
Pratap Bhanu Mehta: Can India Change Course? | Foreign Affairs Interview
What this covers
This Foreign Affairs interview has Kanishk Tharoor questioning Pratap Bhanu Mehta, a political theorist and critic of the government, about what the 2024 result means for India. Narendra Modi now leads a coalition, and the conversation tests how much that has changed in practice. Mehta's main argument is that an opposition's mere existence empowers courts and media, which hedge their bets once power might change hands. He points to the Supreme Court's greater willingness to grant opposition leaders bail. He also stresses how far the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)) can threaten rivals through tax and administrative machinery and inducements to defect. In his account, that threat is what unites the opposition.
The range is wide. On domestic politics, Mehta describes policy reversals under coalition pressure: wakf boards regulation sent to a select committee, and movement toward a caste census that Modi had campaigned against. He separates electoral consolidation from the cultural project of Hindu nationalism, arguing that voter fatigue does not slow the latter, and he cites continued lynchings and home demolitions of Muslims. On the economy, he is sceptical: the expected structural shift out of agriculture has not come, private investment is weak, favoured business houses and tax uncertainty make business harder, and the middle has struggled.
The foreign policy section is the most surprising. Mehta calls Modi a conventional nation-state operator rather than a leader of a civilization state, and sees no militarism in him. He reads the Balakot strike as restraint and describes India's border position with China as more precarious than a decade ago. Tharoor adds that India has largely lost its neighborhood to Beijing. Mehta also contends that the useful question about Hindu nationalism is which failures of liberal, centrist and left governance gave it plausibility. He treats democratic decline as real rather than an American conspiracy, noting that the United States has slid in similar indexes.
Modi's loss of absolute majority in India's 2024 elections represents a genuine democratic reprieve that has constrained his authority and empowered opposition and independent institutions, though Hindu nationalist cultural projects continue unabated and the opposition must demonstrate viable governance alternatives to constitute a sustainable democratic recovery.
- Electoral fatigue with Modi personally and economic disappointment (not catastrophic failure) undercut BJP's dominance after accomplishing key Hindu nationalist agenda items
- Coalition governance has forced Modi into policy reversals and compromises while independent institutions show modest renewed spine, but the Hindu nationalist cultural project of polarization continues through state violence and vigilantism
- The opposition's challenge is not merely opposing but articulating sophisticated, principled positions on issues like civil codes and religious minorities that don't repeat Congress's historical missteps
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The existence of an opposition, independent of its virtue or competence, empowers other institutions including courts and media because those institutions hedge their bets politically, knowing electoral fortunes could shift and other parties might soon hold power.
“one of course just by mere virtue of the fact that we have an opposition just that fact is actually helpful for Indian democracy... even independent institutions like the courts actually try and read the political Tea Leaves and if they have a sense that there is actually some political mobilization behind particular decisions they respond differently... they just need to hedge because you actually don't know who might be in government three years from now”
Unlike Russia (which seeks to recreate Peter the Great's or Soviet territory) and China (which asserts Middle Kingdom hegemony), India under Modi shows no militarism in foreign policy; defense spending is not rising and military modernization proceeds at a glacial pace, as it has for 10-15+ years.
“I think to be fair to India I don't see quite that extr territorial ambition yes officially parts of Hindu nationalist ideology think of the entire subcontinent as kind of sacred territory and would like a sort of reunification but that's kind of hypothetical and to be fair I think the one big difference between India and Russia on the one hand and China on the other is that even under Mr Modi there is no whiff of militarism in Indian foreign policy India's defense expenditure is not Rising India's modernization of its forces is proceeding at exactly the glacial place it has for the last 1015 years or actually a longer kind of Arc”
India's security situation has become more precarious than a decade ago due to a border clash with China and India's loss of territory or patrolling rights in disputed areas, a fact that Modi cannot publicly acknowledge domestically and that Indian media has covered up as a national embarrassment.
“India is in this awkward position where officially Mr Modi can't even say that India lost territory to China or at least lost patrolling rights to disputed territory that it actually has and Indian media actually has in some senses gone along with Mr Modi sort of doing almost a kind of a cover up of what should have been a major domestic embarrassment”
Modi's loss of absolute majority has given Indian democracy breathing room by diminishing his authority, empowering the opposition, and enabling independent institutions including the Supreme Court to show more independence in matters like granting opposition leaders bail.
