
George Shultz on Economics, Human Rights and the Fall of the Soviet Union 9/3/2007
What this covers
George Shultz, who served as Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan, speaks with Russ Roberts about the intersection of economics, diplomacy, and ideology in ending the Cold War. Shultz argues that victory came not from abstract historical forces but from deliberate American strategy rooted in a specific belief: that Soviet governance could fundamentally change. The conversation spans his experience with human rights advocacy, arms control negotiations, and the personal relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev, with particular weight given to the Reykjavik summit as a turning point. Throughout, Shultz connects economic reasoning to diplomatic practice, showing how an understanding of how incentives work over time shaped his approach to Soviet relations.
The substance branches into several distinct domains. On strategy: Shultz describes how the Reagan administration rejected détente's premise of permanent coexistence in favor of containment theory, betting that a contained Soviet system would eventually compel internal reform. On leverage: he outlines how human rights pressure worked not in isolation but in combination with arms control demands and a novel argument about the Information Age—that closed, compartmentalized societies would handicap themselves economically and that the Soviets had rational self-interest in opening communication. On economics more broadly: Shultz questions the adequacy of postwar accounting categories, critiques the blunt instrument of trade embargoes, and reflects on how economic aid succeeds or fails depending on whether governance supports it. The discussion also takes up China's trajectory, the mechanics of credibility in negotiation, and the risks of squandering what Shultz saw as an unprecedented moment of global prosperity through protectionism or diplomatic neglect.
Shultz argues that the Cold War ended not through abstract forces alone but through deliberate diplomacy grounded in the conviction that Soviet governance could change, with human rights pressure and the logic of the Information Age serving as strategic levers, and that personal leader-to-leader relationships (Reagan-Gorbachev) were the seminal breakthrough.
- Reagan and Shultz rejected 'detente'/coexistence in favor of 'containment' premised on the belief Soviet society could change
- Human rights pressure worked in combination with arms control and the argument that closed societies handicap themselves in the Information Age
- Reykjavik mattered because leaders conversed directly, achieving what staff bargaining could not
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Shultz argued to the Soviets that in the emerging Information Age, running a closed, compartmentalized society would severely handicap them, because people must communicate to reap the age's benefits — so it was to their own advantage to let people move and communicate freely; this argument 'made a dent.'
“we are in and moving more and more rapidly further into the information age... in this age you will be handicapping yourself very badly if you run a closed compartment in society people have to communicate to get the benefits of it”
Human rights pressure on the Soviets worked in combination with other agenda items (arms control, bilateral issues, regional issues), and the leverage came from the Helsinki Accords: because the Soviets had signed undertakings, the U.S. could insist on a right to know whether they were honoring them.
“they had signed the health Enki Accords and the Helsinki Accords they agreed to undertakings in this regard and so we could say we have a right to know if you're keeping up with these undertakings you signed this piece of paper and we kept at it”
Reagan explicitly anticipated the end of the Soviet Union, declaring in his 1982 Westminster speech that communism would be on the ash heap of history and that change was inevitable, even though people at the time dismissed him.
“you should read the speech he gave in Westminster London in 1982 he said that communism would be on the ash heap of history and that the change was inevitable and people and patted him on the head”
Embargoes appeal to politicians because nobody dies, no money is paid out, and they look like decisive action, while appearing to cost nothing.
“the embargo whether it has a great appeal to politicians because nobody dies you don't pay any money out and it looks like you're doing someone”
U.S. economic statistics like the GNP accounts are vastly obsolete because their categories were designed in the 1920s for an economy that no longer resembles today's; new activities get forced into old categories, and anything that doesn't fit gets labeled a 'service,' producing the misleading notion of a 'service economy.'
“The GNP accounts were categories were put together by some brilliant people at the National Bureau of Economic Research way back in the 1920s or so and these are the same classifications we use today and the economy today there is almost no resemblance to the economy then we're constantly fitting new things into old spaces and when you don't have a space you call it a service”
At Reykjavik, the Soviets offered dramatic concessions but conditioned them on abandoning missile defense ('Star Wars'); Reagan and Shultz rejected those conditions because the cost was too high, and although the immediate media fallout was intense, the major items put on the table were essentially agreed and over time all came into being — making it a seminal meeting.
“a huge amount of important stuff was put on the table and basically agreed to and once that happens you don't get it back off the table again and in fact as time went on all of the things that were agreed to at RIKEN bik came into being”
Gorbachev identified Reykjavik as the turning point of the Cold War because, for the first time, the leaders sat down for an extended period and conversed directly about all the important issues — a breakthrough that staff-level bargaining could never have achieved.
