
Jeff Snider Answers Your Questions, Eurodollar FAQs [Eurodollar University, Ep. 226]
What this covers
This is a listener-questions episode of Eurodollar University. Emil Kalinowski relays questions from across the globe, and Jeff Snider answers them over about an hour. The questions range widely, so the episode works as a tour of Snider's framework applied to the spring 2022 moment: the eurodollar system as an offshore, dealer-run credit network, and why he thinks the central bank is less in control of it than commonly assumed.
The monetary-plumbing material runs through several threads. Snider calls the federal funds rate archaic and says the Fed keeps it as its communication tool because a more relevant reference rate, such as a repo rate, might confuse the public. He contrasts the limited monetary role of bank reserves in the US, Japan and Europe with their meaningful role in China. He also describes a system with no anchor to a real asset, one that depends on dealer) willingness to take risk. A related point is that data on the repo market is thin: the Federal Reserve Bank of New York collects only what primary dealers must disclose, so large spikes in fails may understate the problem.
The episode then turns to current conditions. Snider reads the rising dollar, inverted curves, repo fails near March 2020 levels and unusually low T-bill yields as tightening, not as Fed success. He treats US inflation as largely logistical and supply-driven, a claim marked as contested, and says rate hikes cannot move oil, chips or shipping containers. Other topics include Japanese banks' exposure to China through Tokyo, Japan's commodity-inflated import bill, and Russia's ruble demands still relying on dollar-denominated collateral. On crisis risk, he says a 2008-style bank failure is unlikely because banks hold safe assets, but market dysfunction is a risk, and the next crisis will take a new form. He closes on private, crypto-style solutions over government ones.
Snider argues that the eurodollar system, not the Federal Reserve, is the true driver of global liquidity and monetary conditions; conventional policy analysis that treats Fed rate decisions as primary monetary control mechanisms misses the actual mechanics of how dollar-denominated credit circulates offshore and among global banks.
- The Fed's primary tool is expectations management through communication, not actual monetary control, because the federal funds market is now irrelevant to real money flows
- Bank reserves have minimal monetary function in developed markets; the eurodollar system operates independently via collateralized wholesale funding and repo networks that central banks cannot directly control
- Current liquidity tightening signals (rising dollar, inverted curves, collateral stress) reflect eurodollar system contraction, not Fed policy transmission, explaining why rate hikes don't address supply-side inflation
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The danger of illiquid markets is contagion through asset fire sales; when collateral-dependent funding chains break, assets used as collateral (like junk corporate bonds) must be liquidated, and the resulting fire sales spread liquidity problems beyond the initial market to other interconnected markets throughout the financial system.
“when you have marketplaces that become illiquid nobody wants to buy for example junk corporate bonds but junk corporate bonds are used monetarily as collateral in certain collateral chains and transformations then fire sales and liquidations in junk markets then spread to not to liquidity problems that are way beyond simply the junk market”
A true reserve currency requires functions that must be reliable, predictable, and subject to specific obligations that single national monetary policies cannot fulfill, making it fundamentally difficult for any country to establish a competing reserve currency system.
“the functions that need to be undertaken that need to be reliable and predictable in order to create a true reserve currency or competing reserve currency system”
The primary dealer repo reporting that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York collects only covers what dealers are forced to disclose on a weekly basis; the vast majority of the repo system is completely uncovered by available data, so large spikes in primary dealer repo fails may not reflect the full system, though they are likely indicative of broader problems.
“repo fails data that we have is simply only uh what the primary dealers are forced to provide on a weekly basis to the federal reserve bank of new york leaving the vast majority of the repo system or at least the majority of the repo system there's an argument about how much um completely uncovered so even if we see if we see a huge spike in fails in the primary dealers reporting that doesn't mean there was one in the whole entire repo system”
Between late February and early March 2022, the entire dollar system 'turned' and accelerated downward; not just the euro weakened but also the Chinese yuan, commodity currencies, and emerging market currencies all fell sharply, indicating broad-based risk aversion rather than isolated regional stress.
“over the last several weeks in particular it hasn't just been the euro that's been moving obviously chinese yuan going back to february 28th as well as any number of currencies including some of the formerly stronger current emerging markets the commodity heavy currencies that had sort of weathered the la the first couple months of 2022 seemingly in favorable fashion so it seems like the entire dollar system is sort of turned and when it turned it seemed to really accelerated in that same window between february 28th march 1st”
US inflation in the last year is more defined by logistical problems and shipping bottlenecks than monetary factors; goods are present in high inventory levels but difficult to move, reflecting idiosyncrasies of the US logistical system rather than global shortage dynamics seen in other regions.
