America finds itself in structural decline, which it is not currently in; however, the US is seen as unreliable trade and security partners by its allies.
“The US remains the world's most powerful country and there's a lot of damage that can be done before America finds itself in structural decline, which it's not in now. Even though America is seen as unreliable trade and security partners by its allies.”
If forced to choose between the US and China on the basis of unreliability, lack of rule of law, and lack of independent judiciary, the US is a much better bet than China, though both are problematic.
“if you have to make a choice between the US and China on the basis of unreliability, on the basis of lack of rule of law, on the basis of lack of an independent judiciary, the US is a much better bet than China.”
Uncompetitive elections that look like a single-party system rather than competitive representative democracy are becoming increasingly plausible, though the speaker does not predict a third presidential term or suspended elections, which the Supreme Court would block.
“uncompetitive elections, elections that look more like a single-party system than a competitive representative democracy, that is becoming increasingly plausible. The Supreme Court would block both of those moves. But uncompetitive elections, elections that look more like a single-party system than a competitive representative democracy, that is becoming increasingly plausible.”
We are now living in a post-American order where no one is willing or able to fill the vacuum, China has its own problems and is not prepared to bite off more than it can chew, and this creates a deeper G-zero world with more conflict, more impunity, causing more damage that lasts longer.
“We're now living in a post-American order and no one is willing or able to fill the vacuum. China has its own problems and is not prepared to bite off more than it can chew, very cautious. All of this means a deeper G0 world. More conflict, more impunity, causing more damage that lasts for longer.”
Trump abandoned his 2016 signature promise to 'drain the swamp,' and corruption and self-dealing are not economic revolution—they're just business as usual in America's increasingly broken capitalist system, now more permitted.
“President Trump abandoned one of his signature promises from 2016, drain the swamp. He's not talking about that. And corruption and self-dealing are not economic revolution. They're just business as usual in America's increasingly broken capitalist system. They're just more permitted now.”
Trump has abandoned his 2016 signature promise to 'drain the swamp,' and corruption and self-dealing in his administration are not economic revolution but 'business as usual in America's increasingly broken capitalist system, just more permitted now.'
“President Trump abandoned one of his signature promises from 2016, drain the swamp. He's not talking about that. And corruption and self-dealing are not economic revolution. They're just business as usual in America's increasingly broken capitalist system. They're just more permitted now.”
The Pentagon's culture prioritizes service to the country over loyalty to any individual, and while high-level officer purges have been attempted, they do not undermine the military's core operational integrity, preserving military as a potential institutional check on executive power.
“The military stands for professionalism. Its culture continues to prioritize service to the country over loyalty to any individual. The Pentagon's purges of some high-level military officers have made headlines in the US, but not like China's of the last week, and they don't undermine the military's core operational integrity.”
A constitutional crisis before the next elections now looks likely, with possible outcomes ranging from a break within the Republican Party and conservative movement toward a sustained political shift toward single-party rule, and cannot rule out enormous political chaos, realignment, and violence like the US has seen historically after the Civil War.
“A constitutional crisis before the next elections now looks likely. Possible outcomes of that crisis range from a break from Trump within the Republican Party and the conservative movement towards a sustained political shift towards single-party rule in the United States. Nor can we rule out enormous political chaos, realignment, and violence that the United States has seen historically, certainly in the decades after the Civil War.”
A constitutional crisis before the next elections now looks likely; possible outcomes range from a break from Trump within the Republican Party and conservative movement to sustained political shift toward single-party rule, and cannot rule out enormous political chaos, realignment, and violence historically seen after the Civil War.
“A constitutional crisis before the next elections now looks likely. Possible outcomes of that crisis range from a break from Trump within the Republican Party and the conservative movement towards a sustained political shift towards single-party rule in the United States. Nor can we rule out enormous political chaos, realignment, and violence that the United States has seen historically, certainly in the decades after the Civil War.”
