
Breaking The Global Dollar System | Freya Beamish
What this covers
This is a conversation between host Jack Farley and Freya Beamish, Chief Economist at TS Lombard, recorded on April 14, 2025. It starts from the current selloff in US assets and asks what it says about the post-1973 dollar system. Beamish treats the episode as a rebalancing of relative returns, not a [financial crisis](jargon:financial crisis), which is why the dollar can weaken without the usual flight-to-safety rally. She sets out what a reserve currency requires: high risk-adjusted returns, a willingness to borrow, and a strong dollar policy. The last of these includes the claim that The Federal Reserve must cut off each wage cycle to protect it.
The range is wide. On history, she uses the 1956 Suez crisis to argue that a credible currency threat requires the threatener to have no exposure to the currency. She applies that to China, whose Treasury holdings she says give it little leverage because selling would hurt its own state-owned banks more than the US. On the home front, she links hyper-globalization to hollowed-out manufacturing in Ohio and Detroit and to asset prices rising faster than the real economy. She also contrasts the positive supply shocks that once supported US profit margins with the negative supply shocks now coming from tariffs and deportations, which she says hurt bonds and equities together. Chief Justice John Roberts and the ruling on firing independent officials come up as a threat to rule of law and to returns.
The more contested turns concern China. Beamish argues that Beijing is choosing demand deflation over default or depreciation, a Japan-like path. She also says the yuan looks overvalued to Chinese policymakers chasing a 5% growth target but undervalued to the rest of the world. The conversation then moves to the Chinese banking system, tariff negotiations, the timing of inflation effects, and her expectation of a US-China deal near 30% tariffs. It ends with her asset allocation views and the roles of gold and the dollar as reserve assets.
Beeish argues the post-1973 dollar-standard international monetary system is breaking down due to deteriorating risk-adjusted returns on US assets and potential policy missteps (tariffs, Fed interference), enabling a faster multipolar currency transition than historically precedented, with major implications for tariff policy efficacy and global capital flows.
- The US dollar's reserve status rests on high risk-adjusted returns, not just incumbency; as returns decline relative to rest of world, the long-term desire to hold US assets erodes
- Tariffs and capital controls risk triggering disorderly currency realignment and monetary cooperation outside the dollar, unlike financial crises which typically strengthen the dollar
- China lacks genuine leverage over the US despite large Treasury holdings because selling would harm China more than US, inverting intuitive power dynamics
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The willingness to borrow (whether public or private sector) is a fundamental structural requirement for being the world's reserve currency because borrowing and lending necessarily offset—someone must be borrowing in order for others to have assets to hold.
“The willingness to borrow, and that doesn't seem to matter if it's it's the private sector or the public sector that's borrowing. It's just something that is deep enough, an asset, because you're when you're borrowing, you're creating an asset for someone to buy or someone to to lend to. Borrowing and lending have to add up, right?”
The 1956 Suez crisis demonstrates that the ability to threaten a currency crisis requires non-exposure to the currency itself, not exposure to it, because the threat only works if the threatener has no losses from executing the threat.
“when the US was wanted the UK to get out of Suez in 1956. They just turned around and said, 'Get out or we're calls a sterling crisis.' That was a credible threat because they didn't hold sterling in any in any kind of relevant level”
China does not have meaningful leverage over the US through treasury holdings because China is deeply exposed to the dollar and cannot quickly escape the dollar system, whereas the US leverage over Britain in 1956 (Suez crisis) was credible because US holdings of sterling were trivial and could be called without self-harm.
“China is very exposed to the dollar. So I I don't see it as China having leverage over the US. I see it as China being tied into the the dollar system in a way that it can't quickly escape from.”
China does not have meaningful leverage over the US via Treasury holdings despite owning large amounts, because selling treasuries to spike yields would harm China's state-owned banks more than it would harm the US, inverting the intuitive power dynamic and constraining China's ability to weaponize its dollar holdings.
“China is very exposed to the dollar. So I I don't see it as China having leverage over the US. I see it as China being tied into the the dollar system in a way that it can't quickly escape from”
Hyper-globalization created winners and losers, with the losers being US workers who would have been employed in manufacturing but faced competition from cheap labor abroad, explaining the hollowing out of middle income and factory closure in places like Ohio and Detroit.
“hyper globalization essentially means this positive supply shock. But who's the who's the loser in the positive supply shock? It's it's the people that would have been employed in the US if it weren't for the the the big increase in in cheap labor abroad.”
The post-1973 international monetary system is fundamentally broken because the preconditions for the US dollar's reserve status—high risk-adjusted returns on US assets, willingness to borrow (public and private), and willingness to run strong dollar policy—are deteriorating as tariffs and negative supply shocks destroy capital and reduce returns relative to the rest of the world.
“the post 1973 international monetary system is broken”
Asset prices as a percentage of the real economy have risen massively over the dollar-system period, accelerating wealth inequality, because gross dollar flows push asset prices above where real economy fundamentals justify them.
