
Our Financial Predicament From a Systems Perspective with Lyn Alden | TGS 188
What this covers
Nate Hagens and Lynn Alden examine the structural forces that lock large developed economies into expanding fiscal deficits and currency debasement. Alden, an independent analyst with an engineering background, lays out why once public debt exceeds roughly 100–120% of GDP, central banks lose their ability to brake the system through rate hikes—interest expense on the debt balloons faster than rate hikes can slow private lending, shifting control from monetary to fiscal dominance. From this systems perspective, the conversation traces how money functions as a ledger of claims against finite energy and materials, and why governments will resolve unpayable nominal debt through invisible purchasing-power loss rather than explicit default.
The discussion draws parallels across history and geography: the 1940s US exit from comparable debt levels through yield curve control and inflation, Egypt's present-day experience of energy constraints colliding with rapid money printing (causing rolling blackouts and currency collapse in real purchasing power), and Japan's further progression into fiscal dominance yet resilience via decades of trade surpluses and social cohesion. Alden and Hagens examine how currency debasement redistributes real losses toward wage-earners and savers while winners emerge among debtors and recipients of government spending, and consider emerging mechanisms—stablecoins, de-dollarization, gold accumulation by central banks—through which different actors hedge against this invisible devaluation. They also confront gaps in competing economic schools: Keynesians expect countercyclical intervention to smooth cycles, while Austrians argue central banking amplifies them. The conversation covers resource competition between wealthy and poor nations, the role of productivity gains swallowed by debasement, and the limited paths forward if nominal growth must exceed real rates without triggering asset bubbles.
Lynn Alden argues that US fiscal dominance—where government deficits now match or exceed private sector credit creation—is an unstoppable dynamic that will continue to devalue currency and purchasing power, with limited policy options to reverse it without severe economic disruption.
- The structural mechanics of fiscal dominance (high debt-to-GDP ratios, aging demographics, interest-bearing liabilities) create a system that must grow nominally or collapse
- Energy and material constraints will increasingly disconnect financial claims from real economic capacity, manifesting as purchasing power debasement rather than nominal default
- Previous periods of high fiscal dominance (1930s-1940s, 2010s-present) followed similar patterns: private debt bubble, rotation to public sector debt, then sustained nominal growth with currency devaluation
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The US escaped its comparable 1940s public-debt-to-GDP peak through a combination of strong growth and inflation alongside explicit yield curve control: the Fed grew its bond holdings roughly tenfold from 1942-1945 and pegged the yield curve (e.g., ~1/3 of 1% at the front, 2.5% at the long end) with an open bid, holding yields at 2.5% even when inflation peaked at 19%.
“they did yield curve control... at one point we peaked at 19% inflation, but they still, held yields hard at 2.5% even on the long end of the curve... The Fed, increased their total bond holdings by about tenfold, from 1942 to 1945. and, they, pegged each part of the yield curve.”
Egypt is a useful semi-extreme (but functioning, not Venezuela-level) case study of energy-constrained debasement: over a decade its per-capita energy consumption topped out and declined—at roughly one-eighth the US level rather than after meeting needs—while money supply grew 15-20% per year, producing summer rolling blackouts, lackluster telecom, more work-hours required to buy a car or laptop, and mal-investment in pre-built ghost-city real estate as people seek a store of value beyond the depreciating local currency.
“over the past 10 years, Egypt has had declining energy consumption per capita... at about one eighth the level per capita... they're still growing their money supply rapidly... instead of something like 7% a year, for them it's like 15 to 20% per year.”
The Great Depression was preceded by a multi-decade buildup of credit enabled by 19th-century telecommunications that let people transact in IOUs for gold worldwide while gold barely moved, creating a hyper-efficient but highly centralized and heavily levered (about 20-to-1) four-layer stack of ledgers vulnerable to the failure that only ~5% of claimants redeeming gold would expose.
“humans invented telecommunication systems and then they spread them across the Atlantic... and we started transacting in IOUs, very quickly around the world. and they were IOUs for gold, and gold barely ever moved anymore. and when that happens, the entities in question... become very reliant on the big centralized ledgers”
Currency debasement creates winners and losers: anyone not on the receiving side of the deficits effectively pays for it through debasement, and because every wage and contract is denominated in the currency, printing decisions reallocate real value—hardening the currency benefits some, weakening it benefits others, with wage-earners and small businesses selling for the currency most exposed.
“anyone who's not on the receiving side of the deficits is kind of paying for it with their debasement... anyone's wage that's denominated in a currency. Basically every contract that is nominated, that currency gets affected by printing decisions.”
In energy-constrained economies with blackouts, richer areas are prioritized while the impoverished bear the brunt of power loss, and acute resource conflicts emerge—exemplified by Egypt's multi-year political conflict with Ethiopia over the large dam that can reduce Nile flow, with desalination remaining too energy-intensive and expensive to be a ready alternative.
“the way that economies tend to work is that richer areas will be prioritized... it is usually the, more impoverished that face, more of the challenges... to their South Ethiopia has built a very large dam, that can potentially reduce the flow of the Nile.”
Debt is fundamentally a claim on future energy and materials, because money in your pocket is a claim on energy and materials when spent, and therefore aggregate financial claims are claims on real-world energy, materials, and ecosystem functioning—a constraint that did not bind as tightly 80 years ago.
“the way that I think about debt, is money in our bank, in your pocket, in your wallet... It's a claim on energy and materials when we spend it largely. And therefore, debt is a claim on future energy and materials.”
Money is fundamentally a ledger system that people use to price things and store liquid value, and it could be backed by nature (like gold) or shared social systems (like central banking), but when the ledger is broken, it drives mal-investment and inefficiency as people scramble to protect themselves from arbitrary devaluation.
“Money is a ledger that people use and that could be a ledger that relies on nature like gold. It could be a ledger that relies on shared society, like basically central banking. So money's just the circulation mechanism. How we price things and how we store liquid value. When it is broken, it makes things way less efficient and it makes us more likely to do things that are mal-investment as we're trying to arbitrarily store value with different levels of sophistication based on what we know to try to protect ourselves from that.”
At the sovereign level there is some de-dollarization (uptick in central banks holding gold instead of Treasuries), but at the grassroots level there is none—people in places like Cairo still want dollars as much as ever due to network effects, liquidity, and branding—so stablecoins are a mechanism that, around the margins, supports the value of the dollar by making it easier for ordinary people abroad to obtain dollars even as their governments try to de-dollarize.
“generally speaking from the bottom up level, there's been no such de dollarization. So, for example, you know, in the streets of Cairo, people still want dollars as much as they did before... the people want dollars 'cause there's network effects and liquidity. and the branding of the dollar”
Money is fundamentally a ledger used to price things and store liquid value; when that ledger is broken it makes the economy less efficient and pushes people toward mal-investment as they try to arbitrarily store value with varying levels of sophistication to protect themselves.
“Money is a ledger that people use and that could be a ledger that relies on nature like gold. It could be a ledger that relies on shared society, like basically central banking. So money's just the circulation mechanism. How we price things and how we store liquid value. When it is broken, it makes things way less efficient and it makes us more likely to do things that are mal-investment”
China's Belt and Road and Japan's private sector both reflect a strategic shift away from accumulating US Treasuries toward acquiring real assets abroad—loans, infrastructure projects, commodity and energy deposits, and part-ownership stakes—using their engineering and industrial bases to build the projects, though such holdings can be challenged during heightened nationalism and resource competition.
