What this covers

This is a conversation between Jack Farley and Alfonso Pecatello of the Macro Compass, recorded on July 12, 2023. It starts from the puzzle of why no U.S. recession has arrived after an aggressive hiking cycle. Pecatello's answer is that the NBER-style growth indicators show about 1% annualized real growth, which is below trend but not recessionary. He attributes the 2022 slowdown mainly to energy prices squeezing consumers, not to rate hikes, and says the economy recovered once those prices fell. He also works through the credit channel as the main transmission route: mortgage lock-in at 3% shields most households, so 7% rates bind only on marginal buyers for now.

The middle of the episode is a long, partly adversarial argument over whether central banks "print money." Pecatello lays out a three-channel model of real economy money creation): fiscal deficits, bank lending, and non-bank credit. By his account quantitative easing (QE)) produces only bank reserves and a portfolio rebalancing effect, and he cites the Bank of Japan in the 1990s and 2000s as evidence. Jack pushes back, and Pecatello's claims here are flagged as contested. He also argues that Europe's 2012–2020 austerity explains much of its underperformance against the U.S. Bank funding mechanics come up too, with First Republic and deposit flight to JPMorgan as the example.

The most pointed challenge is to liquidity-based market narratives. He says changes in reserves explain only about 3% of S&P 500 return variability over twenty years, and he uses the 1999–2000 bubble to argue that no single variable predicts stocks. The closing segments turn to bonds. He covers why they lagged despite falling inflation, including strong payrolls against early-2023 consensus and weak core services momentum. He argues that bonds could diversify in a low-growth disinflation scenario, and he places recession risk around late 2023 to early 2024. He also notes that hedge funds selling crash protection were hurt in March 2023.

Sharpest takeaway

Pecatello argues that monetary policy lags are playing out on normal historical timelines rather than accelerated, so the recession risks are still concentrated in early 2024 even as credit conditions tighten gradually; stock market euphoria about soft landings underprices tail risks that bonds can hedge cheaply.

  • Yield curve inversion in May-June 2022 historically takes 13-21 months to produce recession, putting us at month 13 now with lags just beginning to kick in
  • Credit conditions tighten gradually as refinancing walls arrive staggered over time, not as cliff events, so real economy pain spreads over 6-12 months
  • Market is pricing near-zero recession probability while call options are as cheap as pre-banking crisis, creating asymmetric risk premium for protective bond positions

The claims · ranked35 claims · weighted by value

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0.78

Real economy money is created in exactly three ways: (1) fiscal deficits that inject spending money into private sector bank accounts and are not offset by Treasury General Account increases; (2) bank lending that creates new mortgages and business loans; (3) non-bank credit through capital markets and shadow banking. Quantitative easing does not create real economy money—it only creates bank reserves and causes portfolio rebalancing.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“real economy money printing happens only in these three conditions there are no others in the world fiscal deficits that are not offset by an increasing the treasury general account...the government printing money for the private sector deciding to cut your taxes decide to send you check home...the second form you want to stop me here to ask a question about fiscal deficits...the second one [bank lending]...third way...credit through non-banks basically uh Capital markets Capital markets Shadow banking security”

0.75

Yield curve inversion between 2-year and 10-year Treasuries historically takes between 13 and 21 months to produce recessionary forces in the real economy, and the current inversion occurred in May-June 2022, placing the economy at month 13 with lags potentially kicking in now through late 2023 or early 2024.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“if I take the ill curb inversion between two year and 10 10 years one key signal that monetary policy has been tightened by the fed and therefore the curve is inverted if you look at history an inversion between the two-year and ten year of the yield curve generally takes between 13 and 21 months to play into recessionary like forces in the real economy”

0.75

Economies like Australia, Canada, China, South Korea, and others have high private sector leverage but low government leverage, showing that debt is not primarily a government phenomenon; looking only at government debt-to-GDP misses the true leverage picture, which is better captured by total credit-to-GDP across both public and private sectors.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“many people look at government that as the only metric for watching how leveraged and economies and that's a mistake because I can name you a bunch of very virtuous economies Australia China Canada Korea Norway Switzerland all of these have very low levels of government that verito levels why well they use the private sector balance sheet to lever up and to access Credit”

