
Lyn Alden: The Economy Is Crashing Into Stagflation
What this covers
This is a conversation between host Adam Taggart and macro analyst Lynn Alden, recorded in mid-2022 with financial assets down and the housing market cooling. Alden traces the inflation to its sources: several trillion dollars of combined stimulus, broad money creation, and years of thin commodity capex, alongside supply chains built for efficiency rather than resilience. She argues the policy response is trapped between the Fed's inflation and employment mandates and its shadow mandate of financial stability. Taggart adds a household-level view, citing 13+ months of falling real wages and record revolving credit balances as stimulus runs out.
The middle of the discussion is about why the Fed cannot repeat the 1980s. Alden says real interest rates are still deeply negative and rising slowly because of the debt load, and that Paul Volcker himself said he could not do it today. She prefers the 1940s to the 1970s as a parallel, and she uses Ray Dalio's long-term debt cycle framework. Her sketch of how the Fed ends up capitulating is the most contentious part: once credit, Treasury liquidity, or employment breaks, it must either let yields rise into a fiscal spiral or cap them with yield curve control (YCC)), at the cost of currency devaluation. Her forecast is that stagflation lasts through the 2020s.
The talk then widens. Europe gets its own treatment: the ECB has absorbed Italian issuance, Italy's debt is around 150% of GDP, and Europe lacks the fiscal union that cushions US states. Alden also gives a long-run account of money, arguing that commerce outran bearer assets like gold, which pushed the world toward central banking and claims-based credit. She argues that a credit system must keep growing and has no clean off-ramp for deleveraging. She also criticizes Janet Yellen's admission on "transitory" inflation as a sign that planners look backward.
Lynn Alden argues that the global economy faces structural stagflation driven by underinvestment in commodities and energy, constraining central banks' ability to combat inflation without triggering financial crises, making a defensive posture and hard asset allocation essential for the next several years.
- Underinvestment in real-world systems (especially energy) combined with massive currency supply increases creates the inflation that central banks cannot print away
- Extreme debt levels relative to GDP trap central banks between fighting inflation and maintaining financial stability—they cannot raise rates high enough without breaking credit markets
- The 1940s (not 1970s) provides the best historical parallel: high inflation persisting alongside low real interest rates due to war debt, suggesting yield curve control and currency devaluation as the eventual policy endpoint
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The 1940s is a more appropriate historical parallel to today than the 1970s, because both periods had very high debt levels due to war spending, and despite high inflation, central banks were forced to keep rates artificially low to avoid crushing government finances—creating a persistent decoupling between inflation and interest rates.
“i've used the 40s as in many ways a closer comparison than the 70s um because in the 40s you had very high debt levels due to the war and and due to things like that and so despite the fact that they had high inflation they just had to hold rates low anyway i see that you had a big decoupling between rates and inflation”
In the long arc of history, having a market-determined price for money across decentralized regions is ideal, but the system evolved toward central banking due to technological change: commerce (via telecommunications and internet) began moving much faster than bearer assets like gold, requiring abstraction into claims-based money.
“i think in the long arc of time yes i think that uh not having a central price setter for money is ideal and that money the price of money can be set in different regions by market forces uh that's the system that used to be and i think that in the future you might have that again one day i think a big challenge is that you know starting in the second half of the 1800s commerce started moving faster than money right so for for thousands of years commerce and money moved at roughly the same rate which was you know the speed of traveling around um but with the introduction of telecommunications channels banks could settle settle ledgers across the world pretty quickly uh and so uh and then of course when you add the internet it accelerates even more whereas the money gold still had you know it still moves at the speed of of physics of of matter”
The underlying economic problem is underinvestment in real-world systems, especially commodities and energy, combined with excessive global diversification of supply chains optimized for efficiency over resilience, meaning the world is now short critical resources when geopolitical tensions rise.
“the underlying problem is that we've under-invested uh in a number of uh real world systems right so commodities especially energy uh as well as we've you know highly diversified our supply chains globally basically we've optimized for efficiency over resilience”
The US has structural advantages over Europe: states are not deeply insolvent relative to Europe because of a fiscal union and shared entitlements, and top-5 US states have relatively low debt-to-GDP ratios despite shared monetary policy; Europe lacks fiscal union integration.
