
What this covers
This is a 13-minute conversation from The Economist's The Intelligence podcast. Jason interviews Henry Curr, the paper's economics editor, about the market reaction to Trump's reciprocal tariffs in early April. The starting point is an unusual pairing: bond yields rose while the dollar fell. Normally higher yields pull a currency up, so the break in that relationship is read as investors leaving US assets whatever the return. Henry compares it to dynamics seen in emerging markets and in Britain after Liz Truss's mini budget, and says it points to a risk premium being priced into American assets.
The middle of the discussion covers how the US got here and what a crisis might look like. The US has long said it welcomes a strong dollar, and the administration has now publicly cast doubt on that. Henry also covers the structure of the debt. Foreigners hold about $8.5 trillion of Treasuries, and each percentage point of higher yields adds roughly one point of GDP in interest costs. The country runs a deficit of about 7% of GDP even in a strong economy. He also describes the Federal Reserve's bind: tariff-driven inflation and risks to its independence limit its ability to step in without appearing to finance Congress. A fiscal correction would need a polarized Congress to act quickly, possibly overriding a veto.
The final stretch asks what could replace the dollar. The euro, Swiss franc, yen, gold and crypto each lack the size, safety and liquidity the dollar offers, and the renminbi is held back by capital controls and weak rule of law. Henry's more contested forecast is that a multipolar system would not leave investors with nowhere to go. It would be less stable, because without a focal point for safety the self-reinforcing clustering that protects reserve currencies breaks down, leaving the system more prone to runs.
The Trump administration's tariffs, fiscal loosening, and skepticism toward dollar reserve currency status risk triggering a bond market crisis and dollar run that could destabilize the global financial system, though correction is still possible if policy is reversed.
- Simultaneous selloff in bonds and dollar signals generalized flight from US assets rather than normal yield-driven dollar strength
- Aggressive fiscal expansion combined with tariffs creates inflationary pressure while administration officials undermine confidence in reserve currency status
- Political polarization may prevent rapid fiscal correction needed to stabilize bond markets if a crisis materializes
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Reserve currency safety depends on a self-reinforcing belief: the currency is safe because everyone believes it is safe, creating a clustering effect where investors concentrate holdings in that currency, making it genuinely safe.
“The thing about reserve currencies is part of what makes them safe is that everyone else thinks they're safe.”
The absence of a focal point reserve currency (as currently exists with the dollar) makes the global financial system more prone to destabilizing runs and currency movements because investors are unsure which asset to concentrate holdings in, destroying the self-reinforcing safety mechanism.
“And that also means that if you live in a world where there are lots of options and nobody's quite sure, it's a world that's more prone to runs and and destabilizing events, movements from one currency to another and so on. So that's a loss uh for the world economy which operates on a global financial system that's premised on the idea that everything's going to revolve around the US dollar and that the US dollar and US Treasury securities are rock solid.”
The safety of reserve currencies depends on collective confidence—once investors believe they are safe, they cluster into them, but if confidence erodes, the system becomes prone to runs and destabilizing currency shifts
“The thing about reserve currencies is part of what makes them safe is that everyone else thinks they're safe... there's this clustering effect. And that also means that if you live in a world where there are lots of options and nobody's quite sure, it's a world that's more prone to runs and destabilizing events”
A world without a clear focal point for reserve currency—multiple competing alternatives with no consensus—is more prone to runs and destabilizing currency shifts, creating a less secure and stable global financial system than the current dollar-centered system
“you're looking at a world, I think, where people are seeking out what the reserve asset is going to be. and nobody's quite sure. So, it's not that you don't have alternatives, but you don't have this focal point that you currently have on the dollar. And that's potentially quite unhelpful and an unstable world”
The global financial system operates on the premise that the US dollar and US Treasury securities are foundationally rock-solid safe assets, so a loss of reserve currency status would create systemic instability not because there's nowhere to park money but because the system loses its anchor
“that the US dollar and US Treasury securities are rock solid. So you have I think a financial crisis in transition and then you end up in a in not not a world where you can't park your assets anywhere but a less secure and stable one”
The Fed would not be fully able to calm global financial markets in a crisis until Congress corrects the fiscal picture, because Fed intervention without fiscal adjustment would appear to be bailing out Congress and financing the deficit, which would further erode confidence
“It would not be I think fully able to calm global financial markets in the way it normally would until Congress had writed the fiscal ship which as I say might be politically difficult”
If the dollar loses reserve currency status, the world does not end up in a state where investors cannot park assets anywhere, but rather in a 'less secure and stable' multipolar financial system that is more prone to runs and instability.