0.74

The credit channel is the main transmission mechanism through which monetary tightening weakens the real economy—by tightening credit conditions, reducing mortgages and corporate borrowing, and forcing companies to slow spending or cut labor to protect margins.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“one of the main forces through which monetary tightening plays into uh real economy weakening is the credit channel so you need to tighten credit conditions for the private sector and by tightening credit conditions for the private sector you'll see people getting on less mortgages companies borrowing less and therefore slowing down their earnings slowing down their spending and maybe even having to cut labor at some point to protect their margins”

0.74

In 1999-2000 during the dot-com bubble, the S&P 500 earnings yield was negative (below 10-year bond yields), yet people were willing to participate in the bubble paying negative risk premiums; this shows that single variables like interest rates or Fed balance sheets cannot predict stock returns because market psychology and valuations depend on multiple complex factors.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“525 fed funds in 1999 and 2000 in the midst of the most acute.com uh bubble headphones were in zero Jack they were much higher than that and if you look at measure of risk premium so let's say forward earnings yield minus 10-year interest rates something like that so the excess earnings yield you can yield in stock markets versus your risk-free rate in 1999 and 2000 they were negative I repeat negative so in order to participate into the bubble people were happy to pay negative risk premium”

0.74

When investors ask 'will bonds outperform stocks?', the question is difficult because historically bonds rarely outperform equities over long periods due to equity's higher beta (sensitivity to growth) and uncapped returns vs. fixed income; bonds can only outperform in brief windows before or during recessions.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“when people ask me bonds over stocks it's always a tough question because if you look at history there have not been many periods check when bonds overperformed equities for two reasons equities have a higher beta than bonds which means that in normal periods the economy grows and the asset with the higher beta to economic growth is equities so it's normal for equity and the return is uncapped whereas bonds are this it's fixed it's called fixed income for a reason”

0.73

In Japan during the 1990s and 2000s, the Bank of Japan dramatically increased bank reserves through massive QE while real economy money in circulation shrank simultaneously, proving that bank reserve creation alone does not force real economy money expansion if the private sector refuses to lever up due to balance sheet trauma (like the real estate deleveraging shock).

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“in Japan in the 90s the bank of Japan printed a gazillion of Bank Reserves between the 90s and 2000s okay so Banks had a lot of Bank Reserves floating around Jack like a lot of them did that increase the real economy money in circulation no it didn't actually real economy money in Japan shrank shrank at the same time that Bank Reserves were going through the roof so the bank of Japan was doing QE Bank Reserves were increasing and the private sector was saying I don't care how low borrowing rates are I am not going to level up because I was just slaughtered from a real estate de leveraging”

0.71

Mortgage rates at 7% are not yet constraining because the bulk of households locked in rates at 3%, but the constraint applies only to marginal new buyers; as more households refinance and exhausted lock-in protection, the marginal new buyer effect becomes the entire market.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“you can kick the can down the road for longer again I think we have gone through the period where the easy win of lags being longer in this cycle is behind us now we are in a period where it's more likely historically speaking that these lags could kick in going forward so we are in the period 13 months plus looking at the ill-carbon version which generally becomes a bit more dangerous... mortgage rates are at seven percent sure but if the bulk of people have locked in mortgage rates at three percent it's only for the residual marginal new buyer that this becomes restraining and the same for corporates as long as corporates are not forced to refinance and they've lengthened the duration of the liabilities the lags can take longer”

0.69

Single banks (especially those with concentrated deposits like First Republic) must attract deposits or wholesale funding post-hoc after making loans; if depositors withdraw funds to other banks (JPMorgan), that bank must find substitute funding in the repo market or face liquidity stress, making individual bank resilience depend on deposit retention and funding market access.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“a single Bank needs to find of course the deposits right once they produce the new asset you need to match it with new deposits now there are banks that have an incredible price in power with deposits like JP Morgan they can always attract new deposits very very quickly there are other banks that come can't do that there are banks that run a very concentrated deposit base and you know that doesn't work”

0.69

Banks do not buy stocks with their bank reserves; they are restricted by regulation to holding high-quality liquid assets (treasuries, agency MBS, corporate bonds) in their liquid buffers, and equities either don't qualify as HQLA or only qualify under extremely stringent conditions and minimal percentages.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“Banks don't have appetite or mandate to buy equities in their high quality liquid books in their high quality liquid books they will buy treasuries they will Buy corporate bonds...equities are in some jurisdiction not even an hqla asset so they don't qualify for banks as an asset they can buy in their liquid buffer in the first place in some jurisdiction they do but only under extremely rigorous assumption and only for a super small percentage of their liquidity buffer”