“united states has a host of its own problems uh particularly net negative net international invest position and trade deficit that that is worse than europe but one area where we don't have is that our states are not as insolvent as european countries and so for example if you look at the top five u.s states their debt to gdp on the state level is actually relatively low because we have a fiscal union and a monetary union right so so we all share the same money and then our states share most of the same you know kind of entitlement uh military system so that that's abstracted away from the state level”
The Federal Reserve can override bond market pricing through formal yield curve control—an unlimited bid at a fixed yield (e.g., pegging the 10-year at 3%)—and has seen Japan employ this policy, but the tradeoff is massive currency devaluation and inflation.
“the fed can always choose to override the bond market with formal yield curve control right and and this is something i've been eventually anticipating we've seen in japan first where the you know banking japan just comes out and says i know you want to price bond yields higher but we're not going to let you we're just going to do an unlimited bid with printed money to peg yields at what we want to do so the federal reserve can come out and say i know you want to raise yields but we're just not going to let that happen we're not going to let the 10 year go about 3 percent for example uh and the offset would be massive currency devaluation right”
Many observers (including Alden) correctly anticipated the inflation in 2021-2022 by observing that massive monetary and fiscal stimulus (several trillion dollars of combined spending) combined with limited commodity capex and broad money creation would inevitably lead to inflation—a simple reasoning that policymakers missed.
“but yes a lot of us were looking at this inflation picture and saying that it's you know we're not seeing the commodity capex we're seeing a lot of new broad money in circulation which was different than what we saw in 2008 uh basically you know just more money chasing fewer goods”
A credit-based system (fractional reserve banking) has to keep growing or it collapses; unlike 1800s gold-based systems where recessions cleared malinvestment and then restarted, modern systems lack an off-ramp for deleveraging.
“the the the debt a credit based system has to keep growing otherwise it collapses there's there's kind of no in between so you know let's say you go back theoretically to the 1800s you have you know gold is based money you have claims on that uh you know claims maybe some you know a few multiples of the base money but it's not massive right and so when you have a recession some of the the male investment gets cleared out and you kind of restart from there whereas in you know going back to like 2008 there was something like 60 claims uh on on base money”
The fundamental problem with the current system is that controlling the price of money (and energy) is inherently flawed—just as price controls in other industries distort downstream signals, controlling these master inputs ripples through every other price in the economy.
“i think that you know we zoom out really far i think the biggest problem is that controlling the price of money is not a good thing to be doing but it's just an inherent part of our current system design um but i think that's kind of an inevitable problem that you're gonna have just like you know in most industries price controls are not a good thing and the problem is that there are a handful of things that if you control the price of them it can distort everything else and those would be things like energy and money right so those are kind of the master inputs that affect every other price”
Ray Dalio's long-term debt cycle thesis provides a framework for understanding how high debt limits central bank policy flexibility; when debt-to-GDP is extremely high (as now), central banks cannot raise real rates without breaking the system.
“that was summed up by ray dalio's long-term debt cycle thesis and that's something that i've incorporated in my research starting several years ago and one thing i've found is that looking back in history has been able to make some sense of the situation”
The Federal Reserve cannot print more real goods and services, so it can only attempt to curtail demand through monetary tightening while trying to avoid outright recession—but the Fed's historical success rate at soft landings is very low, making stagflation with either persistent inflation or unemployment the more likely outcome.
“the federal reserve and other central banks can't print more of those real goods and services but they can try to curtail demand and so right now they're they're kind of they're they're doing the best attempt to jawbone demand lower while trying also to avoid an outright recession uh and historically the fed's ability to do soft landings is not very high it's a very kind of low you know maybe a couple times they almost did it”
The ECB faces a particularly rough spot because member countries' sovereign bond markets (e.g., Italy's) cannot function without ECB support—the ECB has bought all Italian bond issuance over recent years, creating zombie sovereign credit markets.
“ecb is in a particularly rough spot because their countries uh their sovereign bond markets can't really work without ecb support and so for example if you look at italy uh ecb bought basically all italian bond issuance over the past number of years”
The Federal Reserve has three mandates: stable prices, low unemployment, and a shadow mandate of financial stability; when official inflation is high and unemployment is low, the Fed's clear algorithmic focus is to tighten, but this algorithm breaks when it conflicts with the financial stability mandate.
