
The Great Depression Returning... - Lyn Alden
What this covers
This 11-minute video presents Lyn Alden of Lyn Alden Investment Strategy in a condensed, interview-style conversation about why the Federal Reserve's usual tools fit the present economy poorly. The title points to the Great Depression, but the material runs mostly through the structure of postwar monetary policy. Alden contrasts the 1970s and 1980s, an era of monetary dominance in which bank lending drove money creation and rate changes could govern it, with today's fiscal dominance. She puts the threshold at roughly 100% debt-to-GDP, past which higher rates inflate interest expense and the deficit along with it. She also describes a forty-year stretch of rising debt offset by falling rates, an offset that ended around 2020.
The middle of the talk draws out consequences. She calls rate hikes against fiscal and energy-driven inflation incoherent, and argues that a 25-basis point move barely matters to most unlevered investors. She describes a two-speed economy in which young homebuyers are squeezed while deficit-funded spending and asset prices favor the wealthy. She notes that interest expense now exceeds defense spending. Tools for managing high debt, such as financial repression and yield curve control, are discussed as options that bring more debasement and inflation. The Fed, she says, keeps its regulatory role but loses much of its policy effectiveness. Many of these claims are contested. She also expects no repeat of 2021–2022 breakaway inflation, and she describes energy shocks as leaving prices sticky on the way down, with China's inventory drawdowns offsetting an oil supply disruption.
The last stretch turns to AI and technology. Alden compares AI infrastructure to the fiber-optic overbuild, in which essential builders went bankrupt, and notes that many hyperscaler firms are free cash flow negative. She also argues that leading model companies are venture-funded and underprice usage, much as Uber did. She still expects durable GPU and RAM demand, and favors "going fishing" among sold-off companies with strong fundamentals.
Fiscal dominance—where government spending rather than bank lending drives inflation—fundamentally weakens the Fed's traditional monetary tools, requiring investors to shift from rate-focused strategies to selective equity, gold, and commodity positioning while avoiding overvalued AI and technology trades.
- When fiscal deficits exceed net new bank lending, raising interest rates worsens deficits rather than controlling inflation, making rate policy ineffective
- The Fed's 40-year playbook of controlling inflation through rates worked in the monetary dominance era but fails under fiscal dominance with 100%+ debt-to-GDP
- This creates a two-speed economy where bond investors and homebuyers suffer while deficit-funded spending enriches asset holders, requiring portfolio repositioning away from traditional fixed income
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Commodity prices are volatile and often ratchet downward slowly or not at all when their drivers subside, whereas most non-commodity prices tend to ratchet upward persistently in response to energy cost increases but fail to ratchet back down proportionally when energy prices decline, creating persistent sticky inflation.
“most prices, they slowly ratchet up, not usually as quickly as oil and gas, but they ratchet up including in response to higher energy prices. And then if the prices come back down, usually those prices are stickier.”
Even though AI and technology stocks can move quickly and may experience corrections, they can still represent good opportunities after consolidation, with the speaker's strategy being to 'go fishing' in markets that cool off to find companies with strong fundamentals that have sold off due to sector sentiment.
“things can move a little bit too quickly. So, I think the AI trade is heated. I think parts of it are bubbly like SpaceX, but, you know, whenever it does kind of cool off or consolidate for a period of time, I always kind of go fishing in that market and say, 'Okay, what is kind of sold off, but is still doing great numbers?'”
For most investors (equities, gold, real estate, or unlevered bond investors), a 25 basis point difference in Fed policy (one rate hike or cut) is not a major driver and is nearly irrelevant to portfolio outcomes, though it matters significantly for leveraged short-term traders and futures traders.
“Now again, one hike or one cut is not that big of a driving force. For me, it's almost irrelevant. It obviously impacts if you're a leveraged short-term bond trader and things like that, or you know, trading in straight futures and things like that, it's obviously very relevant. But if you're an equity investor or gold investor or real estate investor, you know, even just an unlevered bond investor, like you know, if if you're doing things like that, 25 basis points is not a massive thing to focus on in my opinion.”