“So you have I think a financial crisis in transition and then you end up in a in not not a world where you can't park your assets anywhere but a less secure and stable one.”
The Trump administration's announcement of reciprocal tariffs in early April triggered a simultaneous selloff in both bonds and the dollar—an unusual dynamic where bond yields rose while the dollar weakened, which normally moves together.
“Since President Trump announced the uh so-called reciprocal tariffs at the start of April, there have been big falls in equity markets. Everyone knows about that. The more alarming signal that's happened is this simultaneous selloff in bonds and in the dollar. So, normally what happens when bond yields go up is that the dollar goes up too because investors can get more by buying the dollar and holding those bonds. When your bond yields go up but the dollar goes down, it means that there's this generalized selloff, a flight from those assets which suggests investors are somewhat fearful.”
Following Trump's tariff announcements in April, bond yields and the dollar are falling simultaneously—an unusual pattern that signals generalized flight from US assets rather than normal yield-driven dollar appreciation, suggesting investors perceive elevated risk
“Since President Trump announced the uh so-called reciprocal tariffs at the start of April, there have been big falls in equity markets... The more alarming signal that's happened is this simultaneous selloff in bonds and in the dollar. So, normally what happens when bond yields go up is that the dollar goes up too... When your bond yields go up but the dollar goes down, it means that there's this generalized selloff, a flight from those assets”
If confidence in dollar weakens, foreigners (who own $8.5 trillion of US treasuries, mostly private sector investors) will offload bonds, causing bond yields to rise, which forces the US government to allocate 1% of additional GDP toward interest payments for every 1 percentage point yield increase.
“So I think the first thing that happens is that bond yields continue to rise as foreigners who own US treasuries. So foreigners own I think $ 8.5 trillion of US treasuries, most of whom by the way are private sector investors um with whom the Trump administration couldn't negotiate in a diplomatic fashion. If those investors start offloading bonds, bond yields go up. Now that very quickly feeds back into America's budget because America has a lot of debt. Uh its debts are worth about 100% of its GDP. So you can think about it as a a 1 percentage point increase in bond yields and the interest costs you have to pay eventually lead to you have to find an additional 1% of GDP in taxes or spending cuts in order to pay those interest costs.”
For decades, the US government has carefully maintained the message that it welcomes a strong dollar and that the US is a safe harbor for international investors, but the Trump administration has now publicly cast doubt on this commitment.
“for decades the US government has been careful to say that it welcomes a strong dollar that it is a safe harbor for international investors but now the administration itself has actually cast a bit of doubt on that and seems to be fairly untroubled by the the kurfuffle that that has raised”
Potential alternatives to the dollar as reserve currency (euro, Nordic currencies, Swiss franc, yen, gold, cryptocurrency) each lack the combination of size, safety, and liquidity that the dollar provides, but could each fill some functions in a multipolar reserve system.
“What you do have though is you have lots of alternatives to the dollar. None of which provides the same degree of safety and liquidity and size of economy that America can offer, but provides some of those things in some combination. So, you've got the euro, which obviously has a big economy behind it, but doesn't have as deep capital markets and doesn't have many jointly issued assets equivalent to US treasuries. Uh there are some, but there aren't that many. It's more at the national level. You have the Nordic uh countries. They're perceived as pretty stable, but they're obviously very small. You have Japan. It has big debts of its own, and there are some question marks there. You have Switzerland, also small. Then you have non-savor sovereign assets. You have gold, which is a traditional haven. Uh and you have maybe maybe cryptocurrency.”
The Trump administration would likely want to stop a slide in the dollar if it occurred, but the question is whether the American political system can reach the compromise needed given polarization and the Trump administration's skeptical stance on traditional economic policy
“Well, I think they'd want to stop the slide. The question is, can the American political system reach that kind of compromise in its current condition given what's happened in terms of polarization, given the Trump administration's attitude to the economy?”