“it is given Indian democracy Breathing Room you know obviously there's still significant challenges I think Mr modi's Authority has diminished there's absolutely no question about it and we can talk about the different ways in which it has done so the opposition is empowered the Supreme Court and independent institutions are showing a little bit more Independence they're not quite there all the way yet as we had hoped but certainly in matters like giving opposition leaders bail when they get arrested they're showing some spine”
The Bharatiya Janata Party is not merely a normal political party that will peacefully accept opposition victories, but rather can existentially threaten opposition parties through use of state machinery, tax laws, administrative means, and outright bribery to entice defections, creating conditions of existential dread that unite opposition coalitions.
“the BJP is not just a normal political party that you know let them be in opposition will welcome their winning an election sometime in the future peacefully actually the BJP is the kind of party that can existentially make or break opposition parties using the Machinery of the state using tax laws using administrative means using outright bribery and Corruption inside enticing mlas and I think that last election was fought under that sense of existential dread for almost every single opposition party”
Modi projects India as a major international power with restored respect, and this image remains politically valuable domestically even though his actual foreign policy conduct shows continuity rather than discontinuity with prior administrations.
“no I do think it is a powerful idea in domestic politics and you could argue that in part Mr Modi has not done worse than he has is because there is still this kind of residual Association of him as being a kind of strong leader who's brought respect to India in the International System but you know to be honest I think in foreign policy the self-presentation of India has certainly changed it's much more aggressive it's laying claim to great power status but its actual conduct I think there's actually a lot more continuity than there is actually discontinuity”
The Modi government has created greater regulatory and tax uncertainty and administrative difficulty for private business despite reform rhetoric, contradicting expectations that the government would provide administrative efficiency, clarity on taxation, and fairness—making India a harder place to do business.
“contrary to expectations the government has actually created way more Regulatory and tax uncertainty so part of the process of Reform was supposed to be creating a regime which is administratively efficient where there's more regulatory uncertainty for private business taxation regimes are clearer and fairer but I think there's consensus actually even amongst the government supporters that India's actually become a much harder place to do business”
The structural transformation of the economy that was anticipated—moving people out of agriculture and rural India into urban high-pay jobs—has not materialized; insufficient private investment and government reliance on infrastructure spending (70% of capital expenditure) has underinvested in human capital and education.
“the structural transformation of the economy that we imagined which is taking people out of Agriculture and Rural India into urban India into better quality high-pay jobs those High pay jobs are still not being produced in nearly sufficient numbers”
India's economic inequality has grown measurably; while the top 20-30% have done well and the government created a welfare floor for the poorest through food distribution and cash transfers, the middle has genuinely struggled with stagnant rural wages and insufficient private investment.
“one on any measure inequality in Indian economy has grown and people talk of a kind of k-shaped recovery after the pandemic you know the top 20 30% have done very well well actually the bottom to be fair to government it has kind of created something of a floor under them through a bunch of welfare schemes the free distribution of food grain for example some limited cash transfers but the middle the big middle is actually genuinely struggling rural wages have been stagnant private investment has not really taken off”
Since the June 2024 election, violence against Muslims has continued unabated, including targeted lynchings of Muslims suspected of carrying beef and demolitions of homes of people deemed anti-national (predominantly Muslim), with the Supreme Court only recently issuing strictures against such vigilante activity.
“there have been in recent weeks incidents of Muslims being targeted or lynched because they're suspected of carrying beef in many states BJP state governments will engage in Acts of vigil anti- Justice demolish houses of people they think are anti-national very coincidently most all of them happen to be Muslim and the Supreme Court has just passed some strictures to that effect”
The government has been forced into multiple policy U-turns and shelving of legislation since the election due to coalition pressure, including shelving communally charged wakf board regulation to a parliamentary select committee and moving toward accepting a caste census despite Modi's prior campaign opposition to it as divisive.
“in the last month or so practically every measure that they've announced they've either had to do a U-turn or shelf sometimes because of pressure of allies so for example there's a piece of legislation that seeks to regulate wakf boards which are basically Muslim charitable boards which control vast amount of resources and this is again a politically charged and communally charged issue BJP one and two simply would have introduced it and would have passed in Parliament within like 30 seconds without much discussion or maybe at least an hour without much discussion it has gone to a parliamentary select committee”
The Ram Temple at Ayodhya, built on the site of the Babri Masjid (demolished by Hindu militants in the early 1990s), was a longstanding Hindu nationalist agenda item designed to provide a national symbol of Hindu reclamation against Muslim invaders.
