
The Global Economy from a Liquidity Perspective | Global Macro 69
What this covers
This is a conversation between Michael Howell of Crossborder Capital and host Alan Dunne, built around a framework that treats global liquidity as the driver of markets. Howell holds that capital flows and balance-sheet capacity matter more than earnings or economic data, and that markets price at the margin, so the momentum of new money counts for more than existing stocks of it. He reads the last fifteen years through that lens, including the 2012 Eurozone banking crisis, the 2016 Shanghai Accord, and Basel III's push toward safe assets, all of which sent money into dollar assets. He also argues that the business cycle is now a 5-6 year debt refinancing cycle rather than a capital-spending cycle.
The middle of the discussion is the most contested. Howell says the Federal Reserve's quantitative tightening is largely rhetorical, that its effective liquidity has risen for about 18 months, and that only China has really tightened. He ties liquidity to collateral and Treasury volatility, and he argues that bank purchases of short-dated government debt amount to monetization. On debt, he cites Congressional Budget Office projections and the roughly $70 trillion needing annual refinancing, and he concludes that debt is sustainable but will force monetary inflation. He distinguishes that from consumer price inflation, and on that basis he calls gold a monetary hedge rather than a hedge against high-street prices. He also says the 60/40 portfolio no longer works.
The later segments cover the yen reversal and the unwinding of the carry trade, the stability of G10 currencies, and the possibility of a tacit agreement to weaken the dollar. Howell explains why the yuan cannot become a reserve currency while capital controls remain. He also flags 2024-2026 as a refinancing risk point, discusses the shift toward private credit, and says TIPS yielding 2% or more look attractive. He closes with the view that the liquidity cycle is still expanding and favors risk assets.
Michael Howell argues that global liquidity cycles—driven by central bank policy and capital flows rather than traditional economic metrics—are the primary determinants of asset prices, and that structural debt growth requiring 10-12% annual liquidity expansion necessitates monetary inflation hedges like gold and Bitcoin for decades ahead.
- Central banks control balance sheet capacity (liquidity) which determines debt refinancing ability; the 350 trillion in global debt with 5-year average maturity requires 70 trillion annual refinancing
- Debt growth will outpace GDP growth 2:1 over 25 years, requiring 10-12% annual liquidity expansion equivalent to monetary inflation, distinct from consumer price inflation
- Asset prices are determined by the flow of liquidity and risk exposure, not by earnings or economic fundamentals; this 5-6 year liquidity cycle is now in expansion phase from October 2022 bottom toward late 2025 peak
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Global debt of 350 trillion dollars with an average maturity of 5 years requires refinancing of 70 trillion dollars annually just to stand still, aside from net new debt growth, making central bank liquidity provision critical for refinancing viability.
“you've got 350 trillion dollar of debt in the world economy with an average maturity of five years which tells us you need to refinance $70 trillion of debt every year okay just to stand still now that's aside from the fact that the growth the the debt part is growing”
Flows of money are more important than stocks (existing balance sheet quantities) in driving market prices because markets are priced at the margin, making the momentum of new liquidity the dominant factor.
“I've always come from the school that it's flows that are more important because markets are priced on at the margin and so we need to look at is the flow of new money coming in or leaving exiting your market and that that really is what makes big difference”
The Eurozone banking crisis in 2012 and the Shanghai Accord (2016 G20 agreement among Asian governments to stabilize currencies against a strong dollar) generated an exodus of capital from Europe and China respectively, with flows ending up in dollar assets.
“you also had the Eurozone banking crisis 20102 which meant there was an exodus of money out of the Euro out of the Eurozone and then we started see the China uh anti-corruption Crackdown by Z Jinping which led to a lot of money then leaving China all that ended up flowing into dollar assets”
Aging demographics, rising defense bills, and mandatory spending commitments (Medicare, Social Security) mean that government debt will increase significantly, and there is little political ability to change these commitments without 'euthanizing everybody' or reneging on promises.
