
Arnold Kling on Prosperity, Poverty, and Economics 2.0 12/14/2009
What this covers
In this 2009 EconTalk conversation, Arnold Kling and host Russ Roberts examine why living standards exploded after 1800 while stagnating for millennia before. Kling argues that conventional economic models built on capital accumulation fail to explain the magnitude of modern wealth creation. The core claim is that intangible assets—ideas, institutions, and knowledge systems—not physical capital, drive prosperity. The conversation traces this argument through historical data, cross-country comparisons, and the mechanics of how ideas differ from machines: they are non-rival goods that can be copied and used simultaneously without depletion, enabling growth unconstrained by resource scarcity. Roberts tests the framework with questions about regulation, culture, and what development advice should actually be given to poor countries.
The breadth spans several distinct territories. Kling uses a systems metaphor—institutions as operating systems with "bugs" like weak property rights or dictatorship—to explain why some countries remain trapped in poverty despite labor and capital. He contrasts trial-and-error market discovery with top-down planning, using examples from China's bottom-up agricultural reforms succeeding where Russia's imposed capitalism failed. The conversation addresses why standard macroeconomic models assume homogeneous unskilled labor and capital when modern workers build organizational knowledge. On innovation, Kling walks through how pharmaceutical screening and dot-com ventures reveal that success cannot be predicted ex ante from failure—a claim that complicates forecasting and policy design. Throughout, Roberts raises genuine tensions: whether regulations helped or hurt U.S. industrialization, how much culture versus institutions explains North and South Korea's divergent outcomes, and whether entrepreneurial searchers or government planners better serve development. These disagreements remain unresolved, marking the frontier of applied economic thinking rather than settled doctrine.
Kling argues that the explosion in living standards since 1800 is driven not by capital accumulation but by intangible assets—ideas, know-how, and institutions—discovered through trial and error, which conventional 'Economics 1.0' built on scarcity and capital fails to explain.
- Capital accumulation explains only a small fraction of growth and cross-country wealth differences; most wealth is intangible.
- Ideas behave like non-rival software that can be copied cheaply, enabling growth without consuming resources.
- Institutions act like operating systems whose 'bugs' (e.g. weak property rights, dictatorship) can produce negative intangible wealth, and good institutions emerge through trial and error, not top-down planning.
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Institutions function like an economy's operating system: communism, dictatorships like Mugabe's, and North Korea are extremely 'buggy' systems (poorly enforced property rights, government confiscation, central dictation of the economy) compared to well-functioning systems like Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States.
“communism being a different operating system than capitalism or Mugabe is dictatorship being a different operating system than more democratic society and there clearly are problems with certain operating systems that they really mess up”
Ideas are non-rival, behaving like software rather than hardware: two people can run copies of the same spreadsheet simultaneously, ideas can be replicated cheaply and used by many at once, which is why growth can take off without consuming resources.
“if I have software and you have another copy of the software there's no reason why you and I both can't be running spreadsheets at the same time and so a lot of what we're talking about is economics 2.0 is stuff that operates like software”
Traditional economics treats growth as deferred consumption used to accumulate capital, but we have clearly grown far beyond what capital accumulation alone could deliver, which is why intangible factors—chiefly innovation and ideas—must account for most of the gain.
“the only place that could come from is people foregoing consumption today to get consumption tomorrow by accumulating capital and yet clearly we've been able to go way beyond what we could get just by accumulating capital and so that brings up the intangible factors that we talk about”
A World Bank growth-accounting study converting income into lifetime wealth found the average citizen in a well-developed country holds over $400,000 of wealth, most of which is intangible (human capital, institutions); some countries show negative intangible wealth because their institutions are so harmful they produce less than their labor and capital alone would predict.
“the average citizen in a very well developed country has over $400,000 of wealth that is sort of lifetime income you might think of that and most of that wealth is intangible”
Good institutions cannot be imposed from outside; the software part of development must evolve locally in a way congruent with a country's culture and existing institutions, through the freedom to try, fail, and try again—a deeply Hayekian story.
“it's institutional design the software part of the story has to evolve there in a way that's congruent with their culture and their existing institutions can't be imposed from the outside”
Once you have learned how to do something, that knowledge doesn't depreciate the way physical capital depreciates, which is one reason intangibles generate increasing returns and abundance rather than diminishing returns.
