
Harvard Economist Ken Rogoff: Iran, Oil & the Global Economy at Risk
What this covers
This is a single-guest conversation in which Charlie Rose interviews Ken Rogoff, the Harvard economist and former IMF chief economist. It begins with the Iran war and its effect on oil, gasoline, and fertilizer prices, then widens to the dollar, debt, interest rates, China, and AI. Rogoff argues that the Strait of Hormuz may now matter more in the near term than whether Iran gets a nuclear weapon. He also says Donald Trump underestimated how easily Iran could close the strait and how determined its leaders would be to fight. He expects the psychological damage to markets and to Gulf investment to last well past any formal end to hostilities. Supply chains come up as well, with helium for Taiwan's chip production as one named bottleneck.
The middle of the conversation is about money. Rogoff explains that the Fed sets only the overnight lending rate, while the 10-year US interest rate is set by markets. He predicts rates will stay high because of heavy global debt, populist spending, and large military buildups. He says the US can borrow more cheaply than others because of the dollar's role, but that it is near the limit of that advantage. On debt, he contends voters behave like immortal teenagers because none has lived through a real debt crisis. He also rejects the idea that AI-driven growth will fix budgets, since the gains would go to hard-to-tax, politically powerful people such as Elon Musk.
China gets extended treatment. Rogoff describes a collapse in real estate and construction, with most household wealth tied up in housing, and a weak consumer base that stems from the lack of a safety net and the legacy of the one-child policy. He is skeptical that the US can truly decouple, setting the minimum goal as not depending on China for military parts. He also touches on Hong Kong's history and on the middle-income trap facing Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The AI section is the most contentious. Rogoff worries that development is moving too fast and that companies have no incentive to slow down. He points to copper as a physical constraint, to deepfakes, including ones of himself, and to a nuclear-command hacking scenario he attributes to Henry Kissinger. He closes by calling for education to be rethought from the ground up.
Rogoff argues that while the US remains economically dominant globally, multiple converging risks—the Iran war creating sustained instability, AI development moving too fast without adequate safety governance, massive debt at record levels with rising interest rates, and deep geopolitical tensions with China—threaten long-term prosperity and require urgent policy attention that current political incentives prevent.
- The Iran war creates years of instability beyond its direct economic impacts, affecting investor confidence and global energy security in ways markets underestimate
- AI development is advancing too rapidly for society to adjust; without copyright enforcement or international cooperation, it will cause massive white-collar job losses within 3-4 years
- US debt at record levels relative to income combined with rising interest rates means interest payments now exceed defense spending, echoing Ferguson's law about the decline of leading powers
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Britain's control of Hong Kong until 1983 involved significant repression and lack of free expression, which was only liberalized after 1983 to differentiate Hong Kong from mainland China; this historical context is often omitted from Western media narratives.
“I have to say I'm on the Harvard University Press board of synindics and we had this book written by an academic almost by definition fairly left-leaning book and it you know pointed out that until 1983 the British didn't tolerate any free expression cracked down on everything and sort of decided well let's make life hard for the Chinese and they introduced some different things.”
Helium is essential for building Taiwan's chips and if Taiwan doesn't get more helium soon they won't have chips for cars, phones, and industrial equipment, making this a critical bottleneck in global manufacturing.
“energy, fossil fuels are still important. We're and and other things like helium and such that we didn't even know was so important. It turns out helium is essential in building Taiwan's chips. And as someone who is planning to go to Europe over the summer, I'm wondering, will they have jet fuel to get me back? But bigger problems are if Taiwan doesn't get more helium soon, they're not going to have chips that go into our cars, our phones, not to mention industrial stuff.”
There are insufficient copper supplies globally to meet the demands of both AI infrastructure buildout and other decarbonization/electrification goals, creating a binding physical constraint on AI deployment scale.
“There's, you know, a number of papers about how we don't have enough copper to do anything that we want to do. And I will find substitutes, I guess. But um it's not hard to imagine that that happens but uh hard to call the timing of it.”