0.69

Bank lending in late cycle appears robust because yields on loans are very high, making ROE attractive to banks, and fundamentals look good (low unemployment) at that point—this masks the fact that banks are lending most aggressively right before recessions, so late-cycle lending strength is a poor signal of future credit conditions.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“Banks tend to lend very aggressively late cycle they tend to do that for two reasons late cycle yields are very high generally speaking which means that loan yields are very attractive and banks are there to make money Jack so the higher the low yield the more likely a bank is to land late cycle fundamentals tend to look pretty well it's not the news that unemployment rate is generally the lowest just before historically a recession hits so banks are looking at Great loan yields good potential return on equity on these loans they make against fundamentals that late cycle are looking pretty good”

0.69

Many hedge fund clients were blown up in March 2023 during the banking crisis because they were short call options (selling crash protection) betting on a soft landing, assuming no recession or credit event would occur; when the banking crisis arrived they were forced to cover massive losses.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“many hedge fund client of mine unfortunately and not clients as well have been blown up in March because the idea was it's at this inflationally soft Landing the FED it's not gonna cut it's no recession it's fine you know it's just a soft lending there was a narrative so people looked for Carrie and they sold optionality they sold coals to monetize these premiums and then the banking crisis arrived and they were blown up”

0.68

The correlation between changes in Bank Reserves (used as a net liquidity proxy) and changes in S&P 500 returns explains only 3% of the variability in returns over 20 years; even in the post-2020 QE period it only explains 9-10%. This means the 'don't fight the Fed' narrative and claims that QE directly supports stocks are severely overstated.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“I applied also legs so I said maybe it takes time until the changing Bank Reserves the change in liquidity affects the stock market so I tried different lags three months six months 12 months different changes uh year near changes six months changes whatever you want and I went back 20 years the R square so the variability in returns of the S P 500 explained by the changes in Bank Reserves is how much in percentage check tell me I don't know you tell me three percent”

0.68

Portfolio rebalancing is a real mechanism through which QE influences financial markets, but its effects are secondary and compound credit creation; when pension funds and insurance companies are starved of returns (low rates + QE), they move out the risk curve to find yield, but this is not real economy money creation—it only matters if corporates use the resulting lower borrowing costs to issue new debt and leverage up their balance sheets.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“you're talking about the portfolio rebalancing effect yeah so you're talking about a theory which I've experienced firsthand uh running a very large portfolio in a bank during the times where the Federal Reserve and the ECB were running QE at large bases every month”

0.66

Forecasting stock market returns using only one variable (real rates, Fed balance sheet, or 'net liquidity') is impossible; the market is complex and requires multi-variable models, which is why asset managers are paid for their work rather than simply running automated rules on single indicators.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“can I say on forward guidance yes sir okay do it um Jack look the if it was that easy then this wouldn't pay so well as a job and as a sector and as a market you cannot imagine you can forecast future stock market returns with one and one single variable beat real rates be it net liquidity beat whatever you want it to be it's much more complex than that”

0.64

The seven NBER sub-indicators for recession show real growth annualizing at about 1% as of mid-2023, which is below-trend but not recessionary, contradicting expectations that the vicious hiking cycle would produce immediate contraction.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“if I use the seven sub-indicators that the nber is using to characterize whether the US is in a recession or not...those seven indicators are annualizing at about one percent growth as we speak real or nominal real this is real so real growth at about one percent annualized is not consistent with the recession it's below Trend growth”

0.62

Europe's austerity programs between 2012 and 2020 explain most of the difference in real GDP and inflation underperformance versus the United States, because austerity is the opposite of fiscal deficit expansion—it directly reduces private sector spendable money.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“Europe run austerity programs between 2012 and 2020 basically explains most of the underperformance on GDP and inflation that Europe had against the US”

0.60

The idea that 'this time is different' in financial markets is among the most expensive four words in finance; markets that seem to have broken historical relationships typically haven't—the lag just took longer or the mechanism operated differently, but the underlying economic constraints reassert themselves.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“the mistake to avoid is to assume that this time is different those are the four pretty expensive words in finance where we're gonna say well credit doesn't matter you know it doesn't matter at credit's tight”