In a severe bond crisis, Congress would need to pass stabilization measures comparable to those in the global financial crisis to steady the bond market, but the question is whether America's polarized political system can muster the rapid negotiations and potential presidential veto override required
“Congress had to very quickly pass measures to stabilize the financial system. They would have to do the same to try and stabilize the bond market. But the question is, can America's political system, with all the stress it's under, cope with that? Would it be capable of correcting the fiscal picture rapidly with the rapid negotiations that would require?”
Because the US budget is already far out of balance running 7% deficit during expansion, a fiscal correction in a bond crisis would require a large adjustment and would be a major political lift, especially given current polarization
“It's it's run up those high debts, but it's also been running a deficit of 7% of GDP, which a pretty extraordinary deficit to run when the economy is strong... So, it's starting from the this position where the budget's way out of whack. It's destabilizing things further and that just means that the course corrections pretty large and would be a big a big political lift in that moment of crisis if it came about”
If bond investors start offloading US Treasuries (foreigners hold ~$8.5 trillion), bond yields rise, which feeds directly into the US budget as an additional ~1 percentage point of GDP in interest costs per 1 percentage point yield increase, creating a destabilizing fiscal feedback loop
“If those investors start offloading bonds, bond yields go up. Now that very quickly feeds back into America's budget because America has a lot of debt. Uh its debts are worth about 100% of its GDP. So you can think about it as a a 1 percentage point increase in bond yields and the interest costs you have to pay eventually lead to you have to find an additional 1% of GDP in taxes or spending cuts in order to pay those interest costs”
Normally when bond yields rise, the dollar also rises because investors earn higher returns by buying bonds denominated in that currency; when this relationship breaks (yields up, dollar down), it signals investors are fleeing the asset regardless of yield, a sign of loss of confidence
“normally what happens when bond yields go up is that the dollar goes up too because investors can get more by buying the dollar and holding those bonds. When your bond yields go up but the dollar goes down, it means that there's this generalized selloff”
The simultaneous selloff in bonds and dollar—a generalized flight from US assets—mirrors the kind of dynamic seen in emerging markets and in Britain after Liz Truss's mini budget, indicating a risk premium is now being priced into US assets
“It's the kind of dynamic you see more in emerging markets. It's the kind of dynamic you saw in Britain after the disastrous mini budget under Liz Truss's premiership. And that's what's sending this signal that maybe there's this risk premium now uh on US assets”
The Federal Reserve would almost certainly want to intervene to stabilize bond markets in a crisis, but faces a constraint: inflation is currently rising due to tariffs and consumer inflation expectations have increased, complicating its ability to ease without appearing to bail out Congress and finance the deficit
“the Federal Reserve would uh be wanting to intervene to stabilize things in the bond markets almost certainly. But it's one thing to do that in the global financial crisis when there there's no real inflationary de danger. But the other thing that's going on at the moment in part because of tariffs is that inflation is rising. Consumers inflation expectations have shot up”
The US has run up high debt (worth ~100% of GDP) by exploiting its reserve currency status, creating a structural vulnerability where small yield increases automatically force large fiscal adjustments due to interest cost passthrough
“The US is going into this position having exploited its uh status as the reserve currency to a great extent. It's it's run up those high debts, but it's also been running a deficit of 7% of GDP... America has a lot of debt. Uh its debts are worth about 100% of its GDP”
A two-thirds congressional majority would potentially be needed to override a presidential veto on fiscal cuts, particularly to Social Security, which would be necessary for adjustment but politically extremely difficult
“Would it be able to, if necessary, find a twothirds majority in Congress to potentially override a presidential veto if President Trump didn't like the kind of cuts to social security and so on that would be necessary because it's a big adjustment”
If a dollar run intensifies, Chinese renminbi is unlikely to become the replacement reserve currency due to China's capital controls, lack of rule of law, state control ('rule by law' rather than rule of law), and involvement in trade war with the US
“the question has always been will uh the Chinese R&B displace the dollar as the world's reserve currency... That's in my view always been quite unlikely given the state of the Chinese economy, given the uh capital controls in place in China. um given the fact that it doesn't have the rule of law. Chinese Communist Party prefers the phrase rub by law. So it it does not have the confidence of investors or the legal setup necessary to take over a reserve currency status and it's embroiled in the trade war”
The US is running a deficit of 7% of GDP during a strong economy, which is the kind of deficit normally observed during economic crises, indicating structural fiscal imbalance.