“Because the dollar is at the center of the financial system, then you get all these sort of accelerator effects which is the gross gross flows that I mentioned which on one side create a lot of wealth inequality because they're sort of pushing up the asset prices over and above the where where the real economy”
Chief Justice John Roberts overturned a lower court ruling on Trump's ability to fire independent officials, effectively lowering the barrier between government and the Federal Reserve by putting those officials on the same standing as FOMC governors, which undermines rule of law and risk-adjusted returns.
“had this this this ruling being handed down I think on the 9th of April from Chief Justice John Roberts with regards to um the the the ability of Trump to fire independent officials and those those officials he overturned a lower court ruling. those officials appear to be on the same standing as as officials on on the FOMC governors, which is, you know, just the lowering of the barrier between the the the government and the and the the Federal Reserve.”
Negative supply shocks are fundamentally destructive of capital because they create inflation that destroys growth, making them bad for both bonds and equities simultaneously, unlike positive supply shocks that benefited the US during the hyper-globalization era.
“negative supply shocks are just fundamentally destructive of capital in the sense that they they create inflation which then destroys growth. And so it's bad for bonds and bad for equities at the same time.”
Tariffs will likely cause a short sharp spike in inflation initially due to pricing opportunism on tariffed goods (e.g., laundry equipment spiked at 100% annualized rates in 2018), but much of that opportunism reverses, followed by narrative battles about whether inflation is temporary or persistent.
“there's a there is going to be a a short sharp increase in in inflation and it could be really significantly sharp if we look at sort of how prices behaved in in 2018. The the there's a lot of opportunism around tariffs. There's a tariff prices for for the affected goods shoot way way up. If you look at sort of laundry equipment that was at 100% annualized rates at at the peak, the level of of of prices then actually came almost all the way back down again subsequently.”
Japan's experience with large fiscal deficits and long periods of high fiscal spending did not prevent yen depreciation in real effective terms over the long term because the underlying deflation and return compression (caused by excess savings and supply-led policies) continuously pressured capital outflows, making fiscal stimulus insufficient to overcome structural depreciation dynamics.
“Japan has run pretty large s of a great degree of large s in in fiscal policy for for you very long period of time and on a long-term basis the trend in the real effect of exchange rate of the yen is one of depreciation in in real effective terms and that's just a sort of a a simple fact of when you have excess of of surpluses that's that's a deflation environment”
Asset prices have risen massively as a percentage of real economy because of gross dollar flows pushing up asset values, creating wealth inequality even as the real productive capacity grows more slowly.
“if you look at sort of just assets as a as a function of as as a percentage of the of the real economy that has has risen massively over this period of time. But then it also accelerates the the actual borrowing um and the the the the crash on the other side of the borrowing.”
The post-1973 international monetary system is broken and transitioning toward a multipolar currency system, with tariff announcements serving as a catalyst for this rebalancing rather than causing it.
“the problem is that the post 1973 international monetary system is broken”
The US dollar will likely weaken in the short term because long-term desire to hold US assets is being undermined by deteriorating risk-adjusted returns relative to rest of world, not due to financial crisis dynamics.
“what's being undermined here is the long-term desire to hold US assets. And that's that can give us weakness in the dollar over the short term”
The US dollar has historically derived its strength from positive supply shocks (labor availability, digitalization, automation, hyper-globalization) that increased US profit margins as a percentage of GDP, but the Trump administration is now imposing negative supply shocks (tariffs, deportations) that are fundamentally destructive of capital by creating inflation that destroys growth simultaneously for bonds and equities.
“through most of that time you had a sort of slow burn. If you can have a shock that's slow burn, but a slow burn positive supply shock. lots and lots of labor was coming online. You had you had sort of digitalization. You had you had automation. There were all these different things that were causing profits to rise as a percentage of GDP.”
The dollar spikes during financial crises whether in the US or rest of the world (2008, 2014, eurozone crisis, emerging market crises) because of short-term dollar borrowing in those regions, which hollows out ability of places like Ohio and Detroit to compete globally as the dollar rallies.
“if we look at lots of the the periods where you have seen this sort of level shift in the dollar it's July 2008 and it's you know even though the the the story was in the US dollar assets because there were short-term borrowing in US dollar assets and then then that's when we see the the spike in the dollar. imately in 2014. Again, because the US is at the center of the global financial crisis, the dollar spikes when when we have the Euro crisis, the dollar spikes when when we have the rem depreciating.”
The capital account (desire for foreign investors to buy US assets and earn high returns) drives the trade deficit, not US consumer desperation for borrowing; this capital account surplus creates the willingness to supply imports which becomes the visible trade deficit.