0.56

Structural growth in developed economies has declined due to demographics (negative labor force growth) and modest productivity (around 1% annually), forcing policymakers to use credit expansion as the primary lever to maintain acceptable cyclical growth rates rather than accept sub-1% GDP expansion.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“we have had a drop in structural growth which is the combination of demographics being well a headwind actually for many developed markets so labor force growth has stagnated even turned negative in many developed markets because people grow older you know replacement uh rates are not there demographics were bad and so you know your labor force shrinks over time and productivity has been okay around one percent maybe a bit less...your structural growth rate in some economies was below one percent and it's not very socially acceptable right to grow your economy at the half a percent GDP a year I mean that doesn't really work and so we have access Credit we have made sure that credit creation was the lever through which the private sector had more spendable money year after year”

0.53

Core Services inflation (excluding housing sub-component) printed at 1.4% on a 3-month annualized basis in June 2023, showing very weak underlying inflation momentum in the stickiest part of the inflation basket, which supports the disinflationary thesis.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“the core Services uh X housing sub-component which power really cares about indicates the stickier inflationary Trends the one that are closer to this lock in the labor market in the economy printed at 1.4 percent I repeat one point four percent on a three month annualized basis”

0.53

Non-farm payroll consensus forecasts at the beginning of 2023 were for 90-100K new jobs per month; actuals have been much stronger, causing growth surprises to the upside and enabling the Fed to credibly back away from the 'imminent cuts' narrative, which has reversed the bond rally that was built into early 2023 prices.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“we entered the year with expectations that non-farm payroll would print flat in a few months Jack I mean Economist consensus for non-farm payrolls in December for April May this year was that known foreign battles would be 100K 90k they have been much stronger than that right so you have growth surprising on the upside”

0.52

The 2022 economic slowdown was primarily caused by high inflation and oil/gas prices crimping demand and real consumer spending, not by rate hikes themselves; since October 2022 as energy prices have fallen, the economy has recovered from that mid-cycle slowdown.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“as the Federal Reserve was hiking inflation was very high the price of oil was very high 120 dollars and that caused a considerable slowdown in the economy the consumer sentiment was you know in the tank and uh real consumer spending went down purely because inflation was so high a real is inflation adjusted and then since October as inflation has gone down as the price of natural gas and oil has gone down the we've had the reversal”

0.52

The 2020-2021 credit bonanza locked in long-term cheap financing for households (30-year mortgages at 3%) and corporations (corporate bond duration extended from 6 to 10 years), creating a refinancing cliff effect spread across 2024-2025 rather than an immediate impact, allowing firms to 'kick the can down the road' as rates rose.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“the most famous reference is that households locked in third-year mortgages at three percent right and that's one thing people are looking at and they say yeah well then nobody needs to will refinance nobody will sell unless they're forced to because they locked such a great long-term financing rate the other example I can bring is corporates the average duration of corporate bonditions in 2020 2021 skyrocketed from six years to nine years ten years”

0.52

People mistake stock market euphoria and bullishness about soft landings with validation of monetary policy transmission—but the two are different; confusing them is a dangerous mistake because soft landing narratives can persist for months even as credit conditions are tightening and lags are beginning to kick in.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“the mistake to avoid is to assume that this time is different those are the four pretty expensive words in finance where we're gonna say well credit doesn't matter you know it doesn't matter at credit's tight...one of the things I see happening right now is that people confuse stock market Euphoria and bullishness which is fine because we're all investors and we need to respect it and understand that that people confuse that with monetary policy logs without the economy Works our monitor system works and that's I think a potential mistake”

0.52

When measuring monetary policy stance, one must compare it against cyclical growth rates, not just in isolation; keeping rates 'tighter for longer' while growth slows from trend to 1% is like hitting the brakes on a car that is already rapidly decelerating, materially increasing recession risk.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“you need to measure a monetary policy stance against cyclical growth in the economy and now we discussed that cyclical growth has slowed down to about one percent annualized rates but in the meantime the FED is trying to make their best to keep policy tight throughout this Lowdown in economic growth so even if the FED doesn't raise rates massively anymore keeping rates tighter for longer quoting the FED effectively continues to exert a net tightening pressure on the economy if growth comes down it's like seeing a basically a car rapidly slowing down already and then hitting on the brake a bit further effectively increases the risk that the car completely stops”

