
The Crisis Isn’t Over: The Case for Deflation w/ Jeff Snider (MI272)
What this covers
Rebecca Hotsko interviews Jeff Snider, host of the Eurodollar University channel and chief strategist at Atlas Financial, about why he thinks the banking turmoil of spring 2023 is one stage of a longer crisis rather than its end. The conversation starts with the 3-month/10-year curve, then moves through the debt ceiling, labor data, the mechanics of deflation, and what it all means for asset prices. Snider's recurring claim is that the Federal Reserve controls only the short end of the curve, so longer rates carry market expectations that officials tend to wave away.
Much of the middle ground is historical. Snider traces yield curve inversion back to Eurodollar futures in December 2020, and he notes that German curves are now inverted too. He distinguishes "bad steepening" from "good steepening" as signals of recession. He leans on past cycles, including the July 1956 unemployment low followed by recession, the 1973–74 lag before layoffs appeared, and the 2008 rally between Bear Stearns and the autumn collapse. These are his case that strong payrolls offer little reassurance against a credit crunch. He also revisits the Interest Rate Fallacy associated with Milton Friedman, arguing that low rates signal tight money rather than stimulus.
The more contested positions come later. Snider treats recent inflation as a resolved supply shock, using the chip shortage that flipped into a glut as an example, and not as the product of monetary expansion. He describes the dollar system as a eurodollar system that malfunctioned in 2007 and never recovered. He argues that deflation driven by unemployment is more damaging than deflation driven by falling prices. He calls the stock market a beauty contest running on faith in a soft landing, and he says gold hedges extreme monetary disorder, not inflation. He gives no template for how long a deflationary episode will last, and he points to distressed debt as a possible recovery signal.
Snider argues that market yield curve inversions reveal the true state of the global economy—deflation and recession ahead—contrary to policymakers' claims, because long-term bond holders have superior information about future conditions than central banks.
- Yield curve inversion indicates market participants expect falling rates due to deflationary demand for safety and liquidity, not inflation
- Historical precedent shows yield curve inversions precede recessions with 6-12 month lag; current extreme inversions signal severe deflationary crisis coming
- Policymakers consistently misread signals and deny curve warnings; markets have near-perfect track record on recessions vs. central bank forecasts
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The Federal Reserve does not actually control interest rates; it only controls short-term money rate alternatives and can influence rates mainly at the short end of the curve, while longer-duration rates are driven by market expectations about future economic conditions.
“they're raising interest rates, which they don't control interest rates. They only control interest rate or money rate alternatives. So they only have the ability to influence interest rates really in the short run and mostly at the short end of the curve”
Crises develop in incremental waves, not straight lines, creating 'ebbs and flows' where each crisis event is followed by apparent stability, making participants believe each episode is 'the worst' and the crisis is over, setting up for next wave.
“Crisis, something happens, then everything seems okay, then something else happens, and then everything seems okay... Every time something happens, they say, 'That's it. That's the worst. So don't worry about it.' And then something else happens, and they say, 'Oh, that's it. That's the worst. Nothing else.' And then something else happens. It's just back and forth, back and forth, back and forth all the time”
Deflation driven by unemployment is worse than deflation driven by falling prices because it interrupts money and credit circulation, forcing businesses to cut payrolls and workers to reduce spending, creating a self-reinforcing vicious cycle of demand destruction.
“Monetary deflation is where we interrupt the circulation and free flow of money and credit in the economy. And as Keynes pointed out, when we do that, the lack of money in the economy causes businesses to react in all sorts of ways. One of the ways that they do react is they have to fire workers because they don't have enough money for payrolls... In a deflationary economy where the circulation of money is interrupted, it is workers who tend to get the worst end of it”
The biggest, most sophisticated players in the monetary system (those who make and distribute money) hedge for high safety and liquidity demand, revealing private sector expectations that should guide retail investors rather than official policy guidance.
“The biggest, most sophisticated players in the monetary system, the people who make and distribute money, if they're hedging for demand, high demand for safety and liquidity, that's what you need to take into account. The markets are saying you want to own safe and liquid assets”
Yield curve 'bad steepening' (entire curve drops but short end falls faster than long end) is a signal that recession and deflation are really beginning, as distinct from 'good steepening' (short rates fall while long rates rise), which would signal recession avoidance.
“bad steepening... interest rates along the entire curve fall, but they fall faster at the short end than the long end... that's typically what you see right when a recession is beginning, right? When deflation is really starting to bite into the economy”
Low interest rates are historically consistent with tight money, deflationary periods, and depressions—not stimulus—contrary to popular perception; Milton Friedman called this the 'interest rate fallacy' because people confuse low rates with monetary ease.