“the whole Chinese Belt and Road initiative has been a gradual shift towards saying, we don't want, we don't wanna keep accu accumulating treasuries. We instead wanna accumulate basically loans or other things to tie to real assets across the development world.”
US structural fiscal deficits are driven by two entrenched forces: accumulating interest-bearing debt on the public ledger, and baby-boomer demographics—the same generation whose home-buying years drove peak bank lending in the 1970s-80s is now drawing down Social Security and Medicare, turning a prior Social Security surplus into a deficit that flows back into the economy as claims on labor, technology, and energy.
“one is the accumulation of debt on the public ledger, which is, you know, for the most part interest-bearing. and then there's, demographics. So basically the, baby boom generation... now as that very large generation enters their retirement years, they're tapping into social security, they're tapping into Medicare.”
There are softer, less explicit forms of yield curve control besides hard pegging—holding the front end low to entice borrowers into the long end, captive buyers like banks and insurers required to hold paper, and QE to absorb supply; the Fed openly discussed YCC in 2020 as a 'break the glass' strategy, and the Bank of England executed emergency QE during the 2022 gilt crisis at ~10% inflation to halt a recursive leverage-driven yield blowout.
“there are softer ways to do yield your yield curve control. They're not so explicit... during 2020... the Fed Minutes... they openly discussed the possibility of doing yield curve control should they have to.”
During Europe's 2022 energy crisis (Russian gas disruption), Europe outbid poorer countries like Pakistan for marginal LNG—ships visibly changed course toward Europe paying top euro—illustrating that in resource competition wealthier blocs displace poorer, uninvolved nations.
“what they did was they outbid countries like Pakistan... you could see on the maps, like these ships would change course go toward Europe, where they're paying... top dollar or top euro for, the marginal, l and g and you're outbidding, sadly the, poor places of the world”
Humans are highly adaptable and can adjust to extreme economic conditions (as shown in Egypt), so even scenarios that seem catastrophic (like half the GDP becoming unavailable) don't necessarily mean 'the end of the world'; life continues, things are just less convenient, and people adapt—this is a reason for measured optimism.
“basically humans are adaptable. So even things that seem pretty extreme are adapted to. especially when they're, you know, outside of like war where things can just, things can get cut in half in a year or something like that. So outside of very non-linear events, people are able to adapt to a variety of circumstances and life goes on, even though it's not the end, it's not the end of the world.”
The fractional reserve banking system requires nominal growth or collapse because interest is not created with loans, forcing the system into a mathematical requirement for continuous credit expansion; this is a critical path constraint that cannot be easily disrupted short of system redesign.
“the whole fraction reserve banking system on top of central banking, where loans are made in interest. you know, with, interest bearing, you know, liabilities, that's the interest is not created interest not created with the loan. So that system always kind of has to grow or die nominally.”
Anyone's wage denominated in a currency or any contract denominated in a currency is affected by government printing decisions; when government hardens its currency, some benefit while others lose, and when government weakens it, winners and losers shift, making currency debasement a form of silent redistribution.
“the other factor that often gets overlooked in all these discussions is that anyone's wage that's denominated in a currency. Basically every contract that is nominated, that currency gets affected by printing decisions. Yeah. and so, if the government kind of put its thumb in one direction, and they try to harden their currency, they'll, benefit some over others. And if they do the other direction where they rapidly weaken the currency, they'll benefit some over others.”
The ratio of retirees to workers has significantly changed due to slowing population growth, and this is a structural problem because many systems (social security, Medicare, pensions) were designed on the assumption of infinite population growth or infinite per-capita GDP growth, which is no longer tenable.
“the ratio of, retirees to workers has significantly changed, with a, you know, slowing population growth. 'cause a lot of these systems were designed with the idea that every generation is gonna be bigger than the prior generation. So just kind of infinite population growth. So as you kind of potentially reach, you know, max population and, slow down, well, not only population, but GDP Infinite, GDP growth. Yeah, Population and similar kind of, or growing resources per person. and so as you kind of, run past that, you start to get issues and you generally speaking.”
Physical or resource constraints tend to accelerate rather than stop the fiscal 'train' because the train is nominal: an economy that hits serious resource constraints typically sees its deficit blow out and its currency devalue sharply initially, rather than its deficit shrinking.
“the unintuitive outcome is that limits like that tend to accelerate the train because the train is nominal... when you come across an economy that does run into serious resource constraints, it's generally not that its deficit shrinks, it's that his deficit blows out and the currency units devalue very sharply initially.”
The Great Depression and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis are parallel events because both marked the peak of a private-sector debt bubble after which interest rates were cut to zero and even that proved insufficient to reinflate the next cycle, triggering a multi-decade rotation of debt from the private sector to the public sector—with World War I/the GFC and World War II/the 2020s pandemic playing analogous roles.
“When you build up a massive amount and you cut in rates all the way to zero, and even that's not enough to reinflate the next cycle. That's when you enter something more dramatic. And the two times the US reached, that was the Great Depression and then the global financial crisis.”
The US financial system is no longer officially tethered to gold, but in a de facto way it still is, because the decoupling of bank lending and dollar redemption from gold was gradual and pre-dated 1971; even after 1971 higher-level systems still operate on the premise of dollar scarcity, which (with division of powers and central bank independence) keeps the system more constrained than pure fiat would otherwise be.
“1971 just kind of made it official. and then after 1971, even though we're no longer tethered to gold at any sort of base level, many of those higher level systems are still kind of based on the premise that there's some scarcity to the dollar.”
Once a country exceeds roughly 100-120% public debt to GDP (especially combined with structural deficits from demographics), central bank rate hikes blow out the fiscal deficit via interest expense more than they reduce private bank lending, so the central bank loses its braking power over total credit and can even accelerate total credit while trying to slow it.
“The problem is when you get over a hundred percent or 120% debt to GDP, when the central bank raises rates, they actually blow out the fiscal deficit bigger than the reduction they do for bank lending. So they don't really slow down the amount of total credit in the system anymore.”
The only realistic way out of fiscal dominance is to let the economy run hot and grow nominal GDP faster than the interest rate paid on debt (e.g., ~7% real GDP versus 3-4% funding rates), which could theoretically bring debt-to-GDP down to 70-80%; but even in this 'run it hot' scenario you generally want to own almost anything other than bonds because money supply growth flows into scarce assets and rapidly devalues bonds and cash relative to what is truly scarce, including energy over the long run.
“the only potential realistic way out of fiscal dominance is to let the economy run hot, as you say, and grow at higher rates than the interest rates that we pay on debt. So running real GDP of something like 7%... that could theoretically bring debt to GDP down to 70 or 80%”
Developed countries with debt denominated in their own currency default through purchasing power rather than nominal default; over the past five years US Treasury holders were paid back every dollar owed but can buy meaningfully less of almost everything (consumer goods, services, stocks, gold, Bitcoin, energy), an 'invisible devaluation' equivalent to a partial default.
“if it's a developed country where the liability is are in their own ledger, they generally default through purchasing power... every treasury holder got paid back every dollar they're owed, but they can buy back less of almost anything, that they could compared to five years ago.”
When populations become impoverished they consume fewer resources (as seen in emerging-market crises with falling per-capita consumption), but governments are likely to respond to cheap inputs like $40 oil with multi-trillion-dollar stimulus packages or universal basic income to re-accelerate demand—both to avoid political revolution and because re-subsidizing demand 'reinflates' it, meaning the demand-destruction train also doesn't stop.
“if they find $40, oil, they're more likely to say, let's pass a multi-trillion dollar package, to re-accelerate some of that.”
