
Don Boudreaux on Monetary Misunderstandings 01/17/2011
What this covers
Russ Roberts and Donald Boudreaux of George Mason University work through a series of persistent confusions about prices, money, inflation, and deflation. The conversation treats inflation as fundamentally a monetary phenomenon—a change in the quantity of money relative to output—and traces how everyday language and policy thinking muddle this distinction. They argue that common diagnoses (cost-push inflation, individual prices "inflating," the notion that spending itself creates prosperity) all rest on a failure to separate nominal from real phenomena, and that this confusion leads to remedies that worsen rather than cure the underlying problem.
The discussion spans several distinct territories. One thread examines what actually harms inflation: not merely a general rise in prices, but the non-uniform way money enters the economy, distorting relative prices and misleading economic actors—a dynamic supported by empirical work on price dispersion. Another separates two kinds of deflation, arguing that productivity-driven falling prices (as in the late nineteenth-century United States) raised living standards, while money-supply-driven deflation is destructive. They confront the popular claim that deflation paralyzes spending by noting that consumers routinely buy goods despite knowing prices will fall. The pair also contest narrower claims within monetary economics itself—that Friedman's focus on creditor-debtor redistribution understates inflation's real harms, and that Keynesian aggregates obscure the microeconomic adjustments that matter. Finally, they address the post-2008 context: the Federal Reserve's justification for balance-sheet expansion rested on deflation risk, though whether the injected money would eventually translate into price increases remained uncertain at the time of recording.
Boudreaux and Roberts argue that inflation and deflation are fundamentally monetary phenomena, that common confusions (cost-push inflation, individual prices 'inflating', 'spending is good') reflect a failure to distinguish nominal from real, and that whether deflation is harmful depends critically on whether it is driven by money-supply contraction or productivity growth.
- Inflation is a sustained rise in the general price level driven by money-supply changes, not by individual price movements or cost-push forces
- Even fully anticipated inflation harms via relative-price distortions because money enters the economy at specific points, not uniformly
- Productivity-driven deflation (e.g., late 19th-century US) raised living standards, whereas money-contraction deflation is destructive
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Friedman's thermometer analogy: treating inflation as cost-push solvable by price controls is like thinking the heat in a room is caused by the thermometer and 'solving' it by jamming the mercury at 72 degrees; with a thermostat attached this makes things worse by destroying the feedback signal while observers wrongly believe the problem is solved.
“the heat in a room is caused by the thing we use to measure the heat the thermometer”
The harm from inflation increases disproportionately (non-linearly) with its severity, culminating in hyperinflation where prices double weekly and money ceases to function as a meaningful medium, forcing a reversion to barter and the breakdown of the economic system—illustrated by Weimar Germany workers being paid multiple times daily and rushing wheelbarrows of cash to spend before prices rose further.
“as inflation increases in severity the harm that it causes increases... it's not linear”
Cost-push inflation is a fallacy: if one producer raises prices and buyers have no additional money, they must spend less elsewhere, so individual price rises cannot generate a sustained general increase in all prices; 'inflation is caused by higher prices' is circular because inflation IS higher prices and a thing cannot cause itself.
“inflation is higher prices and the thing can't cause itself”
The original meaning of 'inflation' was an increase in the money supply, but through linguistic evolution it now means to most people, including professional economists, a sustained increase in the general price level; preserving the original meaning matters because it keeps the monetary cause theoretically distinct from the price-level effect.
“the original meaning of inflation was an increase in the money supply... it means a sustained increase in the general price level”
Price controls cannot solve inflation if inflation is a demand-pull monetary phenomenon, because outlawing nominal price rises does nothing to address the falling value of money; controls only mask the symptom while making the problem worse by reducing the supply of goods.
“outlawing nominal price rises does nothing to solve the underlying problem”
Unanticipated inflation redistributes wealth from creditors to debtors because lenders receive nominal repayments worth less in real purchasing power than they expected; if inflation is correctly anticipated, nominal interest rates rise to compensate (e.g., 3% real plus 10% inflation equals a 13% nominal rate), neutralizing the distributional effect.
“if we both anticipate... ten percent then I'm willing to pay say 13% rate of interest”
The 1970s US experience of simultaneous high inflation and high unemployment (stagflation) refutes the claim that inflation cannot coexist with unemployment; the idea that inflation must put workers back to work by stimulating demand is false, and at the extreme, hyperinflation is associated with economic breakdown rather than full employment.
“I have one word for you... 1970s”
The claim that deflation halts purchasing because consumers wait for ever-lower prices is empirically false: people buy cell phones, computers, and TVs despite knowing prices will fall, because they value enjoying the good now; moreover the argument ignores that sellers facing deflation would have the opposite incentive (delay selling), making the one-sided 'wait to buy' logic incoherent.
“no one will ever buy a cell phone cuz they just kept getting cheaper”
Money is a 'fluttering veil' (Leland Yeager): what people really care about and what drives activity are real things—command over goods and services—not the dollar figures attached to them; but because money has real effects, its flutters distort our perception of the real economy, so the best monetary policy keeps the veil as steady as possible to minimize distortion of our view of real demands and resource constraints.
“money is a veil... the dollar figures we attach to our activities are not what we really care about”
The popular argument that 'inflation is good and deflation is bad' because rising prices induce people to spend now rests on a fallacious Keynesian premise that nominal spending itself drives prosperity; in reality spending frenzy creates nominal increases, not real wealth, as shown by the fact that Weimar Germany and Zimbabwe had frenzied spending yet became poorer, not richer.