The long end of the bond curve is driven by multiple independent factors: inflation expectations, the supply of new bonds hitting the market relative to existing buyers' balance sheets, and geopolitical decisions about whether international buyers are on strike or accumulating, rather than a single deterministic force.
“There's a lot of moving parts on the long end of the curve. There's obviously expectations around what inflation is going to be. There's sheer amounts of supply hitting the market compared to what existing balance sheets are willing to buy. There's even geopolitical decisions sometimes like are international buyers on strike or are they accumulating?”
Under fiscal dominance, when fiscal deficits in a given year are larger than net new bank loan creation, raising interest rates does not effectively combat inflation because while higher rates may reduce bank lending, they simultaneously increase government interest expenses and thus enlarge the fiscal deficit even further.
“But when you're in fiscal dominance, when fiscal deficits in a given year are bigger than net new bank loan creation, interest rates don't do quite as much for that because every time they raise interest rates, while they could put some downward pressure on bank lending, they actually blow out the fiscal deficit even more.”
The Fed faces a challenging position because current interest rate levels are already restrictive on housing (reducing mortgage demand), yet inflation remains above target, indicating the inflation problem is not driven by excessive bank lending but rather by other sources such as fiscal spending and energy prices.
“it's a challenging position to be in if you're the Fed because as the chairman pointed out, their current levels already restrictive on housing and yet we still have above target inflation and it's because it's not really bank lending.”
Raising interest rates when inflation is driven by fiscal deficits and geopolitical supply shocks (like energy disruption from conflict) rather than bank lending expansion is logically incoherent: the government will not spend less in response to higher rates, and the marginal borrower's behavior change has no bearing on the actual source of inflation.
“if you have, 'Hey, inflation's up because we're running structural big deficits, and you know, we had a war, so like energy was elevated for a while.' And you say, 'Well, let's raise interest rates in response to that.' What exactly are you doing? I mean, the government's not going to spend less. If If anything, they're going to spend more because you just increased their interest expense. And you're still having the similar effect on bank lending, which is, you know, the marginal borrower might be more conservative because interest rates are going up, but that's already not really the core issue anyway.”
The primary AI models (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) are venture-capital funded and highly unprofitable, meaning they are effectively subsidizing end-user usage by pricing it below cost, artificially inflating apparent demand; this is similar to Uber's growth strategy, which slowed once pricing normalized.
“The primary AI models, you know, OpenAI and Anthropic and all this, they are VC funded. They're highly unprofitable. So, they're subsidizing usage of them, meaning that the demand we see in AI now is partly because they're making it cheaper than it really is because they're, you know, they're trying to get growth, which it makes sense when you're in that growth arc, but it also, it's kind of like how Uber was growing very quickly because it was underpriced, but once they started pricing it at a more balanced level, demand kind of eventually slowed down.”
A two-speed economy emerges under fiscal dominance: young families trying to buy homes are severely hurt by high interest rates (mortgages are practically unaffordable), while the government continues spending on Social Security, Medicare, and defense (funded by deficits), and wealthy individuals with asset exposure benefit from higher asset prices and fiscal stimulus, creating a highly polarized economy.
“And that's how you get this kind of two-speed economy where if someone's like a young family looking to buy their first home with a mortgage without help from say their parents, they're in a world hurt right now. It's practically unaffordable, whereas the deficits are primarily going to Social Security, Medicare, and defense. Obviously, wealthy individuals are doing very good. And so, you get this really polarized economy.”
The market is trained to believe that the solution to inflation is always higher interest rates because that lesson was learned in the 1970s, but that paradigm only worked in an era where most money creation came from bank lending and interest rates are a powerful tool for curtailing or accelerating bank lending.
“the market still doesn't fully appreciate because the market is so trained to think that the solution to inflation is always higher rates. That's kind of the main lesson from the '70s. But that was in an era where most of that money creation was from bank lending and interest rates are very powerful tool for curtailing or and sometimes accelerating bank lending.”
China's flexibility in reducing imports and willingness to draw down its large and opaque strategic inventories has been the biggest factor offsetting the oil supply shock, more significant than most observers anticipated when the disruption occurred.