“one was building a temple at the site of a mosque that had been demolished by Hindu militants in the early '90s the barri Masjid and the creation of this Temple was supposed to be the crowning Glory of Hindu nationalism it kind of gives Hindu nationalism a national symbol it's a symbol of the fact that Hindus are finally reclaiming their own country against Muslim Invaders that's in a sense the political symbolism of it”
The government is clearly favoring particular business houses, which compounds the difficulty for broader private investment and suggests the government has not asked why private investment has failed to pick up after 10 years in power.
“it has also become a much harder place to do business because the government is also very clearly favoring particular business houses so the one question the government needs to ask is after 10 years in power why hasn't private investment picked up”
India's democratic score in Freedom House and V-Dem indexes has been sliding, but the U.S. has been sliding similarly, indicating this is not an American conspiracy but a real democratic crisis affecting multiple countries including the U.S.
“by the way to Indian critics of those indexes it's also worth reminding that so was the United States of America I mean the very same so this is not some kind of American conspiracy to downgrade Indian democracy it just that you know democracy was having a hard time in many countries including the United States right”
Modi is not the miracle worker transformative figure on the economy that people had hoped—India is not in a considerably better place economically than it was five years ago, and basic bread and butter issues have resurfaced as electoral concerns despite economic growth not being catastrophic.
“it is becoming increasingly clear that Mr Modi is not The Miracle Worker transformative figure on the economy that people had hoped”
The Balakot strike (Modi's strike on Pakistan) is presented as an example of Modi's assertiveness, but the immediate aftermath—captured Indian air force pilot Captain Abhinandan Varthaman's return—suggests Modi's real goal was pilot recovery rather than escalation, indicating restraint.
“even in the one case where Mr Modi was very assertive which was the strike on Pakistan in balakot the minute Pakistan captured the first Airmen you know captain abinandan that entire effort was to actually get that one single soldier back home”
Modi is actually a conventional nation-state operator obsessed with borders and sovereignty; he will not accept creative solutions to sovereignty conundrums with Pakistan or China, contradicting the 'civilization state' claim that such states transcend nation-state boundaries and operate with graduated identities.
“Mr Modi is a very convention nation state guy I mean the last thing India most obsesses about its borders it's not going to accept Creative Solutions to our sovereignty conundrums with Pakistan or China it's a much more sovereigntist power”
Arundhati Roy, a well-known leftist writer and critic of the Indian government, has been sanctioned for prosecution on a 20-year-old sedition charge that the Modi government seeks to revive, though prosecution has not proceeded forcefully as feared.
“the sanctioning of prosecution for arundhati Roy on a sedition charge but that's still only sanctioning for prosecution I mean they haven't quite followed up with it as forcefully as many of us feared”
India has 'more or less lost its neighborhood' to Beijing's influence; South Asia, which India hoped to lead, does not look as propitious a zone for Indian dominance as it did 7-10 years ago
“India has more or less lost its neighborhood once again now to be fair to India I think our neighbors have their own kind of internal contradictions and problems Pakistan Bangladesh working out but certainly South Asia which India hopes to outgrow doesn't look as sanguin a zone for India as it did 7 to 10 years ago”
Television media remains closely aligned with the Modi regime post-election; there is very little evidence it has moved toward fairer opposition coverage, though direct targeting of individuals may have diminished.
“since this government has come to power for a third time I have to say that there's very little evidence that television media has moved at all in the direction of being fairer or allowing more space for the opposition I'm not quite sure what the story there is but I think all the kind of not just anecdotal evidence the sense is that television media is still very much closely aligned to the regime”
The productive question about Hindu nationalism's rise is not 'what is the essential Indian core?' but rather 'what failures of liberal, centrist, and leftist governance have allowed Hindu nationalism to acquire plausibility as an alternative?'
“I think the question to ask is what is it about the failures of liberal Centrist leftist governance that has actually allowed Hindu nationalism this vineer of plausibility that's I think the much more productive question”
Article 370 of the Indian constitution facilitated Kashmir's accession as a province and provided special status; the BJP made abrogating it and downgrading Kashmir from state to union territory a longstanding goal and achieved this in the current government.
“I think the second item on the agenda was Kashmir had a special status under the Indian constitution there was Article 370 of the Indian constitution that had facilitated kashmir's accession as a province to India and it had been a long-standing Hindu nationalist demand that article 370 be abrogated kashmir's special status be revoked and this government even went one step further it actually downgraded kashmir's status from being a state to being a union territory”
Hindu nationalism operates simultaneously at two distinct levels: electoral consolidation (translating into electoral votes) and a cultural project (rewriting history, changing Hindu-Muslim relationships, and marginalizing Muslim minorities), with exhaustion from the former not limiting momentum of the latter.