Chinese middle-class consumption is suppressed because the country lacks a social safety net (no Social Security or Medicare equivalent), implemented a one-child policy for ~30 years (creating intergenerational care gaps), and forced citizens to save aggressively for old age rather than spending.
“they don't have any social security to speak of. Uh they don't have any kind of Medicare. you really really need to save for your old age...They didn't let them have children. Like they had the one child policy for I don't you know 30 years or something...normally would depend on your kids maybe to take care of you. So there are many reasons that they don't have lacking a social safety net. The middle class is nervous about about spending.”
The Iran war will have lasting psychological effects on market participants and global confidence that extend far beyond immediate price impacts, creating years of instability even if hostilities formally end.
“this war. I guess what I'm trying to get at is the psychology coming from the war. How are people going to feel after the war? What do they feel that's next? And I I I think there's you know that's going to be a lasting effect.”
The Federal Reserve sets only the overnight lending rate; it does not set long-term interest rates like the 10-year US Treasury, which is set by markets and is the bellwether for all major global interest rates including mortgages, car loans, and student loans.
“There a few different kinds of interest rates. The Federal Reserve sets the overnight lending rate. Think of it as the onee Treasury bill rate. So very very very short-term borrowing. It doesn't set long-term rates. Say that there's a 10-year US interest rate. That's the bellwether of the global economy. Every other interest rate in the world is set off the 10-year US interest rate.”
A middle-class Chinese person has lower purchasing power and living standards than someone in the bottom 10% of the US income distribution, so the narrative of a rising Chinese middle class driving consumption cannot replicate Western consumer demand patterns.
“what it means to be middle class in China is a whole different thing than here. I mean, a middle class person in China would be in our bottom 10% here, you know, by a lot of measures.”
The American voter has not experienced a serious government debt crisis for a very long time (arguably since the US default in the 1930s or when the price of gold was changed as a form of default), so voters do not believe debt is a genuine threat and behave like teenagers who think they're immortal.
“because the voter in the United States has not seen a a really big government debt problem for a very very long time. Really, arguably you'd have to go back to our default in the 30s uh to talk about that. But when we changed the price of gold was a form of default. Other countries have, but we have not. We're we're like teenagers that think they're immortal and you can just”
Trump underestimated how easily Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz and the resilience of Iran's response; Iranian leadership is willing to fight because they have nothing to lose—if they lose power they will be 'dragged through the streets' and will die, making them existentially committed to conflict.
“President Trump clearly underestimated uh what it closing the straits of Hormuz of how easily he could counter that. And I think in general, we've talked about the resilience of the uh global economy. I wonder what you think. I mean, do you think he's been surprised at how resilient the Iranians have been? I would assume he has to be.”
The US can borrow 50% more than other countries because of the dollar's international use and large foreign holdings (~1 in 3 Treasury bills are held abroad), but this privilege is not unlimited—the US is at the limit of this advantage.
“the fact people use the dollar uh means there are more foreign holdings of dollars is about close uh if you did market holdings close to one in every three do uh treasury bills is held abroad. So that lets you borrow more but not three times more maybe 50% more. And we're at that where we're borrowing 50% more.”
The US cannot realistically decouple from Chinese supply chains despite political rhetoric, because decoupling would require either tariffs/bans on Chinese goods (politically and economically costly) or domestic production of lower-margin goods like ibuprofen, which is uneconomical without protection.
“I don't think we can separate from China. I think China understands that already. I don't think Washington does...let's make them completely independent of China. Good luck with that...I mean they're just they have because we are totally ind well we're yeah just start with uh a lot of our medicines come from the precursors to make generic drugs come from China...it ain't going to be profitable unless you know you put a pretty big tax on the drugs coming from China or you ban them and you kind of have to ban them from recycling through some third country.”
The Middle East has become much more important to global economics than historically, and because the war has caused substantial damage and reduced investment appetite, the region's future growth trajectory is severely damaged and will require years to recover.