“the federal reserve has two mandates and a shadow mandate right so they want to have stable prices uh they want to have low unemployment uh and they want to uh the shadow mandate is financial stability right so something goes to liquid especially if it's like a treasury market or credit market or something like that they have to address that and so with official inflation as high as it is and with official unemployment as low as it is and with nothing you know really seized up in the financial markets yet uh their clear mandate is to try to tighten and to decrease inflation increase unemployment a little bit and so that's that's the path that they're on it's like an algorithm”
If the Fed encounters breaking points in credit or treasury market liquidity, sees recession emerge, or experiences rising unemployment while inflation remains high, it will be forced to stop tightening and capitulate—at which point it can either allow yields to rise (triggering fiscal spiral) or implement yield curve control to cap yields (triggering currency devaluation).
“if they cause the credit market to become a liquid if they cause a treasury market to become illiquid if they you know calls now a rate recession we start to see high employment uh that makes it very challenging for them to continue doing what they're doing and so i think they're kind of stuck between a rock in a hard place and that the release valve ends up being this weird situation where they're unable to keep tightening despite the fact that inflation is much above their target”
If the Fed does not implement yield curve control, the alternative is a fiscal spiral in which rising bond yields blow out government deficits to unsustainable levels (as Europe experienced in 2012), leading to solvency crisis with no clear recovery path.
“if they don't control yields then they have basically a fiscal spiral you have something like what say europe experienced in 2012 until the ecb stepped in and basically said you know uh you know we're going to hold this together so you'd have basically rising yields in the u.s and elsewhere and you'd have budget deficits blow out and then there'd be no clear way for them to recover that right but once debt as a percentage of gdp is that high and deficits are still widening uh you know that's a that's a disaster for the the solvency”
The current situation is worse than the 1970s stagflation because debt levels in the system are now extremely high, meaning the Fed cannot raise real interest rates as aggressively as Volcker did without causing a financial crisis—and Volcker himself said before he died that he could not do it today.
“in some ways it's worse than that because in the 70s you had very low debt levels and so at the end of the day volcker could uh raise rates to very high real levels and it caused recession but it didn't cause like a you know financial crisis a depression uh because you have pretty low debts in the system so you could you could the economy could withstand those higher rates with a slowdown um and you know you know before volcker passed he even said he couldn't do that today uh and it's only gotten worse since then”
All major countries globally have central banks, and no major country operates under free banking or gold standards—a universal sample suggesting centralized banking is inevitable once the technological and institutional conditions enable it.
“when we see something happen where you know there's 200 countries you know which country doesn't have a central bank which country has free banking currently uh which country is on a gold standard it's kind of like once it became possible to do it happens everywhere right right the answer to lin's questions is i believe none yeah or at least you know no no major one that i can think of maybe around the margins there's a little tiny one but yeah”
Recessions can be measured in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, so if inflation is 8% and nominal GDP growth is 5%, that constitutes a real recession even if nominal figures appear positive—we may already be in or near a real recession depending on how one measures.
“there's a significant probability of having a session uh and one thing to keep in mind is that recessions are measured in real terms and so for example if inflation's eight percent and nominal growth is five percent that's a recession right so so you're basically negative real growth uh for pers for a prolonged period of time and so we already saw and i'm sorry to interrupt it but we also have negative nominal gdp growth in q1 and q2 tbd but the numbers coming down if you look at the gdp gdp now numbers from the atlanta fed”
Despite Fed rhetoric about tightening, real interest rates (measured as rates below inflation) are still deeply negative, rates are still below one percent, and they are rising slowly—a testament to how much debt is in the system constraining the central bank's ability to act.
“despite the fact that they had high inflation they just had to hold rates low anyway i see that you had a big decoupling between rates and inflation uh we've already seen that play out so far and so even though they're talking tough they're still you know rates are still below one percent uh and so they're they're moving up pretty slowly um just you know despite the fact that we have multi-decade high inflation and i think that's a testament to how much debt is in the system”
Italy has approximately 150% debt-to-GDP, which is unsustainable without ECB support; if rates rose high enough to attract foreign capital, a fiscal spiral would occur because interest costs would become unserviceable.
“italy for example has like 150 percent debt to gdp and that's just completely unsupportable without the ecb support uh for those bonds basically there's not a lot of foreign demand for those bonds especially at those rates and if the rates ever went high enough that actually would attract foreign capital it'd be a fiscal spiral there'd be clearly no way to pay no way to support the interest on that debt”
Looking at 2008 data, total debt in the system was approximately 60 times the amount of base money, meaning the claims-to-base-money ratio was highly leveraged; post-QE it's lower but still double-digit multiples, remaining unsustainable.