“Hindu nationalism operates at two levels there's the level of electoral consolidation does Hindu nationalism translate into electoral War but Hindu nationalism is also a cultural project it's also a project of rewriting Indian history it's also a project of changing Common Sense amongst Hindus about the relationships with Muslims and in particular Hindu nationalism's nastiest Edge comes from the fact that it seeks to marginalize the Muslim minorities”
India, like Russia and China, presents itself as a 'civilization state' rather than merely a nation state, but the term carries distinct connotations including ethnic nationalism, extraterritorial ambitions, and de-emphasis of sovereignty concerns—only some of which apply to India.
“the term civilization States has three or four connotations we need to kind of disaggregate to see so one what they mean by civilization state is that the state represents a particular civilization and in India's case it's kind of Hindu civilization so it's actually a code for ethnic nationalism it's a nicer word for ethnic nationalism in some ways that's what it actually amounts to in its current articulation”
Hindu nationalism would have been stronger in the 1950s if Gandhi had not been assassinated, because Gandhi's assassination delegitimized Hindu nationalism and gave the Congress party and Jawaharlal Nehru breathing room to establish secular governance.
“and arguably would have been actually stronger in the 1950s if Gandhi had not been assassinated because Gandhi's assassination delegitimized Hindu nationalism and I think gave the Congress and neeru I think breathing room so that strand has always been I think a strand in Indian politics”
The Congress party won 400 seats (approximately 34% of parliament) in the 1980s and lost this dominance within five years, demonstrating that claims about Modi revealing an essential Indian core misread what is actually a failure of liberal-centrist governance to maintain electoral coalition.
“the congress party in the 1980s wins 400 seats it wins 34ths of Indian's Parliament and then loses it within a span of five years so I actually think that rather than say that it's revealed a kind of essential core I think the question to ask is what is it about the failures of liberal Centrist leftist governance that has actually allowed Hindu nationalism this vineer of plausibility”
Jawaharlal Nehru won three successive elections at a moment of national trauma and commanded tens of millions of followers willing to trust him despite his cultural predilections, demonstrating that the masses' willingness to support liberal governance cannot be dismissed as thin elite veneer.
“javahar nehu like Mr Modi won three successive elections it was a moment of national trauma when he died and to say that that was just a moment of liberal vineer you have to then ask this question how this person be dismiss as you know the last bua the last Englishman was able to mobilize tens of millions of people behind him they were willing to put their trust in him no matter what his kind of own cultural predilections might be right”
The opposition cannot rely on secular ideology alone as a differentiator; it must draw clear moral red lines (e.g., opposition to targeting people for identity) while developing sophisticated positions on contentious issues like civil codes that don't merely defend religious status quo but argue for progressive principles compatible with modern governance.
“I think the challenge for the opposition is it has to draw red lines otherwise what's the point of being in opposition if there are no core moral values you stand for and the core moral value in this case being we can't be a country where people are being targeted simply for being who they are I mean if you can't even draw that red line what's the point of being in opposition”
Broad-based governance in India must give different groups confidence that the government is their government and does not radically privilege one ethnic group over another, requiring either internally diverse political parties or coalition arrangements among many parties.
“if you're going to govern India without provoking much conflict whatever the ruling dispensation is has to be a broad-based dispensation that gives different groups in society a confidence that this government is their government as well that this government does not radically privilege one ethnic group over another”
Coalition Partners in the current BJP coalition lack significant ideological differences; what keeps India's party system fragmented is not deep diversity but institutional failures of national parties (lack of intraparty democracy, high barriers to entry for new groups), creating incentives for leaders to form separate parties.
“what keeps the Indian party system fragmented is not that each of these parties represents some deep diversity what keeps it fragmented is actually the fact that the national parties have become less inclusive there are more entry barriers to those parties for newly mobilized social groups they don't have intraparty democracy so if you are a leader with a particular social base you don't have as much incentive to join an existing party as to in a sense create a new group”
Modi has demonstrated unprecedented personal fatigue and loss of command since the election, evidenced by the absence of bombastic speeches, lack of self-understanding about the defeat, and visible out-of-sortness—a contrast with his prior 10-year pattern of aggressive leadership.
