
Who Does China Want To Win The US Election? | Chinese Economy: Faltering Reforms | Tax
What this covers
This 18-minute China Update episode is built in three parts: a segment on China's tax enforcement, a segment on stalled economic reform, and a closing segment on the US election. Tony narrates the first two. The election segment draws on Chao Chang Yen, with Wendy O adding a view on China's headwinds. The tax segment starts from the revenue numbers. Land-sale income fell nearly 25% in the first nine months of the year, and total tax revenue fell more than 5%. Tony describes the results: self-inspection campaigns aimed at wealthy individuals and businesses, including tax on personal overseas investments, tighter data-sharing across departments, and fine revenue in places like Beijing and Chongqing, where some provinces have stopped reporting the figures. He also raises longer-term options such as property-related taxes, and notes that cutting fiscal ambitions would shrink the political power of central and local governments.
The reform segment relies on the Rhodium Group's "End of the Line" report and its six-part scoring framework. China has improved on its own 2010 baseline and narrowed its gap with the OECD), but Tony says the indicators point to a ceiling on convergence). Beijing did contain the property and local-debt stress in 2023, which lifted its financial-system score. Tony's more contested claim is that China will not concede the state's traditional economic role, particularly through state-owned enterprises). He also points out that OECD countries are backsliding as industrial policy returns, and that analysts now face more data obstacles than in 2019.
The election segment argues that China has no clear favorite, because the tariff conflict is structural. Chao Chang Yen traces continuity from Trump's purchase-focused tariffs, through the China Initiative, to Biden's technology containment. Other threads include China's growing share of legacy-chip manufacturing, the 28 sanctioned Trump-era officials, and the risk of unintended escalation.
Tony argues that China faces dual fiscal and structural crises—depleted government revenues from property collapse forcing aggressive tax enforcement, stalled reforms despite 2023 Third Plenum commitments, and a fundamental confidence crisis among businesses and foreign investors that no external trade policy (Trump or Harris) can solve without internal economic restructuring.
- Local government revenues collapsed (land sales down 25%, total tax revenue down 5%) forcing coercive tax collection and fine-based revenue schemes
- Rhodium Group's analysis shows China has hit convergence limits with OECD and is experiencing reform backsliding, especially in state enterprise competition and innovation
- Restoring investor and public confidence requires fiscal stimulus, transparency, and policy consistency—absent these, multinational companies are relocating headquarters outside mainland China
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The US-China tariff conflict is fundamentally structural, not rooted in personal preferences of individual presidents, which is why tariffs are inevitable regardless of whether Trump or Harris wins the 2024 election.
“no matter whether it's Trump or Harris I think it is inevitable that the US will put more tariffs on China the reason is because it's struct issue it's not just a personal preference”
In market competition, China is unwilling to make the necessary concessions to the traditional role of the state in its economy required to achieve more durable structural reform, especially given the presence of state-owned enterprises.
“two in Market competition especially since the presence of State own Enterprises in the economy but also more broadly China is unwilling to make the concessions to the traditional role of the state in its economy necessary to achieve more durable structural reform”
China's progress stalled in innovation as fiscal constraints have begun to have meaningful impact on technological and development capacity, and in trade where security concerns and geopolitics weigh on trade openness even as China exported more in 2023 and became increasingly important for marginal economic growth.
“three China's progress stalled in several areas tracked by China Pathfinder these include Innovation as China's fiscal constraints begin to have a meaningful impact on its technological and development capacity in some metrics they also include trade where security concerns and geopolitics including uncertainty over data and security rules weigh on China's trade openness even as China exported more and more in 2023 and became increasingly important for marginal economic growth”
The US maintains a technology lead over China, but China is compensating for technological disadvantage by strengthening its manufacturing capacity in legacy chips—China's share of global legacy chip manufacturing grew from 17.7% before 2007 to over 30% today, exceeding the combined G7 share.
“the US still have the lead over China in technology but China is making up for this disadvantage by really strengthening its manufacturing capacity take for example chips before 2007 China's share of so-called Legacy chip manufacturing was only 177% today it is over 30% so China today actually accounts for 30% of the global Shear in manufacturing the rest of the G7 put together is actually still not at that level”
Developed market scores continued to decline on average in several categories including innovation and market competition, showing reform backsliding and a resurgence of industrial policy and geo-economic security policy in the OECD even as most countries remain ahead of 2010 levels.