“so the fact that the us is more of a um you know the the last year defined by its logistical problems the trouble shipping goods the goods are there as we're seeing in the inventory numbers i mean today that we got more inventory numbers advanced uh retail and wholesale inventories that were again near record highs so the goods are there they're just easily moved around which i think speaks a lot to the idiosyncrasies of the u.s logistical system rather than the rest of the world”
The Federal Reserve cannot fight inflation when the inflation is driven by supply constraints rather than monetary expansion (monetary inflation); interest rate increases don't get more oil out of the ground or create semiconductor chips or move shipping containers more efficiently, so inflation control must work through psychological effect on expectations and behavior.
“i'll use the term monetary inflation i don't see how interest rates are going to get more oil up out of the ground or create semiconductor chips or move containers off of the west coast ports and into china where they belong so it's really what we're really talking about in that situation is more of a psychological effect”
US CPI inflation composition between December 2020 and December 2021 was roughly 40% energy, 10% food, and the lion's share from 'other' categories, whereas Europe and other advanced economies experienced inflation driven almost entirely by energy and food with only a sliver of other price increases.
“for europe and other advanced economies it's all energy and all food and a sliver of other so all cpi increases for europe and advanced economies energy and food for the us it's roughly speaking u.s is 40 energy a tiny sliver 10 of food and then the lion's share is other”
Bank reserves have very limited monetary value in the United States, Japan, and Europe in the post-crisis QE era and function essentially as an inter-bank accounting token; in contrast, China uses bank reserves as a meaningful monetary instrument because its financial system is state-controlled, narrow, and lacks the developed wholesale banking networks that characterize the eurodollar system.
“bankruptcy style system don't really mean anything they're not really they're basically a store function for banks in the post-crisis qe era have really no role whatsoever as a medium of exchange whereas in china they use very differently because it's a very top-heavy structure it's very limited and very narrow so it's basically perfectly set up for the use of bank reserves as more than just an interbank token”
The federal funds market is an arcane and archaic mechanism that no longer carries meaningful monetary content; it represents only a narrow slice of global money and is primarily a reflection of banks managing regulatory reserve requirements rather than actual funding dynamics, which shifted to the eurodollar market before August 2007.
“the federal funds system and the federal funds rate in particular the effective rate is sort of a reflection of that narrow slice of the global money marketplace and it really has a lot more a lot more with um banks managing their regulatory requirements as far as reserves and things like that rather than actual useful money in the in the wider system even before the the 2008 crisis back before august of 2007”
Federal Reserve monetary policy is fundamentally expectations-based rather than direct monetary control; the Fed's 2013-2014 debate over reference rate committees centered not on how to influence actual money supply but on how to communicate policy to the public through signals that would be understood and believed.
“there was an enormous federal federal reserve debate and argument way back um was 2013 2014 the alternative rate reference committee all that stuff when they started debating about going to sulfur whether or not they should use a repo rate as their primary communications tool it was really all about that how do we communicate monetary policy to the public's not not how do we influence money but how do we communicate policy”
The eurodollar system is fundamentally based on offshore dollar-denominated credit that divorced the medium of exchange from store of value functions; the system's answer to store of value has been liquid financial instruments, primarily US Treasuries, though in the 1990s and mid-2000s store of value shifted to private label subprime mortgage bonds.
“the euro dollar system itself has been struggling with ever since its inception in fact that's one of the unique features of the system is that it divorced the medium of exchange into store value and from store value and offshore it literally offshore the store value function into financial securities and mostly the euro dollar system's answer to store value has been liquid instruments like u.s treasuries although there was that that little period in the 90s and middle 2000s store value was the function was given to things like private label subprime mortgage bonds”
Japanese banks are heavily exposed to China through the eurodollar redistribution hub in Tokyo; they borrow dollars, transform them maturity-wise (short-term funding to long-term assets), and send them to China, making them vulnerable to both Chinese financial stress and global risk aversion simultaneously.
“there's more to this story than we're being led to believe and it does have it does have a lot to do with the japanese bank exposure to china via their euro dollar redistribution and so you can sort of think about it uh from this perspective of tokyo banks getting hit on both sides maybe you have risk aversions therefore you have reluctance in other euro dollar banks in doing what are essentially collateralized currency swaps with them”
Specific indicators of systemic liquidity tightening include: collateral indications with repo fails up at March 2020 levels, unusually low T-bill prices despite rising interest rates, and the 4-week T-bill at 30-36 basis points while the overnight rate is 80 basis points, indicating severe term premium compression and collateral shortage.
“you see collateral indications repo fails up at march 2020 levels they were down a lot the week before but still relatively high um t-bill prices that are unusually low even though interest rates are rising the four months the four-week t bill at you know what is it 30 some odd basis 36 basis points right now and it's 80. you know that thing”
Japanese imports surged 30% year-over-year in February 2022 in nominal terms but declined slightly in real terms, meaning most of the import increase was driven by commodity and food price inflation rather than volume increases; imports from Australia specifically rose 90% year-over-year.