“we're in a society worldwide where populations are aging in a way that they've never aged before uh as rapidly and we've got on top of we've got commitments for welfare state spending uh Medicare Social Security in the US Etc uh and we've got a rising defense bill so all those fances are causing spending to go up”
Basel III and subsequent regulatory requirements forced banks and financial institutions to hold more safe assets (US treasuries, high-quality collateral), spurring major capital inflows into US assets during the 2010s-2020s period.
“there was a change of regulations uh Banks were becoming more constrained uh there was more placing of Shadow Banks uh the US uh Federal Reserve and the US Treasury tried to get more control of the dollar system and one of the things that you've seen really through that period period of the early 2010s uh maybe from 20102 onwards uh was a huge inflow of money into US assets uh that was partly to do with Basel uh Basel 3 uh you know we're coming up to a Basel for perspectively probably next year but all these things are trying to get Banks and insurance companies and financial institutions to hold more safe assets uh read us treasuries because that's really the the high quality your Chris collateral they must hold”
The Federal Reserve's actions influence financial markets much more than the People's Bank of China because we operate in a dollar-based system; by contrast, PBC actions influence the Chinese real economy and thus global commodity markets and world economic tempo more directly.
“if you look at what the Federal Reserve does that tends to influence financial markets much much more uh because we're a dollar based system uh if the PBC The People's Bank China uh acts that tends to influence the Chinese economy and because uh the real economy in China is such a a large economic footprint or industrial footprint in the world that tends to influence the tempo of the world economy and commodity markets much more so”
Global liquidity rests on a collateral base; lending is collateral-intensive, so movements in the Move index (US Treasury volatility) affect haircuts that credit providers apply to collateral, changing the collateral multiplier and thus total available liquidity.
“the global equility rests on a collateral base so lending is very much collateral involves collateral so you know as I say to you know our clients if they want a sort of quick and dirty view of really what's happening the three most important things to watch uh you know are things like the Federal Reserve The People's Bank of China and factors like the move index of bond market B ility and the reason for looking at the move index is that the move index uh is a reflection of volatility in the US Treasury Market a lot of coatal is US Treasury based and if you get the high level of the move High Bond volatility the haircuts that credit providers will uh give you on or apply to your collateral will go up and that's that will affect adversely what we call the collateral multiplier”
A rising real exchange rate (nominal exchange rate multiplied by a general price index) accommodates increased capital flows, and in modern economies where high street prices are sticky, all adjustment in the exchange rate happens through asset market appreciation rather than currency appreciation.
“now in a modern economy uh a real exchange rate which you can broadly Define as the nominal exchange rate multiplied by some general price index in a modern economy uh High Street prices and service prices tend to be quite sticky so all the movement tends to be in asset markets so if you want a rising real exchange rate to accommodate increase in capital flow your nominal current can go up and or your asset markets go up this what's happened on Wall Street and the US dollar this is all about Capital flow if you like liquidity going into the US”
High levels of debt are sustainable and have been managed sustainably in the past (Britain in the 1950s, Japan over recent decades with debt-to-GDP ratios higher than the current US), so the question is not whether debt is sustainable but what type of debt will be issued at what price.
“I think the other thing to say a lot of economists say well this is unstainable but it isn't because look at Britain in the 1950s and look at Japan over the last few years they've they've managed to create you know much much higher debt to GDP ratios that America or the world is looking at now it's been sustainable governments can always sell debt the question is what type of debt and what price”
10-12% annual global liquidity expansion to fund 10-12% debt growth is monetary inflation that differs fundamentally from consumer price inflation; monetary inflation goes into asset prices while consumer price inflation requires wage growth, productivity, oil prices, and tax considerations.