The rest of the world has an incentive to minimize dollar exposure and hold assets the US government and banking system cannot create rapidly: holding a 4%-yielding Treasury while the dollar count grows 7% per year dilutes your share of the network, whereas gold yields nothing but grows only ~1% per year globally and cannot be frozen at the press of a button, giving it a lower dilution rate.
“if you're holding a treasury that pays you 4%, but the number of dollars going up per year is 7%. You're getting your share of the network is getting diluted. Whereas, for example, if you're holding gold... the amount of gold's only growing by maybe 1% per year globally. So your, dilution rate is generally less and no one can just press a button and freeze it”
Japan is furthest into fiscal dominance with over 200% debt-to-GDP yet remains resilient because it ran decades of trade and current-account surpluses (building large financial claims on the rest of the world), maintained a strong industrial base, and has a harmonious society—social capital that materially aids managing the state's ledger, where the US and parts of Europe score lower on social harmony.
“Japan is the furthest in fiscal dominance with over 200% debt to GDP. now people often ignore their Japan strengths, which is that they ran decades of, trade surpluses... and then there's also the fact that they have a Harmon rather harmonious society... it's basically a type of social capital.”
Keynesians argue government can provide a countercyclical force to smooth credit cycles, while Austrians counter that the whole project of central banking and rate manipulation amplifies the private-sector credit waves in the first place, so trying to put out one fire often starts the next; and although Keynes prescribed deficits in recessions and surpluses in good times, in practice governments always run deficits of merely different sizes.
“the auctions would say that the whole pro, the whole project of central banking and raising a lowering interest rates... is contributing to the, severity of those, private sector credit... waves... and that therefore trying to put out the fire often starts the next fire.”
Stablecoins effectively democratize the offshore bank account—dollar-denominated tokens on blockchains (Ethereum, Tron, Bitcoin layers) backed by T-bills, dollars, and bank accounts—that don't increase the number of dollars but change where dollars are; their two killer use cases are efficient cross-border payments (vs the correspondent banking system, useful where Africa has 40+ currencies and Latin America 30+) and giving non-Americans low-volatility dollar access they can't otherwise get.
“it's for two main reasons. One, cross-border payments. So for example, there's over 40 currencies in Africa... Latin America has over 30 currencies.”
Productivity gains should let people work fewer hours to afford goods, but in debasing economies the opposite happens—Egyptians must work more hours to afford a Volkswagen than five years ago—and they are partly saved only by external technological deflation, as Chinese carmakers rapidly climbing the quality stack (like Hyundai before them) offer ~$15,000 cars, making China the world's biggest auto exporter.
“It should be the other direction. if our productivity's improving, I should be able to work less for the car, but I have to work more for the car. Luckily, this other manufacturer comes in and says, tap the price.”
Energy and ecosystem functioning are the foundation of all economic activity and productivity, technology sits on top of energy, and energy is currently represented by oil (which still makes the world go round), and the US Permian basin (a major shale oil producer) is on its last legs of growth, with future production potentially depending on moves to Canadian shale plays, creating questions about what happens when oil growth peaks.
“bring in energy and AI, if you like. what are your current thoughts on how that fits into your, no stopping the train. It's funny 'cause some people ask me, could physical constraints stop the train? Could they put a lid on physical deficits? so either energy restrictions or demographic restrictions or, anything else? right now, and this may change with AI and electricity becoming a little bit more dominant than it was, but right now, oil still makes the world go round. and in our country, you know, the Permian is on its last legs of, growth. And I don't know where we go after that. We go north to some of the, shale plays in, Alberta.”
The current system is structurally biased toward the old and wealthy and against the young and especially the working/middle class who are too well-off to receive support but work all the time, because those not on the receiving side of deficit spending are impaired—so even as the aggregate train keeps powering on, the train stops for many individuals.
“the way it's kind of designed is that it's good for those that are either older or wealthier. On average, it's less good for those that are, younger and or, especially those that are kind of in the middle.”
The finance community's attention to energy is faddish—currently fixated on rare earths and Chinese material dominance because energy is relatively cheap and flowing readily—and will likely be surprised again when energy returns to the front burner, because professionals in every field are siloed and miss cross-domain disconnects that create both investment opportunities and policy errors.
“the financial community's kinda lost interest. Yeah. In the importa of energy, a front burner... I think once again, the, finance sector will be largely surprised by it.”
Humans are wired to expect a status quo as normal, but for roughly a century things have changed dramatically within a single generation and that change is only accelerating with AI; humans tend to be creative and push past frictions to find 'the next runway,' so the best one can do is be well-informed, cultivate virtue and connections, keep skill sets in demand, and align assets with what's coming.
“we're geared toward kind of expecting a status quo to be normal... I tend to err somewhat on the side of optimism in the sense that we tend to be pretty, creative as a species. So we tend to push things longer than we expect.”
The US exited the high-public-debt situation of the 1940s through a combination of strong demographics, strong real growth, and significant currency devaluation through yield curve control and inflation, where the Fed pegged yields at 2.5% on the long end despite inflation peaking at 19%, maintaining artificially low rates to prevent debt service from crushing the economy.
“that was the same thing how we got out of the 1940s. that was the last time we had this much public debt to GDP. And it was that, back then it was a combination of growth and inflation. So we did have very strong demographics back then. we did have very strong real growth, during and after the war. but it was combined with significant currency devaluation. So they did yield curve control, you know, during the forties and early fifties where at one point we peaked at 19% inflation, but they still, held yields hard at 2.5% even on the long end of the curve.”
At the sovereign level, there is less interest in holding dollar assets (especially treasuries); central banks have been shifting toward gold and other alternatives; but at the grassroots level (people in the street), demand for dollars remains strong due to network effects and the dollar's liquidity and stability relative to local currencies.
“Right now across the world, there's generally less, either, either interest or other reasons. At the, sovereign level, there's less interest in holding dollar assets. So treasuries, in particular there's been an uptick in these entities wanting to hold gold, for example. generally speaking from the bottom up level, there's been no such de dollarization. So, for example, you know, in the streets of Cairo, people still want dollars as much as they did before. And so when you're, Scott, Bessant and you say, well, there's all this demand for dollars. Maybe their governments are trying to de dollarize, but the people want dollars 'cause there's network effects and liquidity. and the branding of the dollar stable coins are a way to get, you know, make it easier for them to get their hands on dollars”
If you're a foreigner holding treasuries paying 4% when dollar creation is 7% per year, you're experiencing negative real yields and your share of the system is being diluted; gold, which grows at ~1% per year, offers better protection against dilution, and no one can freeze it.
“if you're holding a treasury that pays you 4%, but the number of dollars going up per year is 7%. You're getting your share of the network is getting diluted. Whereas, for example, if you're holding gold, you're not getting a yield on it, but the amount of gold's only growing by maybe 1% per year globally. So your, dilution rate is generally less and no one can just press a button and freeze it, for example.”
Even if Bitcoin rises to a million dollars per coin, the resulting wealth inequality concern must be weighed against magnitude: at a million dollars Bitcoin is only ~2% of global capital (roughly a quadrillion dollars across all assets), comparable to gold's current ~2% share, with Bitcoin currently around 0.2%—so a 10x gets it to gold's size, achievable either by Bitcoin rising or everything else crashing.