“The biggest factor ended up being that China was a lot more flexible than many people thought in terms of greatly reducing their imports, being willing to draw down their large and opaque inventories. And that was a much bigger offset.”
Historically, the companies that built fiber optic cable infrastructure went bankrupt despite the cables being essential and valuable, because they overestimated demand growth and overbuilt capacity, illustrating a pattern where infrastructure builders in new technologies often fail despite enabling the technology's success.
“Famously, the companies that laid the fiber optic cables like go bankrupt, right? I mean, it's not that we didn't need those. It's great they did that, but it was very expensive and they kind of overestimated how much front-running would happen, how much growth would occur.”
The US experienced a 40-year period (roughly 1980-2020) of rising debt-to-GDP that was offset by structurally declining interest rates, allowing governments and households to service rising debt despite higher principal amounts, but this offset disappeared around 2020 when rates hit zero and have since trended sideways.
“in the US we had a kind of 40-year period of rising debt to GDP, but it was offset by structurally declining interest rates until we hit roughly zero. And now that we're trending, you know, sideways in interest rates, and we still have the high debt to GDP, we no longer have that interest rate offset.”
Artificial intelligence may have experienced a bubble-like valuation spike (stocks rising too quickly) similar to the pattern that occurs with major technological breakthroughs, where early infrastructure builders face overinvestment followed by consolidation and repricing.
“So gold had that crazy two-year run, and the question was, 'Is it a bubble?' And I would say, 'Well, I wouldn't call it overvalued. I just think it got here kind of too quickly for comfort.' And so it it's likely to correct form a higher base, and then it can recover from there. I think AI is similar, which is that I mean, I think a lot of the the is real. I think it is a pretty big productivity game in a lot of cases. Any sort of technological shift often has waves of getting overbuilt or overvalued.”
The Fed has a policy dilemma: inflation is above target and has been rising recently, so the Fed is emphasizing price stability, creating pressure to raise rates; however, the Fed chair recently clarified focus on trending numbers, suggesting that if inflation crests in coming months due to energy base effects, the Fed could moderate its hawkishness even while inflation remains above target.
“one is that because inflation is above target and it's been rising recently. And you know, the Fed made it clear that they're emphasizing the price stability side of their mandate not the unemployment side at the moment. That they do have, you know, kind of an interest in potentially raising rates...But in the Fed chair's recent Q&A, he talked about how they care about trending numbers. So, in a month or two, if we start to see this current inflation wave crest, because if oil prices stop going up...the Fed could conceivably say, 'Well, okay, inflation's above target. We're still restrictive on housing at current rate levels, and it's inflation's rolling over, so we're not going to be super aggressive.'”
Fiscal dominance occurs when federal debt-to-GDP exceeds roughly 100%, at which point the large existing stock of debt means that government interest expenses rise alongside higher interest rates, offsetting any fiscal deficit reduction from higher borrowing costs, creating an unsustainable fiscal trajectory.
“basically fiscal dominance, it can take a few different forms, but essentially when you get over like 100% federal debt to GDP, you've got a very big stock of existing debt.”
The 1970s and 1980s can be characterized as an era of monetary dominance, where the Federal Reserve's policy tools were highly effective because low debt-to-GDP ratios meant government spending was not the primary driver of money creation—bank lending was—allowing the Fed to control inflation by controlling credit expansion.
“So in say the '70s and '80s, we can call that a period of monetary dominance. So you had low debt to GDP, deficits while they were there, especially in the '80s, they just weren't the driving force on money creation as it is now.”
GPU and RAM usage will persistently be much higher five years forward than it was five years ago, creating durable demand for semiconductor companies even as AI hype cycles ebb and flow.
“we are going to just persistently use way more GPUs than we did 5 years ago. We are going to persistently use way more RAM than we did 5 years ago.”
Techniques to manage high-debt fiscal dominance exist, including financial repression (suppressing real interest rates below inflation) and yield curve control (submerging new debt issuance below inflation rates), but these approaches require accelerated currency debasement and produce higher levels of inflation as a side effect.
“There are techniques to deal with it, including financial repression. You know, you can do yield curve control and submerge all the debt below inflation, but then you have generally accelerated currency debasement and the higher levels of inflation.”