“The Middle East is actually become much more important than it used to. It has been growing. We talked about Saudi being the next Korea. They have been growing. They're very important in many, many things. they're they're they're in so much trouble because people aren't going to want to invest. They're they're not really going to believe in it.”
Complete rethinking of education at every level is needed to focus on educating people for life and making education more compelling and interesting, as part of being an empowered citizen, rather than current rote/testing-focused approaches.
“We need to have a complete rethinking of education which is sort of at every level including I teach at the university level uh of trying to educate people for life uh trying to make it more compelling more interesting because that's part of being a citizen you know being able to be empowered”
The minimum acceptable decoupling outcome is achieving the point where the US does not need China to supply parts used in military equipment or conflict scenarios, which would represent significant progress but falls far short of complete independence.
“we're going to be doing great if we can get to the point where we don't need China to sell us the parts that we're going to use to fight them. Like if we can just get to that point that would be a big improvement. You know we used to get all our drones from China until not very long ago. Can you believe that the drones even that our military was using you know were basically coming from China. I was just you know mind-numbing.”
It is possible but not inevitable for the US to decline relative to other powers as Europe did; Japan was also expected to surpass the US but did not, yet the possibility of relative decline should not be dismissed as impossible given historical precedent.
“It wouldn't take it just took 20 years, 25 years for Europe to go from thinking they were being our equal to surpassing us to getting left in the dust. And I think it's a little naive to think there couldn't be these es and flows. We worried China was going to do that to us. I would say not yet. We were at first that Japan was going to do it to us. Yeah, we were Japan's going to do it to us, but I wouldn't conclude it's never going to happen, but not tomorrow.”
Deep fakes and AI-generated content pose risks Rogoff personally experiences: he has received replicas of himself that sound exactly like him, stating that there are likely many deep fake Charlie Roses, and with a million shows available to mimic, bad actors could impersonate anyone in any context.
“I'm worried about employment. Uh I'm very worried about the effect on social media. There must be deep fake Charlie roses going around. I mean there have to be. you just haven't looked if you don't know it. Uh, and you know, saying things and they're just looking because you you're really easy. There's a million shows. They can, you know, mimic you in any situation. They have and sent me replicas. They've sent me u in my voice sounds exactly like me.”
Ben Bernanke's Nobel Prize-winning paper on the conditions for severe economic downturns (arguing that low leverage mitigates severity) influenced Rogoff's thinking and shows that China's housing decline, while severe, may not cause immediate catastrophic collapse if leverage is low.
“It's very interesting because my uh classmate from MIT, Ben Bernani, wrote this Nobel Prize-winning paper that was very influential, influenced my own work, and I will say I teach his paper in every class I can. uh he argued that if you don't have a lot of leveraging it's not so bad and I think everybody thought China the prices will come down but just like when our stock market comes down particularly if it's not too much 25%. It sounds horrible but nothing happens overnight but they're in a lot of trouble.”
Saudi Arabia and UAE face a middle-income trap risk: they depend on commodity wealth (oil/gas) but have not developed strong education systems or diversified economies, creating a development ceiling where they remain wealthy but never become advanced economies—a pattern similar to other commodity-dependent economies.
“very few countries have made it where there are countries they get some coconut oil or you know some commodity and they're making money and they're not so poor but they never develop the education system...they never get it all going...You mentioned the middle class before. They never get it all going and they were really coming and they were really feeling it and very very painful and you know you can say the same about Dubai or you know uh and UAE. Yeah. Kuwait.”
China's economy is in serious trouble because real estate, infrastructure, and construction—which drove roughly one-third of demand in the economy—has collapsed, and 70% of personal wealth is held in housing which has officially fallen 20% in price, likely more in reality, creating a consumption depression the government will struggle to reverse.
“the engine that drove China's economy was real estate, infrastructure, construction, not just that narrow sector, but everything that went into it. the materials, if you sold furniture, even the energy that went into it, they depended on construction more than any western economy has. Uh really by some measures, a third of the demand in the economy grew out of infrastructure, roads, bridges, and real estate. A third.”
