
Financial Derivatives - Class 9 - Credit Derivatives
What this covers
This is the ninth lecture in Patrick Boyle's ten-part university derivatives series, recorded for online delivery in March 2020 when live teaching was cancelled over coronavirus concerns. It begins with the instruments themselves: the credit derivative as a way to separate credit risk from the loan, the credit default swap (CDS)) credited to Blight Masters's team at JP Morgan around 1996, and the asset-backed security (ABS)). The ABS section includes the 1997 bond backed by David Bowie's royalties, and the point that securitizing loans lets originators shrink their balance sheets and capital requirements. From there the lecture moves to collateralized debt obligation (CDO)) structures and the crisis that followed.
The middle of the lecture covers how CDS markets work and where they break. It discusses arbitrage between the CDS spread and bond spreads, which is hard to execute because the bonds are illiquid, and the inversion in which the more liquid CDS prices the bond. It also covers insurance-like moral hazard, since protection can be bought on debt the buyer doesn't own. Case studies include the allegedly engineered default in the Hovnanian episode involving a Blackstone hedge fund, and the Greek restructuring of around 2011, which was not declared a credit event. The 2012 European ban on naked sovereign CDS is presented as the regulatory response.
The harshest criticism is reserved for the CDO boom of roughly 2005 to 2007. The lecture argues that once banks could sell loans, credit monitoring gave way to algorithmic scoring, and subprime origination grew to supply raw material for CDOs. It also claims that:
- Low post-2001 interest rates pushed yield-seeking buyers toward CDOs. - Modelers with strong mathematical but weak lending backgrounds assumed defaults were independent. - Structures held just enough quality to reach AAA. - Some institutional buyers barely understood what a tranche was.
Synthetic CDOs, the failure of AIG after Lehman Brothers collapsed, and post-2008 moves toward central clearing close the account.
Credit derivatives like credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations fundamentally changed financial markets by enabling banks to originate loans without bearing credit risk, which reduced credit monitoring, concentrated risk in non-traditional holders, and ultimately contributed to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
- Banks could originate loans and immediately transfer credit risk to other investors, eliminating incentive for careful due diligence on loan quality
- Credit rating agencies and complex mathematical models failed to properly assess correlation and default probability in CDO structures
- The profitability of these products drove demand for ever-riskier underlying assets and increasingly complex derivative chains (CDO-squared, synthetic CDOs)
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In 1997, David Bowie issued 55 million dollars in bonds backed by the royalties from his music catalog, pioneering asset-backed securities backed by intangible property rights rather than traditional loans.
“in 1997 David Bowie sold 55 million dollars in bonds that were backed by the royalties associated with his music so it was basically he got paid up front he received fifty five million dollars and the investors in this asset backed security which at the time was referred to as a Bowie bond I would receive the cash flows associated with hit the sales of of the CDs that David Bowie had his entire back catalogue”
The problem with derivatives-enabled risk distribution is that credit monitoring and assessment—which was previously conducted by originators with detailed knowledge of borrowers—is not adequately replaced by derivative investors who lack access to borrower-level information.
“why does this even matter because you might say well you know yeah the bank doesn't have to worry about it but whoever is whoever is investing in that c.d.s like the seller of CBS protection which as we've just explained is almost like the buyer of a bond they can do that analysis but they can't because who gets to sit down with the company see do and grilled among their plans and everything else not not all these people who have some exposure to some c.d.s”
Many CDO investors, particularly institutional investors like pension funds and insurance companies, did not fully understand the products they were buying, with some only knowing that 'tranches' meant slices without understanding the underlying mechanics.
“and they didn't fully understand a lot of the people who bought them really didn't understand them”
Historical banking practice involved bank managers performing extensive due diligence before making loans, sitting down with borrowers to assess creditworthiness and monitor loan performance, but this practice was replaced by algorithmic credit scoring after credit derivatives enabled loan sales.
“banks used to do all of this due diligence before they made loans and I have a there was a guy I worked with who had kind of at the time told this story which was kind of an entertaining story of his father I think back in the nineteen sixties going to the local bank manager because he wanted to buy a little two-seater sports car”
Low interest rate environment in the early 2000s (after dot-com bubble and 9/11) incentivized bond investors to buy CDOs because they offered 200-300 basis points more yield than equivalent-rated traditional bonds without investors fully understanding the underlying risks.
