
Dalio on Turkey, Argentina, and the Next Economic Downturn
What this covers
This is a 17-minute Bloomberg Television interview in which Erik Schatzker questions Ray Dalio about the emerging-market stress in Turkey and Argentina and about where the U.S. sits in the cycle. Dalio draws throughout on his book's study of 48 debt crises over the past century. He says they share one logical sequence and split mainly into inflationary and deflationary types, depending on whether debt is denominated in a currency the country can print. Turkey and Argentina are the inflationary case: dollar debt against local-currency income feeds a currency depreciation spiral. He puts both about two-thirds of the way to a bottom, with the timing set by whether central banks raise rates enough to offset inflation and depreciation, and whether governments monetize deficits or turn to IMF-style restructuring.
The second half turns to the United States. Dalio calls the cycle a "seventh inning" one, with a downturn perhaps two years away, and he says it is more like 1937-1940 than 2008. He argues that fiscal stimulus and corporate tax cuts are working only because they arrive at high capacity utilization, so their effect should fade within roughly 18 months to two years. He also contends that monetary policy is constrained near zero rates, that quantitative easing widened the wealth gap, and that the next crisis will therefore be political and social as much as financial. Schatzker presses the "this time is different" counterargument, which holds that the slow recovery and the tax cuts could push recession much further out.
The most contested claims concern the dollar. Dalio says that if foreign buyers of Treasuries judge U.S. finances unsustainable, a depreciation of around 30 percent is possible, and that the Fed cannot easily offset this by printing money. He also gives investment advice: keep portfolios balanced, avoid market timing unless you are a professional, and buy only when there is panic.
Dalio argues that debt crises follow predictable cyclical patterns that repeat throughout history with similar cause-effect relationships, and the current economic cycle resembles the 1935-1940 period where the next downturn will be driven by wealth inequality, populism, and constrained monetary policy effectiveness rather than sharp financial collapse.
- All 48 major debt crises in the past 100 years followed the same logical sequence despite surface differences
- Current cycle is in the seventh inning with downturn likely 2 years out, more similar to 1937-1940 stagflation than 2008 sharp crisis
- Next crisis will be political and social in nature due to wealth gap from QE, with limited monetary policy tools available to reverse it
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In inflationary debt crises in emerging markets, when debt is denominated in foreign currency (like dollars) while income is earned in local currency, currency depreciation creates a spiral where countries cannot service their debt, forcing them to print money, which further depreciates the currency.
“basically the big deal is whether the currency is denominated the debt is denominated in your own currency or in your foreign currency and when it's denominated in foreign currency like these countries have a lot of dollars and nominated debt then that they have a problem trying to service that dollar denominated when the dollar goes up and the money they're earning is in local currency then they don't have enough cash and then they get into that spiral and as a result of that they have to print more money the currency depreciates and it happens in a very mechanical way”
The key to identifying currency bottoms in inflationary crises is understanding how central banks mechanically raise interest rates to offset both inflation and currency depreciation, making bonds attractive to foreign investors despite currency risk.
“the central bank at some point sometimes through IMF support or sometimes through that other is just a tightening of monetary policy has to create an interest rate that will offset both the inflation rate and the depreciation of the currency and knowing how that mechanically happens is the means by which you can identify the bonds the bottoms in those currencies”
The 2007-2009 debt crisis was followed by hitting zero interest rates, which created a fundamentally different type of situation—more likely to produce a depression—similar to the 1929-1932 period rather than a typical debt cycle.
“when you hit zero interest rates you have a different type of debt crisis you have more likely to have a depression so I think the period that we're in is very similar to the 1935 1940 period let me just explain that in a minute 1929 to 1932 we had a debt crisis and interest rates hit zero not 2007 to 2009 we have a debt crisis had hit zero then in both of those cases there's only one thing for central bank's to do”
Central banks must be very careful not to raise interest rates much faster than is built into financial asset pricing curves, because duration of assets lengthens when rates rise and faster-than-expected tightening triggers sharp asset price declines.
“asset prices are sensitive to monetary policy because the duration of those assets is lengthened and so the central banks have to be very careful not to raise interest rates much faster than is built into the curve”
The book documents 48 major debt crises from the past hundred years, and they all play out pretty much the same way except they differ between inflationary and deflationary types depending on currency denomination.
“as you know there's 48 of them in there they all play out pretty much the same way except they're an inflationary deflationary ones depending on the currency”
When interest rates are constrained at zero and Treasury bonds must be sold to foreign buyers, those buyers care about currency depreciation rather than inflation, so if the Fed tries to prop up bond prices through money printing, it causes dollar depreciation and makes foreign buyers less willing to hold dollars.