“at a million dollar Bitcoin, the total value of all Bitcoin is about 2% of global capital... it's somewhere in the ballpark by quadrillion dollars... gold's around 2% already... Bitcoin's around 0.2%. so if Bitcoin 10 x is, it gets to roughly the size of gold”
In fiscal dominance the public sector now creates roughly as much or more net new credit per year than the entire private sector (net new bank loans plus corporate bond issuance plus private credit), reversing the prior 70-year norm where private sector credit creation dominated outside brief recessions.
“if you add all that together, the US fiscal deficit. It's about that size or larger. and whereas for most of the past 70 years, outside of kind of brief recessionary periods, private sector credit creation was bigger than public sector. but in fiscal dominance, public sector's bigger”
Total US debt relative to base dollars was around 50-to-1 or 60-to-1 going into the Global Financial Crisis, but because the Fed expanded the monetary base so much afterward, that leverage has shrunk to roughly 20-to-1 today, counting any contractual IOU for a dollar (bank deposits, bonds) against direct central bank liabilities (physical currency and bank reserves).
“total debt in the US system compared to base dollars, it was around 50 to one or 60 to one... now because they expanded the base so much, they shrunk that, now it's something closer to 20 to one, which is still significant.”
Stablecoin growth supports the front end of the Treasury curve (Treasury Secretary Bessent projects ~$3 trillion in additional bond demand) because stablecoins are backed by T-bills, but under the 'nothing stops this train' dynamic the long end of the curve still faces upward yield pressure, requiring eventual yield curve control.
“Treasury Secretary Scott Besant has said that stablecoin growth, is likely to help bring in an additional, I think, $3 trillion in treasury bond demand. So, I think that will help the front end of the curve. But under your Nothing stops this train narrative, then the long end, yields are, likely to stay under pressure.”
Bitcoin is not a credit instrument but final value delivered, combining portability and scarcity to make it easier to transfer than gold, yet it remains ultimately just portable capital—a way to store semi-liquid value within a network effect that one eventually intends to spend on goods and services or pass on.
“it's not a credit instrument, it's actually just final value delivered. and so Bitcoin has utility, but it's still just a ledger. It's still just a way to kind of store semi-liquid capital.”
MMT is essentially post-Keynesian: it observes that although the current system still legally operates as though on gold (the government must borrow to spend), under fiat the government could simply spend or print, and inflation is avoided not by the gold-era constraint but by directing printed money toward productive capacity (nuclear plants, semiconductor factories) so increased goods-and-services supply offsets the money-supply increase.
“MMT kinda looks at this and says, this is all fiat Now, you, could technically just spend... if you print money and do something productive with it, like build a bunch of nuclear power plants or semiconductor factories... then you'll have more supply of goods and services offsetting the increase in the money supply.”
MMT correctly observes that historically about 95% of money came into existence via commercial banks making loans (30-40 years ago), but as government spending to prop up social systems and the military exceeds what private credit creation provides, the government borrows the difference into existence, shifting the mix toward roughly 50/50 public/private money creation.
“It used to be 30 or 40 years ago that 95% of our money came into existence that way... So the government has to make up for the difference and borrows more, borrows money into existence... It's more like 50 50.”
Bitcoin is best understood not as a line on a chart but as an alternative base-layer ledger—a distributed, mutually-distrustful database operating outside central banking—that emerged only when decades of cryptographic and bandwidth advances (from David Chaum's 1980s Berkeley dissertation onward) finally converged; it doesn't solve energy or ecosystem problems but offers portability plus scarcity as a sound store of value.
“going back to David Chm, in his Berkeley dissertation, in the eighties. it was about how to operate a database or a ledger, by mutually distrustful entities.”
War is usually a productivity killer that simultaneously forces more fiscal dominance out of necessity, accelerating the nominal side while impairing the real side—which is why the 1940s were so inflationary, and why the 2020 pandemic stimulus charts looked like wartime finance even before the 2022 Russia-Ukraine kinetic war (crises tend to cluster).
“any sort of war is usually a productivity killer, but a war would also cause more fiscal dominance, out of necessity probably... when I was analyzing the, pandemic stimulus in 2020, I was like, if you just kinda looked at the charts... it looks like a war.”
Austrian economics emphasizes bottom-up individual decision-making and marginal analysis, arguing that central bank intervention through rate-setting actually contributes to the severity of credit cycles by creating artificial distortions, whereas Keynesian economics argues for countercyclical government intervention to smooth credit cycles.
“Austrian economics is primarily kind of a bottom up analysis. it's, based more on individual decision making, individual, marginal analysis... the auctions would say that the whole pro, the whole project of central banking and raising a lowering interest rates and stuff like that is contributing to the, severity of those, private sector credit, you know, waves happening in the first place, and that therefore trying to put out the fire often starts the next fire.”
When a sovereign becomes very indebted (high public debt-to-GDP), it defaults one way or another: emerging markets that owe in foreign currencies tend to default nominally through restructuring, while developed countries with liabilities in their own currency generally default through purchasing power erosion, where every dollar owed is repaid but buys less of everything.
“generally speaking, when a sovereign gets very indebted like this, it defaults one way or another. if it's an emerging market and it's owed in currencies, they can't print. They're more likely to default nominally, they restructure it, it's alight term. and, if it's a developed country where the liability are are in their own ledger, they generally default through purchasing power. And so, for example, over the past five years, it was, you know, one of the worst periods ever for bonds. you know, e every, of course, every treasury holder got paid back every dollar they're owed, but they can buy back less of almost anything, that they could compared to five years ago.”
Fiscal dominance occurs when a country's public debt exceeds approximately 100-120% of GDP, combined with structural factors like demographics that create persistent deficits; at this level, when central banks raise interest rates, the interest expense on government debt grows faster than the reduction in private sector lending, so the central bank actually accelerates total credit in the system while attempting to slow inflation.
“Fiscal dominance happens, generally speaking, once a country gets over like a hundred percent, public debt to GDP or sovereign debt to GDP, and especially when combined with some sort of. Demographics or other things that give them structural physical deficits. And the reason that the debt load matters is because, any sort of meaningful interest expense on the debt further blows out their physical deficit and makes that rather, unsustainable.”
Bitcoin is an alternative ledger system built on distributed nodes and miners instead of central banking; it's not a solution to energy or ecosystem problems but an alternative base layer with utility due to portability (better than gold for transfer) and verified scarcity (no one can print more).
“Basically what it is, it's an alternative ledger. so we talked before going back to Jevons in, in the 18 hundreds. Most frictions in finance were solved by another layer, centralization and Bitcoin is basically an alternative at the base layer. So it's kind of an alternative to central banking. So instead of just everything kind of tying into the fed, it ties into this more distributed, node system of nodes and miners.”
AI-driven elimination of white- and blue-collar jobs could paradoxically cement peak oil: while boosting society-wide productivity, the large loss of income reduces demand for basic oil and diesel services (vacations, travel), suppressing oil demand toward ~$40/barrel, which would cement November 2018 as the peak because depletion and the accelerating Red Queen decline rate would catch up faster.
“the, reduction of white collar jobs... the large swath of loss of income from blue and white collar jobs, is going to be a reduction in demand for basic oil and diesel services... And therefore, if there's a drop in demand for oil and we go to $40 oil or something like that's gonna actually cement peak oil, which as of now is still November, 2018”
There is plenty of energy in absolute terms, but not enough cheap energy at the ~100-million-barrels-a-day scale to keep the current system of financial claims going; combined with the fact that interest is not created when money is created (the system must grow nominally or die), this forces yield curve control and eventually a 'too big to save' situation that manifests in currency reform.
“there's plenty of energy. I just don't think there's enough cheap energy at the a hundred million barrels a day scale to keep this current system of claims going.”