“going back to like 2008 there was something like 60 claims uh on on base money meaning that for example that the total debt in the system uh just from memory was something like 60 times higher than the amount of base money in the system that's just bananas and i'm sure it's worse now but anyways continuing well it's actually less now because they created new base money but it's still i mean it's double digit a double digit multiple”
Real wages have declined for 13+ consecutive months, and extraordinary stimulus from 2020-2021 has been exhausted, forcing households to maintain consumption via credit card debt, creating record revolving credit balances—a predictive indicator of household financial stress.
“we're seeing real wages continue to decrease month after month after a month i think we're something like 13 months straight of decreasing real wages and with all of the extraordinary stimulus that was pumped out there in 2020 and 2021 that is done and we're basically seeing that you know people are maintaining their current lifestyles uh but they're doing so by putting it all in the credit card so we're back to you know record revolving credit uh balances”
Stagflation will likely persist throughout the 2020s decade due to sustained energy supply constraints, meaning inflation may come down from current peaks but not to pre-pandemic norms, and whether inflation falls further depends on how forcefully central banks tighten despite the political and financial cost.
“for example if you go look at the 70s um even during the economic slowdowns the recessions in the 70s you still generally had pretty high inflation uh you just had you know maybe you took the edge off inflation compared to some of the most inflationary periods and so my general view is that this whole decade is probably going to be somewhat stagflationary basically we're going to have supply side problems particularly on the energy side i think for quite a while for years at least”
As the Fed tries to continue tightening, initial jobless claims will rise, creating a shift toward a weaker job market, which can turn an inflationary problem into an unemployment problem—but scenarios exist where both high inflation and high unemployment persist simultaneously (stagflation) rather than trading off.
“to the extent that they try to continue tightening by pulling back on stimulus and tightening monetary policy i think we're going to see a shift towards uh a weaker job market uh and you kind of can turn an inflationary problem into an unemployment problem uh but you can also have both at the same time”
Janet Yellen's public admission that she was wrong about inflation transitory reflects a general problem: central planners are more backwards-looking than forward-looking, which is poor practice for monetary policy.
“i think generally they're they're more backwards looking than forward-looking which is not good uh and it you know to her credit it's good to admit that she was wrong and it's also in it it's hard to say ahead of time what the exact level of inflation is going to be right”
The ECB balance sheet has grown dramatically, and when asked if this concerns her, ECB President Lagarde evasively replied 'in due course' it will be brought down—but realistically, central bank balance sheets cannot normalize and will only continue growing until systemic change occurs.
“i think they're i think they're unable to normalize them um they could stop growing for periods of time they could even shrink for short periods of time um but i think we're until we have a structural change i think we're an environment where they're kind of forced monetizing”
We are currently entering an economic deceleration within an otherwise stagflationary environment, requiring a defensive investment posture focused on assets with real-world utility rather than speculative exposure.
“right now i would say we're basically going into a economic deceleration in an otherwise stagflationary environment uh and so i think this is a rather defensive uh you know you generally want to be more defensive at this at this time and focus on things that have real world utility”
Finite resources (especially energy) combined with a system mathematically designed to require eternal growth creates an eventual collision: the system cannot deliver perpetual expansion if resources are constrained, making the long-term structure unsustainable.
“because you brought up the limiting effect of finite resources out there right so we have a system that's designed for eternal growth we are entering a period where resource growth is becoming constrained so at some point isn't the system almost sort of doomed that it's it's it's never going to get the eternally growing resources it needs to to always grow the way that it mathematically has to in the long arc of time yes i think so”
The financial markets still believe the Fed's tightening narrative and expect normalization in the future (e.g., oil futures 2025-2026 are priced much lower than current spot), but this credibility will evaporate once the Fed is forced to stop tightening while inflation remains elevated.
“the market still is kind of looking at this is rather transitory that we're going normalize is that it's war-related uh even though it's all happening prior to the war um and so i think that there's the market still has that degree of of credibility for the fed and it's not until that they have to stop tightening at some point they they run into one of those breaking points i mentioned credit markets treasure market liquidity recession something like that with inflation still being a problem and when they kind of fold i think that yeah that's when the that's when you kind of have that that game changes”
Over the next 6-12 months, the job market will weaken significantly as the Fed follows its tightening mandate, with shifts from hiring freezes to reduced hours to layoffs—but the long-term inflationary forces will remain, eventually forcing the Fed to back off its unemployment-raising strategy.