“It's also been running a deficit of 7% of GDP, which a pretty extraordinary deficit to run when the economy is strong. That's the kind of deficit you usually see in a in an economic crisis.”
Trump administration pressure on the Fed and upcoming Fed chair nomination give the administration leverage over monetary policy, and a court case may weaken protections preventing Fed governors from being fired, creating additional risk to Fed independence.
“President Trump would like them to lower interest rates. he gets to appoint a new Fed chairman next year or at least nominate a new Fed chairman to replace Jerome Pal. And there's also this court case making its way through the system which might reduce the protections eventually afforded to Fed governors uh that you know they're protected from being fired at the moment, but this court case provides an opportunity for the courts to to weaken those protections. It's quite unlikely, but it's an helpful risk to have hanging there.”
The US is running a structural deficit of ~7% of GDP despite economic strength—a magnitude usually seen only in economic crises—which reflects exploitation of reserve currency status to finance high debt and undisciplined fiscal policy
“The US is going into this position having exploited its uh status as the reserve currency to a great extent. It's it's run up those high debts, but it's also been running a deficit of 7% of GDP, which a pretty extraordinary deficit to run when the economy is strong. That's the kind of deficit you usually see in a in an economic crisis”
Congress is preparing aggressive fiscal loosening through renewal of Trump tax cuts plus potential additions, with the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimating total fiscal stimulus could exceed Trump tax cuts, COVID stimulus, and Biden stimulus combined.
“And what's also going on at the same time as the trade war is that Congress is preparing to loosen the purse strings as it renews the Trump tax cuts from the first term and potentially tries to add to them. And it's passed this budget framework which is very aggressive in terms of the fiscal loosening that could go on. you know, potentially more than the Trump tax cuts, the COVID stimulus and uh Biden stimulus combined according to the committee for a responsible federal budget.”
The yuan (Chinese renminbi) has always been unlikely to replace the dollar as reserve currency because China has capital controls, lacks rule of law, has an unstable Communist Party legal system ('rub by law'), lacks deep capital markets, and is now embroiled in trade war tariffs.
“the qu the question has always been will uh the Chinese R&B displace the dollar as the world's reserve currency. That's the question people like to uh entertain. That's in my view always been quite unlikely given the state of the Chinese economy, given the uh capital controls in place in China. um given the fact that it doesn't have the rule of law. Chinese Communist Party prefers the phrase rub by law. So it it does not have the confidence of investors or the legal setup necessary to take over a reserve currency status and it's embroiled in the trade war. It's taking a big blow from these tariffs.”
President Trump can nominate a new Fed chairman to replace Jerome Powell next year, giving the administration direct control over monetary policy leadership during a period when Fed independence may be threatened
“President Trump would like them to lower interest rates. he gets to appoint a new Fed chairman next year or at least nominate a new Fed chairman to replace Jerome Pal”
Stephen Moran gave a speech proposing that foreigners should pay fees or checks to the US government for the services the US provides globally (including reserve currency provision), which represents an unprecedented public assertion that challenges decades of US tradition of promoting dollar confidence.
“There were a lot of rumors flying in financial markets earlier uh this year about this so-called Mara Lago called which was based on something that Steve Moran had written before he joined the administration that's been left to the side now but he did give this updated analysis in a speech recently which entertained ideas such as asking foreigners to pay checks to the US government in order to pay for the services the US was providing to the world which includes includes the provision of the reserve currency and saying these kind of things in public is a pretty uh bold thing to do uh because for decades the US government has been careful to say that it welcomes a strong dollar that it is a safe harbor for international investors but now the administration itself has actually cast a bit of doubt on that”
This simultaneous bond and dollar selloff is the kind of dynamic normally observed in emerging market crises and was seen in Britain after the Liz Truss mini-budget in 2022, indicating investors now view US assets as carrying a risk premium similar to those markets.
“It's the kind of dynamic you see more in emerging markets. It's the kind of dynamic you saw in Britain after the disastrous mini budget under Liz Truss's premiership. And that's what's sending this signal that maybe there's this risk premium now uh on US assets.”