Trump could potentially deploy the National Guard in Democratic cities under the guise of a declared national emergency to suppress voter turnout, and federal probes into Democratic fundraising and organizations add to these pressures making such tactics increasingly plausible.
“More concerning is the possibility of President Trump deploying the National Guard in Democratic cities under the guide guise of a declared national emergency to suppress voter turnout. Federal probes that are starting into Democratic fundraising and organizations add to these pressures making these tactics increasingly plausible.”
Trump pledged a $20 billion bailout for Argentina's struggling economy, but only if voters reward President Milei's party in upcoming legislative elections, directly interfering in the domestic politics of a friendly democracy.
“He pledged a $20 billion bailout for Argentina's struggling economy, but only if voters reward President Milei's party in this Sunday's legislative elections.”
Once economic, political, security, and diplomatic investments are made by allies, America's unreliability in the years well beyond Trump will matter less; defense and hedging strategies are already underway and likely to succeed in varying degrees over time.
“once all of these economic, political, security, and diplomatic investments are made, America's unreliability in the years well beyond Trump will matter less. In short, the defense and hedging strategies are already well underway and they're likely to succeed in varying degrees in various places over time”
To safeguard national interests, allies should avoid fights with Trump by whatever means necessary and let his anger fall on others like Brazil rather than themselves.
“To safeguard their national interests, if you can avoid a fight, other governments should avoid it by whatever means necessary. Let the spotlight of Trump's anger fall on Brazil or anybody else, just not you.”
Countries with bargaining leverage like China and India have shown that standing up for oneself and willingness to absorb punches creates needed space; Putin has benefited from this approach with Trump as well.
“From governments that have more bargaining leverage like China and India, we've seen that standing up for yourself and a willingness to absorb punches can create needed space. By the way, Putin has benefited from that approach with Trump as well.”
Trump could potentially deploy the National Guard in Democratic cities under the guise of a declared national emergency to suppress voter turnout, a tactic that is increasingly plausible given federal probes into Democratic fundraising and organizations.
“More concerning is the possibility of President Trump deploying the National Guard in Democratic cities under the guide guise of a declared national emergency to suppress voter turnout. Federal probes that are starting into Democratic fundraising and organizations add to these pressures making these tactics increasingly plausible.”
We must invent new communities grounded in truth (not spin), bolstered by action (not just talk), and based in cooperation (not division), because there is no hidden strategy that makes the current geopolitical and institutional crisis easier.
“We have to invent new communities that are grounded in truth, not spin, that are bolstered by action, not just talk, in cooperation, not division. That's hard as I stand up here and I address you today. I understand that. But there's no secret lever to pull. There's no hidden strategy that makes this easier.”
US allies should let Trump's anger fall on other countries and invest in building their own long-term capacity and reinforcing their own stability, including becoming more economically dynamic and competitive, which is China's current approach and what Japan must emulate.
“All countries, though, whatever your current relationship with the White House, have to invest in building your own long-term capacity and reinforcing your own stability. You just heard this from Governor Koike. You have to become much more economically dynamic and competitive for the future. That is China's current approach.”
Allies must assert much more diplomatic leadership internationally and accept responsibilities in building multilateral architecture, with models already existing such as Mario Draghi's competitiveness report for the EU, Mark Carney's Canada Strong Plan, and Japan needing an ambitious new Prime Minister initiative.
“You have to assert much more diplomatic leadership internationally and accept responsibilities in building multilateral architecture. Models already exist. We see Mario Draghi's crucial competitiveness report for the European Union. There's Mark Carney's thoughtfully crafted Canada Strong Plan. And Japan's new Prime Minister will need to make a mark at least as ambitious as that.”
We need more empathy, more leadership, more cooperation and trust from us (people in this room), not waiting for politicians to act (because too many refuse to see danger or hope to profit from it), not relying on markets (everyone selling product), not counting on Washington to lead or Beijing to step up or multilateral institutions to fill the gap.