“i think that going forward until we see their shadow mandate come into play until something in financial markets truly breaks uh like treasury market liquidity or credit market liquidity something like that i think their their clear focus is going to be on softening the job market and so i would i would keep looking at at that uh as a key thing to watch going forward um i think that we're over the next six months 12 months we're going to see that shift towards a weaker job market and it might or might not bring inflation down depends on on what happens with oil production what happens with china reopening right there's a lot of variables that can affect specifically what happens with inflation um but i think longer term the inflationary forces are going to remain and that they're going to have to end up backing off their decision to create more unemployment”
Multiple economic indicators—ISM manufacturing, housing (mortgage rates have roughly doubled), energy costs, persistent high inflation, declining real wages (13+ months negative), and surging revolving credit—signal a recession is at significant risk within the next 6-24 months.
“the may ism data is rolling over if we look at the forward-looking data it's doing the same um so you know manufacturing is weakening the housing market you mentioned that mortgage rates have risen dramatically in a relatively short period of time roughly they've doubled pretty much since last summer obviously just mathematically that's going to have to start bringing prices down in addition to other factors that may be cooling the housing market off as well at least in certain regions you know energy uh costs uh just cost of living you know is is is persistently high for folks and and may in certain key areas even go up further who knows but but at least the pinch everyone is feeling it doesn't look like it's going to go away any time soon and then if we look at households you know even those that remain employed we're seeing real wages continue to decrease month after month after a month i think we're something like 13 months straight of decreasing real wages”
The 2022 outlook involves a weaker housing market due to doubled mortgage rates, persistent energy costs, and household income pressures—all converging to form a recessionary setup that could range from light to prolonged and deep depending on policy response.
“we're seeing that shift towards uh a weaker job market uh and you kind of can turn an inflationary problem into an unemployment problem uh but you can also have both at the same time and so i think that there are scenarios where they could cause like you know some sort of deflationary bust temporarily like you you could kind of you know cause a severe contraction uh but i think that unless they push it that far i think we're in more of this kind of malaise”
The Fed will eventually capitulate on tightening and let the currency go while controlling yields through YCC, because currency devaluation is the only viable exit from the long-term debt cycle trap—but this constitutes a complete loss of central bank credibility.
“at the end of the day they're gonna you know they're gonna let the currency go and control yields because i think that's it's kind of the only way out uh but of course that's disastrous for cash and bond holders but i think that there's a there's a bumpy road between then and there because that's basically a complete uh capitulation right that that's kind of the the end of central bank credibility”
The walls are closing in on the Fed: as tightening progresses, the policy corridors for balancing inflation, unemployment, and financial stability get narrower and narrower, until eventually one mandate must be abandoned completely while the others still fail.
“the challenge is that the the walls are closing they're getting narrower and narrower so that they basically balance between trying to support those two mandates and it gets closer and closer uh where you eventually just get stuck where you you know you're kind of already you're fully focusing on one but you still can't fix it and the other one's closing on you as well”
We've conditioned the public to expect authorities to intervene at the first sign of pain (precedent: 2020 rapid recovery from market crash via stimulus), which reduces consumer fear of recession and encourages continued risk-taking—but a jobless scenario and credit availability shock could reverse this rapidly.
“we've conditioned the public that at you know the first sight of pain the authorities are going to step in and help out and and you know you can say they needed to or what not but we we had the kind of blink and you miss it recession in 2020 you know um so you know whether or not you got laid off or whether or not your stock portfolio got whacked in march or april of 2020 you know your your stock portfolio did great by the end of the year and even if you didn't get hired back you've got pretty substantial government support so yeah i guess my question is i i don't see a lot of fear in the average consumer's eyes about recession right now”
A shift from a job glut (great resignation, workers are choosy) to a job drought would reverse the labor market dramatically—workers who had leverage to leave jobs will desperately seek re-employment, but those jobs may not exist if companies have already laid off workers.
“my concern is that you know i could make an argument that in a year's time we're going to go from a jobs glut to a jobs drought and all of a sudden you know people are going to be it's going to be the great un-retirement movement right people are going to be begging for their old jobs back those jobs might not even exist if the companies have laid off”
The speed mismatch between commerce and bearer assets created arbitrage opportunities, allowing policymakers to centralize and manipulate monetary systems via claims-based abstraction—a 150-year pattern of monetary history driven by technological possibility.