“underlying this fallacy... is that spending is good and not spending is bad which I think strange and silly”
Concepts should be used at a level of aggregation that enlightens rather than hides important forces; Keynesian aggregates (aggregate demand, aggregate K capital, L labor) blind the analyst to the microeconomic adjustments that matter, whereas the average price level used within the equation of exchange illuminates more than it hides.
“use your concepts at a level that enlighten rather than then hide”
Even fully and accurately anticipated inflation is dangerous because money is not distributed uniformly by helicopters; it is injected at specific points and raises those prices first, distorting relative prices, which misleads decision-makers (who look at relative prices, not a price level) into misallocating resources—the core of the Austrian business cycle theory.
“inflation is not created by helicopters hovering above distributing money evenly and proportionally”
The last three decades of the 19th-century US economy were one of the great economic success stories of human history despite—or alongside—sustained deflation, because the US was on a relatively inelastic gold standard while productivity rose dramatically, so a roughly constant money supply chased far more goods, raising money's value and lowering prices; this refutes the claim that an economy cannot prosper under deflation.
“deflation marked the US economy for the last 30 years of the 19th century”
Deflation driven by a contraction of the money supply (whether by Fed commission, Fed omission, or gold-standard shocks such as France hoarding gold in the 1930s) is fundamentally different from and more harmful than deflation driven by productivity growth, because monetary deflation 'mucks around' with the money supply and impairs the ability to calculate and contract in prices, whereas productivity deflation leaves the monetary unit stable.
“that kind of deflation caused by monetary policy... is fundamentally different from deflation caused by increases in the economy's productivity”
The unanticipated-contract problem (borrowers and lenders being hurt by unexpected price-level changes) is symmetric: an unanticipated decline in the rate of inflation—e.g., a sudden Fed move from a steady 10% to 5%—produces the same harmful contract effects on creditors and debtors as unanticipated deflation does, so the deflation fear is really a fear of any unanticipated change in price-level trends.
“those very same issues that you highlight would exist if there's an unanticipated decline in the rate of inflation”
The deflation fear is that, unlike the anticipated productivity-driven deflation of the late 19th century, modern contracts are made in nominal terms by people with no experience of deflation, so unanticipated falling prices and wages would leave borrowers unable to meet fixed nominal obligations (e.g., mortgages), worsening foreclosures and threatening bank solvency, which could further exacerbate deflation as banks contract their balance sheets.
“we've made a lot of contracts in nominal terms almost all of contracts are nominal terms”
If the money supply is held constant while productivity rises at varying rates across industries (e.g., fast-falling electronics prices versus slow-changing labor-intensive education), the average price level falls and relative-price changes correctly signal consumers to buy more of the goods that got cheaper, raising real purchasing power and standard of living—whereas a gold-supply shock causing non-uniform price falls would not raise real living standards.
“some goods are getting cheaper at a faster rate than others because they're innovating at a faster rate”
Inflation is, conceptually, anything that causes the supply of circulating money to rise relative to output; this is captured by the equation of exchange MV=PQ, so inflation can arise from money-supply increases, rising velocity, or a fall in money demand, assuming output is stable.
“it's MV equals PQ money supply... times velocity equals price times quantity”
Measuring inflation via a weighted price index like the CPI is inherently a statistical approximation fraught with quality-change problems, since one cannot measure every good and even a single good (e.g., apples) varies by variety, crispness, location, time, and accompanying amenities.
“this is inherently a statistical problem you don't can't measure every good”
Calling a rise in one sector's price (e.g., 'inflation in the energy sector') inflation is nonsensical, because a rise in energy's relative price simply reflects falling supply or rising demand for that good; isolated sectoral price changes cannot ripple through and cause general inflation in the absence of a monetary change.
“the price of gasoline is inflating... that's quite confusing and nonsensical talk”
Standard Chicago monetary theory is itself too dependent on aggregates that hide rather than enlighten: by framing inflation's harm mainly as wealth redistribution from creditors to debtors, even Friedman understated that the process of increasing the money supply distorts relative prices.
“the chicago view... is also a little bit too dependent upon aggregates that hide”
The argument that we should avoid changing an unwise monetary policy because people have built expectations around it cuts far too broadly; it would have counseled against Volcker's October 1979 decision to change Fed targets, which (despite a deep early-1980s recession partly caused by mistaken prior expectations) succeeded in bringing inflation down from double digits to three or four percent—so the right response to a mistaken policy is to end it even at adjustment cost.
“that argument cuts way too broadly... the same argument could have been used against Paul Volcker's famous October 1979 decision”
Empirical research by Alex Cukierman in the 1980s-90s found that the higher the rate of inflation, the greater the dispersion of relative prices, providing empirical support for the Austrian claim that inflation does not raise all prices uniformly and therefore distorts the relative-price structure.
“the higher the rate of inflation the greater the dispersion of relative prices”
The Federal Reserve and Chairman Bernanke justified the dramatic expansion of the Fed's balance sheet after 2008 by the risk of deflation; the expanded money has not yet produced inflation because banks are sitting on the reserves rather than lending them into the economy, but the presumption is that once banks deploy it, money-supply increases will translate into price increases.
“the worry was that we could have deflation... this was a justification by the Federal Reserve and Chairman Bernanke to expand the Fed's balance sheet”
Doubling both wages and prices leaves a person neither richer nor poorer, as Mark Twain illustrates in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, because real purchasing power is unchanged—a point that is surprisingly hard for non-economists to grasp.
“if you double my wages and you double the prices I'm not richer”
Inflation and deflation are really one topic—the average level of prices and its movements.
“it's really one topic these are the average level of prices and their movements”