“five developed Market scores continued to decline on average in several categories including Innovation and Market competition this shows some reform backsliding and a Resurgence of industrial policy and Geo economic security policy in the oecd even as most countries remain well ahead of where they were in 2010”
Trump's first-term goal with tariffs was to force China to buy more US products and to balance the trade deficit; the strategy was effective as China did buy significantly more agriculture and energy products from the US, which is why the Biden Administration kept most Trump tariffs in place despite lobbying pressure.
“the first time Trump's goal was to actually Force China to buy more products from the US and to balance the so-called unfair trade where China had a huge Trade Surplus against the US the result is that China did end up buying much more from the US particularly Agriculture and Energy Products so it's effective that is why the Biden Administration despite all the lobbying and pressure they by and large kept the Trump tariffs in place”
Under Trump, the China Initiative was implemented as a tool against Chinese economic and technological competition; under Biden, it was removed in name but Biden fully embraced similar policies with different rhetoric, showing continuity in substance across administrations.
“the so-called China initiative under Trump under Biden they removed it but actually they fully embraced something very similar”
Historically, there are many examples of great conflicts where neither party wanted or intended a war, suggesting that even with de-escalation intent from both US and China, the risk of unintended escalation remains.
“of course there are plenty of examples throughout history of great conflicts where neither party intended or wanted a war”
China does not have a clear preference for either Trump or Harris because each candidate presents distinct issues, and the US-China relationship involves structural conflicts more fundamental than individual presidential preferences—the rhetoric will differ but policy direction will likely remain the same.
“I don't really think China has a clear preference because each brings its own issues and also the relationship between China and the US is really more structural in terms of conflicts the different candidate will mean that the rhetoric will be different but the policy direction will remain probably more or less the same”
Some provinces including Beijing and Chongqing have increased revenue from fines on businesses to boost government income, though many have stopped reporting these figures due to rapid public concern about the practice.
“some provinces including Beijing and Chongqing saw significant increases in revenue from fines though many have stopped reporting this due to its rapid rise and the resulting public concern”
In 2023, Beijing prevented debt emergencies in the property sector and local government financing space from triggering a general financial crisis, and credit cleanup improved China's financial system reform score—with its composite cluster score surpassing several OECD countries for the first time since 2010, though such achievements remain modest compared to ongoing problems in financial intermediation and capital productivity.
“in a narrow sense China saw more progress in dealing with financial challenges in 2023 Beijing prevented debt emergencies in the property sector and local government financing space from triggering a general financial crisis and resulting slowdown in credit and cleanup was reflected in an improvement of China's Financial system reform score its composite cluster score surpassed that of several oecd countries for the first time since 20 however such achievements are modest compared to ongoing problems poor Quality Financial intermediation declining Capital productivity and deviations from Market Financial regulatory principles”
There are now more data obstacles to analyzing China's economy than in 2019, including data lags, delays, and a chilling effect on open discussion of economic problems, though alternative data sources and frank domestic and international economic commentary are improving these conditions.
“there were more data obstacles now to analyzing China's economy than in 2019 including data lags and delays that hamper study and have a chilling effect on open discussion of economic problems in China but alternative data and the rise in Frank domestic and international economic commentary are improving these conditions”
Local governments are tightening tax surveillance systems and enabling greater data sharing across departments and financial institutions to enhance monitoring of tax obligations.
“local governments are also tightening their tax surveillance systems enabling greater data sharing across departments and financial institutions to enhance monitoring”
For the past four years, despite lobbying attempts to negotiate, the Biden Administration kept most of Trump's tariffs in place, indicating that US tariff policy on China is bipartisan structural preference rather than partisan difference.
“for the past four years despite all the lobbying attempts to negotiate the Biden Administration has kept most of Trump's tariffs in place”
China's economy faces multiple structural headwinds—both domestically (property sector weakness, continued fiscal pressure) and externally (trade war risks, technology containment, foreign company relocation)—that cannot be solved by election outcomes alone.
“China's economy is facing a lot of headwinds domestically and also externally so no matter who is going to be in the white house for the next years China is going to face some questions is China going to fight a trade war on two fronts both with the European Union and the United States is China going to face closer coordination on the tech and economic rivalry across the Atlantic will China face an escalation of the US technology containment strategy and will China be able to find and expand its external markets in the emerging economies in the global South to counter the loss”
US policymakers from both parties are eager to bring manufacturing jobs back to the US, which they see as addressing the 'hollowing out of manufacturing' that occurred over decades, and they are using tariffs and incentives to encourage Chinese and other foreign manufacturers to relocate production to the US.
