
Why Chinese Are Growing Anxious & The Danger of Declining China | Ep. 11 David Rennie (Drum Tower)
What this covers
This is a conversation between host Dominik Presl and David Rennie, the Economist's Beijing bureau chief and co-host of the Drum Tower podcast. It starts with the mood inside China and works toward the question of war. Rennie describes a country that is anxious and in a funk after the pandemic lockdowns. Many people lost income but still owed on mortgages and cars. Youth unemployment is at record highs, graduate statistics were halted and then restarted with a new method that showed lower numbers, and some applicants report being interviewed entirely by AI bots.
The middle of the episode is about how far the economic gloom threatens the party. Rennie explains that the CCP rests on performance legitimacy rather than elections. He also points out that Xi Jinping has put so much power in his own hands, with a Politburo Standing Committee of loyalists, that blame is hard to deflect. He offers some cushioning facts: conservative loan-to-value ratios, family loans in place of bank mortgages, and high precautionary savings for healthcare. He also covers censorship of economic news, including phone calls that warn analysts off criticizing conditions, and the party's use of private polling and social media monitoring. The comparison to Vladimir Putin is raised as another case of a repressive ruler who is obsessed with public opinion. The pair also discuss the party's utilitarian bargain of order for the majority, which comes at the expense of minorities such as Uyghurs, and why the end-of-lockdown protests should not be read as Tiananmen-style revolt.
The last section turns to war. The host raises the "peak China" argument that a declining power is the most dangerous one, and he cites Drum Tower's reporting on food stockpiling, "eat bitterness" rhetoric, and de-emphasis of the economy as groundwork for a long-term contest, a reading that is contested. Rennie weighs this against state television's measured reaction to Taiwan's election, the scale of an amphibious operation, and the prospect that a Taiwan war would pull in Japan and America. He also discusses SWIFT alternatives and decoupling as defensive resilience.
David Rennie argues that while Chinese government preparations for potential conflict suggest long-term strategic hedging, an imminent Taiwan invasion is unlikely because the economic pain, military risk, and absence of domestic propaganda mobilization make it an unreasonably dangerous bet for the CCP, despite Xi Jinping's ideological reorientation toward hardship and sacrifice.
- Taiwan invasion would be the largest amphibious operation since D-Day but across rougher, deeper waters—betting the entire Communist Party on success
- Current Chinese state messaging emphasizes economic recovery, not nationalist fervor; response to Taiwan's 2024 election was deliberate de-escalation, not rage
- Xi's ideological project of hardening China, food security stockpiling, and anti-Western rhetoric reflect defensive decoupling and moral party renewal, not imminent offensive preparation
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The CCP's governance model is fundamentally utilitarian and majoritarian: it aims to deliver certain public goods (safety, order, prosperity) to the majority through centralized policy choice, accepting the trade-off that minorities who are in the wrong place at the wrong time will be repressed without mercy.
“very often Chinese policy is aimed at trying to ensure it's a kind of utilitarian structure it's designed to try and deliver a certain set of public goods Chosen and selected by the Communist Party to a majority of the people”
The 'peak China' theory argues that China has already peaked economically and demographically and will peak militarily soon, and that declining powers are most dangerous because they must act now to achieve major geopolitical changes before relative decline makes them impossible.
“there's an idea that China has it's it's sometimes called the peak China Theory and it's basically that the idea that China has already peaked in terms of economy demography uh and that in terms of military it's going to Peak in a next few years and the idea is that it's often not the rising powers that are the most dangerous but it's it's the powers that have reached their Peak and they know that if they want to really achieve some major change um of the international order and and to really improve their standing they have to act now”
Putin doesn't need to care about public opinion because he has a robust repression machine and elections can't change anything, but in practice he enormously cares and is obsessed with public opinion—this parallel is similar to what happens in China.
“in theory Putin wouldn't need to care about the public opinion because he has this robust bu repression machine and it's not like elections can change anything but in practice he actually enormously cares and is kind of obsessed with the public opinion”
Chinese media censorship creates a significant gap between foreign reporting and Chinese domestic reporting on economic crisis, particularly regarding millions of people paying mortgages on unfinished apartments—a story widely covered in foreign media but systematically absent from Chinese press.
“if he wants to point to you know an area where there is probably a very large gap between the reporting that you'd see outside China and the reporting you'd see inside China you know the the several million people who are currently paying mortgages on apartments that have not yet been built or finished and you know these are people who have done absolutely nothing wrong they bought an apartment they got a mortgage uh and yet that apartment has not been delivered because China has this strange kind of Ponzi scheme property sector where you buy the apartment up front and the developer then takes the money for the next project but those millions of people you know you can read in foreign news reporting that uh uh you know sometimes they will go and stand outside the headquarters of the biggest property developers and I've seen them myself outside uh Country Garden The you know the one that's in trouble at the moment um you will not see their stories in the Chinese press and they will often be warned by the police not to speak to journalists”
Xi Jinping has centralized power very visibly around himself, creating a Politburo Standing Committee widely understood to be filled with his loyalists rather than institutional power brokers, which means when people doubt the leadership knows what it's doing, it's very hard to shield Xi from blame because he personally embodies governance.