Stablecoins are typically pegged to the US dollar (over 99% of them), though some are pegged to gold or other fiat currencies; they maintain their pegs through arbitrage mechanisms, and well-designed ones have proven more stable and better backed than typical bank accounts because they're backed by T-bills, reverse repos, and other short-term safe assets.
“you know, they're, you know, backed by. T-bills, dollars, bank accounts, you know, various entities can offer these and they might have different levels of trust. but basically it's these pools of dollars and dollar denominated tokens that are redeemable, for dollars at least by large entities. So when stable coins come into existence, that it, does that increase the amount of dollars in existence? not the number of dollars, no. It just kind of affects where dollars are.”
The US is largely energy independent (90%+ of its own supply) compared to Europe and Japan which are not, giving the US a structural advantage in managing fiscal dominance compared to countries that must compete for energy resources globally.
“the US has 90% plus of our own energy supply. We've gotta be in better shape than countries like Japan that are already doing yield curve control on steroids. so I just, I see this eventually manifesting in currency reform of some sort, which results in.”
US debt is projected to reach around $52 trillion by 2032 (per Bank of America's Michael Hartnett), and regardless of party the political system will keep voting for higher debt ceilings, because the US will not voluntarily tighten its belt.
“Michael Hartnett from Bank of America said 2032 US debt will be around 52 trillion... Nothing stops this train Republican, democrat, doesn't matter who's president, we will, vote for a higher debt ceiling.”
Properly-constructed stablecoins are quite stable because, unlike Bitcoin (which has no redemption and a freely-fluctuating price), they have an arbitrage mechanism that restores the peg when they temporarily disconnect, and the largest ones are arguably more backed than a typical bank account via short-term T-bills and reverse repos.
“stable coins have a mechanism to make them stable toward the dollars they're arbitraged if they become temporarily disconnected from their peg... they're more backed than typical bank account is by short term, you know, tbi, reverse repos”
US fiscal deficits constitute a 'train' that cannot be stopped within any realistic investing time horizon (5-10 years); fiscal dominance is continuing and there are very few narrow ways out of it, so we are essentially stuck in it.
“there are very, few narrow ways to get out of fiscal dominance in any sort of, investing time horizon. So five to 10 year periods, that we are basically stuck, more or less in fiscal dominance is what that means.”
The economic system is ultimately tethered not to gold but to energy and ecosystem functioning; when more money is created through either fiscal dominance or conventional monetary creation, it represents a claim on future energy and materials, and this is the third and fourth ledgers beyond the asset and liability ledgers that MMT identifies.
“I think the financial system is indirectly tethered to gold, like you say, but the economic system in the United States and globally, and this is my, one of my, Disagreements with MMT is tethered to energy and ecosystem functioning. So MMT correctly shows that there's a double ledger, that an asset and a liability come into existence when money is created, when there's a loan made at a commercial bank, but there's a third and a fourth, ledger. As well, there's a claim on energy and that new energy and materials that comes into the economy from that money being spent is also a claim on nature, and, our ecosystems.”
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) argues that since fiat currency systems no longer need to be backed by gold, governments can simply print money and spend directly without issuing bonds, and if the money is spent productively (on nuclear plants, semiconductor factories, etc.) creating additional supply, inflation can be offset by the increased productive capacity.
“MMT enters the picture with, it's kind of like post Keynesian in the sense that all of the current system, all of our current financial system, the majority of it still runs almost like legally as though it's on gold, even though it's not. Which is to say, for example, if the government wants to spend, they have to borrow. and, MMT kinda looks at this and says, this is all fiat Now, you, could technically just spend. You don't even have to issue bonds to spend, you could just print money. And of course they would then say, well, if you, obviously if you print too much money and do something crazy with it, then you're just gonna cause inflation. But if you print money and do something productive with it, like build a bunch of nuclear power plants or semiconductor factories or whatever the case may be, then you'll have more supply of goods and services offsetting the increase in the money supply.”
Nigeria is much more engaged with Bitcoin and stablecoins than Egypt; this variation by country reflects different levels of technological adoption, banking infrastructure, and inflation rates—Nigeria has higher inflation and more tech adoption than Egypt.
“Bitcoin less so. It's interesting, if you look at, say, Nigeria and Egypt, so two of the, two of the three most populous countries in Africa, Nigeria is way into Bitcoin and stable coins. Egypt, has, is generally not as technical as Nigeria is. they've been slower on the Bitcoin and stablecoin side.”
The current system is geared toward status quo expectation (things have been relatively stable for a century), but we are in an accelerating period of change due to AI, geopolitics, energy constraints, and other factors, and humans are experiencing disruption at rates unprecedented in living memory, especially for non-Americans, though Americans are also not immune.
“Generally, I would say it's funny 'cause we're hu like, we're geared toward kind of expecting a status quo to be normal, literally for like a century now humans have been on this trajectory where things change so much within a span of a generation. at the moment that's only accelerating, with AI and everything. and it's a very disruptive time in general, in many cases, especially for non-Americans. But, Americans are also not immune to it.”
Water security is an increasingly critical constraint in Egypt: the Nile dam built by Ethiopia poses a threat to Egypt's water supply, creating multi-year political conflicts over water rights; desalination could help but is very energy-intensive and expensive, illustrating how resource constraints interconnect.
“I mean it's long had a water shortage issue, which they've managed to avoid becoming acute. But for example, one of their biggest political issues is that, to their South Ethiopia has built a very large dam, that can potentially reduce the flow of the Nile. and Egypt has obviously not been thrilled about that. So they've had on, they've had multi-year kind of, political conflicts with them. Around basically water rights regarding the Nile.”
Base dollars consist of physical currency (cash) and bank reserves (liabilities of the central bank), with physical currency comprising roughly half of the base, and a fairly large chunk of physical currency is held outside the US, especially in larger denomination bills, so the amount available per American citizen is quite small, maybe a few thousand dollars.
“So that'd be about half of the base dollars. Okay. So the other half would be bank reserves, which is, owned, by banks. Okay. So when the bank has a deposit at the Central Bank, that's a bank reserve and, you know, they can transfer 'em to other banks. and to some extent they're fungible with physical dollars. And then the part that the retail public uses, the, direct currency, the physical currency, the, funny thing about the physical currency is a really big chunk of it is outside the us. Especially larger denomination bills. so I don't have the calculation on hand, but it is a fairly small amount. like you said, it's, you know, a handful of thousands, per American.”
During 2020 (the peak of equity crashing and pandemic disruption), the Fed Minutes openly discussed the possibility of implementing yield curve control should it become necessary, treating it as a 'break the glass' emergency strategy, though they ultimately did not pull that lever at that time.
“during 2020. So during the peak of the whole kind of equity crashing and all that, the Fed Minutes, I mean, they openly discussed the possibility of doing yield curve control should they have to. and they ended up not pulling that lever. but that is absolutely some, that's kind of their, that's kind of their break the glass strategy.”
Bitcoin has been growing through multiple boom-bust cycles over 16 years, with some cycles involving 90% price drops; as Bitcoin grows from a multi-billion to a trillion-dollar asset, volatility is expected to decrease and become more liquid and distributed, similar to how larger asset classes behave.
“now it's been growing for 16 years, through various boom and bust cycles. Any, anytime something has upward volatility, it attracts leverage. In euphoria, you get a period of downward volatility. You've gone through something like four or five of those now. Like, some of them were like 90% drops... There were multiple 90% drops. the latest ones have been a little smaller, which is generally what you'd expect when you're talking about a trillion dollar asset rather than, you know, multi-million or multi-billion dollar asset. more liquid, more distributed.”
