
What this covers
This is a conversation between YC partner Paul Buchheit, the creator of Gmail, and a host, recorded for Startup School. Buchheit draws on his time at Google, his own startup FriendFeed, and his observations of Facebook, Stripe, and SpaceX to ask what separates companies that reach the largest scale. His main working framework is a two-part question for founders: what about the world in 2028 will be fundamentally different from 2018 as it relates to the startup, and how will the founder be the one to capture that change. Audience questions are taken near the end, including one from a founder who already has strong customer willingness to buy. Buchheit's advice is to stop deliberating and start selling.
The range is wide. On Gmail's origins, he describes building email search in a single day from Google Groups code, at a time when email could not be searched at all. He also describes a popup asking "Are you happy?" that he used to find unhappy internal users and work through their problems one by one. On Google's early culture, he credits Larry Page's long-horizon, somewhat irrational thinking and the company's exclusive focus on search while Yahoo built a portal. He explains why Google never built a successful social network): it was a defensive move and not in the company's DNA, and Orkut grew in Brazil but became too slow in the US.
The more contentious material concerns money and conviction. Buchheit uses Juicero to argue that raising too much too early lets founders avoid customers, and that expectations scale up with every dollar raised. He cites Zuckerberg turning down Yahoo's $1 billion offer and replacing his management team, and Musk's all-in commitment at SpaceX, as extreme examples of Founder Conviction. He argues that a network business must please the network itself, not only individual users, and that Product-Market Fit shows up as demand you cannot keep up with. He also suggests that FriendFeed's "like" button turned up on Facebook months later.
Building epic companies requires identifying exponential shifts in reality, maintaining dual focus on present customer needs and future vision, and ruthlessly prioritizing deep user satisfaction over broad appeal.
- Google, Microsoft, and Facebook succeeded by riding exponential technological changes (microcomputers, internet growth, network effects)
- Founders must balance visionary thinking with obsessive present-moment attention to customer feedback and market signals
- Too much early funding destroys startups by enabling founders to avoid painful reality of customer validation
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Google's attempt to compete in social (Google+) was defensive—driven by wanting to compete with Facebook—rather than from founder conviction; competing from defensive motivation against a world-class competitor who is genuinely better at the category is a losing proposition.
“I mean like the founders of Twitter or at least like two of the three founders of Twitter where Google employees right like like and they never would have built that at Google...when they did try to do it it wasn't because like it wasn't because like you know Larry has a deep love for social networking or whatever right it was because they wanted to be competitive with Facebook but by then Facebook was way ahead of them and had a much deeper understanding of like what makes this stuff go so if you're behind and not as good you're guaranteed to lose it's not a good outcome”
Juicero (a $700 juice-squeezing machine) is an example of how excessive early funding destroys startups: with $120 million raised before talking to any customers, founders never faced the pressure to validate their assumptions; if they had raised only $120,000 and were forced to talk to customers, they would have quickly learned that no one wanted a $700 juice machine.
“juice arrow like the the $700 juice bag squeezing machine and the thing that made that I think such a like tremendous trainwreck is that they gave them a hundred and twenty million dollars for that thing before they ever like talked to any customer like if if juice arrow had gone through YC and we gave them one hundred and twenty thousand dollars they would have had to go talk to a customer and be like hey like we want to sell you the seven hundred dollar juice bags right they would have had to talk to customers like like and that's the thing like we push so you have to go talk to your customers”
Gmail originated as an email search feature built in a single day by Paul, using code from Google Groups, because Paul had a short attention span and wanted to build something quickly rather than engaging in detailed system design.
“having learned from my prior experience I decided to you know I think I kind of know I have a short attention span so the very first version of Gmail I wrote in a day and it wasn't very good but I took I previously been working on Google Groups which was like a Usenet search at the time now it's something different but I took the code that I've been working on for that and then I just like took all of my email and shoved it into that you know database into that indexing engine and then you know I kind of had an email search”
One of the biggest problems at hyper-growth Google was datacenter insufficiency—they couldn't build datacenters fast enough to keep up with exponential growth, which is a sign of having achieved true product-market fit.