“one of the consequences of centralizing power very very visibly around one man xiin ping and creating a poit bureau standing committee which was widely understood by people who kind of follow the news here as a standing committee of sh jimping loyalists people who'd worked with him for years and years and years you know one of the consequences of that degree of absolute centralization and the absolute focus on personalizing uh governance here as the wisdom of Xi Jinping is that when people are not sure that the leadership knows what it's doing then it's very hard to Shield the guy at the top”
The CCP's legitimacy rests on 'performance legitimacy'—the ability to point to growing economy, safety, and prosperity—rather than electoral mandate, making erosion of demonstrated government competence particularly dangerous to regime stability.
“there's this political science term of performance legitimacy that you know a government like China's which doesn't have an election mandate because it doesn't win elections uh has performance legitimacy it can point to the growing economy or its comp uh or the fact that people are safe um people do still acknowledge that the economy in their lifetimes has got you know much larger that life is more prosperous that you know in many ways cities have been you know dramatically modernized in many bits of China there's highs speeded trains people are very proud of all of those things um but there are now elements of the governing performance that they're just not uh they're not sure why it's not working properly and and they are definitely disappointed”
Chinese mortgage rules are typically very conservative, with loan-to-value ratios of 50-60%, compared to Western countries with 80-90% mortgages, meaning even significant property price declines do not immediately create underwater mortgages or systemic financial crisis among Chinese homeowners.
“it's very common for mortgage rules to be very very conservative here it varies from City to city but you know people might have a 50% mortgage uh or a 60% mortgage and so actually it takes a long time for the pain to feed through”
The Chinese Communist Party uses modern social media monitoring tools and private opinion polling—both direct surveys and contracts with tech companies to sample public opinion from social media—to track public opinion and party concerns.
“one of the things that sort of uh the Chinese Communist party has tried to do over kind of recent years is to use modern tools of uh sort of social media monitoring uh or sort of opinion polling they you know they they do polling as far as we can tell you know you can occasionally meet academics who uh do kind of private polling for the party or for the government uh we know uh that there are private tech companies that have quite lucrative contracts to sample public opinion by kind of surveying social media because you can sometimes meet those tech people and they'll tell you uh about those contracts”
Chinese cities are exceptionally safe (walkers can traverse at 2 AM in a way that would be dangerous in New York, London, or Berlin) because they are very tightly policed with security cameras everywhere, representing a trade-off the majority accepts in exchange for order.
“they know that people like the fact that Chinese cities are amazingly safe and that's because they are very tightly policed there's security cameras everywhere and but you know it is you know you can walk down the streets of Beijing at 2 am in a way that would be unwise in New York or London or or or Berlin and that's an achievement it's aimed at the kind of the majority who will accept the trade-offs in terms of privacy and uh policing to live in a safe orderly stable Society”
Chinese government framing of Uyghur coercive assimilation (elimination of Uyghur language from schools, intense surveillance in Xinjiang) is justified as necessary for national unity with 92% Han Chinese majority, and the strict security measures in Xinjiang are popular with Han tourists who appreciate the safety and stability it provides.
“for the Chinese Communist Party their their view is you know we need a peaceful stable China 90s something percent of the country are hand Chinese so this is just going to be how it works and and you know the very very strict intense security and kind of surveillance in shinjang is popular with lots and lots of Chinese tourists who love going to shinjang and dressing up as weers and uh and they will say you know this place used to be really dangerous there used to be kind of bombs and knife attacks and now it's super safe it's lovely great you know come and have a holiday in shinjang”
War between China and Taiwan would very easily turn into a three-way war with Japan and America involved, making it a war between two nuclear-armed superpowers, which is a terrifying and should-be-unimaginable prospect but is not completely unimaginable.
“does that mean that war is completely Unthinkable I wish I could say it were because it would be a war that could very easily turn into a war very fast with Japan and with America and then we'd have you know two nuclear arms superpowers at War which is just a terrifying Prospect it should be unimaginable it's not completely unimaginable”
If Xi Jinping successfully takes Taiwan and occupies it, he would enter the pantheon of China's great leaders, comparable to expansionist Qing Dynasty emperors like the Kangxi or Yongzheng Emperor, but if he attempts it and loses, he goes down in history as one of the worst Chinese rulers of all time.