AI models are fundamentally probability engines that work differently than human cognition; they hallucinate and make errors even when corrected, making them unreliable for detailed recall tasks, suggesting they hit a ceiling in usefulness despite productivity improvements.
“these AI models are basically probability engines. they, you know, they run all these calculations, say what is likely to come next. it's an inherently a different way of thinking than humans. Funny tests I like to do is, you know, if I don't, if I find myself not finishing a book, I'll, go to AI and say, Hey, summarize how this book ended, just so I know. and I relied on that a couple times and then I wanted to. Check. I wanted to remind myself of a book I read before... and it said all this stuff. And I was like, that's actually wrong. Like, that's all wrong, what you just told me. And it's like, oh, I'm sorry. Here's what actually happened. I'm like, that's actually wrong too.”
When wealthy countries like Europe outbid developing countries (like Pakistan) for marginal LNG supplies during crises, the cost is pushed to less developed nations which suffer shortages, illustrating how resource competition under constraints creates distributional violence.
“you know, all contracts that were geared toward one way. All, you know, you could see on the maps, like these ships would change course go toward Europe, where they're paying, you know, top dollar or top euro for, the marginal, l and g and you're outbidding, sadly the, poor places of the world that weren't even involved, in, the initial conflict.”
US debt is forecasted to reach ~$52 trillion by 2032 (per Michael Hartnett, Bank of America); this continuation of 'nothing stops the train' is politically inevitable regardless of which party is in power, as both Republicans and Democrats will vote to raise the debt ceiling.
“I clearly see and have seen for a long time the tea leaves that we are not going to voluntarily tighten our belts in the United States or in the world, therefore. Nothing stops this train Republican, democrat, doesn't matter who's president, we will, vote for a higher debt ceiling. I think the newest forecast, Michael Hartnett from Bank of America said 2032 US debt will be around 52 trillion.”
Nate's view is that reductions in white collar and blue collar jobs from AI will reduce demand for basic oil and diesel services (summer vacations, commuting, etc.), which paradoxically could drop oil prices to $40 and accelerate peak oil by reducing demand at a time of declining supply, creating a double squeeze.
“the reduction of white collar jobs, as you say, the reduction of lots of jobs. May, boost productivity, society wide, but the large swath of loss of income from blue and white collar jobs, is going to be a reduction in demand for basic oil and diesel services like summer vacations and all these things. And that's gonna actually paradoxically create a drop in demand for oil, because of the economy. And therefore, if there's a drop in demand for oil and we go to $40 oil or something like that's gonna actually cement peak oil, which as of now is still November, 2018 because the decline rate, the, running in place faster and faster, red queen phenomenon is just gonna catch up all, the quicker.”
Japan is the furthest along in fiscal dominance with over 200% debt-to-GDP but has offsetting strengths: decades of trade and current account surpluses that built financial claims on the rest of the world, a strong industrial base, and social harmony/social capital that facilitates policy coordination, making Japan's situation more manageable than its raw debt numbers suggest.
“Japan is the furthest in fiscal dominance with over 200% debt to GDP. now people often ignore their Japan strengths, which is that they ran decades of, trade surpluses and current account surpluses. so they built up a lot of financial claims on the rest of the world. They've also built up, and they've still maintained a very strong industrial base. and then there's also the fact that they have a Harmon rather harmonious society.”
If a large portion of society changes their ledgers (holdings) in anticipation of continued fiscal dominance and currency devaluation by buying hard assets like gold and Bitcoin, they will accumulate a large percentage of these scarce assets, creating massive wealth inequality, and if Bitcoin goes to $500,000 or $1 million per coin, this could cement a 'crypto feudalism' where a small percentage of society holds most of the truly scarce assets.
“But I think that is a small percentage of society. So if golden, let's say Bitcoin continues going up and goes to 500,000 or a million dollars per Bitcoin, just let's just say, doesn't that create massive wealth inequality? Because a small portion of society is gonna hold a lot, a large percentage of the Bitcoin and then there is some sort of a crypto feudalism that is a result of that?”
The two periods that had in common a peak in private sector debt bubble and subsequent rotation of debt from private sector to public sector were the Great Depression era (1920s-1940s) and the post-GFC era (2008-2024), and in both cases the public sector then ran much larger deficits and burned off some debt at the sovereign level while continuing that rotation.
“But what the global financial crisis and the Great Depression had in common is they were the peak in the private sector debt bubble. and then throughout the, decade after that, you had this kind of gradual rotation of debt from the private sector more to the public sector. And then what you had in common from the 1940s and the 2020s was then you ran hot, you ran way bigger deficits, you kind of burned off some of that debt at the sovereign level, and continued that rotation from private sector to public sector, and also had a little bit more of a top down command economy to some extent.”
Even though the US ended the gold standard in 1971, the financial system still operates under the premise of scarcity constraints similar to a gold standard because of distributed central bank independence and division of powers, meaning the removal of the gold peg didn't fully decouple the system from acting as if scarcity mattered.
“a lot of people point to 1971 as the moment where we were no longer tethered to gold. and I would say there's a couple aspects of that. One is even before that time, the system was gradually less tethered to gold, even while we were still officially tethered to gold... and then after 1971, even though we're no longer tethered to gold at any sort of base level, many of those higher level systems are still kind of based on the premise that there's some scarcity to the dollar. and that's true for generally fiat currencies in general and any sort of one with a reasonable division of powers. and, you know, central banks to some degree of independence, tends to operate a system that's this more constrained than it might otherwise be.”
Physical constraints on resources (energy restrictions, demographic constraints, etc.) tend to accelerate fiscal deficits rather than shrink them because when faced with resource scarcity, economies don't reduce nominal deficits but instead blow them out, with currency devaluation occurring initially and then followed by a hangover period.
“It's funny 'cause some people ask me, could physical constraints stop the train? Could they put a lid on physical deficits? so either energy restrictions or demographic restrictions or, anything else? The, kind of, the, weird outcome, the unintuitive outcome is that limits like that tend to accelerate the train because the train is nominal, at least the way I refer to it as, which is to say, for example, when you come across an economy that does run into serious resource constraints, it's generally not that its deficit shrinks, it's that his deficit blows out and the currency units devalue very sharply initially.”
Even if real GDP grows faster than debt rates, a 'run it hot' scenario will likely still see purchasing power devaluation for bonds because of money supply growth and inflation seeking scarce assets, meaning bonds and cash will perform poorly relative to productive equities, gold, Bitcoin, and scarce real assets.
“now there's still the cost that if that happens, if they, if you, if they run a run it hot playbook, it's ge still generally the case that you wanna own almost anything other than bonds. because you're still running a hot nominal environment. There's still a lot of money supply growth that will generally find its way to the scarce IT assets best equities, gold, bitcoin, waterfront properties, fine art. it'll kind of go in there.”
Finance tends to focus on the 'flavor of the day' (currently rare earths and China's control of them), and when energy is relatively cheap and flowing readily, the financial sector loses interest in energy as an important front-burner issue, making them likely to be surprised when energy constraints re-emerge.
“it's funny 'cause finance tends to think of like the flavor of the day. and so right now it's more about materials like rare earths and things like that... so that's become more. Kinda rapidly learned in the area of finance, I think because energy's gone back to being relatively, inexpensive and pretty, you know, flowing pretty readily right now. I think, from what I've seen, the financial community's kinda lost interest. Yeah. In the importa of energy, a front burner.”