“you look at the japanese trade numbers for example their imports were up 30 some percent year over year in what was in february but in real terms they were actually down slightly and most of that was with oceana so japanese importing raw materials including food at exorbitant prices i think their imports from australia up something ridiculous like 90 percent”
There is no comprehensive dataset showing the true state of the global monetary system; monetary policy makers and central bankers deliberately hide this information because they want the public to believe they have full control when they don't; banks refuse to disclose data because this is a bank-centered system and most activity is off-balance-sheet.
“there's a couple key reasons number one um the authorities monetary policy makers central bankers don't want it they want you to believe that they have full control when they absolutely don't the other reason is that because this is a bank's global bank centered system the banks don't really want to share their data they don't really want to tell people what's going on in fact when the fed switched its main call reporting to monthly rather than quarterly they raised holy hell about it they don't really want to disclose what it is they're doing obviously because most of the stuff that they do is off balance sheet anyway”
The specific form of the next financial crisis won't resemble 2008 or even March 2020 because the system continually invents new failure modes; the unpredictability of how financial contagion spreads through complex interconnected markets is what makes systemic risk analysis difficult.
“it may not be the same sort of financial crisis as 2008 or even as march 2020 would be and that's sort of the uh what keeps you on your toes and what keeps you up at night is thinking about all the new ways that the system will invent uh to all the new ways the system invents to fail”
A devastating 2008-style financial crisis is unlikely in the near future because modern banks have fortified their balance sheets with safe, liquid instruments; however, this defensive posture prevents adequate money from flowing into the system, creating liquidity crisis risk in the form of market dysfunction rather than bank failures.
“i don't believe there'll be another lehman brother at any time because most of the big banks have fortified their balance sheets which is kind of the fact that they're all risk averse and only holding safe and liquid instruments i mean their soul is sort of their sort of the purpose behind or the reason behind the fact that we can't get enough money into the system to begin with”
The Federal Reserve deliberately avoids switching away from the federal funds rate as its primary policy communication tool despite it being archaic and irrelevant to actual monetary flows, because they fear that using a more relevant reference rate (like a repo rate) would confuse the public and undermine the Fed's power to influence expectations.
“nor is there much interest in resurrecting the federal funds market because everything has become collateralized essentially everything is either repo or derivatives nowadays so the federal funds market is sort of an arcane archaic historical device that the federal reserve continues to use for the sole reason that they're afraid that if they go they move to some other reference rate that's actually more relevant to the worldwide system that it'll confuse the public the public won't be able to easily understand what the fed wants them to understand because remember this is an expectations based policy”
The global monetary system lacks a fundamental anchor or 'north star' because there is no convertibility to a real asset or ultimate store of value; instead the system is entirely dependent on dealer-intermediated relative financial transactions. When dealers decide to become risk-averse, the entire system becomes fragile simultaneously because all parts depend on dealer participation.
“without convertibility the entire global monetary system can be that fragile because there is no north start upon which to base everything on it's really just a series of relative financial transactions and options for transactions balance sheet building that that when things go wrong what we've seen is that because they're utterly dependent upon dealers to make markets and to make eyes and to keep things steady when the dealers decide they want to be risk averse it doesn't really matter which market or which which financial sector we're talking about it all becomes a big problem”
The most important question is not what Snider would do, but what can actually be done given political and institutional constraints; this points to private actors (crypto projects, decentralized systems) working toward solutions rather than relying on government authorities.
“i think the real question isn't what what i do is what can we do and that's uh that's a maybe even a more complicated issue but at least i think there's as you're pointing out or any number of groups who are actually working towards solving a monetary issue rather than leaving it up to so-called monetary agents and officials who have no interest in the monetary system whatsoever”
Even as countries formally demand non-dollar payment (like Russia demanding rubles), they still use eurodollar infrastructure and dollar-denominated collateral to execute those transactions; for example, banks help firms swap coupon payments into rubles using eurobond collateral denominated in dollars, meaning the dollar system is inescapable.
“even as the russians are supposedly getting rubles for payments they're still using the us dollars the euro dollar system to do it... a bunch of banks they didn't say where but i would guess that probably swiss banks were helping a russian oil firm swap their coupon payments into your into rubles using eurobond collateral and dominated us dollars”
The dollar is currently rising and continuing to strengthen despite Fed rate hikes, which indicates growing risk aversion and liquidity tightening across the eurodollar system; rising dollar value is a worrisome sign of systemic stress rather than a sign of Fed policy success.