“if you need liquidity to refinance the debt low and behold Global liquidity has got to expanded a similar 10 to 12% now that is monetary inflation okay and investors need to think about this because this is a new world okay the GFC increased debt covid Amplified that dramatically and the Aging demographics are rising defense bill mean that debt is going to government debt is going to increase significantly”
Gold is not a hedge against high-street (consumer) inflation but rather a monetary inflation hedge; gold performs well when the money supply grows faster than real output, but may fall when consumer inflation moderates even if monetary inflation persists.
“many people argue that gold is an inflation hedge it's not an inflation hedge okay it's not a High Street inflation hedge at least okay uh so for example you know you would expect if US inflation as it's done in the last uh you know couple of months is attenuating slowing down then the gold market should fall away okay but that's not the point gold is not a High Street inflation hitge it's a monetary inflation hit and that's a fundamentally different thing”
Rising interest rates can have perverse effects in debt-dependent economies by creating income transfers to governments rather than economic drag, particularly when governments monetize rising interest bills; Rick Rieder of BlackRock has made this point repeatedly.
“for example think of interest rates if you've got a government which is indebted and is basically paying a large interest bill which they're basically monetizing or just creating more debt with uh Rising interest rates are actually an income transfer so it may be that Rising interest rates have a perverse perverse effect Rick Ryder of Black Rock has made that point repeatedly uh very very compelling argument”
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) yielding 2% or more real return are exceptionally attractive because financial assets typically do not provide real returns of that magnitude long-term.
“if you can get 2% or anything more than 2% on the tips government uh you know treasury inflation protected security anything more than 2% is a steal because Financial assets don't give a real returns of that M sheet longterm so if you get that you're getting that uh with inflation as well it's a great great deal so look at tips”
Post-2008 global financial crisis, central banks stimulated sluggish economies, creating optimal conditions for financial markets with money flowing into risk assets first, followed by progressive real economy pickup; current 2024-25 phase replicates early 2010s dynamics.
“the best time for financial markets tends to be when policy makers are trying to stimulate uh sluggish economies I mean that's really you have the best of all worlds money tends to go into financial markets it lifts asset prices and then progressively the real economy will begin to pick up and that's normally what one sees so uh this phase we're currently in is probably replicating in a number of ways uh that period in the in the sort of early 2010s to 12 period where you've got more liquidity”
The 2024-2026 refinancing period is a risk point because there is a 'bunch' of debt that came due around 2019 (when rates were very low) that must be refinanced, creating potential for stress if rates remain elevated.
“there was a lot of debt issued uh you know around Co time 2019 when when when rates were very low um and particularly you know a lot of refinancing done at that stage in terms of commercial real estate and and corporate debt as well so many commentators pointing to this coming period kind of 2024 25 26 you know with a lot of kind of five six seven year debt either being refinanced or have kind of trigger payments is that a is that a kind of a risk point on your radar in terms of refinancing or is it just the ongoing kind of the 70 trillion perum do you see as as a bigger issue no it is it it clearly is a risk point because you've got this Bunchy”
The Chinese yuan cannot become an international reserve currency as long as capital controls exist and questions surround its long-term value; if China eliminated capital controls today, the yuan would depreciate significantly.
“it's very very difficult to see the Chinese you are becoming an international standard of value when you've got Capital controls um and you've got question marks over it's long-term value and actually you know the the whole legal framework uh surrounding the UR uh and I think the simple question to ask is if China eliminated Capital controls today what direction would the Yan go would he go up or down I think go down a lot”
Only China among major economies has engaged in significant quantitative tightening; other advanced economies ended actual QT about 18 months ago while maintaining QT rhetoric, and have been pushing liquidity into markets despite official messaging otherwise.