“low-interest rates are not stimulus. Historically speaking, low-interest rates are consistent with tight money, deflationary periods, depressions even... Milton Friedman called this the interest rate fallacy for this reason, because everybody gets this backwards”
The dollar system is actually a Eurodollar system (offshore dollar credit system) that malfunctioned in August 2007 and hasn't recovered, creating systemic problems that open the door to alternatives but don't require dollar replacement.
“The dollar actually does need to be replaced because it's not actually a dollar system, it's a Euro dollar system, and the Euro dollar system malfunctioned in August of 2007 and hasn't been the same since, which has opened the door to all sorts of competing ideas”
The disconnect between strong US employment data (low unemployment, solid payroll reports) and severe banking system stress reflects a lag effect: credit crunches take time to develop before impacting the real economy, creating an ambiguous transition period.
“the truth is it usually takes some time for first the credit crunch to develop and then the credit crunch to really impact the economic system as well as the financial markets too”
Deflationary periods have highly variable durations with no predictable template: can last 7-8 months (1980-81, 1937), up to years (2008+), making precise forecasting impossible due to complex systems with unpredictable knock-on effects.
“there's such a wide variation. That's what makes it so incredibly difficult because you can't, you'd like to say there's a template that we can just follow... The truth is that you can see any number of varieties of ways that this can work out, which makes sense because it's a complex system, and you can't really predict how one individual thing or how one part is going to lead to the next”
Historical recession patterns show recessions often begin with little visible data evidence: 1973-1974 recession started in late 1973 but major layoffs didn't appear until August-September 1974 (10-11 month lag); 2008 recession began December 2007 but NBER didn't declare it until December 2008.
“the recession began in late '73 with the oil shock, and we really didn't notice a huge wave of layoffs until the summer of '74, really August and September. So you had almost a year period where, sort of like Wile E. Coyote, you're off the edge of the cliff and you don't realize that you're off the edge of the cliff”
The semiconductor and vehicle chip shortage flipped from severe scarcity (millions of unfinished vehicles on lots) to massive glut forcing South Korea to shut down production, exemplifying how supply shock problems have been resolved.
“some of the most emblematic goods, like semiconductor chips, we couldn't get any semiconductors. In fact, there were millions of almost finished vehicles just sitting on dealer lots because they didn't have chips. Well, that has flipped from 'we can't get any chips to finish cars' to 'oh my God, we have such a huge glut of chips, we have to shut down South Korea's economy'.”
The market rally from Bear Stearns through June-July 2008 occurred because investors mistook one crisis stage for the end of the crisis, providing false confidence before the actual cliff-fall in September-October 2008.
“There was a rally in the marketplace because everybody thought Bear Stearns represented the end of the crisis because that was one of those incremental stages”
Stock market is not an actual market but a 'beauty contest' where prices reflect narrative sentiment rather than fundamentals; current stock market strength despite banking failures and recession warnings reflects misplaced faith in Fed policy and soft-landing narrative.
“the stock market isn't a real market to begin with. It's a beauty contest... these risks are not being priced in because there are several misconceptions about a lot of things, including inflation, including central banks being everybody's friend”
Interest rates trading toward zero indicates that markets are pricing in a deflationary scenario where demand for safe, liquid instruments will surge dramatically in the near future, not an inflationary environment.
“the market is saying interest rates want to go back down to zero and what does that actually mean it means that interesting when we talk about interest rates we're talking about again about the U.S treasury market or the German bond market Government Bond Market curves these are safe liquid instruments if those rates are going to zero that means their prices are going way up which means the demand for safety and liquidity are going to go way up in the near future safety and liquidity in high demand is not inflation that is absolutely deflation”
Yield curve inversion began further back than commonly recognized: Eurodollar futures showed inversion as early as December 2020; two-year/ten-year Treasury spread inverted in March 2022; near-term forward spread (3-month/10-year) inverted November 2022—all preceding current extremes.
“the curve inverted last year back in March. Actually, the first inversion was Eurodollar futures way back in December of 2020. But the yield curve inverted, the two-year, 10-year spread in March, and everybody said, 'No, the yield curve inversion doesn't mean anything.' We watched the near-term forward spread... Then that inverted, and those two inverted last November”
The lowest unemployment rate in modern US history occurred in July 1956, followed immediately by recession starting in August 1956, proving that very low unemployment rates do not predict future economic health and provide little comfort about imminent recession risk.
“the lowest unemployment rate in the modern US era was in, I think, July 1956. And then the recession began in August, the very next month. So the low unemployment rate doesn't necessarily tell you much about what's happening in the future”
Signals for recession recovery include: (1) yield curve steepening, (2) credit spreads beginning to narrow, (3) positive signals across broad cross-section of markets, (4) dollar strength, (5) stock market movement—require comprehensive view, not single indicator.