“to the first time really the leaders sat down for an extended period and talked to each other converse with each other about all the important issues and there it's possible to make changes where as staff people bargaining never could have broken through that way”
Trade sanctions have limited utility and usually only short-term effect unless very broad and adhered to; financial restrictions tend to be more effective than trade sanctions, as illustrated by South African businessmen who suddenly couldn't get loans in London and faced a deteriorating currency.
“I think the most the greatest impact actually comes were from financial restrictions rather than trade sanctions myself and I noticed that in the South Africa case that when the South African businessmen who were very well-established suddenly come to London and they find they can't get loans”
Overusing trade sanctions backfires economically because if you get 'too fast and loose' with embargoes, trading partners lose confidence and decide the U.S. is not a reliable supplier; trade cut off does not simply switch back on, so policymakers must be careful — what Shultz called 'light switch diplomacy.'
“if you get too fast and loose with it has happened in some periods of time people lose confidence and they say maybe the u.s. is not a reliable supplier”
Reagan and Shultz rejected detente's premise of permanent peaceful coexistence in favor of the original 'containment' concept, which held that contained long enough the Soviets would look inward, dislike what they saw, and change — implying the pattern of governance, including how people are treated, could change.
“the idea of containment was we should contain them and if we could contain them long enough it would cause them to look inward and they would not like what they see and they would change”
Economic foreign aid is hard and often done wrong; aid only helps if governance is right, and giving free food can be harmful by pricing local farmers out of the market and causing long-run damage, whereas funds supporting reform, education, or infrastructure at critical moments can be useful.
“I think a lot of cases when food is given and it's given then you price the local farmers out of the market because they can't provide something in no cost and that in the long run does a lot of harm”
History can be understood either as driven by extraordinary individual leaders (Bush's/Brooks's view) or as transformed from the bottom up by the everyday experiences of millions, with politics being 'a thin crust on the surface of culture' (Tolstoy's view) — and both views contain truth.
“Tolstoy believed great leaders are puffed up popinjays they think their public decisions shape history but really it is the everyday experiences of millions of people which organically... shape the destiny of nations from the bottom up”
China's rapid economic growth required relative openness, and an open economy gives the population a wholly different knowledge base; thus the question is not whether China will change but how, and China has already changed in gigantic social and political ways, not just economically.
“you don't have the kind of growth that they see in China without having relative openness in your economy and when you have an open economy that way people know what's going on and you have a wholly different kind of knowledge base in your population”
To protect the current 'golden moment' of prosperity, the U.S. needs an aggressive diplomatic full-court press addressing energy supplies, protectionism, the threat of radical Islam acquiring nuclear weapons, and climate change — which requires a larger, better-staffed State Department.
“we need to have an aggressive full-court press to policy to do everything we can to protect the golden moment... we need to have a larger State Department take more people have more people able to spread around”
The first U.S.-Soviet deal under Reagan was a quiet human rights deal: people who had taken refuge in the U.S. embassy during the Carter era were allowed to emigrate, on condition the U.S. wouldn't publicize it; Reagan's willingness to keep silent convinced the Soviets his word could be 'taken to the bank.'
“the first deal we made with the Soviet Union was a human rights deal... the basic deal was we'll let the matter if you don't crow so they got out and Ronald Reagan said no nothing”
A background in economics was extremely helpful in diplomacy because economics is inherently a strategic science: economists are accustomed to acting today without seeing immediate results, understanding that consistent action pays off with a lag.
“economics is sort of inherently a strategic science that is economists are accustomed to think that you do something today and you don't see any immediate result it happens with a lag”
Milton Friedman immersed himself in public policy while George Stigler tended to stand off on the sidelines, analyzing and occasionally laughing or crying about the political process — illustrating two different scholarly relationships to public affairs.
“Milton I wouldn't say immersed himself in it but he certainly immersed himself in the world of public policy George was more likely to stand off on the sidelines and and laugh about it analyze it”
The world economy at the time was experiencing nearly universal expansion — the IMF World Economic Outlook table had no minus signs — making it a 'golden moment,' arguably the most promising in world history, which makes it important not to throw it away by succumbing to protectionism.
“the IMF published the table recently on the world economic outlook and it had some countries in some regions and so on anyway there are no minus signs on it's a golden moment”