“one of the biggest problems inside of Google is like we couldn't build datacenters fast enough right like things are just exploding so quickly that you can't even scale out that's that's what tells you that that you have that”
Google never built a successful social network because social networking wasn't in the company's DNA; while Google was excited about big computer science problems, social seemed like a distraction; Orkut grew exponentially in Brazil but died in the US because it became unresponsive (too slow) at scale, suggesting lack of organizational commitment rather than technical inevitability.
“we actually like had even before Facebook do you remember Orkut like we like it was we actually could have or you know at the time like in Brazil right yeah well it became big in Brazil but I actually tell you like orchid actually was taking off and you can make up a bunch of reasons why maybe it didn't end up being the social network but it was exploding and then it became it was growing so fast it became unresponsive so like it just that was kind of why it died off”
The key example of focus in early Google's success was that they were focused exclusively on search while competitors like Yahoo tried to be portals offering many services; this exclusive focus allowed Google to become the best in the world at search while others remained mediocre at many things.
“that was like you know with google that was part of the reason that we won it search was i was all we were focus on like early on right is and you became the best in the world at it like you versus like everyone else's ago we want to be a portal right we need all this other”
Stripe founders (Patrick Collison) had early customers who were desperate enough that they would physically come into customer organizations and write code to integrate Stripe into their systems; this willingness from customers to work together closely is a sign that you've found someone in sufficient pain.
“one of the things that works really well like is is is if the founders are actually able to just go into the organization and actually work there so like that was how like the very early stripe installs Patrick Collison would show up and integrate stripe into your code you just show up and do the work and so like that's a good thing”
Regardless of how much money a startup raises, the expectations scale proportionally: a company with $50K must create proportional value, and a company with $5M must create 100x more value, not linearly more, making large funding rounds inherently harder to justify through actual results.
“no matter what you raise if you raise fifty thousand dollars or five million you you should think of the amplification you need if you raise five million dollars that doesn't mean you can create 150 thousand dollars worth of value and be happy you have to create 50 million dollars worth of value”
Mark Zuckerberg represents an extreme example of founder conviction; when Yahoo offered Facebook $1 billion to acquire the company when it had about 10 million users, the entire management team pressured him to take the deal, but he declined and actually replaced the management team with people who believed more in the company's future.
“back when they were just a college social network they had something like 10 million users which first social network isn't that much and Yahoo wanted to buy them for like a billion dollars and everyone is like used to take the money he actually took the money but then a change that they like they're gonna changed theirs and he didn't want it there was pressure on him right so like everyone around it was like pressuring him to take the deal... so like everyone around it was like pressuring him to take the deal and then by the way if you get offered a billion dollars take the deal right in case you have any doubts right and so finally yeah I mean ultimately turns it down basically replaces an entire management team after that because they were all kind of like we should sell”
The tipping point for market acceptance is when you can't keep up with demand—not a theoretically derived metric, but a practical reality where your ability to produce is saturated by customer requests.
“the tipping point is when you can't keep up with demand right and so again like you don't you don't find this by thinking about it if you think about it too much you end up just like in delusional land you find out by talking to the market and having them give you dollars and and and so it's it's like literally when you're just like scrambling to keep up with with demand”
FriendFeed invented the 'like' button; the feature mysteriously appeared on Facebook months later, possibly by coincidence but suspiciously timed.
“we actually created the like button so like the very first like button was on FriendFeed and then mysteriously appeared on Facebook number of months later they advanced instantly completely by coincidence ya know”
Elon Musk demonstrated extreme obsession by having enough money for only three rocket launches at SpaceX; the first three exploded, and he needed a fourth rocket to succeed, meaning if it failed he would be bankrupt—this level of irrationality and all-in commitment is rare among founders.