“That trade deficit to me is not really because the US consumer is desperate for borrowing and and has kind of sucked in capital from the rest of the world. It's more that there has been a desire to get in on high returns from the rest of the world to to the US and that has kept kept interest rates low enough in the US”
The Fed maintains strong dollar policy by cutting off the wage cycle at the end of each expansion, preventing wage growth rises that would improve middle-income prospects, thereby perpetually suppressing the labor share of income cycle after cycle.
“what's the policy that that is needed to maintain the US dollar at the center of the global financial crisis? It's kind of cutting off the wage cycle at the end of the cycle. And we know that labor markets lag the cycle. And so if you're continuously preventing the the wage growth from rising at the end of the cycle, then you're actually cutting off the part of the cycle where the middle income part of the distribution gets replenished.”
China's yuan is overvalued from a Chinese policymaker's perspective running a supply-growth model (requires constant export growth to hit 5% GDP targets), but undervalued from rest-of-world perspective where Chinese goods remain cheaply competitive.
“from the perspective of a Chinese policy maker that is trying to run a supply growth model the remn is actually overvalued from the perspective of the rest of the world of course of course it's very very cheap”
To exit a debt crisis like China faces, countries can default, depreciate the currency, or undergo demand deflation; China is choosing demand deflation (wage compression, excess supply environment) which perpetually depreciates the real effective exchange rate and destroys returns, similar to Japan's trajectory.
“How do you get out of a a debt crisis? You you you can either default. It doesn't look they're going to like they're going to default in in a great enough scale to to get out of this. Or you can depreciate the currency or you can go through demand deflation. And demand deflation is essentially just compressing wages and and creating this kind of excess supply environment where you get this deflation that that comes through and compresses returns.”
China's policy since September 2024 (shift from supply-led to demand-led growth) reflects both domestic political pressure and response to global pushback against deflation-export policies, indicating political coalitions in other countries are finally punishing surplus nations.
“That's why it's very very important that we saw in September the Chinese authorities responding to their own sort of civil civil pressures and responding to the sort of the push back from the rest of the world saying we we actually don't want this flood of supply. It's kind of causing quite a lot of dislocations for us in terms of our production and that sort of pivot from the from from supplyledd policy to more domestic demandled policy”
The capital account (foreign desire to invest in US assets) drives the trade deficit more fundamentally than the trade deficit drives the capital account, because the desire for high US asset returns from the rest of world creates capital inflows that keep US interest rates low enough to sustain borrowing.
“I would say it's the it's the capital account that that creates the the the trade the trade deficit and the the sort of that channel is something that a lot of people will push back against”
The current volatility and selloff in US assets is not a financial crisis but a genuine rebalancing in investors' appreciation of relative returns between US and rest of world, which means the dollar can weaken without the typical flight-to-safety rally, enabling faster transition away from dollar dominance.
“It's a it's a genuine sort of rebalancing in people's appreciation of the relative returns of the US versus the rest of the world”
From China's policy perspective the yuan is undervalued because hitting the 5% growth target requires net exports to contribute approximately 50% of GDP, so the currency must remain cheap; however from the global perspective the yuan is undervalued and causing deflationary excess supply, creating a fundamental conflict that tariffs cannot resolve and that threatens a broader multipolar currency realignment.
“from the perspective of a Chinese policy maker that is trying to run a supply growth model the remn is actually overvalued”
Europe's weak defense sector (which has been allowed to atrophy) is a structural disadvantage in competing for reserve currency status because historically, dominant reserve currencies have been backed by strong military capabilities.
“typically historically when you have a reserve currency it tends to be correlated with a strong defense sector and unfortunately Europe has sort of allowed its defense sector to to go to to waste.”
The Federal Reserve's role in maintaining dollar dominance requires it to cut off wage growth at the end of business cycles by restraining labor markets, which prevents middle-income wage recovery and perpetuates labor share decline, making hawkish monetary policy a structural requirement of the dollar system itself.
“the willingness of the of the Fed to to to run strong dollar policy, which again, what's the policy that that is needed to maintain the US dollar at the center of the global financial crisis? It's kind of cutting off the wage cycle at the end of the cycle”
During financial crises outside the US (Euro crisis, emerging market stress, ruble depreciation), the dollar spikes as safe-haven capital flows in, which hollows out competitiveness for manufacturing in places like Ohio and Detroit even though the crisis is not US-originated.
“when you have the crash because there's so much short-term dollar borrowing then that's going to create a lot of dollar strength at that moment in time. So if we look at lots of the the periods where you have seen this sort of level shift in the dollar it's July 2008... imately in 2014. Again, because the US is at the center of the global financial crisis, the dollar spikes when when we have the Euro crisis, the dollar spikes when when we have the rem depreciating. And so that again sort of hollows out the ability of of Ohio and and you know Detroit, these these places to to actually be competitive on a global standard because the US dollar rallies when there's financial crashes that don't either whether they're to do with the the US or whether they're to do with the rest of the world.”