“the problem there is that when when you abstract it like that when the speed of commerce greatly exceeds the speed of money that allows for arbitrage and centralization uh and so i think that that's been really the story of the past call it 150 years of monetary history is that policymakers have been able to uh you know arbitrage that difference and and make use of the fact that we have a separation between the claims the money and the underlying money itself”
The Fed could cause a temporary deflationary bust through severe contraction if tightening goes far enough, but absent such extreme policy, the more likely outcome is economic malaise with high energy prices held in a choppy range as the Fed tries to balance demand destruction against financial system stability.
“there are scenarios where they could cause like you know some sort of deflationary bust temporarily like you you could kind of you know cause a severe contraction uh but i think that unless they push it that far i think we're in more of this kind of malaise where you know energy prices are high they're kind of the constraint uh and they can be in a big choppy range if you're really trying to hold demand down but it's like holding a beach bowl under water”
When the Fed capitulates and implements yield curve control, natural resources, commodity stocks, commodity producers, hard assets (gold, copper, silver, bitcoin), hard infrastructure (pipelines), and quality real estate financed with fixed-rate mortgages will experience significant appreciation as currency devaluation currencies and inflation accelerates.
“i'd expect a big uptick in natural resources both the stocks and then the actual resources themselves so various types of commodities oil gold uh copper silver uh bitcoin uh as well uh and then hard infrastructure things like pipelines uh and assets like that uh high quality real estate that's not particularly overvalued there's different parts of the market where you know you can get a nice uh quality asset with a low you know if you get kind of a fixed rate mortgage on it it's funny mortgage rates went up a ton but they're still below the official inflation rate right and so i think where depending on where you are that's basically you know it's a long-term dollar short which i think would do well in that environment”
The Fed's decision-making is constrained by an 'algorithm'—given today's conditions (high inflation, low unemployment, stable markets), the Fed tightens; but if financial markets seize up (credit or treasury market illiquidity), the shadow mandate (financial stability) overrides the inflation mandate, forcing the Fed to reverse.
“i think the challenge is that the the walls are closing they're getting narrower and narrower so that they basically balance between trying to support those two mandates and it gets closer and closer uh where you eventually just get stuck where you you know you're kind of already you're fully focusing on one but you still can't fix it and the other one's closing on you as well and so i think that going forward until we see their shadow mandate come into play until something in financial markets truly breaks uh like treasury market liquidity or credit market liquidity something like that i think their their clear focus is going to be on softening the job market”
Over the next several months during quantitative tightening and rate hikes with no new stimulus from Congress, maintaining a defensive stance with potential for modest disinflation (not deflation, but slower inflation pace outside of energy) is prudent, while a barbell approach combining energy investments with defensive holdings like cash and Treasury bonds may be optimal.
“for the next several months as long as we're you know going to experience quantitative tightening raising rates and you know no new stimulus from congress and things like that i think it pays to be defensive around the margin and to look towards maybe some degree of disinflation not necessarily that inflation will go away but we might not keep going up at the same pace that we were uh at least that you know especially outside of energy uh and so that's how i play this basically i think that we can almost have a barbell approach where you stick with energy types of investments but then you also look at some of the some of the more defensive types of things like cash and even treasury bonds”
An emerging-market style recession scenario is developing in the US: nominal GDP and asset prices may grow in local-currency terms, but in dollar/real terms they decline (as seen in Turkish equities and real estate, which are up in lira but down in dollars).
“it ends up looking like an emerging market recession where you know gdp and local currency terms are still going up and and maybe stock prices and even housing prices and local currency terms are still going up you know like if you look at turkish uh equities or turkish real estate prices and lira terms they're going up um but in dollar terms they're of course struggling and so i think that you know in a more mild sense that's the kind of the environment we're in now where real growth is is struggling uh you know could be negative could be very low positive uh you know if we end up having a negative real gdp print this quarter then we're arguably already in a mild recession at this point”
Blockchain-based digital bearer assets, particularly if one captures majority liquidity and network effect, represent the most credible way to introduce a successor to the current fiat system, though the technology is still early (Bitcoin at 13 years old is still being tested).
“i i think that's the most credible way to to maybe introduce something new right but it's still early technology i mean bitcoin is 13 years old it's being tested to see how it's going to handle that i think basically digital bearer assets specifically if one can capture the majority of the liquidity and network effect uh introduce a new way of doing things but uh that's kind of the the the expectation or the hope of the expectation of what's possible um but there are still ways that that can be messed up or that that can be disrupted in some way so it's something i'm watching and i think it's worth looking at it building on it exploring it”