“once you've learned how to do something that knowledge doesn't depreciate the way capital depreciates so you you there are all sorts of reasons why you get sort of positive returns increasing returns abundance”
Innovation proceeds through trial and error—pharmaceutical companies screen many molecules and progressively test promising ones, and entrepreneurs like the dot-com firms tried many ventures; the successes (Amazon) could not be predicted ex ante from the failures (pets.com).
“they literally will just try a bunch of different molecules and see how those molecules will affect different symptoms and different tissues and then if they find some that they think are promising then they'll maybe try them on animals”
From the formation of civilizations until around 1800 the standard of living changed relatively little, then accelerated dramatically—people went from roughly $150/year before 1500-1600 to a worldwide average of about $8,000/year today (and about $40,000 in the US).
“from the time when you know people first you know formed civilizations until around 1800 the standard of living change relatively little compared to a dramatic improvements in the standard of living since then”
The Solow growth model explains living standards through capital accumulation, but Solow himself found empirically that capital accumulation accounts for relatively little of the increase in living standards over time (maybe a quarter or less) and poorly explains differences across countries.
“soullow himself was found the most important problem which was empirically capital accumulation doesn't account for very much of the different of the increase in standard of living over time you know maybe on the order of a quarter maybe less”
Knowledge—including not just facts but know-how, from ORT (sugar-water to prevent dysentery) to Walmart's logistics systems—is a distinct intangible factor that drives an enormous amount of productivity and exists independently of human beings and physical machinery.
“knowledge is really driving an enormous amount of our productivity where knowledge includes know-how it's it's not facts”
Scarcity has not been eliminated—saving still requires sacrifice today for gains tomorrow—but in Economics 2.0 the relevant saving is investment in human capital (e.g. paying for college) and in research/trial-and-error to start businesses, whose failures are themselves part of the sacrifice needed for progress.
“there there are two types of saving that are important... one is in terms of developing your own human capital... and the other is that the lot of these ideas do require research efforts if nothing else they require the trial and error”
We have no decisive way to evaluate whether US regulations during 1880-1980 industrialization enhanced or retarded growth—both 'growth would have been even greater without regulations' and 'it wouldn't have happened without them' are claims we cannot resolve except through prior bias—because we run almost no controlled experiments.
“we don't have any way to evaluate those two claims I don't think other than prior knowledge and bias”
The entrepreneur's role is to force the adoption of new ideas because people and big companies resist change; wide-open free entry and the ability of small firms to grow put the competitive pressure on large organizations that is needed to produce change.
“the entrepreneurs role is to force this adoption because people resist change I think I think big companies resist change”
We don't know the relative roles of culture versus institutions: South Korea has a standard of living 15-20 times higher than North Korea despite shared culture (showing institutions matter), yet installing Western institutions in Iraq would likely fail because of cultural problems—and we don't know how long new institutions must persist to change culture.
“South Korea has a standard of living that's you know 15 to 20 times higher than North Korea so clearly it's institutional differences”
Focusing on business cycles takes your eye off the ball because growth matters far more: changes in consumption during a recession turn out to be quite small, but people get frightened and government sees the crisis as an opportunity to expand.
“looking at business cycles is in some sense taking your eye off the ball because growth matters... if you measure the changes in consumption during a recession they really turn out to be pretty small but people get frightened or maybe government sees the crisis as an opportunity to expand”
Trial-and-error innovation is hard to model or formalize, which is likely part of the reason it isn't more commonly taught in economics, and growth cannot be forecast because ideas get used in unanticipated ways.
“trial and errors is underrated it's also difficult to model it doesn't lend itself to formalization very well which may be part of the reason this isn't as commonly taught”
The fear that a service economy will impoverish us ('you can't get rich doing each other's laundry') misunderstands innovation: Economics 1.0 celebrates sending shirts out to be ironed via comparative advantage, but Economics 2.0 points to permanent press (and later no-iron cotton) which eliminates the ironing job entirely and creates abundance for consumers.
“the economics 2.0 answer is well that's great that you can send your shirt out to be ironed by somebody else but haven't you heard of permanent press you know somebody came up with an idea that allows you to eliminate the job of ironing shirts all together”
People are not simply replaced by machines but by ideas: when toll-booth collectors are replaced by EZ-Pass transponders, it is misleading to say the gadget put them out of work—it is the extraordinary software and concept behind the system that does the work.