The argument that AI growth will solve budget problems is wrong for three reasons: (1) AI wealth will accrue to hard-to-tax people (like Elon Musk) who are politically powerful, (2) higher income does not automatically reduce spending—the government is like an improvident relative who will just spend more, and (3) social disruption from AI will lead to counterproductive policies.
“Let me list three. One is a lot of the money is going to go to people that are very hard to tax. I mean, I don't know how much you can tax Elon Musk or somebody who's onetenth of Elon Musk. They're too politically powerful. That's, you know, true all over the world. Hard to t capital's getting more money. Hard to tax them. Uh secondly, um you know, making more money doesn't mean we're not going to spend more money. The budget problems we have have to do with living within our means. If you have an impunious, you know, relative who's just constantly spending money, you're not solving their problem by giving them more money. They're just spending that. And I think that's a good description of our budget problems. uh and and third, they're going to create all the social disruption that may lead to policies that are counterproductive.”
Rogoff worries that AI is developing too fast and could be slowed through intellectual property enforcement and property protection, but companies have no incentive to self-regulate because they want to win the race, particularly against China.
“I worry that it's going too fast. I've always worried about that. Could you slow it down? Yeah, of course you could. You could enforce intellectual copyright. You could enforce uh property protection. You know, they don't.”
The possibility that an AI hacker could insert malicious code into command and control systems of the US, Russia, or other nuclear powers, making them believe an enemy attack is occurring and triggering nuclear war, is a serious concern that Rogoff attributes to Henry Kissinger's worries.
“Can an AI hacker I think she was very visionary. Can an AI hacker put a shadow into the command and control center uh of the US and maybe Russia and make everybody think something might be happening with their enemy and get them all to fire the missiles. So I I I've heard that worried about I mean there's a range of things.”
Japan and Korea are big winners from AI because they're very good at building memory chips and memory is the binding constraint for AI at the moment—there's simply not enough memory capacity.
“Asia feels there uh Japan Korea are being big winners from AI why because they're very good at building memory chips uh memory And memory is the binding constraint at the moment. There's just not enough memory.”
Control of the Strait of Hormuz may now have more near-term geopolitical importance than whether Iran develops nuclear weapons, because the strait controls critical energy supplies while nuclear weapons may remain unusable like North Korea's.
“Is control of the straight up hermuz becoming more important than whether they It's amazing to say this or even think this, but has it come does it have more near-term impact than whether they have a pathway to nuclear weapons? Well, I mean, one view of Iran was they were going to become the second North Korea, and so far North Korea's terrible, but they don't really have a you they don't really have a way to use it.”
Middle Eastern countries (UAE and Saudi Arabia) were interested in significant AI investments because AI requires cheap energy and they have energy advantages, but the Middle East is not likely to succeed in building AI competitors to Claude or ChatGPT without finding a strategic niche.
“there was much talk about u certainly UAE um and the Saudis that they were very interested in significant investments in AI. Well, they had it's it's not crazy because AI equals energy. If you have really cheap energy, you have an a big advantage with AI. It's very very consuming.”
A 30-40% drop in tech stocks could happen 'very suddenly' if the market perceives constraints—for example, if they realize every backyard needs a data center to fulfill company value, or if copper scarcity prevents global deployment of AI infrastructure.
“it's easy to imagine that we could have a 30% 40% drop in these tech stocks very suddenly if something came up where people saw there was a constraint just for example that especially those that have committed a lot of money to to yeah especially the ones that have committed a lot of money but if people see that you need the d for example you just have to have the data center in every backyard or you're not going to fulfill the value of these companies”
The Iran war demonstrates that even sophisticated militaries and advanced planning cannot fully predict or control the outcomes of war, as generals and strategists are always surprised by enemy creativity and innovation.
“any of these things you can ask your generals and your admirals and probably even your AI and the smartest people and if you're, you know, I'm not a general or an admiral and didn't, you know, wouldn't know, but you just, you get surprised in the war what happens. you know, the creativity, the enemy innovates and uh you know, every every no battle plan survives a war.”