If tariff rates exceed approximately 55-60% on Chinese goods, Chinese exports to the US would fall to zero regardless of the nominal tariff rate, making extreme tariff rates above that threshold economically meaningless because the multiplicative effect of tariff on zero trade volume is zero.
“by by the time you get above 55 60% Chinese exports to the US would be zero. So a gazillion gazillion% of zero is still zero”
If China's large tariff-displaced exports flood other markets (Europe, Australia), those countries' governments will escalate tariff protections against Chinese goods, creating potential for further global trade war escalation beyond US-China tensions.
“How does the rest of the world respond to that? they they probably won't accept that level of of of of reorientation of of global trade flows because you know there are lobbies within each of these different economies for you know the auto sector and for the various different sectors that are very very exposed and already have been under attack from the the flow of of Chinese goods”
Profit share of income is at historic highs relative to labor share, and the political economy of the system creates pressure for that to reverse toward higher labor share and lower profit share, but tariffs and negative supply shocks worsen this dynamic by destroying absolute profit levels while simultaneously raising wage pressure.
“profits are very high as a percentage of GDP and and and almost in direct parallel to that labor is is very low as a percentage of labor income is very low as a percentage of of GDP. And so the sort of the political thrust is towards labor share of income increasing and profit share of income decreasing”
Trade is a more important contributor to Chinese growth than fiscal policy because China has already over-invested domestically (very low returns), so multipliers on fiscal stimulus are low; therefore, even with fiscal policy gains, loss of trade due to tariffs will produce net structural slowdown.
“I think there's a temptation to think of, you know, the greater is tariffs than the greater than fiscal policy will be and those two things will sort of offset each other. I don't think that works because, you know, trade as a as a contributor to growth is is probably more meaningful than than fiscal policy as it currently stands in China because there's been so much fiscal policy and there's been so much overinvestment domestically that the returns there are very low and the multipliers are probably very low as well.”
The North People's Congress (NPC) fiscal numbers in 2025 are reasonably strong and frontloaded compared to recent years, suggesting China is attempting to shift toward domestic demand even though it hasn't fully delivered in narrative terms.
“They haven't really come through on the numbers rhetorically. I actually think that the that the NPC numbers were were reasonably reasonably strong on the fiscal front and then actually looking at the the amount that they've issued in local governments, they have frontloaded that much more so this year than they have in in recent years as well.”
The People's Bank of China has been preventing the yuan from depreciating by sucking liquidity out of the system and pushing up short-term rates in order to maintain capital flows and protect the currency, indicating China's priority is avoiding rapid depreciation.
“When we look at what the PBS has been doing until sort of post liberation day, they've been preventing the currency from depreciating. they've been they've been sort of sucking liquidity out of the of the system and pushing up short-term rates in order that that again these capital flows are are sort of maintained within the currency or at least that the pressure the depreciation pressure is is is less.”
The uncertainty effect of tariff escalation could be large enough to tip the US into recession even if the tariff level itself wouldn't, because uncertainty about future policy makes investment and hiring decisions impossible.
“Now whether whether the uncertainty effect is just too great in addition to the sort of subtraction from growth that is is implied by by the 10% tariff. That's that's a sort of another question.”
Renminbi is not a successor to dollar in reserve currency hierarchy; euro is also not; instead, multipolar currency system will emerge with monetary cooperation outside US (CBDC systems, cross-border lending) creating advantages that may eventually exceed dollar system.
“I think what becomes particularly interesting is is when you start to get monetary cooperation outside of the US. So we already have seen a lot of that. ...but I think there is now a sort of a geopolitical shift to to to speed up that process towards the remn but I I don't think it as I said I don't think it's a a sort of successor to the dollar in any way in the same way that I don't think the euro is.”
China's digital renminbi system is a parallel to dollar system that is currently shallow but geopolitical shifts are incentivizing deeper development; if borrowing in short-term renminbi and lending in renminbi assets accelerates, this speeds up renminbi circulation globally.
“China essentially has a parallel system which is much more sort of digitalized that outside of of the dollar and that is very shallow at the moment like it's there and it's in parallel but it's not it's not been kind of used to any great sort of depth but I think there is now a sort of a geopolitical shift to to to speed up that process towards the remn”
Trade as a contributor to growth is more meaningful than fiscal policy for China because China has already deployed massive fiscal stimulus with low multipliers, and overlapping frontloaded trade gains and fiscal stimulus will not smoothly transition, creating structural slowdown risk.
“trade as a as a contributor to growth is is probably more meaningful than than fiscal policy as it currently stands in China because there's been so much fiscal policy and there's been so much overinvestment domestically that the returns there are very low and the multipliers are probably very low as well.”
China's response to high tariffs will likely redirect exports toward Europe and Australia, and those countries will resist further Chinese import penetration, creating a potential for tariff escalation and trade war expansion beyond the US-China bilateral relationship.