“it would really be misleading to say that the EasyPass transmitter put the person out of work it's really the extraordinary set of software behind that little gadget that is doing the work”
Most modern workers don't make widgets—they build organizational capital, adding to a company's capacity to do something new or control its risks, which creates a very different environment than macroeconomics' assumption of homogeneous unskilled labor and homogeneous capital.
“most people today most workers don't make widgets they build organizational capital most people who work in companies are really trying to add to the capacity of that company to do something new”
We do not know the optimal institutional structure: the US heavily regulates housing, agriculture, education, and health, and a startup country couldn't tell which of those policies to copy—an economist can offer powerful critiques of all of them—so beyond knowing that communist dictatorship doesn't work, there is wide room for controversy.
“we don't know what the optimal institutional straw sure is... which of those regulations should they copy should they have our same agricultural policy should they have our same housing policy”
For helping poor countries, doing nothing is much better than sending thugs money or enabling confiscation; beyond that, Easterly's 'searchers vs planners' distinction favors searchers—bottom-up entrepreneurs whose individual failures cause little harm, versus top-down planners whose failures become spectacular nationwide disasters.
“doing nothing is much better than sending thugs money or allowing them to confiscate money”
China's reforms have worked better than Russia's because China's were bottom-up—the government tolerating and adapting to what peasants were already doing (privatized farming), freeing labor for the industrial sector—whereas Russia tried to impose economic reform top-down onto people not ready for capitalism, yielding a mafia-type system with weak property rights.
“Russia tried to impose economic reforms from the top down and that China's reforms really were the government adapting to what first of all what peasants were doing peasants were trying to do privatized farming”
China's high personal savings rate is driven by the one-child policy combined with the absence of a government social security system: with fewer children as an old-age safety net and no state pension, individuals have a strong incentive to save for their own old age—contradicting the myopia rationale for Social Security.
“you have the one-child policy so that the what used to be the safety net for people growing old was having a lot of children they limited that and yet and there's no government Social Security system so what you have in China is you know strong incentive for people to save for their old age”
Markets are highly effective trial-and-error vehicles because their profit-and-loss system weeds out failures (the Edsel, Corfam) quickly, whereas government is the most ineffective trial-and-error mechanism because it lacks an equivalent mechanism to discard failed experiments.
“markets are very efficient trial and error vehicles because there's a... profit and loss system and when companies lose money the the innovations that they tried could fall by the wayside”
Intellectual property has no one-size-fits-all answer: where an idea took years of costly trial and error (a pharmaceutical molecule that can be cheaply copied) protection is justified, but where an idea took little effort (Amazon's one-click ordering, conceivable in an afternoon) granting years of legal protection is not warranted.
“there are some situations where clearly a lot of work goes into developing the idea and yet the idea could easily be copied so again the case of a pharmaco suit achill”
Free trade's main advantage in the Economics 2.0 world is that it spreads ideas and puts competitive pressure on firms to adopt the latest practices—as when Walmart's superior logistics forces every other retailer to improve—and multinationals building factories abroad bring recipes and ideas at no investment cost to host countries while raising local living standards.
“trade has the advantage of putting competitive pressure on people to adopt the latest ideas”
India still has many 'bugs' in its operating system—roughly 90% of land lacks proper title (inflating titled-land values), electricity is widely stolen (creating bad incentives), and the 'license raj' makes starting and running a business hard—but fixing even a few of these has enabled significant progress.
“maybe 90 percent of India's land doesn't have proper title so there's huge inflation in the value of the land... a lot of electricity gets stolen which of course creates really bad incentives”
The 2009 downturn is likely to accelerate growth long-term by speeding the exit from declining industries and forcing people—especially college students—to think harder about what skills and careers will actually be useful, and to be more creative about starting businesses and developing human capital.
“we're probably getting an acceleration in movement out of declining industries and also people are going to have to be a lot more creative about how they start businesses and how they deal with human capital”
The traditional economics textbook frames the economic problem as allocating scarce resources among competing ends (guns versus butter).
“people have unlimited wants limited resources and the economic problem is to allocate scarce resources among competing ends guns versus butter”