Interest rates will remain elevated because multiple structural factors will drive them up: very high global debt levels, tremendous spending needs from populism and redistribution, and massive military spending increases coming in China, the United States, and Europe over the next 5-10 years that will be 'astounding' in scope.
“we have uh very high debt in the world that drives interest rates up people want to borrow there's tremendous spending needs some from uh populism or you can call it redistribution you know uh depending how you want to view it but the military spending that's going to come in the next 5 or 10 years in China, in the United States, dare I say, in Europe, it's just going to be astounding.”
The Iran war is part of a larger geopolitical game between the US and China (analogous to the 19th-century 'great game' between Russia and Britain in Central Asia) involving competition for influence over Saudi Arabia, with Russia also benefiting from Iranian energy and using Iranian drones.
“this is ultimately I think part of a larger geopolitical game between the US and China. I mean, the war in Iran involves uh Russia. Iran was making all their drones. Uh Russia, you know, would can get energy from Iran. uh China gets its energy from Iran. Uh China wants influence over Saudi Arabia. This is, you know, I guess they had this thing in the uh 19th century called the great game in Asia where Russia and Great Britain were competing for power in Central Asia. And it was really not about the local war. It was about this greater struggle between Russia and Britain.”
Rogoff proposes four priorities for an incoming leader: (1) moral grounding of society, (2) addressing inequality through tax/income reform (value-added tax + universal basic income), (3) complete rethinking of education, and (4) maintaining a more civil society.
“I think some kind of moral grounding of our society is important...I think we have to come to grips obviously with uh inequality. Uh and it's not easy to do that. I can tell you on the economic side, we certainly if we could hold the fort, we should have a much simpler tax system that had basically a value added tax like they have in Europe. That's a kind of sales tax on everything. That's regressive. But then you have some kind of universal basic income...We need to have a complete rethinking of education...how we maintain a more civil society than we have.”
Asia gets 70-80% of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and the Iran war has caused gasoline prices to rise 25% there (much more than in the US), with immediate impacts like airlines cutting flights at Hong Kong airport due to lack of jet fuel and European concerns about summer jet fuel shortages.
“Asia gets 70 80% of its oil through the Straits of Hormuz and there's Russian oil that we're now allowing. Therefore, has the price of oil gasoline much more there than here. It's not just the price has gone up. Uh things they're talking about cutting a lot of flights at Hong Kong airport because there's no jet fuel. I I'm sure you've read that in Europe they're talking about that before the summer starts that they just may not have jet fuel.”
Anthropic (an AI safety company) was cut off from US government contracts by the Trump administration due to a conflict with the Pentagon, signaling that national security considerations override safety research in current policymaking.
“certainly people in the AI world worry about this uh anthropic famously famously got you know cut off for a while by the Trump administration uh over this with the conflict with the Pentagon.”
US tech stocks have exploded in value and now represent ~70% of global stock market value despite the US being ~25% of global output, with much of this driven by tech; this creates conditions for a significant bubble burst.
“I think something like 70% of the value of the world's stock market is in the United States. Can you imagine that? I mean we're we're maybe 25% of output but 70% of the value of global stock and and a large percentage of that is is tech stocks.”
The US has separated itself from Europe and Japan over the last 20 years; Europe's economy is ~30% smaller than the US today (vs. equal-sized in 2000), Europe's stock market is 40% of the US (vs. equal), and Japan has a similar story of falling behind.
“In the I want to say uh around 2000, Europe's economy was as big as ours. Its stock market was the same as ours. Today, its economy is, you know, I don't know, 30% smaller. I'm pulling that number out of a hat. It's it depends on per capita this and that. Its stock market what is half 40% of where the US is today. There's a similar story about Japan.”
The claim that the US must beat China in AI to maintain advantage is flawed because the US will not stay more than 2-3 months ahead of China; code and cyber capabilities are constantly leaked through various methods (insiders, spies, disgruntled employees), making sustained advantage impossible.