“he's a very upfront aggressive I take charge I'm everywhere kind of leader it's almost as if they haven't quite diagnosed or even yet internalized the consequences of their diminished mandate and I think they're at a loss to explain it I mean I think one of the things that's actually quite striking about Prime Minister Modi since the election is the lack of kind of those bombastic speeches there's not even a kind of a whiff of self-understanding or explanation of what went wrong here it's almost as if we were cheated out of something and I think they're at a genuine intellectual loss in terms of how to actually understand this loss we did everything right how come we've lost right”
Hindu nationalism is resisted more by poor and rural India than by anglicized urban elites, contradicting the narrative that illiberalism is a bottom-up eruption of a repressed mass essence.
“even today it's actually more likely that if Hindu nationalism is resisted it is actually resisted by the poor and Rural India rather than by India's anglicized Elite so sociologically that actually doesn't kind of map”
Hindu nationalism is exhausted electorally after the BJP achieved two of its principal agenda items—the Ram Temple consecration in January 2024 and the abrogation of Kashmir's special status (Article 370)—creating a sense among supporters of 'what next' with no clear agenda remaining.
“frankly the mood in January 21st was almost euphoric... but I think that Euphoria e okay so you've done this fine what next... many of these agenda items in a sense BJP had actually fulfilled but there was also a sense of okay what's left for Hindu nationalism to do what's the next move here so I think a sense of exhaustion also seems to have crept in”
During India's 1990s-era coalition governments (roughly early 1990s through Modi's rise), coalition partners had much clearer stands against Hindu nationalism than they do currently.
“India's last protracted experience of Coalition governments right from roughly the early 990s to the rise of Mr Modi this kind of 30-year period many of the Coalition partners and many of the regional constituents that went into these Coalition governments used to have a much clearer stand against Hindu nationalism”
Hindu nationalism has operated as a persistent strand in Indian politics since independence, but this is not evidence of an 'essential core' of Indian illiberalism; rather, it reflects the inevitable ethnic majoritarianism that accompanies modern nation-state formation in most countries, not unique to India.
“I find these arguments too ahistorical and too essentialist this is not just true of India I mean I think this is true of kind of the way we think of the history of democracy everywhere the United States I mean did Trump reveal a kind of irrevocable American core let's put it this way all democracies have a strand of ethn nationalist supremacism with him and India's had it for a long time there's no question about it”
The critical question for Indian democracy post-election is what policy moves the Modi government makes and how the opposition responds; there is 'one more round left before we can be completely reassured that Indian democracy is entirely safe.'
“there's as it were one more round left before we can be completely reassured that Indian democracy is entirely safe”
The opposition must demonstrate governance success in states it wins (like Maharashtra) to signal it is a viable alternative to the BJP, not merely an opposition coalition, because the BJP banks on the TINA (There Is No Alternative) fact and still commands 42% of national vote.
“the real test comes when you actually have to share The Spoils of power in some ways and I think that's where opposition I think the M unity in Maharashtra is actually I think going to be tested right and they have to Signal strongly that they actually are a viable governing alternative to the BJP because one of the thing the BJP still banks on is the Tina fact that there is no alternative and let's remember the bjp's share of national vote hasn't diminished much in the last election it's you know still about 42%”
Coalition partners in the current BJP coalition do not consider Hindu nationalism a dealbreaker; none have taken strong exception to violent hate speech from BJP politicians or taken strong stands on violence against minorities.
“Hindu nationalism is not as much of a deal breaker for most Coalition Partners none of the Coalition Partners have actually come out and taken strong exception to for example the kind of violent hate speech that many BJP politicians engage in and that was by the way going on during the election as well I mean that was not a deal breaker for them none of them have taken a significantly strong stand on violence against minorities”
India's judiciary is a puzzle; while recent orders show somewhat renewed protectiveness of civil liberties, the application is inconsistent and the institution historically uses legitimate decisions to build legitimacy before making catastrophically bad rulings.
“the Indian Judiciary is in the state that it is the only thing we can see in the last few weeks as I've said since this election is the Judiciary has become once again a little bit more protective of the civil liberties of individuals but the reason I say it's a bit of a mystery because there's a line amongst Delhi lawyers that the Indian Judiciary is going one step forward three step sideways and one step backwards which is these orders are still being inconsistently applied”
Personal laws in India—marriage, divorce, inheritance—are governed by different codes for different religious communities rather than a unified civil code, a system Modi has questioned as inconsistent with modernity.
“India has a variety of personal laws where different religious communities are governed by set of laws pertaining to marriage divorce inheritance personal laws that are specific to those communities”