“he came into Google gave like a Tech Talk I want to say 2003 or something like that and it was it was after he had started SpaceX but before they had done the first rocket launch and someone is like what are you gonna do if the rocket explodes when you launch it he's like well I have enough money for three launches so I hope one of them succeeds like he literally ploughed his entire fortune the first three blew up - I think yeah the first three did Lobby that he managed to scrape together enough money for like a fourth rocket yeah but that fourth rocket hadn't gone there would be no SpaceX and Elon would be bankrupt right like he like that is insane”
Building a successful company requires having a clear vision of a big future, but not so much detail that you guarantee to waste time on plans that won't survive contact with reality; the vision provides orientation while execution must remain flexible.
“I think you have to have some notion of the big picture and it doesn't mean you look like a detailed step-by-step plan like occasionally I'll run into a startup where they're like here's our five-step plan for how we become whatever and like it isn't until like the fifth step that actually they have a product anyone would want to use if those are like really bad I mean you have to you have to have something today that's good and you have to have something tomorrow”
Gmail's first feature was email search, which was innovative because at the time you couldn't search email—you could only find emails by manually clicking through them. This search capability, not whose email was being searched, was the truly valuable insight.
“all right so your first thing was just an email you could search yeah and so then I like email that out to you know the engineering team I'm like hey I built this email search you let me know what you think... but it there's a stunning lesson in there I think which is like the point wasn't so much that whose email was being searched it was that email was being searched like you guys are users you built product like you said you built Gmail originally for people yeah yeah and so with front feet was kind of the same thing of like we're just thinking about like what do I want”
Buchheit embedded a single-question popup in Gmail's interface asking 'Are you happy?' to systematically identify which internal users were satisfied and which were not, then worked one-by-one with unhappy users to understand what would make them happy.
“we actually had as our kind of like launch gate this idea that we needed to have a hundred happy users inside of Google because we you know we just had we hadn't launched it to the world obviously and so I actually embedded in the in the in the interface this thing of a pop up and be like are you happy yes or no it was just like a single question are you happy with you know Gmail or what was at the time known as Caribou yes or no and and it would get a list then I would look at of who said yes and who said no”
The Y Combinator principle of 'better to have 100 deeply loyal users than thousands who might leave' comes from the observation that deep love from a small user base is easier to expand than broad lukewarm adoption, because marginal users will convert as improvements are made.
“my philosophy and what we try to get you know all the stars to do is figure out a thing that will just have really deep appeal even if it's to like a tiny fraction of people if you can make that small fraction people just like obsessively love what you're doing it's easier to then grow that group you know cuz like there's always people at the margin where if I just make something slightly better they're gonna join into that group”
Google had a product-oriented mindset where employees thought about building products users wanted, whereas Facebook's powerful insight was that in social networks, you must please the network itself (ensure your friends are there), not just individual users, because sometimes what's good for the network conflicts with what's good for individual users, and Facebook would always optimize for the network.
“Google always had like a very product oriented mindset like like we would try to build products that were like like what the user wanted... with front feet was kind of the same thing... one of the really powerful insights that they had at Facebook was that it's almost like the it's not the end user who you have to please it's the network because they understood that the most important feature of a social network is that your friends are there and so sometimes there's actually a tension between like what's good for the individual and what's good for the network and they would always do what's good for the network”
In network effect businesses, you must identify whose happiness makes you successful—sometimes it's the end user, sometimes it's the buyer (in enterprise software), and sometimes it's the network itself; the error of thinking 'you're the product, not the customer' misses this nuance about who actually drives success.
“people get this wrong a lot of times where they think like there's this meme out there that like oh if you're not paying you're not you're the product not the customer wherever but it really isn't right like you have to identify whose happiness makes you successful so like for Google it really is like the end like the people using Google search like if they go to a different search engine like there's Google screwed right like you have to keep those people happy and you know with the Enterprise example its whoever the buyer is in the I think the sort of subtle thing with with Facebook was was that what makes those people happy is that you have this like huge network”
Google had a transformative culture in its early days where employees felt excited about their work because the founders (Larry Page) were thinking years ahead and articulated an irrational but compelling vision, exemplified by Larry suggesting they store everything in memory when they didn't have the RAM, demonstrating his forward-thinking mindset.