If a dollar crisis occurs and requires Congress to stabilize the bond market and fiscal situation, the necessary fiscal correction would be 'large' and would constitute 'a big political lift' requiring difficult decisions like cuts to social security, which may be impossible given current political polarization.
“it would be something comparable perhaps to what happened in the global financial crisis where Congress had to very quickly pass measures to stabilize the financial system. They would have to do the same to try and stabilize the bond market. But the question is, can America's political system, with all the stress it's under, cope with that? Would it be capable of correcting the fiscal picture rapidly with the rapid negotiations that would require? Would it be able to, if necessary, find a twothirds majority in Congress to potentially override a presidential veto if President Trump didn't like the kind of cuts to social security and so on that would be necessary because it's a big adjustment... the course corrections pretty large and would be a big a big political lift in that moment of crisis if it came about.”
The damage to dollar credibility may already be partially done by the administration's public casting of doubt on reserve currency benefits, creating a permanent risk premium on US debt even if the administration reverses course on tariffs and executes fiscal correction.
“So I think the dollar's position is so strong its dominance of trade its tolerance dominance of uh derivatives trading of currency trading of central bank holdings across the board that if uh the Trump administration pursued a sort of stabilization agenda and roll back the trade war and uh there was a fiscal correction in Congress uh that the dollar's position would be secure in the short term. I do think that they have now cast doubt on things to a degree that it wouldn't be quite as secure as it was a month ago. Um, and that risk perhaps a small risk premium even on on on the debt and the dollar is always going to be there. So, I think there's a permanent cost that's been incurred here, but we're not in the crisis yet.”
The Federal Reserve faces a constrained position in a potential dollar crisis because it would need to stabilize bond markets (requiring easing) while facing inflationary pressure from tariffs and consumer inflation expectations, making it unable to provide full market stabilization without appearing to finance Congress's deficit.
“And the other thing that would need to happen is that the Federal Reserve would uh be wanting to intervene to stabilize things in the bond markets almost certainly. But it's one thing to do that in the global financial crisis when there there's no real inflationary de danger. But the other thing that's going on at the moment in part because of tariffs is that inflation is rising. Consumers inflation expectations have shot up and there's been pressure on the Fed from the Trump administration... So you have the Fed that's in this somewhat compromised position and would as well as wanting to stop any bond market crisis if one happened would be desperate not to give the impression that it was bailing out Congress and financing this big deficit when the bond markets wouldn't.”
By openly doubting the value of reserve currency status, the Trump administration has cast doubt on the dollar's future that will persist even if policies are reversed, creating a permanent risk premium on US debt and dollar assets
“the administration itself has actually cast a bit of doubt on that and seems to be fairly untroubled by the the kurfuffle that that has raised”
Trump administration figures including Stephen Moran (Chair of Council of Economic Advisers) and JD Vance argue that the strong dollar is a 'tax on manufacturing workers' because it makes US exports more expensive and have questioned whether reserve currency status benefits the US.
“you have senior figures in the administration who aren't that keen on the dollar's reserve currency status. uh they've made uh Steven Moran who is the uh chairman of the council of economic adviserss has made this argument that the strong dollar is a tax on manufacturing workers because it makes us exports more expensive. Uh JD Vance has said that in the past as well. So there is this idea out there in MAGA circles that the reserve currency status is something that brings big costs.”