“interest rates had come down and down right so interest rates were sorta low at least for the time and September 11th happened and so the Federal Reserve slashed interest rates made them even lower”
The 2017-2018 Hovnanian case revealed a moral hazard problem in CDS where GSO Capital Partners (Blackstone hedge fund) allegedly engineered a default on bonds they held CDS protection on to profit from the hedge rather than the underlying investment.
“what happened is that wouldn't company was suing another because what was happening was that that a company I believe they're called GSL Capital Partners which is a part of Blackstone the big asset management company were alleged to be asking hovnanian to be late on a coupon payment on their bonds”
CDS markets experienced a major structural problem during the European debt crisis around 2011 when Greek bonds were restructured but regulators declined to classify the restructuring as a credit event, preventing CDS holders from receiving expected payouts.
“when we'll say Greece for example restructured their bonds it was very much engineered in order not to be a credit event and the reason for that was of course we just come through the credit well we barely come through the credit crunch at this point and everyone was terrified that another big credit problem would occur”
Synthetic CDOs referenced baskets of mortgages through credit default swaps rather than owning actual mortgages, allowing banks to create unlimited synthetic exposure to mortgages without actual mortgage supply constraints.
“the synthetic CDO is one that's made up of credit default obligation CDOs...you're able to reference baskets of securities and just say we will create a CD S on this basket of mortgages then we essentially create these synthetic bonds and then we'll put these through the machine and we will make a CDOs out of those”
CDS arbitrage opportunities existed when CDS spreads diverged from the credit spreads of underlying bonds, but these opportunities were often difficult to execute because underlying bonds were illiquid and couldn't be readily shorted.
“if the bonds aren't actively traded it's all very nice to say well the credit spread of the bond is this and the c.d.s is dad and so I'll I'll trade the bonds against a seed yes but you might find that you're unable to trade the buns you can either buy them nor short them if shorting them with what you need to do in order to extract the the profit”
Banks used mathematical models created by PhDs in physics, mathematics, and engineering to price CDOs and determine loss assumptions and default correlations, but these modelers often lacked deep knowledge of the lending industry.
“the pricing and the rating of these are tied to these loss assumptions that were calculated right and these are complex products and there were all sorts of actuarial calculations required to work out what these loss assumptions were and very smart people did them you know but these weren't necessarily people with a deep knowledge of the lending industry these were often you know mathematics and physics and engineering PhDs who went to Wall Street around this time”
Banks no longer needed to monitor credit health of borrowers or analyze loan quality because they could immediately sell the risk, and credit monitoring costs were eliminated, lowering the interest rates banks had to pay and allowing even worse lending.
“CD s markets did reduce credit monitoring significantly monitoring has costs right...they could just look up your credit rating on the computer system...when lenders were able to get rid of these costs right they could lay off the bank manager who used to ask all of these questions...it was actually cheaper to make loans right and that would have also been reflected in the credit spreads of credit spreads would have narrowed”
The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the credit crunch were directly caused or significantly amplified by credit derivatives (CDS and CDOs) that enabled excessive risk-taking and reduced credit monitoring.
“towards the end of the this lecture we're going to talk a little bit about the credit crisis of 2007-2008 and we'll see how some of these credit derivatives caused all sorts of problems”
CDO correlation models assumed defaults were independent random events, not recognizing that defaults become correlated during systemic crises when borrowers all face common shocks (recession, house price collapse) causing simultaneous defaults.
“the relationship that the big issue is is not just it's not just how many people are likely to default but it also matters when they default and a lot of the assumptions just work built around this idea that people might in a random way lose their jobs or you know fall on hard times and they might default but it wasn't built around the idea that firstly a lot of these loans have been issued to more and more questionable credits”
CDS markets are more liquid than their underlying bonds, meaning traders often price bonds off of CDS spreads rather than vice versa, representing an inversion where the derivative drives pricing of the cash market.
