
When even the optimisms throw in the towel on the global economy...
What this covers
This is a single-speaker commentary by Jeff Snider of Eurodollar University, built around the World Bank's January 2023 Global Economic Prospects report. He walks through how its forecasts moved between June 2021 and January 2023: global growth for 2022 fell from 4.3% to 2.9% by mid-2022, and the latest figures put the world at 1.7%. US growth went from 4.2% to 1.9%, with 0.5% expected for 2023, and Europe went from 2.4% to zero. China is treated separately, with its expected growth dropping from 5.4% to 5.3% and then to 4.3%, a level he sets against the 7% that was once considered an "absolute floor." He quotes Hakan Coves (or Coves)) saying the worst-case scenario from six months earlier is now the baseline.
The second line of argument is about why the forecasts failed. Snider holds that the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan and the World Bank all rely on DSGE models that assume a multiplier effect above one for government intervention, so their errors are correlated rather than independent. He reads 2021 through Warren Buffett's "very unusual recession" remark, arguing the headline "red hot" quotation hid a more qualified statement. He also revisits Larry Summers's early-2021 overheating warning, which he says mistook a supply shock for demand strength.
The most contested part is causation. The World Bank blames synchronized monetary tightening for worsened financial conditions. Snider answers that markets had already priced the downturn: TIPS inversion from January 2021, then yield curve inversion and inverted eurodollar futures by December 2021, before any hike. A smaller, more fringe thread points to missing dollar reserves, including China's missing $800 billion, as a liquidity constraint that institutional models cannot explain. He closes on the idea that optimists conceding recession risk is itself a lagging signal.
Global economic optimists have finally recognized that the 2021-2022 recovery was artificial and temporary, not a 'red hot' economy, and the economy is now contracting toward recession due to misguided government stimulus and supply shocks, not central bank rate hikes.
- The World Bank's own forecast revisions from June 2021 to January 2023 show a collapse from expected 4.3% global growth to 1.7%, revealing optimists were always wrong about economic strength
- The deterioration began in mid-2022 and was already priced into financial markets (yield curves, TIPS spreads, eurodollar futures) as early as December 2021, proving it was not caused by 2022 rate hikes but by the unwinding of artificial stimulus
- Warren Buffett's 'very unusual recession' framing in May 2021 was the key insight missed by mainstream economists—the recovery was never genuine, only temporarily boosted by pandemic fiscal intervention and supply shocks
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The shift in the global economy from apparent strength in mid-2021 to evident weakness in mid-2022 was not caused by central bank rate hikes in 2022, but by the natural unwinding of artificial stimulus and supply shocks that were visible to markets as early as December 2021, as evidenced by inverted yield curves, TIPS spreads, and eurodollar futures.
“monetary policy is theorized to work on a leg if there's economic weakness that even The Optimist can see right now it couldn't have been those rate hikes because it wasn't those rate hikes markets a understanding of the mechanics behind the supply shock what the difference between inflation inflation and inflation is all of these things had told you way back in May of 2021 when the headlines blared of Warren Buffett's statement about a red hot economy”
Mainstream economists and central banks (Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan) all employ the same DSGE models that incorrectly assume government interventions always have multiplier effects greater than one, leading them to systematically overestimate the lasting benefits of fiscal stimulus and misinterpret temporary supply-shock effects as genuine economic strength.
“the World Bank numbers that we just got today they begin by those same assumptions they they started out thinking yes 2021 governments did a lot of things and governments do only good things that's what the econometric models that they employ always assume if a government intervenes it's going to have a multiplier greater than one which means it has lasting impacts so the more the government does the better it gets”
The World Bank and Federal Reserve's shared use of DSGE econometric models means they make the same fundamental errors in forecasting, and when one institution's forecasts collapse, it predicts the others' will too, because they are not independent analysis but variations of the same flawed framework.
“a lot of these mistakes got pushed out everywhere including these econometric models that are employed by places like the World Bank as well as the Federal Reserve or ECB Bank of Japan everywhere else they always use they all use the same models they're all dsge models of varying assumption but largely the same thing all over the place so when you look at the world bank's progression of estimates starting in the middle of 2021 the red hot economy you can see that's exactly what the World Bank was expecting if the World Bank was expecting that you can bet you better believe that everybody else was because again they use all the same models”
The recovery from the 2020 pandemic recession was structurally different from normal recoveries because it was artificially boosted by extraordinary government intervention (fiscal transfers, supply shocks) that masked underlying weakness, creating a 'very unusual recession' rather than a genuine recovery.