“I remember having an early memory where I was building this system and then I'm talking to Larry about he's like why are you even bothering with it disk we're just going to store everything in memory or whatever which at the time was sort of an absurd you know we didn't have enough RAM to store all the data but he was always thinking like so many years ahead in and it was a little bit insane but it made it a very like exciting place to be”
A question from an audience member indicated they had 80% customer willingness to try their product and customers willing to pay $40 for a cup of coffee; Buchheit advised that this is already the 'tipping point' and they should simply start selling rather than thinking about it further.
“about 80% of the people want to try what our product does and we even have people pay 40 bucks for a cup of coffee I just take my money so what's your question so how do you identify the tipping point and really how you execute that tipping point that gets a market to that so the question is how do you identify a tipping point for a market I almost feel like this is being over thought if you've got people who will pay you $40 for a cup of coffee I would just start selling $40 cups of coffee like that sounds like a really good business”
The critical distinction is not that Facebook created the need for social networks, but that they positioned themselves to capture an inevitable exponential trend; even without Facebook, someone would have built a giant social network, but Facebook's execution allowed them to own the position.
“because even if like Facebook didn't exist I guarantee someone would have built a giant social network right like Facebook was was was sitting on top of that exponential change and they were the ones who were most able to like capture it that position and hold on to it but if it wasn't them I guarantee someone else would be in that ecological and estimated ability there's a Nevitt ability these companies will exist in some form and maybe you're making it a little bit faster or a little bit better or something like that but that position is gonna exist”
In established product categories with long histories and strong user opinions (like email, 30 years old when Gmail launched), attempting to build products that appeal to everyone results in mediocre products that no one loves; instead, successful products should have deep appeal to a small fraction of users initially, then expand.
“when you're starting out building something new especially if you're kind of going into an established category like email like like literally you know email was like 30 years old when we started on it right so there is a lot of history and a lot of opinions about how email should be like people would sometimes angrily tell me I'm like doing it wrong like because we made the reply on top instead of the bottom or like weird stuff like that and so there's like all this history so it's pretty much impossible to enter a space like that and make a thing that appeals to everyone and if you try to do that what you end up making is just like a mediocre product that nobody really loves”
Buchheit's framework for founders thinking about billion-dollar company potential is a two-part question: (1) What about the world in 2028 is fundamentally different from 2018 as it pertains to your startup? and (2) How are you going to be the one who captures that change?
“I give them a two-part question and so the first part is like let's say I hop in my time machine which is hopefully a DeLorean and I like travel ten years into the future so I get out it's the Year 2028 you know I take a look around... I ask questions like what about the world of 2028 is fundamentally different from 2018 like what's what's the thing that's totally different right... the second part of the question is simply like how are you gonna be the one who captures it”
In summer 1996, Buchheit attempted to start a web-based email company but failed because his approach was wrong—he had a grand vision of an intricate system and implemented it piece by piece, then got bored and gave up, a failure he later attributed to not learning the lesson of launching quickly.
“I had like grand visions for it but I my approach to developing it was was wrong it was it was very much like I had this great big grand vision and then I started trying to implement it you know piece by piece the components and then I got bored and gave up... I actually like did sort of this detailed design of this very intricate system and everything and I've kind of come at least for myself I've come to decide that that doesn't work”
For enterprise software companies, the danger is that customers will express interest in a solution during conversations, but when you deliver the product months or years later, they claim to be too busy or out of budget, causing fatal delays; you need to find customers with urgent, desperate problems who would cut off their own arm to solve them.
“so the danger I feel like with a lot of these enterprise things is that you end up not really solving an urgent problem because like when you talk to people they're like oh yeah this is it would be great to have this solution or whatever and so then you go off and you build this thing you spend years maybe building this product and then you go to them you're like here it is we got it and like you know we're really busy this quarter and actually we don't have it in the budget until maybe next year so can we talk again in nine months or something right like and that's just deadly for a start-up”
Buchheit sold FriendFeed to Facebook because he came to realize that Facebook was an unstoppable force that would dominate social networking, similar to how Google dominated search; he believed no other company (including Google and Twitter) could beat Facebook, so joining them was the rational choice.