The global financial crisis was like World War I on the historical timeline (a disruption without full recovery), not the endpoint of a cycle; the can was kicked in the 2010s similarly to how the 1930s never fully recovered without WWII, meaning the system was never healed but merely postponed, and we're now in the 2020s continuation of that unresolved cycle.
“the global financial crisis was kind of like World War I on your timeline. It wasn't really healed, it was just the can was kicked again. Yeah. But I would kind of say the same thing happened throughout the thirties, which is they never really got the system back together throughout the 1930s. Kinda like how in the 2010s they never really got the system back together.”
Even if AI and automation reduce oil demand, governments facing resource constraints and poverty will likely respond by re-accelerating deficit spending (universal basic income, subsidies) to maintain demand and prevent economic collapse, ensuring the train keeps running nominally even as real constraints tighten.
“Well, it almost would have to be accompanied by some form of universal basic income or some regressive support. Otherwise, there would be revolution, which potentially then re accelerates the demand side. I mean, part of the, fiscal dominance kind of theme right now is that with Social security and Medicare, we are subsidizing demand for certain things. So we're, subsidizing, you know, that generation's retirement now that, after, the prior working, now before ai it was, it would argue that there were fewer workers supporting those retirees. Now with ai you potentially have kind of ironically more workers, in some capacity. but yeah, anytime you have a situation where. People are poor, they're gonna consume less resources. But then if you do sub subsidize them and get them back up to their prior consumption levels, then you kind of rein, reinflate that demand.”
The pandemic stimulus (2020-2021) had the characteristics of wartime finance even before kinetic war resumed with Russia's 2022 invasion, and crises like pandemics and wars tend to cluster, so the period ahead may see multiple shocks layering on top of the already strained fiscal dominance.
“I was like, if you just kinda looked at the charts of what's happening right now, it looks like a war. and that was, before 2022 with Russia invading. But I was like, Hey, before then, this already looks like wartime finance. It just so happens that luckily it's not a kinetic war, it's, the pandemic lockdown disruptions, things like that. of course later we brought in kinetic war, 'cause he sensed that tend to happen in clusters. but basically base case is these things run hot nominally, and then it becomes a question of, will we be able to keep, you know, what time horizon will we be able to keep energy flowing?”
Egypt provides a semi-extreme but realistic microcosm of energy-constrained economies: it's experienced declining energy per capita for ~10 years at 1/8th the level of the US, is running 15-20% annual money supply growth while energy production stagnates, and faces rolling blackouts in summer despite trying to build nuclear capacity, showing how aggregate growth metrics mask real squeeze dynamics.
“over these, let's call it 10 year period, they've got declining energy per cap. they've got, they're still growing their money supply rapidly, and it's more rapid than the us. It's, instead of something like 7% a year, for them it's like 15 to 20% per year... basically they have rolling blackouts in the summer when they have, when they're all using the air condition in an energy constrained environment, in a very hot environment.”
The best an individual can do in response to fiscal dominance and asset devaluation is: (1) be knowledgeable about what's happening, (2) cultivate virtue and connections beyond financial metrics, (3) ensure skill sets remain in demand as technology changes, and (4) align assets with coming changes.
“The best you can do is be as well informed as possible as, you know, kind of cultivate as much virtue as you can and connections as you can, not, everything's financial, and understand what's happening... try to make sure that their skill sets are in demand as technology changes, and try to make to the extent that they're interested in investing, to make sure that their assets are well aligned, with the kind of things that are coming.”
In a 'nothing stops the train' scenario, many people around the world and in the US will see the train run over them—their income (denominated in dollars) will be diluted while they hold no alternative stores of value, making them vulnerable to debasement.
“in another, nothing stops this trained scenario for many people. Around the world, and especially in the United States watching this podcast, that train runs over them, in a way if they have all of their income denominated in dollars without any tether to these, base ledgers that, that you're talking about. This is why it affects the average person, this very complex story that you're telling.”
From the second half of the 1800s into the early 1900s, humans invented and spread telecommunication systems across continents, enabling transacting in IOUs for gold without physical gold movement, which created reliance on centralized ledgers (banking, telco, government systems) that became monopoly powers, and this centralization was extremely efficient but also levered approximately 20-to-1, meaning if only 5% of people demanded their gold, the system would collapse.
“from roughly the, like the second half of the 18 hundreds, and then going into the early 19 hundreds, humans invented telecommunication systems and then they spread them across the Atlantic, across, you know, Europe and the United States. and we started transacting in IOUs, very quickly around the world. and they were IOUs for gold, and gold barely ever moved anymore. and when that happens, the entities in question that are doing the transaction, they become very reliant on the big centralized ledgers that are operating the system. these were kind of monopoly powers, the banking system, the tel, the telco system, the governments that, operate both.”
The Great Depression resulted from a multi-decade credit buildup during a new technological age (telecommunications infrastructure), which created massive imbalances, unsustainable credit bubbles, and gold pegs that no longer made sense after WWI, with banks highly leveraged and many people borrowing to buy stocks.
“So there's a lot of factors that caused the Great Depression... from roughly the, like the second half of the 18 hundreds, and then going into the early 19 hundreds, humans invented telecommunication systems and then they spread them across the Atlantic, across, you know, Europe and the United States. and we started transacting in IOUs, very quickly around the world. and they were IOUs for gold, and gold barely ever moved anymore.”
The critical path approach to analyzing the future (used in project management and engineering) is more useful than catastrophic framings: identify which constraints are truly binding (demographics, debt structure, fractional reserve banking), then assess which peripheral issues can be easily disrupted, rather than treating all problems as equally critical.
“if anyone is managed like an engineering project, there's something called a Gantt chart. So there's all these things that kind of happen in parallel. Like, okay, one person has to do this, one person has to do this, and this. Then you find the critical path, like what is the thing that is likely gonna take the longest or that has the highest likelihood of being disrupted in some way and say, well, what if that gets disrupted? How does this affect the other strands?”
Austrian economics is a bottom-up, marginal analysis of individual decision-making where there is no single objective price for anything—illustrated by the diamond-water paradox, where a thirsty person in the desert will pay everything for the marginal liter of water though water is normally cheaper than diamonds.
“Austrian economics is primarily kind of a bottom up analysis... the idea of marginal analysis... what is more expensive diamonds or water?... someone who's very thirsty in the desert somewhere will give any diamond they have for water.”
Countries with currencies pegged to the US dollar benefit from US economic growth and dollar inflows but suffer the downsides of currency devaluation when the US runs deficits and debases its currency, meaning non-US countries bear the cost of US fiscal expansion while not receiving the benefits.
“when the US. Does fiscal dominance and issues more debt. and MMT, yeah, we can invest in the right things by spending money into existence. But there are many countries around the world, you might know how many that their currency is linked to the US dollar. So when we spend money into existence to help the US economy, with services and, other things, those benefits don't get in the other countries that, but the, declining devaluating currency does.”
Stablecoins are democratized offshore bank accounts, enabling anyone (especially non-Americans in countries with currency instability) to easily hold dollars without needing access to traditional banking systems; they solve the friction problem that wealthy people historically solved with offshore accounts.
“going back to stable coins for a second. Basically for years, for, a long time there've been the idea of offshore bank accounts. Wealthy people, you know, in, in countries in the world can have accounts somewhere else. It's not something that's available to, you know, the middle class or working class. stable coins kind of take that technology and, you know, minimize the overhead. so they say that kind of everyone can have an offshore bank account now. it is basically what a stablecoin is.”