“if if certainly if these tariffs stay in place and in that case that's that is a sort of a recessionary environment but even if the tariffs are are negotiated down to sort of 20 or 30%. There is going to be a flood of of of tariffs of um sorry exports that is redirected to the rest of the world and you know that is is disinflationary. Yeah. How does the rest of the world respond to that? they they probably won't accept that level of of of of reorientation of of global trade flows because you know there are lobbies within each of these different economies”
China's exports to the US will be effectively zero if tariff rates stay above 55-60%, making discussion of tariff rates above 100% meaningless because the quantity goes to zero; the real policy space is 20-30% tariffs which allow some trade to continue.
“this doesn't matter at all because by by by the time you get above 55 60% Chinese exports to the US would be zero. So a gazillion gazillion% of zero is still zero.”
Deleveraging creates a long period of slower growth when the credit cycle crashes, compounding the inequality problem because asset owners must liquidate during downturns while workers face wage pressure.
“when you then have the crash then then there's a long period of deleveraging for instance which which causes slower growth.”
US dollar strength on a real effective exchange rate basis (adjusted for unit labor costs) is measured as significantly overvalued relative to the 1973+ long-term average, making it uncompetitive on global standards despite numerical weakness moves.
“From the perspective of the US though, if we look at my my favorite way of looking at it is just to take a very long-term average since 1973 of the of the real effective exchange rate on a unit labor cost basis. And on that but that basis, we're still pretty we're we're very kind of overvalued for for the US dollar. And that's that's the problem, right?”
The US dollar has been sustained as reserve currency through three decades of hyper-globalization and automation creating positive supply shocks and high profit margins, but these polices created structural inequality and hollowed out middle income in the US, making Trump's electorate an indirect product of the very dollar system Trump now attacks.
“hyper globalization and automation these are the things that have created increase in in profits as a percentage of GDP and shown the US being exceptionalism”
The ECB can likely continue cutting rates while Europe undergoes a deflationary phase, and Europe's short-term disinflationary environment creates opportunity for fixed income investors despite longer-term reflation story.
“we have the ECB be likely to cut rates and able to cut rates because it's a and if anything a sort of a short-term disinflation story that we have for for Europe”
If US administration tampers with capital flows or undermines Federal Reserve independence, this would create chaotic environment incentivizing rest of world to accelerate development of alternative CBDC-based system.
“those things would create the sort of chaotic environment which would would would incentivize the rest of the world to sort of get its act together in terms of maybe creating some sort of system that might resolve revolve around sort of central bank digital currencies and sort of parallel the the the dollar system”
China cannot rapidly pivot away from supply-led growth to consumption-led growth within 5-10 years despite stated willingness from both US and Chinese governments because the structural reforms required (financial repression removal, social safety net, banking recapitalization) are politically and practically difficult.
“I think from a longer term perspective I'd take the second part of of of the way that you that you framed it. I think for for the reasons that I said I think it's very difficult for China within a a 5 10 year time frame genuinely to transition towards private consumption-led growth.”
From a longer-term perspective, China will likely remain unable to transition to genuine private consumption-led growth within a 5-10 year horizon due to structural constraints (financial repression, low social safety net, banking system fragility), but at the margin China has shown willingness to reorient toward stimulating domestic demand as reflected in fiscal numbers since September and local government bond issuance frontloading.
“I think for for the reasons that I said I think it's very difficult for China within a a 5 10 year time frame genuinely to transition towards private consumption-led growth”
To maintain the dollar's center position in the global financial system requires three preconditions: (1) high risk-adjusted returns relative to elsewhere, (2) willingness to borrow (private or public), and (3) willingness to run strong dollar policy; and these preconditions historically have been sustained by hyper-globalization and automation.
“There's there's what are the preconditions for being the the the global reserve currency? There's, as we said, high-risisk adjusted returns relative to to elsewhere. The willingness to borrow, and that doesn't seem to matter if it's it's the private sector or the public sector that's borrowing. It's just something that is deep enough, an asset, because you're when you're borrowing, you're creating an asset for someone to buy or someone to to lend to. Borrowing and lending have to add up, right? So that that willingness to borrow is is a fundamental part of of the of being the the world's reserve currency and being at the center of the global financial system. And then not only those those first two preconditions, but also there has to be a willingness to run a kind of a strong dollar policy as well.”
Risk assets face significant downside risk because the average valuation level that has persisted since 1989 (around 23x) is likely to be revised considerably downward over the next 10 years due to increased likelihood of negative supply shocks.
“I do think that there's a significant risk there that the the the average of valuations that has persisted since 1989 being sort of above above 20 sort of 23 or so is is at risk and that we could see that average being being sort of revised considerably down over the next 10 10 years or so. And I think actually that increase in likelihood of negative supply shocks is one of the triggers for that.”