“interestingly enough often these credit derivatives like CVS are more liquid than the underlying bonds which is kind of a crazy thing but it's true”
Regulatory changes post-2008 require derivatives trades to move toward exchanges and central clearing houses to reduce counterparty risk, though over-the-counter derivatives markets continue to exist.
“regulatory pressures increased to trade CDs in a more transparent manner we talk about this a little bit in the book at the time that we wrote the book about a year ago that leaf the revised edition of the book a lot of this had changed and so there's much more of a push with this and with a lot of derivatives to move them onto exchanges to you know to move towards clearing houses”
The 2012 European ban on naked CDS on sovereign bonds (requiring investors to own underlying bonds to buy protection) was a regulatory response to prevent speculation and limit use of CDS as weapons against vulnerable governments.
“since 2012 there was a ban in Europe which has curbed investors from speculating on a country's financial woes so you were no longer able to buy protection unless you could show that that you owned the underlying bounces”
Banks and mortgage lenders increased originations of subprime mortgages to questionable borrowers to provide the raw material (mortgages) needed for CDO production, directly linking loan quality deterioration to CDO demand.
“it eventually reached the point where the banks were pushing lenders to go out and lend money because they needed the raw material which was mortgages to make up these things”
CDO and ABS markets peaked around 2006-2007, then dramatically collapsed after 2007 as defaults surged, revealing that underlying asset quality was far worse than ratings indicated.
“as you can see here there was huge growth up until that's around o 6 it started tailing off in our seven and it kind of disappeared after that”
Using asset-backed securities, originators can remove loans from their balance sheets and reduce their required capital reserves, improving their apparent credit ratings even if the underlying asset credit risk is unchanged.
“the initial company that issued these loans are that that they're not necessarily loans they're trade receivables that they could be their credit cards that have been issued or anything like that there's as I said earlier there's a bunch of things that we could use as underlying assets and so the credit risk of these assets is transferred to another legal entity so the risk of these not being paid is no longer on the books of the company that that initially issued them”
Blight Masters, working with her team at JP Morgan approximately 20 years before the lecture (circa 1996), is credited with inventing the credit default swap, the foundational credit derivative.
“blight masters here is the woman who is credited with inventing the credit default swap which is the main form of credit derivative now there's lots of different types of credit derivatives but the credit default swap which is the first credit derivative that we're going to talk about in today's class is also probably the biggest one and now there's so blight masters along with her team at JP Morgan I guess around 15 years ago know it's longer than that it's probably about twenty years ago came up with the idea of these credit default swaps”
Unlike traditional insurance, CDS protection can be purchased on bonds or credit products that the buyer does not own or have an economic interest in, which creates a moral hazard analogous to buying fire insurance on a neighbor's house.
“you are able to buy CDs protection on just any bonds or any sort of credit product that's out there okay now that's quite different and people refer to this as whether you have an insurable interest or not”
The peak of the CDS and ABS boom occurred in 2005-2007, with credit derivatives representing the most profitable business lines for investment banks during this period.
“this was probably the most profitable business for investment banks in the you know early 2000s”
CDOs were structured with only enough underlying asset quality to achieve AAA ratings, not more, because additional high-quality assets would increase costs without raising the rating ceiling, incentivizing banks to include lower-quality assets up to the AAA threshold.
“if there was a line beyond which you passed the the bonds got more and more secure but they weren't rated any higher because triple-a is the highest rating you wouldn't really put any more the good bonds in the portfolio right you just put in enough to make it triple-a rated and no more than that right so straight away you put it in like it's just a really borderline product that is good enough to be triple-a rated”
Synthetic corporate bonds can be created by combining a risk-free bond purchase with CDS protection sales—buying a 5% risk-free bond and selling 200 basis points of protection creates the equivalent of owning a 7% corporate bond without actually owning the bond itself.
“what if you went a new boss the risk-free bond...and then you sold c.d.s protection on this corporate bond and you will receive 200 basis points a year what you've done is you've essentially created a synthetic corporate bond right because you will be receiving 7% a year”
AIG, an insurance company and major seller of CDS protection, was forced into crisis when Lehman Brothers failed in 2008 because AIG had sold protection on Lehman credit risk but lacked the capital to pay out, requiring government bailouts.