“what made it unusual was of course the pandemic starting with that but also government intervention as well as to supply shock and many people interpreted the supply shock effect along with government intervention as genuine red hot recovery inflation that everything that happened over the balance of 2021 into 2022 was the red hot part that Buffett was talking about rather than very unusual recession”
The World Bank's economic growth forecasts collapsed from June 2021 to January 2023: global GDP estimates fell from 4.3% to 1.7% for 2022, US GDP from 4.2% to 1.9%, and Europe from 2.4% to 0% (zero growth), representing a fundamental failure of economic models to predict actual conditions.
“for 2022 going all the way back to the June 2020 or June 21 uh uh World Bank global economic prospects released so this is middle of 2012 red hot economy and thought in 2022 world GDP would be 4.3...by January of 22 however world GDP according to the World Bank they they they trimmed it a little bit down to 4.1 percent but by June after all that stuff with oil prices Russia Ukraine they started thinking uh-oh maybe 2022 might be in a little bit of trouble this is before rate hikes remember June of 2022. World Bank says now it's 2.9 and as of January 23 the latest numbers I think yes last year was probably 2.9 percent”
China's economic forecasts collapsed from expected 5.4% (June 2021) to 5.3% (multiple revisions in 2022) to just 4.3% (January 2023), and this 4.3% represents a major downshift for a country where 7% was previously the 'absolute floor' and 6% was considered a temporary anomaly.
“the Chinese estimates the 2022 they thought 5.4 5.1 4.3 then got the pictures 2.7 of course blaming much of that on zero covid they thought okay 2023 will do 5.3 5.3 5.2 and now they're thinking oh maybe it'll only be 4.3 and remember China 4.3 percent GDP this year for a country when not all that long ago seven percent GDP was thought the absolute floor and then in 2018 and 2019 just thought well maybe six percent is a temporary deviation below the floor and now we're just hoping after a horrible year of 2.7 maybe China can get back to the fours”
The World Bank's June 2021 forecast expected world GDP of 4.3%, but by June 2022 (one year later) they reduced it to 2.9%—this is not a minor revision but a complete failure of their forecasting models, which occurred because they did not anticipate that stimulus would be temporary and transitory.
“for 2022 going all the way back to the June 2020 or June 21 uh uh World Bank global economic prospects released so this is middle of 2012 red hot economy and thought in 2022 world GDP would be 4.3...but by June after all that stuff with oil prices Russia Ukraine they started thinking uh-oh maybe 2022 might be in a little bit of trouble this is before rate hikes remember June of 2022. World Bank says now it's 2.9”
Missing dollar reserves and constrained eurodollar credit (e.g., China's missing 800 billion reserves, other trillion in missing reserves) contributed to the recession risks by limiting global liquidity even as inflation was high, creating a paradox that institutional models cannot explain.
“the treasury you occur the German yield curve all during this period when it's not rate hikes but the natural progression of a supply shot also constrained by all the missing money around the world where's China's 800 billion where's the other trillion in reserves all these other things the risks of recession were high”
Europe is expected to experience zero growth (0%) in 2023 according to the World Bank's January 2023 forecast, down from 1.9% expected in June 2022, representing stagnation across the continent.
“and then as of today zero for the entire year zero growth across Europe and that's again this is optimists the best case scenario”
The US economy in 2023 is expected to grow at only 0.5%, which represents 'serious trouble' and indicates the collapse of the 'red hot' narrative of 2021.
“these optimists are now expecting GDP in the United States for the full year of 23 to be just half a percent just half a percent the U.S economy is in serious trouble”
China's GDP growth expectations fell from 5.3% (2022-2023) to just 4.3% (2023) due to zero-covid policy impacts in 2022, but even this revised 4.3% is far below the historical 7% floor that was standard only a few years ago, signaling structural economic decline.