“we're not going to stay far ahead of the Chinese. They're going to get anything we have that the the code for the uh the cyber hacker has been leaked already. Everybody has it. And that's going to keep happening. Uh maybe somebody in the community will do it. Maybe there'll be a spy. Maybe there'll be some uh lonely software developer somewhere in Silicon Valley, you know, who gets turned by a spy. Who knows? Uh but I don't think we'll stay more than two or three months ahead. So that that's that's just a crazy criteria.”
Rogoff expects massive white-collar job losses from AI within 3-4 years and worries about employment effects, while many of his younger colleagues dismiss these concerns as Marxism, believing AI will be beneficial like previous technological revolutions.
“I think it's going to lead to just massive job losses. Uh my I have friends at the very highest levels of AI because I was a chess player and followed it my whole life. and they say to me, 'Ken, why don't economists work on what happens when 3/4ers of the jobs are gone? Why aren't you working on that?' That's what they think.”
The US is at the point where interest payments on the debt now exceed defense spending, echoing Neil Ferguson's 'Ferguson's Law' that this signals the end of a country's status as a leading power (though somewhat exaggerated, it's still a good point).
“It's reaching the point where interest payments are now more than defense spending. Our friend Neil Ferguson has this thing called Ferguson's law that that's the end of you as a as a leading power exaggerated but a good point. Defense uh interest rates are on track to be the biggest item in the budget. If we went back six years ago they were nothing.”
US debt has reached record levels relative to income, and the combination of sharply rising debt and sharply rising interest rates is a severe problem that requires both tax increases and spending cuts, but neither political party has the will to address it.
“We probably going to have a deficit on the order of 7 and a half% of GDP something like that this year. Our debts at a record high relative to income and super importantly interest rates have come up. And I and I want to say Charlie I have not talked about US debt until this my most recent book you know the last year. I was not going around worrying about US debt.”
There will certainly be a tech stock bubble burst, but Rogoff cannot predict when it will happen or how far stocks will fall; the 2010s experience with Greenspan and Schiller calling a bubble years early shows timing is unpredictable.
“Of course there's going to be a bursting of the bubble. Of course, there's going to be. What I can't tell you is when will it happen? How far will it go down? When it bursts.”
A simple and feasible US tax system would replace the current complex code with a value-added tax (like Europe's sales tax) plus a universal basic income, which would be more economically efficient and socially progressive while avoiding the political impossibility of direct income tax increases.
“on the economic side, we certainly if we could hold the fort, we should have a much simpler tax system that had basically a value added tax like they have in Europe. That's a kind of sales tax on everything. That's regressive. But then you have some kind of universal basic income where you give a basic income to everybody. I think that's a pretty simple system that would be better.”
The US has enormous wealth and could theoretically afford its debt, but this requires 'living within our means' through political will to reform tax and spending systems; the problem is not theoretical capacity but political will.
“So, we are richer than any country's ever been. Our wealth is incredible. We can afford to owe a lot of money, but that doesn't mean that we don't get in trouble. Rich people go bankrupt all the time.”
US society needs moral grounding and a civic foundation, which have been eroded in recent times across both political sides; this is important to the 250th anniversary of the US and foundational to addressing inequality and maintaining social cohesion.
“I think some kind of moral grounding of our society is important. This has been a rough period for that on both sides. uh obviously particularly characteristically with President Trump but you know we there's sort of a question of what's the moral grounding or society I think that's been a you talk about the 250th anniversary of the United States that's been very important that we felt we've been morally grounded”
Inflation will remain elevated at 3.5-4% over the next year due to tariffs and the Iran war working through the supply chain, following the pattern that gasoline prices rise quickly but fall slowly.
“Inflation's going to be high the next year 3 and 1/2 or 4% because the tariffs are still working their way through. The Iran war is working its way through. There's a saying about uh gasoline prices, you know, they can go up very fast but go down very slowly. I think we'll see that as well.”