“So it's the yield curve steepening. Is credit spread starting to come back? Are we seeing enough positive signals in a wide enough cross section of the marketplace? What's the dollar doing exchange rates? What are stocks doing?... It's really a comprehensive view where you find a majority of the signals”
Gold is a poor inflation hedge but an excellent hedge against extreme monetary events: extreme inflation (1970s) or extreme deflationary danger (2008, present). During 2008 crisis, gold was volatile but outperformed most asset classes, signaling its hedge value against disorder and dysfunction.
“gold is a terrible inflation hedge... It's actually a good hedge against what Keens call the twin evils of monetary policy: extreme levels of inflation, as in the 1970s, or extreme levels of deflationary danger as in 2008... In 2008, gold was all over the place, volatile, which was probably what's going to be moving forward. But by and large... gold actually performed relatively well”
Distressed debt is historically one of the best-performing assets because it trades at pennies on the dollar during crises, attracting shark investors who time entries correctly and attract follow-on risk takers, signaling recovery.
“the best performing acid in history is distressed debt. Because after there's all sorts of failures and everybody's, you know, these things are selling for pennies on a dollar and they start to come back up again. That's, that's usually a sign that there are risk takers coming in. And the risk takers have a pretty good idea when to come in and take those risks.”
Credit crunch on top of what might be a mild recession on its own leads to 'some pretty bad recessionary cases'—suggesting compound impact where banking failures trigger tighter credit conditions that amplify recession severity.
“a credit crunch on top of what might be a mild recession on its own leads us into some pretty bad recessionary cases”
Recent inflation in consumer prices was primarily driven by supply shocks (pandemic lockdowns, production disruptions, goods/semiconductor shortages) and demand mismatches, not monetary expansion—a non-inflationary price shock similar to 1940s-1950s patterns, now resolved.
“it wasn't actually inflation. It wasn't a monetary phenomenon. It was the economic mismatch between supply and demand, the lockdowns, COVID, pandemic, all that stuff that interrupted the ability of the global economy to supply goods, particularly in the way that demand, which had been artificially boosted temporarily by government interventions. Just this huge mismatch led to an outbreak of prices. But we've seen these kinds of supply shocks throughout history. Go back to the 1940s, for example... supply shocks that were non-inflationary”
The deflationary crisis is global, not US-centric: German bond curves inverted in September 2023 for the first time (except one day in 2008), now with sustained inversions since October-November that match Treasury curve severity, indicating synchronized global deflation concerns.
“the German bond curve inverted way back in September, which was already unprecedented because if you go back to 2008, apart from one single day in 2008, the German curve didn't invert. Now we've had almost constant inversions since October and November that have gotten worse and worse and worse to the point that the German curve looks just like the Treasury curve”
Policymakers and central bankers consistently dismiss yield curve inversion warnings, saying 'this time it's different,' then when conditions worsen, reluctantly acknowledge recession risks while still downplaying severity—pattern repeated continuously since December 2020.
“everybody said, 'No, the yield curve inversion doesn't mean anything'... 'don't worry about those things. Those things don't mean anything either. We're going to look at the unemployment rate'... Now they're saying, 'Okay, yes, the unemployment rate is really low, but the risk of recession has probably gone up, and it's only going to be a mild one'”
Investors should make a decision today about whether a deflationary crisis is coming, commit to that positioning, and execute it rather than trying to time individual waves, because attempting to trade the ebb-and-flow creates the risk of being caught in the final cliff-fall phase.
“if you believe we're heading into a crisis, make that decision today and act on it today. Don't get caught up in the back and forth. Don't get caught up in trying to time it... If you believe that we're heading into a deflationary crisis, make your decision today and act on it today, and just let it happen”
Investors believe the Fed has solved the problems through rate-hike pauses and soft-landing narrative, ignoring that rate hikes and banking failures are the actual transmission mechanism of recession, not obstacles to it.
“if you thought that the stock market weakness from 2021 into 2022, and now this year, is all about interest rates and rate hikes, if you think the Fed is the biggest problem in the stock market, and then you also think that the Fed ending its rate hikes... is going to be tremendously stock market positive”
Every time 'dollar is doomed' theories emerge, the dollar actually appreciates in exchange value because there's insufficient dollar supply; this pattern has held for 15 years and is likely to continue as eurodollar system remains broken.
“Every time we hear this dollar is doom theory come up, what happens? The dollar goes up in exchange value because there's not enough dollars. That's not likely to change anytime soon. In fact, the markets are telling you that's not going to change in the foreseeable future.”
Copper remains difficult to source despite supply issues, but most emblematic supply shock goods (chips, some logistics) have normalized, with remaining problems being logistical friction rather than systemic shortages.