The Federal Reserve was not designed or equipped to manage fiscal dominance; its policy framework and tools are fundamentally mismatched to the problem, representing not an acute crisis but a structural breakdown in policy effectiveness.
“And the answer is the Fed's not really designed for fiscal dominance. This is kind of the breakdown scenario, not in the acute sense, but in just in terms of policy effectiveness.”
Going forward, the Federal Reserve will retain its core function in bank regulation and banking system oversight, but its two primary policy tools—interest rate decisions and balance sheet decisions—will become significantly less impactful, and its policy option space will narrow because the tools designed for monetary dominance (raising rates to curb bank lending) cannot solve problems driven by fiscal dominance (structural deficits).
“going forward, the Federal Reserve, they still have all their major roles in bank regulation, basically oversight of the banking system, and that remains unchanged, but their two primary tools of interest rate decisions, as well as balance sheet decisions, basically become less impactful, and their option space like narrows because instead of saying, 'Okay, high inflation, cuz banks are lending too much, let's raise rates.' It's clean. But if you have, 'Hey, inflation's up because we're running structural big deficits...' And you say, 'Well, let's raise interest rates in response to that.' What exactly are you doing?”
There are no signs of breakaway inflation like in 2021-2022 because the current money supply growth environment differs fundamentally from that period, suggesting inflation should not spiral into runaway territory in the near term.
“there's really no signs that we kind of have a breakaway inflation like we saw in in 2021, 2022 because we don't have the money supply growth of that era.”
Interest expense has now outpaced defense spending as the largest federal budget item, with no clear resolution in sight, meaning interest costs will remain a large ongoing part of the federal deficit going forward.
“interest expense has outpaced defense spending, and there's really no clear resolution to this. It's just like it's going to be an ongoing large part of the federal deficit going forward.”
There is real risk with hyperscaler companies (AI infrastructure providers) because many are currently free cash flow negative, meaning they are spending more than they earn, creating a sustainability problem if growth slows.
“I think there is real risk with the hyperscalers because a lot of them are free cash flow negative now.”
The sharp increase in inflation over recent months has been driven primarily by energy prices, which have accounted for the biggest factor, whereas money supply growth is currently at fairly normal levels without the 40% year-over-year increase in M2 that occurred in 2020-2021 and trickled through the economy over subsequent years.
“the sharp increase in inflation we've had, there's been a couple reasons for it, but energy's been by far the biggest factor...We have kind of a fairly normal rate of money supply growth at the moment...we don't have like the, you know, the 40% year-over-year increase in M2 and that then trickled over next several years out into the economy, out into prices.”
Gold experienced a very powerful two-year run (2023-2025), rising rapidly, which means it must build a new base at lower levels after the recent sell-off, though not necessarily retracing all its gains; the asymmetry in the gold trade has been partly removed by the recent rally.
“gold had a really, really powerful two-year run. So I do think that it has to like build a new base. Like, you know, some bears would say gold's going to round trip, you know, all of its gains from 2024 to 2025. I wouldn't be in that camp, but it did rise really quickly. A lot of the asymmetry was taken out of the trade”
Bitcoin is currently in a low sentiment area and is receiving no favors from a hawkish Fed (similar to gold), but once it forms a bottom and longer base, it represents an interesting two-year or longer-term trade.
“I think Bitcoin's still in a very kind of low sentiment area. It's not getting any favors at the moment from a hawkish Fed, similar to gold. But once that starts kind of forming a bottom and a longer base, I think that's a an interesting kind of two-year trade or or longer.”
Inflation is likely to remain sticky above 2% but may move sideways to down in coming months as the current inflation wave (driven by energy) crests from the ceasefire and shipping corridor opening.
“I think inflation's still probably going to be stickier above 2%, but I think it could be correct that it goes kind of sideways to down in the coming months.”
Parts of the AI trade are way ahead of themselves in terms of valuation, particularly infrastructure plays and speculative positions, though the speaker remains bullish on chip stocks (GPU/memory manufacturers) relative to other AI trade components.