Senior Trump administration figures including Stephen Moore (chair of Council of Economic Advisers) and JD Vance have publicly argued that the dollar's reserve currency status is a tax on manufacturing workers because it makes US exports more expensive
“you have senior figures in the administration who aren't that keen on the dollar's reserve currency status. uh they've made uh Steven Moran who is the uh chairman of the council of economic adviserss has made this argument that the strong dollar is a tax on manufacturing workers because it makes us exports more expensive. Uh JD Vance has said that in the past as well”
Stephen Moore recently gave a speech proposing that the US could ask foreigners to pay checks to the US government for services the US provides globally, including provision of the reserve currency—a public statement undermining traditional US messaging that it welcomes a strong dollar
“he did give this updated analysis in a speech recently which entertained ideas such as asking foreigners to pay checks to the US government in order to pay for the services the US was providing to the world which includes includes the provision of the reserve currency and saying these kind of things in public is a pretty uh bold thing to do uh because for decades the US government has been careful to say that it welcomes a strong dollar”
A pending court case could potentially reduce the legal protections afforded to Federal Reserve governors from being fired at will, though this is unlikely, it creates a risk to Fed independence that the Trump administration could exploit
“there's also this court case making its way through the system which might reduce the protections eventually afforded to Fed governors uh that you know they're protected from being fired at the moment, but this court case provides an opportunity for the courts to to weaken those protections. It's quite unlikely, but it's an helpful risk to have hanging there”
It is unclear whether the Trump administration or Congress wants to stop a slide in the dollar or whether they are indifferent to its decline, raising questions about whether stabilization would even be attempted
“it sounds as if that if it came about it's not even clear that the administration that Congress could pull it together to to stop the slide. Maybe doesn't want to stop the slide.”
Congress is preparing to aggressively loosen fiscal policy by renewing Trump's first-term tax cuts and potentially adding to them, with a budget framework that could result in fiscal loosening exceeding the combined impact of Trump tax cuts, COVID stimulus, and Biden stimulus
“Congress is preparing to loosen the purse strings as it renews the Trump tax cuts from the first term and potentially tries to add to them. And it's passed this budget framework which is very aggressive in terms of the fiscal loosening that could go on... potentially more than the Trump tax cuts, the COVID stimulus and uh Biden stimulus combined according to the committee for a responsible federal budget”
If the Trump administration pursues stabilization (rolling back tariffs, correcting fiscal deficits), the dollar would remain secure in the short term, but the question of whether Congress can execute rapid fiscal corrections in the current polarized political environment remains uncertain.
“The question is, can the American political system reach that kind of compromise in its current condition given what's happened in terms of polarization, given the Trump administration's attitude to the economy?”
Even if the Trump administration reverses course on tariffs and fiscal expansion, pulling back trade war and pursuing fiscal correction, the damage to dollar confidence from undermining reserve currency status may be sufficient to maintain the dollar's security in the short term, but a permanent risk premium will be priced in
“I think the dollar's position is so strong its dominance of trade its tolerance dominance of uh derivatives trading of currency trading of central bank holdings across the board that if uh the Trump administration pursued a sort of stabilization agenda and roll back the trade war and uh there was a fiscal correction in Congress uh that the dollar's position would be secure in the short term”
The Trump administration remains in a position to stabilize the system if it pursues a stabilization agenda by rolling back the trade war and allowing fiscal correction, but questions remain about the administration's willingness and the political system's capability to do so
“There's definitely uh the opportunity to correct course here um still”
Potential alternatives to the dollar include the euro (large economy but limited deep capital markets and few jointly-issued assets like Treasury equivalents), Nordic currencies (stable but very small), Japanese yen (carries big debt questions), Swiss franc (small), gold, and cryptocurrency—but none offers the safety, liquidity, and economic scale of the US
“you've got the euro, which obviously has a big economy behind it, but doesn't have as deep capital markets and doesn't have many jointly issued assets equivalent to US treasuries. Uh there are some, but there aren't that many. It's more at the national level. You have the Nordic uh countries. They're perceived as pretty stable, but they're obviously very small. You have Japan. It has big debts of its own, and there are some question marks there. You have Switzerland, also small. Then you have non-savor sovereign assets. You have gold, which is a traditional haven. Uh and you have maybe maybe cryptocurrency”
US national debt is worth approximately 100% of GDP, creating a debt-to-GDP ratio that makes the US vulnerable to rising interest rates because interest payments consume an increasingly large share of the budget.
“America has a lot of debt. Uh its debts are worth about 100% of its GDP.”
The interviewer (Jason) is the host, establishing baseline context for the conversation about US financial system stability.
“Thanks very much for your time. Thanks, Jason.”
There were rumors in financial markets earlier in 2024 about a 'Mar-a-Lago call' based on an analysis Stephen Moore had written before joining the administration, though this has been set aside for now
“There were a lot of rumors flying in financial markets earlier uh this year about this so-called Mara Lago called which was based on something that Steve Moran had written before he joined the administration that's been left to the side now”