“when they look at the interest rate so if a currency goes down if the bonds become cheaper I think the Federal Reserve at that point will have to print more money to make up the for the deficit have to monetize more of the and that that'll cause a depreciation and the value of the dollar”
The severity of emerging market crises depends on whether countries choose to monetize fiscal deficits through money printing or restructure balance sheets through IMF loans and monetary tightening, which determines the exact bottoms in those currencies.
“if there's place out classically what they'll have is large fiscal deficits and how they choose to monetize those fiscal deficits or how they choose to restructure their balance sheets through IMF loans or through the tightening of monetary policy will be the determinant of the exact bottoms in those currencies”
Most countries lack reserve currencies and have debt denominated in foreign currency, so most of their crises are inflationary in nature with currency depreciation that wipes out local currency debt holders.
“most of the countries don't have reserve currencies don't have the debt denominated in their own currency and as a result most of their crisis's are of that sort”
Most investors cannot successfully time markets actively; it is a professionals-only game that is extremely difficult to execute well even for professionals, so passive investors should avoid active trading.
“Prudent investors have a choice of whether they're trying to be active investment nesters embark at time which most of them are not going to be able to do well that's a professionals game and it's tough to do it as a professional and then their emotions and all the things that enter into that so I would say that generally speaking they should not be actively trying to invest”
If investors must be active, they should buy when there is blood in the streets (maximum panic) and sell when times are good, going opposite their instincts, because sentiment-driven trading loses money.
“if they do then they have to go opposite their instincts you know by when the blood blood is stripped in the streets and sell when times are good”
Portfolio balance is crucial because different asset classes perform differently depending on economic and inflation conditions, so as the economy's characteristics change, balance ensures some holdings perform in every regime.
“is important just like we were even talking about prior to the show is to be able to have a know how to have balance in the portfolio know how to achieve that because each market performs as a reflection of the economy at the time and all of the economy's characteristics keeps changing there's inflation and deflation and all that balance is key”
The United States currently has a privileged position being able to borrow in its own currency (the world's leading reserve currency), but is risking that privilege through excessive borrowing and fiscal deficits.
“I think we have the privileged position of being able to borrow in our own currency because we have the world's leading reserve currency I think we are risking that by our finances in other words borrowing too much”
Feeling good and rising wages are not indicators of future growth; euphoria is what makes bubbles, and bubbles feel best right before they burst, so current positive economic sentiment indicates late-cycle conditions rather than durable strength.
“feeling good is not an indicator of the future euphoria is when what as bubbles are made of euphoria by the way so they feel the best right”
The time to invest in crisis currencies is when there is sufficient panic and 'blood in the streets' because that signals deep enough depreciation to create value despite remaining risks.
“and as the saying goes the time to buy is when there's blood in the streets right and to know when there's value and those are the calculations one has to do is there enough blood on the streets yet to see value well I think we're getting there generally speaking”
Fiscal stimulus is currently producing growth because it is being applied at high capacity utilization (late in the cycle), which means its effects will be short-lived, lasting about 18 months to 2 years before the stimulus fades but deficits remain in the marketplace.
“I just do the calculations and the fiscal stimulation that we're having is coming at a higher rate of capacity utilization a higher rate and so we're getting that stimulation at the part of a cycle and that's what we're having and that's a stimulant that will last for particularly it feels good right wages are rising the unemployment rate is at a record low feeling good is not an indicator of the future euphoria is when what as bubbles are made of euphoria by the way so they feel the best right”
Currency depreciation in inflationary crises is self-correcting: as currencies become cheaper, the balance of payments improves (they export more, import less) and they attract capital, assuming the country remains an attractive investment location.
“all of the crisis's are self-correcting mechanisms so when the currency becomes cheaper then it becomes more the balance of payments improves because they can sell more or they import less and also they begin to attract capital if they remain a healthy place for people to invest”
When interest rates hit zero in both 1929-1932 and 2007-2009, central banks had only one option: print money and buy financial assets, which pushes asset prices up but benefits only financial asset owners and contributes to wealth inequality.
“in both of those cases there's only one thing for central bank's to do and that is to print money and buy financial assets they print money buy financial assets in both of those times that pushes financial asset prices up puts a lot of liquidity in and also contributes to a greater wealth gap because those who own financial assets benefit when those who don't own financial assets”
Corporate tax cuts provide short-term benefits by giving companies cash and enhanced productivity, but this boost is temporary and will not offset the long-term effects of persistent fiscal deficits.