0.52

In 2019 and 2016, when growth was weak (~1%) and inflation was declining, bonds performed well alongside equities because real yields were near zero and the Fed was accommodative; today with 1% growth and 1.65% real yields, a similar disinflationary scenario would support both bonds and growth stocks, making bonds an attractive portfolio diversifier.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“in periods where in 2016 and 2019 you had these inflationary Trends and growth more or less where it is today okay under the NBR definition real rates back then 10-year real interest rates were at zero percent...if you have this inflation where you have growth which is low but not recessionary what are the assets that do best in these environments stocks generally you have growth stocks...they do amazing because you have the disinflationary trend...but bonds also should do well in the environment because if you remember in 2019 or in 2016 of course when you have this inflation and you have growth pretty weak you are gonna have bonds performing relatively well”

0.52

If borrowers in 2023 with a true refinancing need in 2025 face rates at 9%, they will wait and hope rates decline to 7% by next quarter, as two-year lead time allows risk-taking; but this strategy becomes riskier as the refinancing deadline approaches and becomes untenable with only 6 months left.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“if you're in 2023 and your true refinancing leader in 2025 let's say then you have two years which means if as you said high yield or nine percent well you're gonna just take a bit of risk and completely miss your refinancing window you won't add anything right now and you will wait you will wait and you will hope that high yield rates are seven percent by next quarter and you will start with financing by then it's easier to do that when you have two years to go until your actual refinancing need it's more complicated when it becomes one and a half years it gets definitely more risky as a strategy if you have six months to go until you're actually refinancing need”

0.48

The 2021-2022 9-month to 12-month lag between credit impulse peak and earnings per share growth is a standard pattern: credit expansion arrives first, earnings follow 9-12 months later, so the current weak credit impulse will likely depress 2024 earnings forecasts.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“credit inputs registered a massive increase at the end of 2020 not a surprise nine to twelve months later earnings per share followed and the the SMP recorded I think a 40 50 percent you don't hear increase in earnings per share in 2021”

0.47

Net liquidity (often measured as Fed balance sheet minus RRP minus TGA, leaving only bank reserves) is used as a proxy for Fed QE/QT, but this single metric conflates multiple independent variables (Fed balance sheet size, reverse repo usage, Treasury general account balance) and should not be treated as a monolithic indicator.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“in most cases net liquidity is one single item that you listener can go and check for free on the Fred website you just type Bank Reserves okay so net liquidity is always pictured as the fat balance sheet minus RRP minus TGA well i'm only left with Bank Reserves as the only item left on the FED balance sheet so Bank Reserves are basically used as net liquidity proxy”

0.45

Triple-B corporate yields are approximately 6% (as of June 2023), roughly 100 basis points higher than the 2015-2019 pre-pandemic period, indicating a significant tightening of corporate credit conditions and reduced access to cheap financing for non-investment-grade borrowers.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“Triple B corporate yields are about six percent 10-year Triple B corporate yields they are a hundred basis point higher than the period between 2015 and 2019 so let's say before pandemic so also for corporates it's tougher to get access to cheap credit”

0.45

Call options for Fed cuts in late 2024 (protecting against recession/credit event) are currently priced at the same cost as the day before the March 2023 banking crisis, indicating the market has zero recession probability priced in and is selling optionality to monetize low perceived tail risk.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“the cost of these calls they are now basically as cheap as the day before the banking crisis unfolded so if you want to buy optionality for fed Cuts somewhere in late 2024 that are consistent with a credit event or a recession something that protects your p l against one of these events you can I you can now buy these calls as cheap as the day before the banking crisis”

0.45

The credit impulse (measured as inflation-adjusted rate of change of total credit) shows a much stronger relationship with earnings per share than bank reserves show with stock returns, explaining roughly 15-20% of EPS variance compared to 3% for reserves and stock returns.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“if I do the same on the credit impulse then I will find week earnings with changes in earnings so credit impulse is a rate of change metric against changes in earnings with the lag then I will apply basically the same methodology I did on the other end I would find something around 15 18 20 okay so R square numbers that are low but you know that using that variable you can explain about 20 of the changes in earnings with the S P 500 it will be like maybe 15 or so”

0.44

Credit impulse measured on a 3-month or 6-month annualized rate of change basis is a more useful leading indicator than absolute credit levels because it captures the pace of new credit creation flowing to the private sector; in 2023 Q2, the stabilization of credit impulse at low levels signals that the tightening phase may be bottoming but near zero injection of real economy money.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Alfonso Pecatello

“so if I look at the same indicator on a three month or a 6 response rate of change annualized it looks less worse so we have stabilized but at pretty low levels”

0.13

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0.13

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