Iran's nuclear and drone programs were being rebuilt after the US bombing in June with Chinese help—China was providing parts and buying Iranian energy—so without the war, Iran would have continued military buildup supported by Chinese assistance.
“There's on very good information that China was helping Iran rapidly rebuild its drone and ballistic missile force. It was providing them with the parts. It was buying their energy. They were built. These are the things that had been damaged or destroyed. We bombed them in June. Yeah, we bombed them in June when we bombed their, you know, nuclear facilities and they were just building back up”
AI is advancing too fast for society to manage safely because the latest versions of AI (like Claude) can already crack security systems and bypass safety measures, creating imminent risks of systemic hacking of banks, hospitals, and critical infrastructure.
“there's the latest version of Claude I think it is can crack those. Yeah. Yeah. can just uh crack anything and we we're the banks are all gonna get robbed and how do we stop it”
Warren Buffett's saying 'nobody ever got rich betting against America' reflects confidence in American dynamism, and despite current issues (war, AI risks, debt, cultural concerns), America is still a remarkable experiment with a better future than most countries.
“Warren Buffett used to say, you know, no, nobody ever got rich betting against America...are in the end do I hear you saying notwithstanding all of our issues, notwithstanding new norms, notwithstanding debt, notwithstanding these cultural issues, notwithstanding um some sense of kindness and civility, all kinds of things that crept into who we are. Um we are still um a remarkable experiment and uh have a better future than almost than anybody I can think of.”
Former students working on AI safety told Rogoff that the competitive logic ('beat China') for accelerated AI development is absurd because success in AI would only let the US claim credit for human extinction rather than preventing it.
“I had another great former student who, you know, works in the space of, uh, safety in general, and I I'd asked her a long time ago, uh, so isn't it important to beat the Chinese? And she said, for what? So we can claim credit for human extinction and they can't, you know, what's what's the purpose?”
The war could be viewed as either a successful confrontation (if Trump 'pulls it out of the fire' and achieves meaningful change) or as another Vietnam-like strategic failure that damages American image; the outcome and narrative are still uncertain.
“You know, there's a nature of these things that if Trump pulls pulls it out of the fire gets a really meaningful change and you know is I mean there's many positive ways you can tell a story that somebody had to take them on and it looks like it worked...more of the flavor of Vietnam where uh you and I, you know, it was it was tough on on our image.”
The 'poisoned pawn' is a chess opening where a player is tempted to capture a weak pawn but doing so places their queen in danger and the wrong part of the board; the US may be taking analogous risks by pursuing policies (Iran war, some AI strategies) that seem advantageous but place the country in vulnerable positions.
“There is a term and help me with this in chess about a poisoned pawn. No, there's there they're there uh openings where it's called a poison pawn variation because it if you take that your queen runs off and takes that very tempting pawn, your queen, which is your most powerful piece, will have gobbled up a weak piece, but find itself in completely the wrong part of the board and wish that it hadn't gone off that way.”
If Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz and extracts payment in cryptocurrency or Chinese yuan rather than US dollars, this would represent a major loss for Trump politically and strategically, undermining the dollar's role and validating a 'minor power' defeating US credibility.
“We could leave this war with Iran controlling the state of Hormuz, demanding to be paid in cryptocurrency or uh Chinese yuan...if they're controlling the straits of Hermoose that's pretty bad...if he's viewed in a year or two as having lost it's going to be very unpleasant and that and that will affect him in everything if they see the what is basically this very minor power beat him.”
The US and China have a common interest in peace in the Middle East and keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, suggesting cooperation might be possible despite their broader rivalry, though Rogoff is hopeful but uncertain.
“I'm hopeful the war somehow the US and China have a common interest in having peace in the Middle East, having the rates of horm open. Uh, and we're going to come back to that.”
The war's timing was clearly a choice (Trump decided when to escalate), not a necessity, and this raises questions about whether the benefits justify the costs, though Rogoff refrains from definitively calling it a 'war of choice' in the traditional sense.