“We need a lot more empathy, more leadership. We need more cooperation and trust, not just from world leaders because too many refuse to see the danger or they hope to profit from it. I'm actually talking about us, the people in this room. We can't wait for politicians to act. Everyone talking their own book. We can't rely on markets and everyone selling a product. We can't count on Washington to lead or Beijing to step up or multilateral institutions to fill the gap.”
History is not deterministic; trajectories can shift because people keep the possibility of something better alive long enough for opportunity to appear, requiring empathy, leadership, cooperation, and trust from people in the room, not just waiting for politicians or markets or institutions to act.
“history isn't deterministic. Our trajectories can shift. And they can shift because people keep the possibility of something better alive long enough for an opportunity to appear... I'm actually talking about us, the people in this room. We can't wait for politicians to act... We can't rely on markets... We can't count on Washington to lead or Beijing to step up or multilateral institutions to fill the gap.”
People in the audience must invent new communities grounded in truth not spin, bolstered by action not talk, in cooperation not division.
“We have to invent new communities that are grounded in truth, not spin, that are bolstered by action, not just talk, in cooperation, not division.”
Xi's willingness to meet Trump at the end of the month and in China next year without a clear path to a deal in place signals a shift in how Beijing thinks about dealing with Americans, suggesting China sees Trump as someone they want to do business with.
“Xi's willingness to meet Trump at the end of the month, and then in China next year without a clear path to a deal in place, is a shift in the way Beijing thinks about dealing with the Americans. And it says that China sees that Trump is a man that they want to do business with.”
There is no secret lever to pull or hidden strategy that makes addressing G-Zero challenges easier; we have no choice but to act through community building and collective responsibility.
“There's no secret lever to pull. There's no hidden strategy that makes this easier. I just know that we don't have a choice.”
Once economic, political, security, and diplomatic investments are made, America's unreliability in years beyond Trump will matter less, and while the speaker is skeptical about short-term competitiveness turnaround, defense and hedging strategies are likely to succeed in varying degrees over time.
“But once all of these economic, political, security, and diplomatic investments are made, America's unreliability in the years well beyond Trump will matter less. In short, the defense and hedging strategies are already well underway and they're likely to succeed in varying degrees in various places over time, even as I am for now at least skeptical about a short-term turnaround for competitiveness.”
Until such a crisis comes, all governments, businesses, and individuals must brace for growing turbulence because the old rules don't apply anymore and the new rules haven't been written yet.
“And until then, all of us, governments, businesses, individuals, have to brace for growing turbulence because the old rules don't apply anymore and the new rules haven't been written yet.”
When dealing with a leader of the world's most powerful country who ignores counsel and acts on impulse, most governments are wise to avoid making Trump unfriendly headlines to safeguard their national interests.
“When you're dealing with the leader of the world's most powerful country who ignores counsel and acts on impulse, most governments are wise to avoid making Trump unfriendly headlines. This is the logic that led Canada to surrender on its plan to impose a digital services tax earlier in the year, and it's why Japan was wise to make unilateral concessions on automotive tariffs. To safeguard their national interests, if you can avoid a fight, other governments should avoid it by whatever means necessary.”
Xi Jinping's willingness to meet Trump at the APEC summit and then in China next year without a clear deal in place represents a shift in Beijing's approach to the US, indicating that China sees Trump as a man they want to do business with, and both leaders want a deal.
“Xi's willingness to meet Trump at the end of the month, and then in China next year without a clear path to a deal in place, is a shift in the way Beijing thinks about dealing with the Americans. And it says that China sees that Trump is a man that they want to do business with. The bargaining process will stay contentious, but both leaders want a deal. And I think a deal will come.”
There is no secret lever to pull or hidden strategy that makes the crisis easier—understanding the structural dynamics of the G-Zero world and the forces driving US withdrawal and Trump's consolidation of power provides no shortcut to avoiding the coming turbulence.
“But there's no secret lever to pull. There's no hidden strategy that makes this easier. I just know that we don't have a choice.”