“the Chinese estimates the 2022 they thought 5.4 5.1 4.3 then got the pictures 2.7 of course blaming much of that on zero covid they thought okay 2023 will do 5.3 5.3 5.2 and now they're thinking oh maybe it'll only be 4.3 and remember China 4.3 percent GDP this year for a country when not all that long ago seven percent GDP was thought the absolute floor and then in 2018 and 2019 just thought well maybe six percent is a temporary deviation below the floor and now we're just hoping after a horrible year of 2.7 maybe China can get back to the fours”
Hakan Coves, the World Bank economist responsible for the Global Economic Prospects report, stated that 'the risks that we warned of six months ago have materialized and our worst case scenario is now our Baseline,' indicating that economic deterioration has proceeded faster than even pessimistic forecasts anticipated.
“those who are predisposed to see the best in every economic situation largely because they want to believe their policies or those of their colleagues around the world are always and everywhere incredibly effective not just in a short run situation but over the long run these are the optimists the risks that we warned of six months ago have materialized and our worst case scenario is now our Baseline”
Markets understood the recession risks far earlier than institutions because they correctly interpreted TIPS inversions (beginning January 2021), yield curve inversions, and eurodollar futures inversions (December 2021) as signals of expected deflation or disinflation and recession, while institutions conflated inflation persistence with economic strength.
“tips inversion all the way from January 2021 which said the Market's expecting yes whatever however High cpis go in the interim they're going to come back down yield curve inversion euro dollar Futures inverted way back in December of 2021 long before any of this stuff which warned the risks of recession were high and unusually high for an unusual set of circumstances”
Even if there is a lag between monetary policy and real economic effects, the economic weakness visible in mid-2022 could not have been caused by rate hikes begun in early 2022, because markets had already priced in recession risk by December 2021, before rate hikes were initiated.
“monetary policy is theorized to work on a leg if there's economic weakness that even The Optimist can see right now it couldn't have been those rate hikes because it wasn't those rate hikes”
Supply shocks (oil price spikes, supply chain disruptions) combined with government intervention were the true drivers of 2021-2022 inflation, not genuine 'red hot' economic strength driven by excess demand.
“what made it unusual was of course the pandemic starting with that but also government intervention as well as to supply shock and many people interpreted the supply shock effect along with government intervention as genuine red hot recovery inflation”
The World Bank's latest report acknowledges that 'very high inflation is triggered [by] unexpectedly rapid and synchronous monetary policy tightening,' but this explanation confuses correlation with causation—the tightening was a response to inflation, not its cause, and the inflation was itself a response to supply shocks and stimulus, not demand strength.
“very high inflation is triggered unexpectedly rapid and synchronous monetary policy tightening around the world to contain it...this tightening tightening has been necessary for Price stability it has contributed to a significant worsening of Global Financial conditions”
A recession is defined as 'a contraction in annual Global per capita income,' and the World Bank now says the global economy is 'perilously close to falling into recession' just three years after the 2020 pandemic recession.
“Global growth has slowed to the extent that the global economy is perilously close to the falling into recession defined as a contraction in annual Global per capita per capita income only three years after emerging from the pandemic induced recession of 2020”
Larry Summers warned in early 2021 that governments were in danger of doing too much stimulus, creating an 'awesome economy' that would lead to consumer price increases; but the real error was confusing temporary transitory supply-shock effects from an unusual recession with genuine 'red hot' inflation driven by economic strength.
“think about Larry Summers what he was warning about in early 2021 too governments were in danger of doing too much they had created this monster of an awesome economy that would lead to the consumer prices that eventually everybody else saw but what if those consumer prices were not because the economy was red hot it was simply suffering the transitory effects of a one-time k a very unusual recession then the results would eventually be very different from what the what was assumed to be this red hot economy leading into a 70s style inflation which is not even that's not even inflation anyway”
Warren Buffett's May 2021 statement about the economy being 'red hot' was more nuanced than headlines suggested; he actually said 'business really is very good in a great many segments' but also described it as 'a very unusual recession,' meaning the recovery was uneven and artificially boosted, not genuinely strong.