“The timing was clearly a choice. I don't I don't know. But President Trump clearly underestimated uh what it closing the straits of Hormuz of how easily he could counter that.”
The Europeans are extremely angry about Trump's statement regarding Greenland (asking to buy or control it), viewing it as an invasion threat from the US to the west while they worry about Putin invading from the east; this was the dominant topic at the World Economic Forum.
“I've never seen the Europeans as mad about anything as they were about Greenland. I mean that was just they they thought wait a second you know we were worried about Putin invading us on uh to the east we didn't know the United States is invading us to the west and openly talked about it.”
Hong Kong's overall mood has improved despite the Chinese crackdown and loss of financial industry, though there remains tension around freedom of speech and people walked more slowly than before, suggesting lingering psychological effects from the pandemic quarantine period.
“it was surprisingly upbeat. I had not been back to Hong Kong probably in before CO at least. You know, it' been a while and certainly what we read about it was very depressed. Obviously, the Chinese cracked down during this period and more fully took control, but you know, I would say uh it it was feeling they were feeling pretty upbeat compared to where they were. I still noticed that when I was walking around, I did a lot of walking around around the city. Everybody seemed to walk slower than they did before.”
Economists including Paul Krugman, Larry Summers, and the majority of Wall Street economists were convinced in the 2010s that interest rates would stay down permanently; they proved wrong, rates rose substantially, and many of those same people now claim rates will go back down, which Rogoff disagrees with.
“There are many leading economists like Paul Krugman, Larry Summers, uh many others. Actually, I'd say the majority of the American economists, Wall Street economists were convinced that interest rates would never go up again when they fell in the 2010s. the 10-year interest rates were scraping the bottom uh you know lowest rates in history and they were saying this time is different. It's they're going to stay down. Well, that proved wrong and they've come up quite a bit and now many of those same people are saying well okay they're going to go back down and I don't agree.”
China's government is puzzled by why the US is fighting in Iran and views the US as a 'loose cannon on the deck of the world'; it's not a matter of Trump derangement syndrome as much as concern about instability and immediate impacts like fuel shortages.
“Well, they don't talk about anything else. I mean, uh they they view it differently than we do. Uh uh uh they uh are puzzled, you know, why we're doing it. They're I don't think they're as Trump derangement syndrome as the Europeans or the Democrats, but you know, they sort of do view there's a loose cannon on the deck of the world kind of thing.”
Saudi and Middle Eastern leaders expected US military bases to defend them but discovered they were intended for attacking Iran, and Saudis are now upset about the war and urging Trump to finish it now that he's started it, though they're worried about their economic future like 'the next Korea.'
“from the Middle East and they're saying well we thought they were building these bases to defend us. We didn't know they were there for target practice you know for the Iranians. We didn't know they were just a base of attack. They're very upset that the war happened at all.”
Europeans view the situation like California (strongly anti-Trump), while Asians view it more like Florida (mixed reactions of support and concern for strong presidential action); the regional variation in perception matters.
“The Europeans it's like being in California. I'm just giving you an idea of what the view of Trump and what we're doing is. The Asians, you know, it's a little bit more like being in Florida where there's a mix. Some people think, you know, good, there's a strong president doing something. There's a mix.”
Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan grappled with fundamental economic problems in ways that have been absent for a long time; Obama did something important for healthcare, and Trump has correctly asked questions about the balance between government and private sector, though ruling out simple answers.
“it has been a long time since we've really grappled with fundamental problems. Bill Clinton did I think in some ways Ronald Reagan did. Uh but it's really been a long time since that that that's happened. I mean Obama did something I think very important with respect to healthcare. Um I think Trump actually has got some things right about trying to ask what's the right balance between the government and the private sector.”
Despite various political craziness, the US system and innovation capability have been 'amazing' and 'really done amazing things'; the US has separated from Europe and Japan due to this innovation advantage.
“So we have been despite all the craziness that goes on just plowing ahead uh our system our innovation so far you know has really uh done amazing. I mean there's you know no question about that.”