Basis trades (where financial entities exploit pricing discrepancies in treasury markets) unwinding and hedge funds experiencing corrections is not a financial crisis in the traditional sense, even if it causes significant pain to specific market segments, because it does not create systemic short-term funding stress.
“I see like basis trades unwinding and that's kind of like very painful for for segments of the the financial sector but sort of hedge funds going through that sort of potentially severe correction is not a financial crisis.”
There is a threshold where inflation volatility (not just levels) matters for term premium: rising stable inflation regime is cyclical stagflation, but rising volatile inflation regime pulls up term premium significantly; threshold appears to be around 4% inflation handle consistently, and tariffs above 10-20% combined with deportations could breach that.
“there's a threshold essentially. You can have a a rising stable regime of inflation and then you can have a rising volatile regime of inflation. And those things mean very different things for how they're absorbed into into asset prices.”
The reason the US dollar became the global reserve currency is distinct from the fact that it is currently the center of the global financial system, and this distinction is crucial because current demand for US assets can deteriorate without triggering the financial stress that would otherwise cause dollar appreciation in a true crisis.
“there's there's some some very clear distinctions that we we have to make. And the first is the reason for the US dollar being the international reserve currency and the center of the global financial system versus the fact that it is right now.”
Chief Justice John Roberts' April 9 ruling allowing Trump to fire independent Fed officials lowered the institutional barrier between government and Federal Reserve, threatening the Fed independence that has been a key underpinning of US risk-adjusted returns for decades.
“had this this this ruling being handed down I think on the 9th of April from Chief Justice John Roberts with regards to um the the the ability of Trump to fire independent officials and those those officials he overturned a lower court ruling. those officials appear to be on the same standing as as officials on on the FOMC governors, which is, you know, just the lowering of the barrier between the the the government and the and the the Federal Reserve.”
The renminbi is unlikely to become a successor to the dollar in reserve currency role because China's deleveraging cycle and supply-led growth policies prevent it from accumulating the kind of surplus savings and asset depth that reserve currencies require.
“I I don't think it as I said I don't think it's a a sort of successor to the dollar in any way in the same way that I don't think the euro is.”
Basis trades unwinding (hedging basis between repo markets and spot prices) is causing severe corrections for hedge funds but does not constitute a financial crisis, as it involves long-duration financial assets (treasuries) not systemic assets.
“I see like basis trades unwinding and that's kind of like very painful for for segments of the the financial sector but sort of hedge funds going through that sort of potentially severe correction is not a financial crisis. The the sort of the issues that we see at the moment are about the the asset involved is the is is US government debt.”
The post-pandemic and post-Ukraine invasion environment has raised perceptions of future negative supply shock likelihood, which causes investors to adaptively expect more frequent shocks and demand higher term premium as protection, making any additional tariff shock that breaches the 4% inflation threshold especially damaging to long-term asset valuations.
“perceptions of the likelihood, that's the important point, the likelihood of negative supply shocks are gradually being pulled higher. And every time you get a negative supply shock, then there's a sort of an adaptive expectations part of of the way in which investors think about things”
The dollar's role as reserve currency will likely face structural challenge from multiple competing assets (euro, gold, renminbi) rather than being replaced by a single successor, with geopolitical shifts creating incentive for increased renminbi usage especially in short-term lending and potentially enabling parallel currency systems outside the dollar based on digital technology.
“I think gold has to be one of the recipients but I don't think it's big enough to be the only recipient I think and that goes for pretty much everything else in the world. It's there there's some marginal benefit for for for for the euro”
In high volatility regimes, it is not always the case that the dollar appreciates; dollar appreciation happens when there is stress in short-term funding markets specifically, not when there is volatility from real economy reassessment.
“if we look at sort of correlations within different regimes. So a sort of a low volatility regime and a high volatility regime. It's not always the case that the dollar spikes when the dollar appreciates when when you have when you have high volatility... if you have stress in short-term funding markets, you know, so many different investors and people are are exposed to that short-term dollar dollar funding. And so actually that's an environment in which the dollar rallies.”
Euro area offers best alternative to US dollar for investors seeking higher risk-adjusted returns because eurozone policy has shifted to loosen fiscal rules and coordinate public-private investment synergies, which will have low multipliers initially but high multipliers over 2-3 years.
“there appears to have been an improvement in the risk adjusted returns in the Euro area. So we we kind of look at the the response of policy makers in Europe to to the to the threat of Trump and as I said to the the the political shifts that have happened within Europe. And the response has been to to change that silly old fiscal rule that they had and and that that seems to be something that could benefit the the block and benefit Germany in terms of of creating these sort of synergies between the the public investment and and private investment.”
The uncertainty effect of tariff policy itself (apart from the direct tariff impact) may be large enough to tip the US economy into recession even at a 10% tariff rate, depending on how much business investment is deterred by policy ambiguity.