“from the Trump side a lot of the talkers about hollowing out the manufacturing jobs in the US and the US Elite are very eager to bring manufacturing back to the US for various reasons one way for them to do that is to use tariffs to protect us manufacturing and to encourage Chinese and also other countries manufacturers to move their Factory to the US to set up a manufacturing center in the US”
The Rhodium Group's 'End of the Line' report analyzes China's economic reform progress using six components: financial system development, market competition, modern innovation system, trade openness, direct investment openness, and portfolio investment openness—providing a quantitative framework for tracking reform progress or regression.
“rum's China Pathfinder compared China's economic system to those of market economies using six components of the market model Financial system development Market competition modern Innovation System trade openness direct investment openness and portfolio investment openness they established a quantitative framework for understanding China's progress or regression on reform”
Raising taxes on affluent individuals and certain companies, while less likely to directly impact most residents, risks further weakening business and investor confidence if enforcement scope expands.
“analysts suggest that while raising taxes on affluent individuals and certain companies is less likely to directly impact most residents it risks further weakening business and investor confidence if the scope of enforcement expands”
Compared to its own 2010 baseline, China has improved in all clusters analyzed by the Rhodium Group's China Pathfinder and has narrowed the gap with OECD countries, however further reform progress has been elusive and indicators suggest China has hit limits on convergence with the OECD that will likely persist in coming years.
“one compared to its own 2010 Baseline China has improved in all of the Clusters analyzed by China Pathfinder China has narrowed the Gap with the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd however further progress has been Elusive and the indicators suggest China has hit limits on convergence with the oecd this Gap will likely remain in the coming years”
The Biden Administration shifted tariff strategy from forcing Chinese purchases to restricting high-end technology exports and capital flows to China, aiming to preserve US technological advantage, and these technology containment policies have been effective but people in Washington are beginning to recognize limitations to the approach.
“the Biden Administration started what people called the technology war against China trying to restrict the most sensitive and high-end of Technology from China not just the important exports but also the capital flow and investment the aim really is to keep the technology advantage over China these policies are in fact quite effective but gradually people in Washington have started to realize the limitations to this approach”
Government income from land sales dropped by nearly 25% in the first nine months of the year and total tax revenue declined by over 5%, compounding years of revenue losses from the property crisis.
“recent data reveals that government income from land sales a major Revenue Source dropped by nearly 25% in the first n months of the year and total tax revenue declined by over 5% this is after already several years of Revenue being hit by the property crisis”
Chinese tax authorities are conducting broad self-inspection campaigns targeting wealthy individuals and businesses to uncover unpaid tax liabilities, including taxes on personal overseas investments, as part of a fiscal revenue recovery effort driven by local government budget shortfalls from the property market downturn.
“tax officials have asked individuals and businesses to conduct so-called self- inspections and pay any owed taxes including on personal overseas investments”
China put 28 Trump Administration officials on sanctions lists, creating a risk that if Trump returns to office and appoints sanctioned individuals to government positions, it would create immediate diplomatic friction and signal bad faith.
“China actually put 28 Trump Administration officials on the sanctions list what if Trump puts someone who is on the sanctions list back in the government”
Longer-term fiscal solutions for China may include expanding the tax base to potentially incorporate property-related taxes, but reducing fiscal ambitions generally would greatly reduce the political power of central and local governments.
“longer term Solutions may include expanding the tax base potentially incorporating property related taxes another option of course is to reduce China's fiscal Ambitions generally but this of course would greatly reduce the political power of the Central and local governments”
Several high-profile businesses discovered unexpected tax liabilities during self-inspections, including Hesong Pharmaceutical's 18 million RMB debt and Qu Jo Gas's 20 million RMB liability, indicating systematic discovery of previously unreported obligations.
“some businesses have begun reporting unexpected tax liabilities for instance he soon pharmaceutical discovered a tax debt of 18 million R&B and qu Jo gas paid an extra 20 million R&B following self- inspections”
The US-China competition involves an asymmetric weapons mismatch: the US is weaponizing its lead in technology research while China is weaponizing its unique global manufacturing capacity, and determining who wins depends on how these competing advantages resolve.
“if Trump or Harris imposed tariffs on China China's way of hitting back would be very different who's going to win this war where does it end it really depends because the US is weaponizing a lead in technology research but China is weaponizing a unique manufacturing capacity”
The fundamental issue for Chinese economic recovery is for the leadership to restore economic resilience and regain public and foreign investor confidence, which requires meaningful fiscal stimulus, increased transparency, and policy consistency to dispel investor concerns.