“there are still pockets of problems. You know, some of the emblematic goods or pieces of the supply shock, like copper, for example, it's still difficult to source enough copper. But some of the most emblematic goods, like semiconductor chips... There are still some kinks in the logistical end of things. There are still container problems, there are still pockets of those things like that. So there's still stickiness to the supply shock, but by and large, those have been dealt with.”
Markets have near-perfect track record on recession prediction (via yield curve), while policymakers are wrong every single time—suggesting market participants have better information about future conditions than central banks.
“Markets have been, their track record is not perfect, but near as near perfect as you can get. Whereas policymakers are wrong every single time”
China, Russia, BRICS aren't trying to replace the dollar but rather managing the 'dollar shortage problem'—dollars are in insufficient supply for their global trade needs, so they pursue bilateral trade alternatives to reduce dollar dependency.
“China, Russia, and the BRICS aren't actually trying to replace the dollar. They're trying to manage this dollar problem that they do have, which is not the dollar going to zero, but that the dollar is in such short supply. It makes it very difficult for them to conduct their global trade business”
After 2008, recovery never actually occurred despite years of monetary policy—unemployment eventually fell but through workforce reduction (people dropping out) rather than genuine recovery, suggesting deflation can persist through entire cycles.
“And of course, after 2008, we never did recover. So there's a lot of work to be done... getting out of it”
China's reopening hasn't generated the expected inflationary boost because reopening wasn't as strong as advertised—China may have deeper structural problems beyond zero-COVID policy, plus China is vulnerable to global recession and inventory cycle weakness regardless of reopening dynamics.
“the reopening hasn't necessarily been as strong as advertised because maybe China's problems weren't actually zero Covid and the lockdown. Maybe China has more structural and longer-running problems... Plus, China is also highly susceptible... to the global economic condition... As the global economy starts to head into a recession, especially with the inventory cycle being such a big problem, that's going to negatively impact China regardless”
John Maynard Keynes wrote in 1923 that deflation is the worst of the 'twin evils of money' (inflation and deflation) because it forces businesses to cut wages and employment, harming workers while disrupting economic activity.
“John Maynard Keynes said this way back in 1923... In 1923, he wrote a book called 'Social Consequences,' where he said the twin evils of money are inflation and deflation, and by far the worst evil is deflation”
Stock market hit record highs in October 2007, two months after the crisis began (August 2007) and weeks before Great Recession began, demonstrating that record stock prices provide no protection against imminent severe downturn.
“The stock market hit a record high in October 2007, which was two months after the crisis had begun, and just a couple of weeks before the Great Recession started”
Oil prices are trending lower despite tight OPEC-managed supplies because deflationary money is dominating and global demand concerns are outweighing supply constraints, signaling the market's conviction about deflationary economic conditions.
“oil prices, what if oil prices yesterday, they flash crashed in early Asian trading, they got down into the low sixties. So even though supply is still a tremendous issue in oil, oil prices are trending lower because of both deflationary money... we have a liquidity problem on the oil market as well as major concerns about global demand”
Eurodollar University (Snider's enterprise) exists because hardly anybody understands the actual global monetary system and how it functions; there is 'tremendous need' to educate on what the monetary system actually is and does.
“hardly anybody has even heard the term, although more have nowadays than before. But there's a tremendous need to really understand what the monetary system is and what it actually does”
Silver has outperformed alongside gold despite being an industrial metal, behaving more like gold than like copper/aluminum, indicating silver is acting as a safety/liquidity hedge rather than an industrial demand play.
“We've seen silver outperform too. And silver obviously is not outperforming for its industrial characteristics because the rest of the industrial metals are screaming deflation. Now, copper is one, but iron just recently fell off. Aluminum's another one that former high flyer... that one can't get a bid even with China reopening. So, silver, it's interesting that silver's acting more like gold than it is like copper or something like that.”
The current problem is increasingly demand-side rather than supply-side, as evidenced by economic data showing weakness in goods economy, inventory cycles, and demand indicators rather than continued supply constraints.
“the problem today isn't supply. It's more and more turning to demand. And one way we can see that in particular is in crude oil.”
Multiple regional and mid-size banks have failed or are in danger of FDIC takeover in a pattern not seen since 2008, indicating systemic banking stress separate from but reinforcing deflationary pressures.
“we have now been talking about the banking system in a way. We haven't in 15 years since 2008. We've got outlier banks, one after another, after another, seemingly going down, or at least in danger of being taken over by the FDIC”
US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned the US could run out of money as soon as June due to debt ceiling impasse, which creates collateral market disruptions but is a secondary problem; primary issue is the already-strained monetary system cannot absorb additional friction.
“Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen on how the US could run out of money as soon as June”