“But I think we have seen that Trump will blink if certain things happen in financial markets which we've we've discussed. And so I think you know he will he will pull back to a level that is is absorbable by by the US economy without necessarily driving it into recession. Now whether whether the uncertainty effect is just too great in addition to the sort of subtraction from growth that is is implied by by the 10% tariff. That's that's a sort of another question.”
The VIX spike following Trump's tariff announcement was not driven by short-term dollar funding stress (which would cause dollar strength) but by reassessment of fundamental US growth expectations, which is why the dollar actually sold off despite VIX rising—a departure from normal crisis dynamics.
“I think the reason why we had high volatility in the wake of liberation day was because people were reassessing the long-term reasons for holding for holding US assets which is another part of your your your question. And so it was actually much more about the real economy than the financial economy. And that's why we had this this big spike in kind of volatility, but you didn't necessarily have the the appreciation of the dollar.”
Trump's reaction function is triggered when both bond yields and the dollar sell off simultaneously (a 'Liz Truss moment'), because this combination means capital is being destroyed with no way to profit from chaos; this is distinct from normal VIX spikes which don't necessarily correlate with dollar strength.
“when you've got both of those things happening, then then you know you're there's no way for you to profit from the chaos effectively. The capital is just being destroyed.”
The Trump administration will end up settling on approximately 10% baseline tariffs on most of the world (used for fiscal revenue) and 20-30% on China (for negotiation), because 10% is large enough to generate meaningful fiscal revenue and appeal to lower-income Republican constituencies while remaining absorbable without causing recession, but the administration overplayed its hand by starting too high and delivering poorly, which accelerated financial market stress.
“I think in the end the the 10% is the one that will will prevail for everyone apart from China and that that 10% has been our our long long-term call”
The likelihood of disorderly transition has risen because of US administration risks around tampering with capital flows and tampering with the Fed, which explains recent correlation shifts in financial markets.
“I think there's there's some some very clear distinctions that we we have to make. And the first is the reason for the US dollar being the international reserve currency and the center of the global financial system versus the fact that it is right now... And I think those triggers are anything to do with the US administration tampering with the the capital flows and tampering with the Fed. And I actually see, you know, both of those things, the likelihood of those has risen.”
The Euro area has improved in terms of risk-adjusted returns due to policy changes in response to Trump threat, including changes to the Eurozone's fiscal rules that enable public investment to combine with private investment synergies.
“there appears to have been an improvement in the risk adjusted returns in the Euro area. So we we kind of look at the the response of policy makers in Europe to to the to the threat of Trump and as I said to the the the political shifts that have happened within Europe. And the response has been to to change that silly old fiscal rule that they had and and that that seems to be something that could benefit the the block and benefit Germany in terms of of creating these sort of synergies between the the public investment and and private investment.”
The connection between hyper-globalization, the dollar's role as reserve currency, and the hollowing of middle-income in the US cannot be disentangled—the policies that created cheap labor abroad, excess supply globally, and low inflation in rest-of-world are inseparable from the dollar's reserve status, and all together explain rising inequality in the US and major economies.
“I don't think you can disentangle those effects of hyper globalization, US domestic policy with regards to globalization, policies that that created kind of wage depression in Eurasia and Europe and and China that those policies that have created sort of excess supply in the rest of the world are part of the hyper globalization and and the US acceptance of of the cheaper goods is part of that hyper globalization and I think that can't be separated searated from the the role of of the US dollar in in global financial markets as well. I think they all kind of go together to explain not just the increase in inequality in the US system, but the increase in inequality globally”
China's limited uptake as reserve currency will occur despite geopolitical reasons for greater renminbi usage because historically reserve currencies correlate with strong defense sectors and Europe has allowed its defense sector to waste, leaving China as only non-dollar alternative but without technological or institutional maturity.
“There's a question there which my my my colleague on the eur euro area raises is typically historically when you have a reserve currency it tends to be correlated with a strong defense sector and unfortunately Europe has sort of allowed its defense sector to to go to to waste.”
Trump's negotiating strategy follows 'art of the deal' principle: open with extreme ask (100%+ tariffs), anchor expectations high, then retreat to lower level that seems reasonable by comparison (10-20%) to appear victorious, but this approach encountered unexpected tightening of financial conditions faster than tariffs hurt trade partners.
“start with the negotiating position of a a very very extreme ask and then you narrow it down and you still get a lot but in relative you know it says oh my god they they they negotiated so for example you start with a 50% tariff on China and then you go to 100% and then in comparison a 20% tariff it seems so low of course China is going to agree to that”
Beeish's base case for final tariff rates is 10% on rest of world (fiscal policy and political necessity to mollify lower-income constituencies) and 20-30% on China (higher due to visceral US administration dislike and perceived unfair trading practices).