“the only economy that really engaged a major QT I would argue is China and we're seeing the consequen of that that's having a disruptive effect on Chinese financial markets in other words ask why bond yields are collapsing in China where you've got deflation uh and maybe while why the world economy overall is pretty sluggish okay uh and then if you start to look back at the at the west or the other advanced economies you find that actually uh QT effectively ended probably 18 months ago uh what we've been seeing now is sort of the the the rhetoric of QT that's in the headlines that's what the FED wants us to believe there's been no qt in the US for for 18 months uh they've been pushing liquidity into markets”
Federal Reserve liquidity (the active liquidity-creating portion of their balance sheet operations) has been rising for 18 months, observable through proper calculations, driving elevated financial markets; this contradicts the public narrative of quantitative tightening.
“one of the things that uh that we talk about is a concept called fed liquidity which you know originated back at my face at Salomon Brothers but uh it's how you know the the team of Salomon brothers would actually look at the Federal Reserve but if you look at calculations of fed liquidity which is the active liquidity creating part of their operations on the balance sheet you find that's been that Rising now I'd like it to rise more but it very clearly has been rising so you've seen this expansion of liquidity now that's why financial markets have been elevated because this liquidity has been going in”
Term premium (the extra compensation required above short-term bond rates to compensate for interest rate uncertainty) rises when liquidity flows into markets because lower systemic risk reduces why investors should own safe bonds, causing shifts into higher-risk assets like corporate debt and equities.
“what you find and that's tends to be a bulk or the bulk of changes in uh uh in the slope of the curve is the term structur uh sorry the term Premier tends to rise now the term Premier is a wonkish concept for an awful lot of people but it basically is uh the extra or the premium you require above the running year bond basically to compensate for for interest rate on certainty uh in the future now what you tend to find is that that t premum think of it as a risk premum uh will tend to rise if you've got more liquidity going into a market reason why is that there's far less risk of systemic risk in a highly liquid market and therefore why should you own safe asset bonds so investors Shuffle out of the bond market of mooving to higher risk asset like corporate debt or equities uh and that causes the term Premier to rise”
Capital flows drive trade balances, not the other way around; in a debt-dominated financial system, capital flows determine whether currencies strengthen or weaken, reversing traditional economics textbook causality.
“so economics has gone Topsy Turvy in this world where debt has become a Paramount factor and that's really what we're saying now if you extend on these arguments then you've got to start to say well okay uh if we start to look at debt and we we find debt is problematic how much is debt going to increase in the future you start to look at data that comes out of the Congressional budget obious in the US and uh you know the great the great advantage of looking at the US is is completely transparent uh the CPO does wonderful calculations far into the future”
If banks rather than the non-bank private sector buy government debt (particularly shorter-dated debt), that is monetization because bank balance sheets expand; when credit providers buy government debt to match their liabilities, official sector liquidity expansion occurs.
“if credit providers rather than the non-bed private sector buys government debt that is monetization yeah Milton freed be telling is GRA what okay because it's it's it's basically official sector uh buying the the debt of of the government is that it yeah I mean the banks balance sheets are expanding I mean that's that's what's going on uh they're buying the debt uh whereas if you looked if the um uh if the non-bank private sector bore the debt bank's balance sheets wouldn't expand so what does that mean”
The 60/40 equity-bond portfolio model no longer works because in higher inflation environments bonds and equities become positively correlated rather than negatively correlated, removing diversification benefits.
“the 6040 model no longer works because in a higher inflation environment you tend toy the bonds uh and Equity prices tend to be positively uh correlated not negative Corr”
The economy's business cycle has shifted from being driven by capital spending (9-10 year Keynesian cycle) to being driven by the debt refinancing cycle (5-6 year cycle), because capital markets are now primarily debt refinancing systems rather than new capital raising mechanisms.
“historically uh we're told we pick up an economics textbook that the cycle is driven by the capital spending cycle so in other words it's Capital spending that drives the economy through some sort of Keynesian multiplier process and that may be a 9 to 10e cycle well fine that's what happened but Capital markets are not new capital raising mechanisms anymore uh they're actually debt refinancing systems and it's something like you know three in every four dollars of trans transacted in financial markets today is a debt refinancing transaction”
US public debt to GDP ratio will double over the next 25 years according to Congressional Budget Office calculations, meaning public debt growth will be twice the clip of nominal GDP growth (10-12% annually if GDP grows 5-6%).