“the fundamental issue and solution for this is for the Chinese leadership to restore economic resilience to regain the Public's and the foreign investors confidence in China the Market's expectation for further fiscal stimulus is quite High we really need to see something to take place on the ground to move the needle to revitalize public confidence for career prospects for income prospects and Outlook they have to rarely increase the transparency and policy consistency in order to dispel lingering suspicions and concerns for investors”
The increased pressure on taxpayers has created a sense of fear among wealthy individuals, particularly in cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, reflecting echoes of class-warfare dynamics from the Mao era.
“The increased pressure on taxpayers has led some wealthy individuals to negotiate with authorities regarding their liabilities and it's created a sense of fear among the wealthy especially in cities like Beijing Shanghai and shenan and of course older folks will remember the class Warfare of the ma era”
If multinational companies continue to reallocate their Asian headquarters from mainland China to Singapore or other cities, China will face a daunting confidence crisis that external tariff policies cannot address.
“if multinational companies continue to reallocate their Asian headquarters outside mainland China to Singapore or other cities China is still going to face a really daunting challenge about this confidence crisis”
Market expectations for further Chinese fiscal stimulus are high, but expectations alone are insufficient—actual visible policy action on the ground is needed to move the economic needle and revitalize public and investor confidence in career and income prospects.
“the Market's expectation for further fiscal stimulus is quite High we really need to see something to take place on the ground to move the needle to revitalize public confidence for career prospects for income prospects and Outlook”
Trump represents greater uncertainty for China compared to Harris—Chinese officials are familiar with Trump's style but no matter how powerful the president is, the complicated US-China relationship requires working-level effort across all official levels, and rebuilding the communications and military-to-military relationships that deteriorated would take time.
“Trump represents greater uncertainty the Chinese officials by now are familiar with him and his style but no matter how powerful the president is the complicated us China relationship requires a lot of work between officials at all levels China actually put 28 Trump Administration officials on the sanctions list what if Trump puts someone who is on the sanctions list back in the government over the past four years China and the US have spent a lot of effort trying to build up communications if Trump comes back a lot of these working level bureaucrats or officials will leave the White House and then there will be a period of uncertainty China and the US also spent a lot of capital to bring back military to military communication if Trump actually comes back his relations with the military leaders in the US at present are not very good and he is probably going to bring a holesale change to that then the two sides will need to work from scratch to rebuild trust between them”
A Harris victory would likely mean more policy continuity with Biden administration China policy, but Harris will also bring her own people, causing uncertainty as many foreign affairs officials will likely leave—however, this uncertainty level would be less than with Trump.
“Harris will be more continuity for China because by large Harris is going to inherit Biden's policy towards China and then even though there will also be a round of changes at least the framework will stay but Harris will also be bringing her own people and many people in charge of Foreign Affairs will probably leave so that will bring a level of uncertainty as well but it is just not going to be as great as with Mr Trump”
Beijing's current Taiwan strategy is to apply enough pressure to prevent Taiwan from pursuing radical independence moves while gradually squeezing Taiwan to force it back to the negotiation table, rather than pursuing immediate military action.
“in terms of Taiwan I think beijing's priority now is to put enough pressure on Taiwan to make sure that Taiwan will not opt for a radical move but at the same time Beijing will use every opportunity to gradually squeeze Taiwan to force them back to the negotiation table”
There is no political will in the US to go into direct military conflict with China, and a Trump Administration that actively pushes for anything triggering an attack across the Taiwan Strait would be out of line with what Trump has previously said.
“I also don't see how there is a political will in the US to go into direct conflict with China a trump Administration that actively pushes for anything that would trigger an attack across the Taiwan straight would be way out of line with what he has said before”
The number one concern across the American electorate is economics, and the Biden Administration has been determined to keep high-level contact with Beijing, suggesting both sides want to avoid escalation despite congressional pressure.
“the number one concern across the American electorate is economics if Harris wins she would generally continue what Biden has done and the bided Administration has been determined to keep high level contact with Beijing on both sides you can see signs that they do not want to get into a conflict of course Congress is another animal here”
The likelihood of armed conflict in the Taiwan region is not very high because China's current priority is economic restructuring and moving up the value chain, not military conflict, and China realizes that time is on its side so it is in no rush to start armed conflict.
“we cannot completely rule it out I don't think the likelihood is very high because a lot of this depends on how China will react right now China's priority is to restructure its economy China's pror PRI is to move up the value chain to complete the Science and Technology transformation China realizes that time is on its side China is in no rush to start an armed conflict with anyone”