“productivity is enhanced by corporate tax cuts and a lot of money is going to the companies there they have lots of cash that is good for the time being if you do where when that stimulus passes through and then diminishes that that diminishes in about 18 months and two years but the borrowing doesn't so the borrowing will be in the marketplace about that time”
Critics argue using 'this time is different' that the post-crisis recovery's slowness, recent massive tax cuts, and Trump administration economic direction will cause GDP growth to accelerate indefinitely and push recession many years away, not two years away.
“to use to borrow Ken Rogoff s-- terminology this time is different that because the post-crisis recovery was so slow because we've had a massive tax cut in the United States because the Trump administration is directing the economy the GDP growth is going to keep on accelerating and that a downturn or a recession is many many many years away not two years away I take it you don't agree”
The next downturn will differ from 2008 because it will involve both debt crisis and unfunded liabilities (pension obligations, healthcare obligations), requiring large Treasury bond sales to foreign buyers, creating additional complexity beyond financial sector stress.
“I also think the downturn well in our form of debt crisis won't just be doc debts it'll also be pension obligations healthcare obligations unfunded love obligations so so and I think one more thing and I think it'll be about us having to sell a lot of Treasury bonds to the rest of the world”
History is doomed to repeat itself because everything happens over and over again for similar cause-effect relationships in debt cycles.
“everything happens over and over again for similar cause-effect relationships right”
The most important thing people can do is study how debt cycles work by reading the book and understanding the 48 historical cycles, so they can recognize patterns and prepare themselves rather than relying on others' predictions.
“the important thing I think is not even what I think about this the important thing is for you and each person to really study how these cycles work in the book we we show how all 48 of the cycles of last 40 last hundred years that we're significant followed the same path so for 60 pages of reading I want to introduce you get that and by the way I'm making it free so that everybody can have it”
Current emerging market crises in Turkey and Argentina are approximately two-thirds of the way toward hitting bottom, with recovery dependent on central banks creating an interest rate that compensates for both inflation and currency depreciation.
“they're I would say two thirds on the way toward hitting bottom I believe and then what happens is then it depends on what the monetary policy operates like because the question will be whether those who are holding those currencies will receive an interest rate differential that will compensate for the depreciation and the value of the currency”
When foreign buyers of US bonds view US finances as unsustainable, they will discount the pile of dollars they receive for holding bonds, leading to potential 30 percent depreciation in the dollar through the crisis period.
“you can get to the point where you know others when you own a bond in a in a US bond or in any particular currency you're getting a pile of that currency by how much could the dollar go down well I you know you could have you easily can have a 30 percent depreciation in the dollar through that period of time”
Debt cycles provide both great opportunities and real problems, and understanding them is essential rather than depressing because they follow a logical sequence that can be learned and managed.
“there are debt cycles and debt cycles provide great opportunities and they provide real problems so I think it's just like a progression a disease that progresses and the reason I wrote the book is actually was just a compendium of research that I wrote mostly before the financial crisis and it's because I think it's essential for everybody to understand the sequence of events the logical sequence of events that makes these all the same”
Wealth gaps and economic stagnation for large segments of the population create populism, which appeared in the 1930s-1940s period and is appearing again now, indicating we are in a similar historical phase.
“as a result in both periods of time of the wealth gap and the economy not improving for a large segment of the population we have populism so the last time that we would say when was populism popular it would be in the in that period of time that populism issue is an important issue”
The next downturn will occur probably in a couple of years and will be very different from 2008 because central banks are now tightening monetary policy (raising rates), making asset prices sensitive to rate changes and requiring careful policy coordination.
“as we look forward and we say when the next downturn comes which will happen probably in a couple of years we're going to have a different type of downturn very similar to the one that happened in 1937 to the 1940 period we are we are in the part of the cycle now that the Fed and other central banks in varying degrees are beginning to tighten monetary policy asset prices are sensitive to monetary policy”
We are currently nine years into the economic cycle, which means we are approximately in the seventh inning of a nine-inning cycle, indicating substantial cycle duration remains but the downturn is approaching within a couple of years.
“I think we're nine years into the cycle and the cycles are the are the cycles and the balance of payments and supply demand of credit is what it is and so I'm saying that we're probably in the seventh inning of this game and therefore I'm not particularly worried at the moment but if I was to take as we get to the ninth ending of the game”
The next downturn will primarily be a political and social crisis driven by wealth inequality and populism, rather than a sharp financial crisis like 2008, because monetary policy effectiveness has been exhausted.
“so I would say two years out is when I'm worried about and I and I would think that that's for these various reasons speaking in financial terms if we look at what you're saying through the lens of the markets how bad is it likely to be relative to what we went through in 2008-2009 oh I don't think that it's going to be as sharp and severe like that I think it's more going to grind on and I think the it all of these obligations will be a problem to be funded and I think it'll be more back there of a dollar crisis than it would be a debt crisis”