“they had bought that insurance policy from AIG and of course as soon as Lehman Brothers went AIG was on the rock so you know yes they had insured their risk but they didn't sure that with an insurance company that at the time did not look like it would survive another weekend”
The largest percentage growth in asset-backed securities since 2012 has been in cell phone contracts, cell tower leases, and consumer lending, showing how securitization continues despite the 2007-2008 crisis and regulatory reforms.
“the biggest growth is cellphone contracts right which in 2008 there was no money and now there's seven and a half billion dollars worth of them in 2018 of asset-backed securities built on a cell phone contract”
Warren Buffett and other academics and analysts warned before the credit crisis that CDOs and credit derivatives spread risk and uncertainty throughout the economy, but their warnings were not widely heeded.
“there were many people that were academics there were analysts within banks there were people like Warren Buffett or you know all sorts of people warned that CDOs backed securities and other derivatives spread risk and uncertainty throughout the economy more widely”
Credit card receivables are unusual because they lack scheduled principal repayment and have no contractual maturity, making them difficult to price and classify as non-amortizing loans.
“because principal repayment is not scheduled right like it's there's no requirement to actually ever really pay them you just have to make this minimum payment credit card debt doesn't have an actual maturity right so this is a difficult product to price”
CDO-squared are CDOs backed by tranches issued by other CDOs, representing a second layer of leverage and risk concentration that amplified the problem of converting low-quality assets into high-rated securities.
“a CDO squared is kind of an interesting product because it's a term used to describe CDOs that were backed by the tranches issued by other CDOs right because I said to you that we're able to if you imagine it as sort of a sausage factor and we're able to put in all of these average mortgages and grind them through the Machine and out the other income some really good bonds”
Recovery rate in defaulted bonds is typically not zero but rather 30-40% of face value, because bondholders have priority over equity holders and can recover proceeds from asset sales, which means CDS payouts relate to the decline in bond value rather than total loss.
“often in bankruptcy events bonds don't go to zero and let's think about why that might be well when a company goes bust you know the stock will usually often or usually go to zero that the equity but the bonds don't because the the bondholders if you own a bond you you of course get the recovery of the assets”
The CDO equity tranche (lowest tranche, taking first losses) was so risky that it was often unsellable to external investors and instead retained by the issuing bank on its balance sheet.
“the equity tranche which was just a you know the worst possible like all of the early hits would would hit this you can imagine that we're gonna pay a lower interest rate to these triple-a lenders and as we move down we're going to pay slightly higher interest rates but there is Morris from with that equity tranches it was almost unsellable”
Historical banks limited loan volume not only by available deposits but also by sector risk diversification concerns, refusing loans to customers in over-represented sectors to avoid concentration risk.
“the downside of that is it might have limited the size of the loans market right because if there are fewer people making the and more good credits like good customers who need to borrow money the bank might be unable to lend to them in such a situation and it doesn't it's not always just the situation is that the bank doesn't have sufficient capital to lend out it could even be things like sector risk or size of loan that a bank finds unattractive”
CDS notional outstanding peaked at 33 trillion dollars around 2007 but fell dramatically to 9.4 trillion by 2017, with the shift toward central clearing increasing from 17% in 2011 to around 55% by 2017.
“the market for CD has flourished during the last credit boom and by that I mean pre credit crunch with gross notional outstanding reaching a period a peak of 33 trillion”
Despite CDO failures and the credit crisis, the securitization model itself is not inherently flawed—the core idea of partitioning risk across different investor types can work if participants actually scrutinize underlying asset quality.
“in many ways you can imagine that even though it went horribly wrong hopefully lessons have been learned and there is possibly a way in the future where this idea of partitioning up risk and selling different risks to taking an asset that has a mix of risks in it and selling certain risks to certain investors”
Credit derivatives markets would have been more efficient if structured with multiple maturity points (like futures markets) rather than standardizing on 5-year contracts, because intermediate hedging creates timing mismatches.