“on their calculations it looks like the public de to GDP ratio in America is going to double over the next 25 years okay now what that's what is that telling you it's telling you the public debt growth is going to be growing at twice the clip of GDP in the economy so if you said well okay uh let's say that the real economy in normal terms grows at 5 to six% per anom okay I think most people would accept somewhere around those figures uh without thinking about a split but 5 to 6% nominal then debt is going to grow twice that so it's 10 to 12%”
China's capital outflows—caused by hitting the middle-income trap with compromised productivity and US-China tensions—have forced China's real exchange rate downward; the Chinese government has monetarily tightened to support the Yuan, so all adjustment has come through collapsed asset markets and deflation rather than devaluation.
“money can leave economies and just think of what's happened to China over the last uh few years China has been basically seeing a an exodus of capital for a whole number of reasons we would argue that the main reason for that is probably uh that China is sort of uh hit the sort of middle inome barrier uh or whatever or the middle income trap and it can't really get beyond that therefore it's productivity is compromised and productivity is a major factor in attracting Capital into the economy on top of that you've got the tensions between America and China Etc but capital is leaving China now what that means is that China's R exchange RS got to go down okay now if you follow through the law what I've just said that means the uh the Yuan has to devalue Andor asset prices and maybe to some extent High Street prices need to go down well the Chinese have been imparting a significant monetary tightening over the last few years which has actually held the uan up so all the adjustment in China to that Capital outflow has come through uh collapsing asset markets and deflation actually in the highry and now we're evidencing in wages too”
The Eurozone economy and monetary policy have been matching the US, preventing significant EUR/USD divergence; this is a policy desire to maintain stable currency pairs rather than natural market forces.
“generally speaking if you look at um if you look at the Euro Zone it seems to be largely matching um US policy so I think from that perspective of this been a uh and the economy is for that matter more in sync so you'd expect uh or PR another way you would not expect the currencies to be moving significantly out of line uh if there was a a significant difference in policy uh then then you might but you I agree I mean they they have been uh remarkably stable but then I think that has been that has been a policy desire”
Growth of private credit and non-bank lending may reduce systemic risk if these specialist lenders effectively assess credit, but the risk is unknown leverage in private credit markets and whether credit models stress-tested during major crises (2008-09) will hold during future stress.
“if you're getting specialist lenders who are basically sourcing funding from the same sources as Banks or maybe they're getting their funding from Bank deposits indirectly those specialist lenders if they are uh good at their game should actually reduce risk in the system rather than increase risk I think the problem is a we don't know the extent of whether there is a leverage in that s in that uh uh in that in that part of the market”
The Dollar is likely to inflect lower (weaken) from current levels if the Fed eases policy, but will not collapse due to structural underpinnings; the dollar's ongoing strength depends on medium-term demand factors rather than rate differentials alone.
“I don't think it's going to be a big inflection because I think there's a lot of factors underpinning the dollar in the medium term but not withstanding the fact we can see an inflection and I mean would we not expect to hear the administration make some noises about that the US obviously Trump has a particular view on on on the dollar but but Biden yelling it's been very much a kind of a hands off VI with respect to the to the dollar”
Japan's Yen fell at unprecedented speed in early 2022 at the start of Russia's Ukraine invasion; Howell argues markets don't move currencies like that—governments do—suggesting this was an engineered deal to pressure the Chinese financial system.
“if you go back to early 2022 and let's uh acknowledge the fact that this was pretty much coined with uh Russia's invasion of Ukraine um the Japanese Yen started to go into freeall now in all my years in financial markets which Mount up uh you know as we speak uh I've never seen a major G7 currency fall with the speed the Japanese Yen fell at markets don't do that to currencies governments do and that struck me that this was an engineered deal”
The trend is toward embedded higher high-street inflation, but cyclically the near-term is still in downswing due to Chinese economic slowdown and tight Chinese monetary policy over the last 12-18 months, requiring careful differentiation between trend and cycle.
