
What this covers
Patrick Boyle responds to a CNBC interview in which Tony Robbins said private equity delivers returns about 50 percent higher than public equities at lower risk. The video takes up that claim in two stages. The first is a history: the 1901 Morgan–Carnegie Steel deal, McClean Industries' 1955 purchase of Pan Atlantic and Waterman, and the 1970s breakup of discounted conglomerates. It then follows KKR)'s 1978 Houdaille deal, which Stephen Schwarzman called a "Rosetta Stone" for leveraged buyouts). Houdaille was bought with $1 million of equity for a $380 million price, then struggled through the 1981–82 recession and Japanese competition. The second stage is a critique of the numbers.
The measurement section is the most technical part. Boyle explains why IRR) is a poor basis for comparing funds. It builds in a reinvestment assumption, and bridge loans that delay capital calls shorten the period the IRR clock runs and so raise reported figures. He then draws on academic work. A Financial Analysts Journal bottom-up study found buyout portfolio companies to be smaller, more leveraged, and tilted toward consumer discretionary, while an Oxford paper argued the usual global equity benchmark is the wrong comparison. Adjusting for size, sector, and leverage cuts apparent outperformance by more than half, and adjusting for vintage removes it, a finding the material marks as contested. Mark Anson and Cliff Asness supply the argument that stale pricing hides risk, a practice Asness calls volatility laundering.
The video also covers the case for private equity. Public companies are fewer, and net equity issuance is at a 25-year low. Aswath Damodaran's research suggests little evidence that buyouts destroy jobs on net, and that targets' profits tend to recover when leverage is higher. Boyle adds that the 1986 repeal of the General Utilities doctrine cut buyout profitability. He concludes that past returns, even if real, are a poor guide to what a newcomer will earn today.
Private equity returns are not meaningfully higher than public equities when properly adjusted for risk factors (size, leverage, sector composition), and investors are not being compensated for illiquidity risk, making Tony Robbins' claims about exceptional returns with low risk misleading.
- Academic research shows private equity outperformance disappears when adjusted for leverage, small-cap exposure, and sector differences
- Private equity pricing lacks transparency (stale pricing), creating 'volatility laundering' where real systematic risk is hidden from investors
- The historical outperformance was driven by different economic conditions and tax rules; today's crowded market with $2.6 trillion in dry powder makes exceptional returns unlikely
Bridge loans delay when investor capital enters funds, inflating IRR calculations despite originally serving investor convenience.
- PE funds often use bridge loans to make investments before calling investor capital, which was originally done to make capital calls more predictable for investors but actually decreases the time during which investor cash is held in the fund, thus delaying when the IRR clock starts ticking and resulting in a significant boost to reported IRRs.
“There are other tricks too: The Wall Street Journal described in 2018 how the funds often don't call the cash as soon as an investment is identified, instead borrowing money to make the investment – in what's called a bridge loan, tapping investors' for cash later." According to the Journal, this was originally done to make capital calls more predictable for investors. But while the practice doesn't boost a fund's cash profits, it does decreases the time during which investors' cash is held in the fund delaying the moment when the clock starts ticking from an IRR calculation standpoint which can result in a significant boost in the IRR.”
Controlling for size, sector, leverage, and fund vintage eliminates evidence of private equity outperformance.
- When adjusted for size, sector composition, and leverage of portfolio companies in buyout funds, outperformance was reduced by more than half, and when adjusted for the vintage of the funds, researchers found no evidence of private equity outperformance.
“When they adjusted for size, sector composition, and leverage of portfo¬lio companies in buyout funds, the outperformance was reduced by more than half. Finally, when they adjusted for the vintage of the funds, they found no evidence of private equity out¬performance.”
Tony Robbins's height is irrelevant to his qualification to write self-help books.
- Tony Robbins is 6 feet 7 inches tall, making him an actual giant and therefore uniquely qualified to write a book called 'Awaken the Giant Within.'
“The answer is Tony Robbins – he is 6 feet 7 inches tall – an actual giant. There is no one better qualified to write a book like that.”