“back in May of 2021 a fellow by the name of Warren Buffett you may have heard of him he made a pronouncement about the economy that of course got headlines all over the world he said the economy was red hot now Mr Buffett being Mr buff and of course I don't know the guy but he as being a public figure for as long as he has he was a little more nuanced than that lost in the hysteria over his red-hot economy pronouncement remember this is May 2021 cpis were just about to get going they hadn't really been released yet so it fit with the mainstream Narrative of that period of time but what he said was what he actually said was I think this was a Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting right now business really is very good in a great many segments of the economy it's almost a buying frenzy this has been a very unusual recession everybody focused on the Red Heart part uh the red hot part very good and a great many segment to the economy without you know considering very unusual recession”
When optimist economists begin to concede recession risk ('economy is on a Razor's Edge'), it is a lagging indicator that the economy has already entered a recessionary state—their pessimism is always behind the actual deterioration.
“when even the the optimists are ready to throw in the towel they haven't just yet but even when the optimists understand that they're they need to get the towel up off the floor and ready to toss it that's when you know you're already in trouble because they are the last people to figure these things out”
Mainstream optimist economists are the last to recognize economic trouble because they are predisposed by their belief in policy effectiveness to see the best in every situation, and when even they begin to accept recession risk, it signals the economy is already in serious distress.
“keep in mind these are the optimists those who are predisposed to see the best in every economic situation largely because they want to believe their policies or those of their colleagues around the world are always and everywhere incredibly effective”
The recovery from the 2020 recession was actually still a recession in nature ('very unusual recession'), not the beginning of a new expansion, which explains why it collapsed so quickly and completely when temporary stimulus ended.
“this has been a very unusual recession everybody focused on the Red Heart part uh the red hot part very good and a great many segment to the economy without you know considering very unusual recession”
The World Bank's latest economic report states 'very high inflation is triggered unexpectedly rapid and synchronous monetary policy tightening around the world to contain it...this tightening has contributed to a significant worsening of Global Financial conditions,' but this diagnosis is backward—the economic weakness was already evident before rate hikes took effect.
“very high inflation is triggered unexpectedly rapid and synchronous monetary policy tightening around the world to contain it including across major advanced economies although this tightening tightening has been necessary for Price stability it has contributed to a significant worsening of Global Financial conditions no which is exerting a substantial drag on activity”
The World Bank and other major institutions expected robust global GDP growth of 4.3% in 2022 as of June 2021, but actual 2022 GDP was only 2.9%, representing a massive 1.4 percentage point miss due to failure to anticipate the unwinding of temporary stimulus.
“so from 4.3 percent down to 2.9 which doesn't sound like a whole lot but that's a tremendous downshift especially considering the idea that the economy was supposed to be red hot but in 2023”
The pandemic-era government stimulus was fundamentally different from normal fiscal policy because it was delivered as one-time lump-sum transfers to households into an economy with severe supply constraints, creating an unsustainable boom rather than sustainable growth.
“what made it unusual was of course the pandemic starting with that but also government intervention as well as to supply shock and many people interpreted the supply shock effect along with government intervention as genuine red hot recovery inflation that everything that happened over the balance of 2021 into 2022 was the red hot part”
In January 2023, the World Bank revised its 2023 global GDP forecast down from 1.7% (January expectation) to 1.7% (stated as latest estimate), and reduced 2024 estimates by three tenths of a percent down to 2.7%, extending the recession risk across multiple years.
“even they even reduce the estimates uh for 2024 by three tenths of a percent down to 2.7 so the idea that the economy is in a bad place or as The Economist said what did he say um the economy is on a Razor's Edge and could easily fall into recession”
Jay Powell's repeated statements that 'the economy is good, we just need to slow it down a little bit' in 2022 reflected the Fed's failure to recognize that the economy had already begun deteriorating and was not genuinely strong.
“you heard Jay Powell say it all the time the economy is good we're just needed to slow down a little bit now they're seeing they're recognizing maybe the economy wasn't in a good place”
Rebounds in some regions (Europe experienced delayed reopening in 2022) can slightly boost growth in a down year, but this is temporary effect masking underlying weakness—the World Bank estimated Europe 3.3% growth in 2022 due to reopening, but expected zero growth in 2023.
“some of the reopening that ex that we experienced in the US during 2021 was delayed into 2022 so you had the global recession the oil price spike all of that stuff balancing against some reopening positivity in Europe gets it to 3.3 because some of the reopening that ex that we experienced in the US during 2021 was delayed into 2022 so you had the global recession the oil price spike all of that stuff balancing against some reopening positivity in Europe gets it to 3.3 gets Europe to 3.3 percent last year but here's 2023...as of today zero for the entire year zero growth across Europe”