“I think you've got to uh you've got to try and differentiate trend from cycle I think the trend is towards a more embedded and higher rate of highr inflation but I think cyclically we're in a downswing still and that downswing is largely because the Chinese economy is sling down so much and that's tresy of the fact that the previous or the last 12 months 18 months seen a uh a dangerously tight monetary policy from China”
Liquidity is defined as the total stock of credit issued by banks and shadow banks plus savings from households and corporations, representing the balance sheet capacity of the financial sector.
“it's basically uh the flow of funding liquidity or funding through markets it's the total out of credit that's issued by Banks and Shadow Banks plus the savings that can be uh uh taken from households or corporations uh it's generally a measure of the balance sheet capacity of the financial sector”
Asset markets have two moving parts: the flow of global liquidity and the risk exposure (deployment) of that money by investors; understanding both is essential for market analysis.
“in terms of how it fuels markets we think of asset markets as having two moving Parts one is the flow of liquidity or Global liquidity may be and the other is the risk exposure of that money the deployment of that money um which we think of as the risk exposure of investors”
The liquidity cycle operates over medium-term periods of 5-6 years, not days or weeks, so central bank actions from 3-6 months prior are having current effects on markets as that money calculates through the system, making short-term attribution of market moves to overnight central bank policy misleading.
“the liquidity cycle we we envision is a cycle that lasts about five to six years um and not you know not five to six days or five to six weeks so it's really a medium-term cycle and I think you've got to look at it in that way”
Understanding debt refinancing and the recycling of US dollars globally is critical for investment managers because China's large trade surpluses are denominated in dollars and, despite efforts to denominate in yuan, holders of yuan convert them back to dollars, keeping the system dollarized.
“we've written a lot about how China fits into that equation and sort of the great Paradox and the great source of instability in the world economy is China and the irony in many cases is that if the chi if the Chinese Trade Surplus goes up the dollar goes up but that's not what economic textbook should tell you but that's how it works because basically China uh is demonizing sell a lot of trade either directly or indirectly in US dollars so the normal price signals don't work so you you know I'll come quietly and except people saying well okay they're denominating a lot more trading uan sure but the holders of those uan are converting them speedily back into dollars”
The carry trade unwinding may actually be a source of new liquidity if it reflects a conscious policy deal to stabilize currencies, because the Fed will be forced to inject more cash over the following weeks and months to support markets.
“I don't think it's uh it's everything about liquidity declining and actual fact as I argue it may be a source of new equility if it's a reflection of the fact that there's been this tcid deal down own currencies because it will mean that the fedus have to is going to have to start injecting more cash uh over the next few weeks and months”
The liquidity cycle will turn down by the back end of 2025 because central banks will attempt to tighten again, likely prompted by either stronger economic growth, rising inflation, or (more cynically) governments' need to sell debt by pushing investors out of equities into bonds.
“why would it turned out I think because central banks will try and tighten again um by the back end of mix year that maybe because economies actually get a lot more impetus which I would sort of expect and it maybe the inflation becomes more of an issue but you know the other thing which is the cynic in me says it's the governments have got to sell debt and one of the easiest ways to sell debt is to get people out of equities and risk assets so maybe there's you know maybe we've got to start thinking about that”
The US Treasury has undertaken deliberate active duration management in recent years, shifting issuance toward shorter-dated tenors and increasing bill financing to suppress longer-end yields; this is a battle with term premium which may be rising from other factors like increased debt supply.