“I did sort of come to realize this because in in the process of you know trying to make friend foetus success we kept running into this company Facebook who who actually knew what they were doing and and part of why ultimately like I came to believe that Facebook was just this unstoppable force in that like we weren't gonna beat them and Google wasn't going to beat them and Twitter wasn't gonna beat them... and I kind of once I was inside so that was why you know it sold front feed to Facebook cuz I'm like wow this is gonna be like another Google sighs”
The energy and excitement in a company comes from employees knowing what's really happening and genuinely believing in the mission, not from surface things like perks; if employees are collecting paychecks while waiting for the company to fail, that energy is different from if they believe they're building something world-changing.
“I think the reason that works is because the employees actually know what's going on right and so if you're just there cuz like you're collecting your paycheck while you wait for the company to go bust like you're gonna have a different energy from yeah you feel that if it versus if you think like oh my god I need to launch this thing it's gonna be so exciting like it's gonna take over the world right”
The core virtues for building a 100-billion-dollar company are: focus, frugality, obsession, and love; focus is the most important weapon a startup has because it can concentrate all resources on one point while larger competitors are scattered across many priorities.
“focus frugality obsession and love and it seems like like if you encapsulate those things even in the very beginning... I i think like focus is one of the most important things because like as a start-up it's actually i think your most powerful weapon right like the reason that you're able to take on like these big companies or whoever is because they're doing a thousand different things right and so the only way you can win is if you take everything you have and you focus it at one point”
Frugality is essential because it creates a good input-to-output ratio; the best indicator that you're doing it right is that you produce more with less—ideally creating ten dollars worth of output per dollar of input, which allows scaling of the business model.
“frugality i think is also really essential I think like one of the best indicators of if you're doing it right is essentially your input to output ratio so you want to do more with less... like you want to do more with less... your amplify time and money right... if I give you a dollar and you turn into ten dollars my god that's a good business right like we just scale that thing up”
For large markets, there will always be customers in some amount of pain; the rule is to find someone desperate and focus on them rather than trying to appeal to the median customer in a market.
“and if it's a big enough market there's got to be someone who's desperate back there”
Buchheit started FriendFeed with former Google colleagues because he got depressed after retiring, and working distracted him from depression; the explicit goal was to create an awesome place to work, essentially creating a job for himself by recreating the best parts of Google without the frustrating parts.
“after I left Google I sort of like retired and then we just like get depressed cuz it turns out tired of it's not fun yeah and maybe I have issues with depression that I don't know so I but working distracts me so I started talking some other friends from from Google who were thinking of leaving and basically ended up starting a new company which which was FriendFeed and that was actually the actual goal of FriendFeed which was just to build a place that was really awesome to work at I was actually just trying to create a job for myself”
To build a 100-billion-dollar company, you must identify an exponential change in reality and position yourself to capture it; Microsoft, Intel, and Apple succeeded because they rode the rise of microcomputers; Google succeeded because of exponential growth in online information; these companies became dominant not just because they were smart, but because they sat on top of a fundamental shift.
“what I think necessarily to get to that point you're sitting on top of a big exponential change in reality or in the world so like you know Intel and Microsoft in in the early days Apple we're kind of sitting on top of this like the rise of micro computers right... and likewise you know Google obviously was sitting on the growth of the Internet... the amount of information online was increasing exponentially and so we were gonna have to get a lot better at like or organizing it right”
Social networking is an exceptionally hard product category to engineer success in; many smart companies have tried (Google, Facebook's competitors, Twitter) but only a few succeed, and the reasons for success may include post-hoc rationalizations that aren't actually causal.
“social stuff is just really hard even and we've seen this Ivan you know we've had a lot of social stuff come through YC you know Google has tried it like it's a really hard space like somehow some of these things that kind of like you know Twitter or Facebook they just kind of like catch and you can go back in time and make up a bunch of stories about like why it is and some of those stories may or may not be true”
When Buchheit joined Facebook after the FriendFeed acquisition, he noticed the office had a similar energy and vibe to early Google—a sense that this company was going somewhere, which is a powerful but subtle indicator of organizational health and founder/employee conviction.