Chinese vehicle manufacturers (like those making $15,000 cars) are following the same trajectory as Hyundai (entering at the cheap end, then moving up the quality stack), and China is now the world's largest auto exporter; this provides relief to Egyptians and others in constrained economies who can no longer afford higher-priced vehicles from Western manufacturers.
“the cost of a Volkswagen has maybe tripled or quadrupled in a pretty short period of time, but then China comes in and says, well, we have the equivalent of a $15,000 car, that maybe three years ago had a reputation for bad reliability. But because they've gone up the, quality stack so quickly, it's kinda like when Hyundai, you know, kind of entered the market in the cheap stack, and then they get up to the middle stack that China's car is doing the same thing. We don't see them in the us but when you look at kind of the whole developed world, China's now the biggest auto exporter in the world.”
Currently, the fiscal train benefits those who are older or wealthier and is structured against younger and middle-class individuals: those who work but don't receive government support are impaired most, while retirees and the wealthy benefit from asset appreciation and deficit spending, creating generational and class conflict.
“the way it's kind of designed is that it's good for those that are either older or wealthier. On average, it's less good for those that are younger and or, especially those that are kind of in the middle. Like if you're working class or middle class, but you're not so impoverished that you're retire entirely getting help. But if you're kind of doing well enough that you're not really getting support, but you're also not, you know, you're working all the time. you're kind of the one on the short end of the stick there, in, the current system.”
Lynn tends to err toward optimism because humans are creative and tend to find ways to push through constraints longer than expected, adapting through pricing and mechanism changes, making her more optimistic than Nate on long-term outcomes.
“I tend to err somewhat on the side of optimism in the sense that we tend to be pretty, creative as a species. So we tend to push things longer than we expect. Whenever you start to kind of run into a friction pricing and other mechanism, con convinces a bunch of us to focus on something and we manage to find the next runway,”
Historically, about 95% of money came into existence through commercial bank lending 30-40 years ago, but now it's closer to 50-50 between commercial banks and government borrowing, indicating a fundamental shift in how money enters the economy.
“MMT, modern monetary theory correctly points out that most of our money historically comes into existence from commercial banks making loans. It used to be 30 or 40 years ago that 95% of our money came into existence that way. But what's happening as we run, as we spend more, because we need to, prop up social systems in the military and everything else. That amount isn't enough. So the government has to make up for the difference and borrows more, borrows money into existence. And so what you're saying now is every year it's no longer 95% from commercial banks. It's more like 50 50.”
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant has suggested that stablecoin growth could bring in approximately $3 trillion in additional treasury bond demand, which would help support the front end of the yield curve but the long end will likely remain under pressure from fiscal dominance.
“Treasury Secretary Scott Besant has said that stablecoin growth, is likely to help bring in an additional, I think, $3 trillion in treasury bond demand. So, I think that will help the front end of the curve. But under your Nothing stops this train narrative, then the long end, yields are, likely to stay under pressure.”
The system was leveraged approximately 20-to-1 going into the Great Depression (20 units of claims for every 1 unit of base money), 50-60 to 1 going into the 2008 financial crisis, and now approximately 20-to-1 again after central bank balance sheet expansion, though the calculation remains significant.
“so going into the great, recession, the global financial crisis, if you look at, total debt in the US system compared to base dollars, it was around 50 to one or 60 to one. right, right at kind of the prior moment. now because they expanded the base so much, they shrunk that, now it's something closer to 20 to one, which is still significant.”
In Egypt, even as nominal earnings per hour have risen over 5-10 years, the hours of work required to purchase a car or laptop has either stayed the same or increased, contradicting the expectation that productivity improvements should reduce labor time required per unit of consumption.
“if you ask a lot of them, you know, how many hours does it take to buy a car? it's generally more hours. or how many hours does it take to buy a laptop? Even, generally speaking, it'll be equal or more hours. Are Bitcoin and gold a thing on common people's minds there or not?”
Wealthy people in Egypt use the black market in Cairo to accumulate physical US dollars as a store of value because they perceive the dollar as protecting them from local currency devaluation; a physician Nate knows holds physical dollars in his apartment as his preferred savings technology, similar to how Americans view Bitcoin.
“people will literally go out to the black market in Cairo and, get physical dollars. So they'll like, especially when there's a disconnect between the official rate and like, what is actually the supply and demand. There's these kind of black markets that develop, or gray markets, and people will accumulate. Like I, I knew, I know a physician that would hold physical dollars in his apartment in. 20 24, 20 25, as what he perceived as the best savings technology for near term savings.”
Humans are adaptable, so even extreme circumstances (outside non-linear events like war where things can halve in a year) are adapted to and life goes on; Americans tend to treat every problem as the end of the world, whereas spending a month living among ordinary people in a place like Egypt reveals how the world can still function under stress.
“humans are adaptable. So even things that seem pretty extreme are adapted to... go spend a month in Egypt and not at a resort actually... and you'll get an idea of how the world. Can function.”
About half of US base dollars are physical currency (roughly $1,800-2,000 per American, though a large chunk of larger-denomination bills circulates outside the US) and the other half are bank reserves held by banks at the central bank, which are partially fungible with physical dollars.
“So that'd be about half of the base dollars. Okay. So the other half would be bank reserves, which is, owned, by banks... a really big chunk of it is outside the us. Especially larger denomination bills.”
When stablecoins are created, they do not increase the number of dollars in existence—they just affect where dollars are held. To create a stablecoin, someone wires dollars to a stablecoin issuer and receives tokens in return, with large entities and wholesale workers being the primary users, not increasing the overall dollar money supply.
“not the number of dollars, no. It just kind of affects where dollars are. and so generally speaking, for a stablecoin to be created, someone wires dollars to a stablecoin issuer, and then they get stable coins. and those are the large entities and then they're the wholesale, you know, workers of them.”
The purpose of programs like 'The Great Simplification' and others is to share knowledge and help people understand what's happening in order to protect themselves and protect others, recognizing that informed citizens are better prepared for whatever comes.
“And your program and others like it are, trying to share as much knowledge as possible for people to discuss the issue and protect themselves and protect others.”
AI is a moderately useful tool that automates some white-collar work the way the tractor and factory automation displaced blue-collar work, but it will eventually hit a ceiling because AI models are inherently probability engines that 'say what is likely to come next'—a fundamentally different and error-prone way of thinking than humans, as illustrated by repeatedly confident-but-wrong book summaries.
“these AI models are basically probability engines. they, you know, they run all these calculations, say what is likely to come next. it's an inherently a different way of thinking than humans.”
Alden is involved with Bitcoin venture capital (Ego Death Capital with Jeff Booth and others), talks regularly with Bitcoin core developers, founders building on Bitcoin, and people in inflationary/authoritarian regimes using Bitcoin and stablecoins, giving her on-the-ground perspective on Bitcoin's real-world use beyond just viewing it as an investment line on a chart.
“my involvement in the space, for years now is, I mean, I, because I'm also involved in Bitcoin venture with Ego, death capital, Jeff Booth and others, we, I talked to founders throughout the space that are actually building things on top of Bitcoin. you know, I talked to the, some of the, core developers. It worked on Bitcoin for years, you know, those that, actually published the, code that, that people use. I talked to, like, I'm friends with Alex Kla, you know, the Human Rights Foundation, so I, he, was on the show. Yeah, he's great, isn't he? Yeah. I talked to him and also, not just him, but like I, you know, I, talked to some of the people that they work with, people that are operating in very inflationary or authoritarian regimes.”