“the issue of the dollar uh the fact that the dollar is higher and in fact it continues to go higher is already itself a worrisome sign”
Commodity price increases are robbing the Japanese economy of vitality and demand-destroying capacity; various countries seeking bilateral currency arrangements (like paying for oil in yen or rubles) are rational responses to being squeezed by global commodity price increases and terms-of-trade deterioration.
“the japanese economy is being robbed of its vitality not that it had much to begin with but robbed of whatever little vitality it had through commodity price increases and things like that so it's fine to deal with what are essentially price and balances globally you could understand why paying but other countries around the world would seek other opportunities to mitigate what is essentially a heavy a heavy dose of what will lead to demand destruction”
The Fed's ability to influence behavior through rate increases is highly questionable; despite rate-hike rhetoric, markets bet against the Fed by inverting yield curves, suggesting participants don't believe the Fed can actually tighten monetary conditions or that rate hikes won't stick.
“i'm of course obviously skeptical about that in fact i don't think they really influence much behavior at all and i think that's why markets have behaved as they are because i don't believe the vast majority of the financial or monetary system believes much in the fed either which is why despite all the rate hike rhetoric you see yield curves invert and the market essentially bet against the fed's reasoning”
A decentralized, blockchain-based, transparent monetary system without central bank or major bank privilege would be superior to the current bank-centered eurodollar arrangement; while current technology may not yet enable full convertibility, digital formats might replicate the benefits of convertibility while avoiding the problems of the current system.
“i wouldn't have any issue i wouldn't have any issues with a decentralized say blockchain based transparent and open system but with some rules attached there has to be some sort of constraints um we can't we can't have convertibility at least i don't believe there would be at least currently a way to to have full-on convertibility in a digital format but maybe there's ways that we can mimic the best parts of convertibility in a digital space”
Before the 2007 credit crisis, dealer banks created arbitrage opportunities that allowed the Fed to influence wider interest rates (like LIBOR) by moving fed funds rates, because dealers would automatically adjust other rates to eliminate spreads; once dealers faced trouble in August 2007, this arbitrage mechanism broke and the Fed lost its leverage.
“the federal reserve sort of leveraged that arbitrage opportunity by create by moving the federal funds of target around they they sort of influenced all the rest of the interest rates around the rest of the world including uh things like libor because of the arbitrage that dealer banks had it would engage in making sure that there was never any real spread between say for example federal funds and overnight libor but once the dealers started to run into trouble around august 9th of 2007 that's leverage disappeared”
The 2007-2008 financial system breakdown occurred because the system was inherently unstable, full of contradictions, based on flawed beliefs (like the Greenspan Put), and was a 'rickety shallow arrangement' that was bound to fail eventually.
“the short answer is the fact that it was completely unstable eventually it was going to break at some point it was full of contradictions full of inherent flaws full of mistaken beliefs and myths including the greenspan put and that just it was a rickety um very shallow arrangement that it just at some point there was going to be a spark that led to eventual downfall”
China is not interested in reserve currency status through its own national currency but would theoretically sign up for an international currency not tied to a single national monetary policy or bank-centered system; instead China is focused on managing its own dollar problems through small-scale bilateral trade agreements and the Belt and Road Initiative rather than recreating the eurodollar system.
“i don't think that the chinese really want have any interest in a reserve currency that is specifically their own national currency i think they would sign up for an international currency that isn't that isn't specifically tied to a single national monetary policy or a single national reserve currency or even this private uh bank-centered base system is that it exists currently so china's kind of in a pickle here”
China attempted to develop an offshore yuan market centered in Hong Kong but the People's Bank of China and communist authorities deliberately constrained it by refusing to let go of direct control; they wanted offshore yuan benefits without actually privatizing the system, so the Hong Kong offshore yuan market dried up and died as authorities tacitly rejected the reserve currency business.
“they they kind of dabbled in an offshore yuan there was the hong kong offshore yuan market that they developed uh many years ago and then they just it never took off because the pboc and communist authorities over there did not want to take the shackles off they sort of wanted to have their yuan cake and eat it too which meant that they were okay we realized we need some kind of offshore monetary system challenged a dollar but not willing to actually let it be a private session really needs to be and so the hong kong offshore yuan market just essentially dried up and died it really isn't much of a marketplace anymore”
Europe is making some effort to understand offshore financial arrangements (secured funding transactions/SFTs and repo), but progress is extremely slow despite regulators repeatedly acknowledging that the potential for problems is huge and nobody understands these systems.
“there's really no urgency to doing it even though time and again whenever they write up their paper saying that we're looking at these things they always say hey the the potential for problem here is obviously huge and nobody knows about this stuff so maybe we should look at it but yet you know it takes some a decade just to start up pilot programs”