“one of the arguments we've put forward uh over the last couple of years is that Janet Yellen may be in cooperation with um J pal is undertaking a deliberate and active duration management of the US uh of the US calendar uh in other words what they're basically doing is they're stting to shift issuance towards shter dated teners and they're also using a lot more Bill finance and that's actually suppressing yields at the longer end of the market”
Record low term premium in bond markets and spreads between agency mortgages and 10-year Treasuries trading above what durations would suggest indicate yield curve manipulation, similar to 2008 financial crisis patterns.
“one of the easiest ways to see that manipulation is either to look at the record low levels of term Premier in the bond markets okay or what you can look at is look at the spread between uh US agency mortgages and 10-year bonds now ageny mortgage is a risk-free uh asset uh admitt it's got different duration and convery uh attributes to the treasury but if you make those simple adjustments try and make it treasury equivalent what you find is that uh the agency market is trading uh at yields well well above what you'd expect uh looking at the 10 year and that would suggest there's manipulation go on and the same thing happened in 2008 on during financial crisis”
Bitcoin has proven itself a hedge against monetary inflation over the last 5 years, though Howell is neutral on its merits; if monetary inflation continues as projected, these assets will appreciate significantly.
“what has proven itself over the last 5 years is Bitcoin okay now I'm not saying whether there is any Merit or demerit in Bitcoin I'm an expert well what I'd say is it has proved a wonderful hedge against monetary inflation and if you're going to get more monetary inflation these assets are going to go up in price”
The carry trade is estimated at roughly $500-600 billion, significant for FX pair volatility (particularly Nikkei, peso, Real) but not systemically large relative to $175 trillion global equities; it creates volatility but isn't primarily about liquidity contraction.
“our estimates would suggest that carry trade is about maybe 500 600 billion doar of that sort of magnitude some of it's been closed already in the last two weeks there's still some around uh some of it actually is may be G on again for for all we know but uh it's so that's magnitude you the context of global equity which is you know $175 trillion is not that big”
Financial markets are in mid-to-late cycle phase with significant gains already realized from October 2022 lows; technology has led with cyclicals lagging, and defensives underperforming, which is normal bull market pattern positioning.
“they're are folding in the way that they normally unfold in the bull market uh technology socks have led cyclical have been uh you know definitely invoke defensives are performed you're starting to see you know things like big financials and maybe some commodity uh some of the Blue Chip commod uh producers starting to perform now pretty much as you'd expect”
Global liquidity has expanded from its October 2022 bottom and continues moving higher, though in some cases the evolution has been relatively slow; recent Yen carry trade chaos represented a change in investor risk exposure rather than liquidity contraction, with risk-taking now resuming.
“our view is that the liquidity cycle continuing to expand it bottomed around October of 2022 it's been moving higher uh since that time uh one would have to say in cases it's been a relatively slow Evolution but it's still going up and what happened in the last few weeks the last 3 to four weeks with the uh with the chaos and the Yen carry trade is basically a change n liquidity but it's actually a change of the risk exposure of investors uh that is as we talk now uh seems to be coming back uh again investors are taking on more risk”
The liquidity cycle is expected to bottom in late 2022, peak in late 2025, and then turn down; this 3-year expansion follows the typical 5-6 year cycle pattern and represents 'normal cycle' behavior in line with historical patterns.
“our original sort of schema was to say that the cycle bottomed in late 22 or peak in late 25 that's normal normal cycle 8 it seems to be sort pretty much trading that that path right now so there's still quite a lot further to go”
A potential 'secret deal' may have been struck recently (hinted by the Yen rally) where the US agreed to ease policy in exchange for Chinese concessions on Treasuries or other matters, similar to the 1985 Plaza Accord period when dollar weakness was negotiated to ease international pressures.
“it could equally be that there was a deal struck that said enough is enough we've achieved what we want uh the Chinese have basically agreed something we don't know what uh that might be a deal on Treasures it may be a deal to do with supporting Russia you know who knows uh what that may be uh but it basically means that the dollar now should begin to weaken”