“I do think that parts of AI are way ahead of themselves. I've been a little bit more bullish on the chip stocks than others, than like other parts of the AI trade”
SpaceX trades at 100 times revenue, which the speaker considers excessive and indicative of bubbly valuations in some parts of the AI/tech space.
“when SpaceX trades at 100 times revenue, it's excessive.”
If the market expects the Fed to be more hawkish, curve flattening occurs because the Fed becomes more hawkish on the short end (raising rates) while remaining more comfortable with long-end yields, creating a spread compression.
“if the market expects that the Fed's going to be a little bit more hawkish than they did, it makes sense that we've seen some curve flattening, which is that of course they're a little bit more hawkish on the short end and they're a little bit more comfortable with the long end.”
For most investors, the core of a portfolio should consist of equities, though the specific positioning depends on their views on inflation, growth, and monetary policy.
“But for a lot of investors, I think the core of a portfolio makes sense to be equities.”
Even if oil prices stabilize without rising further, this allows month-over-month and year-over-year inflation measures to cool down as prior-period comparisons become less distorted, which is beneficial for inflation trends even if it doesn't necessarily reduce other commodity or good prices.
“And even just not having oil rise anymore, if it just stays where it is and just chops around, at least it's not rising in that environment. And that allows kind of month-over-month, year-over-year measures of what's going on to cool down.”
If a ceasefire in the Middle East takes hold and the Philadelphi corridor remains open, oil supply should increase, putting downward pressure on oil prices, which should be bearish for oil and bullish for the global economy.
“If the memorandum of understanding and as he's fire remain in effect and the street does open, you know, for the most part, that should be a kind of a bearish force on oil, which is good for the world.”
Politicians and policymakers often describe falling inflation as 'prices coming down' when they actually mean 'the rate of price increases is slowing,' a linguistic conflation that misleads the public about the real impact of inflation on living costs.
“especially when politicians talk about prices coming down, they really mean the rate of change of prices going up is reducing.”
The world has been surprisingly resilient to the closure of Russian oil supplies hitting the global market, a shock that many people (including the speaker) expected to cause more economic damage than it did.
“I think many people, including me, have been surprised at how resilient the world has been to a closure of that much oil hitting the market.”
President Trump's political incentives lead him to cite stock market performance and oil prices as reasons for moderating US policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict, rather than citing the actual driving factors (the conflict's unpopularity, violation of campaign promises, upcoming midterms, and political separation from Israel's interests), which would be more politically damaging to mention.
“There's some of those reasons he can't realistically cite. So, I think he has to point to other ones. He's pointed to stock market. He's pointed to oil. And so, I think there's a lot of reasons for him to have eased out of the war. And you know, he'll cite the subset that is less damaging.”
From 2019 until a year or two ago, the speaker held a structural bearish view on bonds (either higher yields and lower prices, or sideways yields with real returns not keeping up with inflation), but shifted to viewing bonds as a neutral, unimpressive trade around 2023-2024, neither anticipating significant moves up or down.
“From 2019 until, you know, a year or two ago I was kind of on the record being a pretty structural bond bear, meaning that either combination of higher yields meaning bond prices down or even just sideways yield and not really keeping up with the basement. But once we got to like a year or two ago, I viewed them more as kind of a neutral unimpressive trade, which is I don't try to anticipate, you know, 50 basis points moves in either direction for the long end.”
The speaker's strategic portfolio allocation consists of high-quality equities (those not in a bubble), growth-at-reasonable-price (GARP) stocks, and value equities, along with a permanent strategic allocation to gold.
“I have a strategic allocation, which is just high-quality equities, basically equities that are not in a bubble, growth at a reasonable price, sometimes value. You know, gold obviously took a hit whenever you have a the market perceived that the Fed's getting a little bit more hawkish, you generally get a little bit of a sell-off in gold...So I'm not jumping into gold as a trade, even though you still have like a permanent strategic position in it.”
The probability of a Fed rate hike is meaningful (non-trivial) this year, though the speaker thinks 90/10 odds on a hike is too aggressive, preferring a more neutral split to one hike probability weighting.
“Our chance of a rate hike is pretty meaningful this year. I think 90/10 is a pretty aggressive position on that. I'd be a little bit more split on neutral to one hike.”