“going into the office it kind of had that vibe of like this is a place that's going somewhere right and and I think it's like a really powerful indicator and it's a subtle thing and it's a little bit almost metaphysical or everybody like you walk into an office and you're just like how is the energy how does it make me feel does it when I'm here is that like when I watch my own energy levels am I going up is this making me feel like oh wow or is this like pulling me down”
The problem with excessive early funding is that founders spend all their time dreaming about the promised land rather than dealing with the urgent problems in front of them—they lose focus on the immediate challenges that are blocking progress.
“I think those are kind of the two things I being a visionary alright yes like between you know just paying incredible attention to your current customers right and having take over the world right and I think the thing that happens with too much money is you just spend all of your time like dreaming of like the Promised Land but you're not actually dealing with the problem that's in front of you”
The startup principle 'if you're not embarrassed by your product on launch, you've waited too long' is rooted in frugality, because launching minimal products quickly means spending less time and money on the wrong thing, and getting to real feedback faster.
“if you're not embarrassed of your product you've waited too long to launch like these things are at the root there there's there's like a lot of like frugality there right because you don't want to spend too much time or too much money like you want to get it out there as quickly as possible in as little cost and well so you don't want to spend too much time running on the wrong thing and you just don't know enough right”
Most startups exhibit poor input-to-output ratios: you give them money and they burn it up with no results; building the right ratio early—producing outputs with minimal inputs—is a fundamental skill.
“unfortunately most startups do less with more so like you give them money and they just burn it up and there's like no results so like being able to to produce a lot of outputs with a minimum amount looks like amplify time and money right”
When asked about hiring practices using personas, Paul rejects the framework, saying he doesn't believe in using personas to represent customers—implying direct customer engagement is more valuable than abstract user representations.
“do you believe in using personas to represent your customers do I have that right not really don't believe in using people to represent my customers sorry”
Paul Buchheit was the 23rd employee at Google when he joined in 1999 and the company was located on the second floor above a bookshop or cafe on University Ave in Palo Alto.
“I was the 23rd at that point and so we were in we were in Palo Alto on University Ave kind of on the second floor above what is I think a book shop or cafe or something like that”
Email access was a constraint in the 1990s because email clients like Eudora used POP3 to download email to individual computers, requiring users to be physically in their room to check email, which was inefficient because information shouldn't be location-bound.
“in college I I had actually been thinking a lot about this because like again back in the 90s like people their email would download to their computer they would run like Eudora or something and it would use pop3 to pull the email down to their computer and I remember people be like I need to go to my room to like check my email and like that's dumb like that doesn't make any sense it's information it shouldn't be like stuck in a box”
Twitter founders (at least two of the three) were Google employees who left specifically because they wanted to build something technically interesting that couldn't exist within Google's culture and priorities.
“the founders of Twitter or at least like two of the three founders of Twitter where Google employees right like like and they never would have built that at Google because like if you had built it you'd be like what is this thing there's nothing technically interesting about Twitter right”
Gmail was initially called 'Caribou' internally at Google during development before the name Gmail was chosen.
“are you happy with you know Gmail or what was at the time known as Caribou yes or no”
Working at a large established company (Intel, HP) creates a 'fur line rut'—comfortable but stagnant—where employees are essentially waiting out time toward retirement, which is antithetical to the mindset needed to build something new.
“I used to call working at HP where I first worked the fur line rut yeah it's comfortable it's comfortable but it's a rut yeah I actually have a specific memory like hanging out with a couple of other friends who worked at Intel and you know I'm like 21 22 years old something like that and they're talking about like oh yeah they've got this really great like retirement plan where you know if you work there until for however many years like your age plus your number of years of service like you could retire at like 55 or something I'm like ah like it's like like oh yeah why don't I just take the next 30 years of my life and stick it in a box and bury it”
Paul created the phrase 'Don't be evil' as Google's motto, which became a defining principle of the company's culture and public positioning.