“I think in the end the the 10% is the one that will will prevail for everyone apart from China and that that 10% has been our our long long-term call because there's there's a number of different things that tariffs are being used for here. There's there's tariffs for negotiation, which is the so-called reciprocal tariffs, and then there's tariffs for fiscal policy. And I think the tariffs for fiscal policy is the 10%.”
Fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone will initially be low but will rise sharply over time, which plays into a 2-3 year reflation story for the euro area.
“I think initially the fiscal multipliers there won't be that high but they will rise quite sharply over time and that plays into a sort of 2 to threeyear story that will validate sort of reflation stories around around the euro area”
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessett revealed Trump's implied reaction function when he stated that tariffs wouldn't be so inflationary because the dollar would strengthen; but actual events showed the opposite (tariffs caused dollar weakness initially), suggesting the administration misunderstood the inflation-currency dynamics.
“when Treasury Secretary Scott Besson was testifying for Congress to be approved he said part of the reason tariffs wouldn't be so inflationary is because the dollar would strengthen and if it's weakened obviously you get the opposite effect”
The relationship between unit labor cost inflation and CPI inflation is reverting to a 1990s level, which implies higher structural inflation and lower profit margins than the 2010s-2020s when offshore labor kept that relationship suppressed.
“the relationship between unit labor cost inflation and CPI inflation goes back to a sort of a '9s relationship which does imply higher higher inflation and lower margins.”
The US administration's poor execution on tariff delivery (inconsistent messaging, apparent last-minute changes, appearance of incompetence) damaged investor confidence more than the tariff policy itself, triggering a reassessment of competency that accelerated market repricing.
“in terms of how they delivered it, which just seemed to create the, you know, the appearance the appearance of incompetency. Like they had this board and they were they were sort of pointing at things and and it just it just they were negotiating. They were they were thinking about these tariffs apparently right up until the the day when they talked about when they actually when they actually revealed them and just multiple things about the way in which it was delivered made investors really question you know the the competency behind the the the the delivery there.”
Tariff implementation may be slowed by DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) efforts, which work against rapid tariff schedule changes needed for inflationary tariffs to flow through, potentially reducing short-term inflation shock but delaying the reckoning.
“One other sort of point that I'll make there is also just how quickly can this be implemented in practice because some of the Doge stuff goes against the the the actual implementation because you know I is there actually going to be are there actually going to be changes to the tariff schedules in time”
Shorter-term traders should view tariff deals as selling opportunities; when good news on deal emerges, buy the rip, don't buy the dip, because underlying trend is toward stress.
“I think there are going to be opportunities there for sort of shorterterm investors just because as I said I think that the the the tendency is going to be towards sort of good news with regards to to deals. I would then say that those are sort of selling opportunities. So how did my strategy counterpart put that? buy sell the rip don't buy the dip”
The US administration is engaging in 'cakeism'—wanting to have both a strong dollar (for reserve currency prestige) and currency depreciation (for trade and reshoring competitiveness) simultaneously, which is economically impossible and reflects contradictory policy objectives.
“there's a whole different bunch of ways in which they they certainly can be accused of of cakeism. You want to sort of have your cake and eat it”
If tariff implementation is slowed or delayed (due to Doge-related capacity issues or practical scheduling barriers), the inflationary response could be more gradual than expected, potentially spreading price increases and term premium effects across a longer period.
“there's just how quickly can this be implemented in practice because some of the Doge stuff goes against the the the actual implementation because you know I is there actually going to be are there actually going to be changes to the tariff schedules in time”
Short-term investors should buy into dips and sell subsequent rallies during the tariff negotiation period, because the tendency will be toward positive news flow on deals, making short-term rallies selling opportunities rather than buying opportunities.
“I think there are going to be opportunities there for sort of shorterterm investors just because as I said I think that the the the tendency is going to be towards sort of good news with regards to to deals. I would then say that those are sort of selling opportunities”
The US administration's delivery and execution of tariff announcements appeared incompetent to investors—they were being thought through nearly until the announcement day, and the manner of revelation created market perception of incompetency, which contributed materially to market repricing beyond the tariff economics alone.
“they were negotiating. They were thinking about these tariffs apparently right up until the the day when they talked about when they actually when they actually revealed them and just multiple things about the way in which it was delivered made investors really question you know the the the competency behind the the the the delivery there”
The host (unknown name) and Freya discuss whether the US or China has greater negotiating power on trade, with the host noting Treasury Secretary Scott Bessett has argued the US (trade deficit country) has more power than China (trade surplus country) because tariffs hurt surplus countries more.
“Treasury Secretary Scott Bessett has made the case that the the US is a trade deficit country. The China is a trade surplus country and as a result, the US has negotiating power because it if imports go down, it's going to hurt China way more than the United States.”
The host (unknown) reports that 70 countries are calling (Trump) seeking to negotiate tariffs, but this is not equivalent to substantive concessions—it's a signal of diplomatic engagement without resolved commitments.
“they said 70 countries are calling but that's different than you know substance concessions.”