“I would argue that that's not there there are certain things about CD s contracts that in my opinion make them not great derivatives and this is one of them if you look at the way the futures market is organized where there's a whole bunch of different futures contracts that expire at a different points in time that seems more efficient than it always being this sort of five-year contract”
A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is a legal entity created specifically to hold underlying assets, issue securities backed by those assets, and manage cash flows to investors, insulating the assets from the originating company's other business risks.
“the structure usually involves the use of what we call an S PV which stands for special purpose vehicle...these are just all different companies are different entities involved in this business”
A credit default swap (CDS) is a legal contract that provides insurance against the risk of default by a company or country on its bonds, where the buyer makes periodic CDS spread payments to the seller and receives a payout if a credit event occurs.
“a credit derivative or a c.d.s is a legal contract that provides insurance against the risk of default by a company or country on its bones”
The lecturer's research in 2005 found that profitable CDS arbitrage opportunities existed but were quickly eliminated as more traders entered the market seeking the same risk-free profits.
“this was in 2005 I did find profitable opportunities in the historic data but there were a few things that there was a profit they kind of quickly disappeared”
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are asset-backed securities where underlying assets are bonds, and the payoff structure is divided into tranches with different seniority levels, so lower tranches absorb losses first before affecting higher rated tranches.
“C D o stands for collateralized debt obligations and once again these were a big issue during the the credit crunch and this is a type of asset-backed security so CDO is an asset-backed security for the underlying assets are bonds”
Companies or countries referenced in CDS (the reference entity) do not need to be involved in the CDS contract, as CDS are side bets issued between two counterparties either on exchanges or over-the-counter by banks, not issued by the reference entity itself.
“the company or country that it's based upon which we call the reference entity does not need to be involved okay and so once again we're all of our credit or with all of our derivatives...often people are confused and they think that companies issued these derivatives companies don't issue them these are side bets”
Credit is defined as trust which allows one party to provide resources to another party when the second party doesn't pay right away, and credit risk is the risk of investor losses arising from a borrower who does not make payments as promised.
“credit we have here our definition is the trust which allows one party to provide resources to another party when the second party doesn't pay right away”
Michael Lewis's 'The Big Short' chronicles the people who recognized the problems with CDOs and profited by shorting them during the crisis, illustrating that accurate prediction about credit markets was possible but required seeing through the distortions.
“there is a very good book written by Michael Lewis...called the big short...and...the it's it's a entertaining film as long as well as you know telling you about these products...the book...is about the people who did see these problems and how they ended up profiting from it”
The implied probability of default can be backed out of CDS market prices, making CDS a source of forward-looking probability estimates about borrower default.
“a key feature of CDs valuations are the probably of default right because you know that that should make obvious sense...these can be backed out of market prices and they're called the implied probabilities of defaults”
Asset-backed securities are securities whose value and income payments are derived from and collateralized by a specified pool of underlying assets, typically small and illiquid assets that cannot be sold individually.
“an asset-backed security much much like it sounds like is a security whose value and income payments are derived from and collateralized by a specified pool of underlying assets”
CDS indices like the CDX in the USA and iTraxx in Europe track CDS spread movements and became extremely important market indicators during the credit crisis, with traders monitoring them constantly.
“we talked about how there were options on indices there's also CDs indices and so these are indexes that were created to track CD s spread movements and when I was you know I was a trader at a big bank during the credit crunch and it was a rather entertaining thing in that everyone's Bloomberg screen at the time always had you know these two spreads in the USA it's called the CD X was the big interest and in Europe the I tracks was the big index”
The lecturer was forced to move this entire course online due to the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020, representing a significant shift in university teaching methods.
“today's lecture is the first lecture that I am doing entirely remotely for the university and the reason for this is of course the coronavirus thing that's going around and so classes have been canceled”
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 was an interesting time to teach derivatives because market movements were extreme, with S&P 500 falling approximately 12% in a single day (largest since 1987 crash) and subsequent volatility making derivatives pricing and theory immediately relevant.
“it's quite an interesting time to be teaching a derivatives class simply because of what's going on in the markets at the moment you know that almost every every week I teach this class for the last month I've come in and discussed whether the S&P futures were limit down or not over the last few days”