“Paul is known for a lot of things not the least of which is his wisdom and all things when it comes to startups but he's also of course the creator of Gmail the inventor this is true of don't be evil”
The interview was conducted at Y Combinator with an interviewer identified only as the host, discussing Paul Buchheit's journey from Intel through Google, FriendFeed, Facebook, and into his role at Y Combinator as an investor and advisor.
“it is now my great pleasure to introduce my longtime colleague at Y Combinator Paul Buchheit”
Buchheit left Google because it was becoming a big company again, and he also had personal circumstances (a baby with a traumatic start to life) that made that the right time to move on.
“I left the the company kind of you know it was becoming a big company again and and I just decided that wasn't the direction I personally wanted to go and I just had a baby who had a pretty traumatic start on life so I kind of had other things going on”
Buchheit's first angel investment was in Kevin Hale's company Wufoo in Y Combinator winter 2006 batch; it returned 50x, much higher than his initial estimate of 10x, which unfortunately made him initially overestimate his investing ability.
“I made my very first angel investment in a company in the second batch winter o 6 which was Kevin hey who then later became a YC partner wufu... I had I forget what the multiple is but pretty pretty high yeah you know I thought my first investment returned like 10x and it was actually a little unfortunate because it made me think I was better at it than I was I think it's maybe like 50x”
Buchheit has invested in at least a few companies from every Y Combinator batch since winter 2006.
“so yeah I so that was kind of how I got hooked into this stuff so I started at that point just getting to know the founders in each batch and I've invested in every batch since then it's at least a few of the companies”
Buchheit spent seven years at Google, the same amount of time he has now spent at Y Combinator.
“so I was like Google for seven years... I've actually been at YC from over seven years now”
Some Gmail users were Outlook converts who switched only because Outlook corrupted its database once users hit 2 gigabytes of stored mail, which would cause total data loss; Gmail then became their only option to preserve their email, making them Gmail users even if not happy ones.
“I did end up getting those people and the way I would get them is that outlook at the time when you would hit 2 gigabytes in your in your mail file it would corrupt the database and they would lose all of their mail and then I had the only copy of their email and so then they would become a gmail user not always a happy user but they would become a user anyway”
Buchheit first learned about Y Combinator through Slashdot, where he read about the summer founders program; he was interested but didn't attend the very first demo day, making him unique in having attended every subsequent demo day except that first one.
“I saw this thing about the summer founders program which I thought like sounded super cool... I was one of the very first reddit users I think when when that launched and then did you go to the demo day no I didn't make it to the very first that's the only one you ever miss the only one I missed”
Buchheit's decision to negotiate for more Google equity after already accepting the job was one of the smartest financial decisions he ever made, though he wishes he had negotiated for even more, and he was told he had to do it before starting.
“I went into their office and I just sort of felt the pressed like like you could just tell people weren't really that excited to be there and then they'd asked kind of like dumb questions I didn't think we're like anyway it just wasn't like a good sign versus like Google kind of like they were into whatever it was they were doing and actually after I was there for maybe like a week I went back and I'm like hey I want more equity like sorry you have to negotiate that before you start so yeah that might have been like the the smartest pseudo investment decision you've ever made even though it didn't I guess it worked out but yeah I mean it worked out overall but yeah I do wish I'd gotten more more”
Buchheit's initial resume bounced from Google due to a misconfigured mail server (broken MX record), which limited his interview options to only Google and one other company, making the Google choice easy since he wasn't interested in the other company.
“I came up with a list of like six startups that seemed like they might be interesting you know doing stuff with Linux and so I like just emailed my resume to all of them sort of like ironically it immediately bounced from Google because their mail server was misconfigured so I didn't hear back from from most of them ever I interviewed at one other company and then they I resent my resume the next day and then it went to they had fixed like I think the MX record was broken or something so I only interviewed at like Google and one other company and the other company like I wasn't interested”