“if xiin ping could successfully take Taiwan and occupy Taiwan and drive his red flag limousine you know over the scorched and kind of smoking Avenues of central Tai Bay with the kind of the Communist party's flag flying from buildings and Pla troops lining the Avenue then he would undoubtedly enter the pantheon of China's great leaders because he would have finished and won a final victory in the Chinese Civil War the chairman now failed to end... but if he if he tries it and loses then he you know then he goes down in history as one of the worst Chinese rulers of all time”
Many young Chinese have borrowed money from family members to purchase apartments rather than taking bank mortgages, further insulating them from systemic financial collapse because family loans are renegotiable or forgivable, whereas bank mortgages are not.
“and the fact that people may have borrowed from their own family to buy an apartment rather than borrowed from the bank and so people are not desperate”
There is a pattern within the drum Tower podcast that China is laying groundwork for not launching an invasion in the near term but for creating conditions to be able to do so in the medium-to-long term, including nationalist propaganda, food security stockpiling, rhetoric that economy is no longer a priority, and statements that people should 'eat bitterness.'
“I feel like there are these recurring themes that come up that sort of seem like uh the Chinese government laying groundw for not launching an invasion in near term next year but for at least creating conditions for it to be able to do that if they decide to do it in sort of midterm and I'm talking about you know whether that's is sort of the nationalistic and anti-American anti-western propaganda or the obsession with food security and and stocking up on on huge supplies of food or you know policies and statements from G and other officials that actually the economy is no longer a priority for China and that Chinese people should learn to um eat bitterness”
Ordinary Chinese people maintain precautionary savings of 20-33% of income specifically to cover healthcare costs (medical expenses and medications), whereas American households with comparable income disruption lack this cushion, making Chinese households more resilient to temporary income loss despite lower absolute incomes.
“ordinary Chinese people partly because you know the health insurance system is very very skimpy particularly in the countryside people are terrified of the unexpected costs of having to go to the hospital pay for medicines so they save a huge percentage of their income you know a fifth a quarter a third of their income goes into saving for a rainy day so when ordinary Chinese even migrant workers on low incomes don't get paid for two months they're not finished financially in the way that I think their counterparts in the west might be”
A significant but non-trivial number of ordinary Chinese—perhaps a million or more—died of COVID at the end of pandemic controls when the chaotic opening overwhelmed the system, and this is a lived reality for families who experienced these deaths because doctors were forbidden from writing COVID on death certificates.
“there is absolutely no doubt that a non-trivial number of people you know a million maybe more uh died in those last very chaotic uh moments of the pandemic and that had an effect”
Over the past year, there is an unmistakable pattern across different regions of China that people are anxious, in a funk, and definitely concerned about the direction of the economy, with this anxiety emerging from pandemic lockdowns that left many without income while still facing mortgage and car loan payments.
“over the last uh of year or so I think there is an unmistakable pattern that in different places for different reasons people are anxious they are in a funk they are um definitely uh concerned about uh the direction of the economy”
Chinese government censors actively suppress negative economic narratives and pressure bank economists and analysts not to speak negatively about the economy to financial journalists, with direct phone calls warning them to stop if they are quoted criticizing conditions.
“if you are kind of an economist for a bank uh in mainland China or an analyst who might speak to financial journalists in China there is now strong pressure not to uh you know talk down the economy if you if you say something negative uh and is quoted by a journalist in the Chinese press then you as the bank analyst or Economist will get a phone call uh telling you to stop it”
The propaganda machine (people's daily, Central Committee propaganda bureau memos) emphasizes that the party must 'increase work on public opinion guidance,' ensure the economy is reported in ways reflecting 'positive energy,' and prevent 'hostile foreign forces' from lowering Chinese morale—this language reflects intense focus on managing narratives and mood.
“the propaganda machine uh you know in in the journals which are designed to instruct party members about the line to take you know things like the people's daily there are endless kind of pieces by the propaganda Bureau of the Central Committee saying you know we must increase our work on public opinion guidance uh we must ensure that the economy uh is discussed and reported and analyzed in ways that reflect positive energy and do not allow kind of hostile foreign forces to you know try to lower the morale of the Chinese people”
The Chinese state evening news (Shanbao) does show aircraft carriers, fighter jets, missiles, and warnings about Taiwan being careful not to provoke China, but the response to Taiwan's recent election of a candidate China disliked was measured and calming—officials said Taiwan isn't walking away, we have time, and the wrong people won the presidency but the right people won the parliamentary elections.
“if you watch State you know the state Evening News Shambo the you know the the news that you know hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese watch every night you know yes there are shots of aircraft carriers and fighter jets and missiles they like to talk about how strong the pla is and yes they talk about um you know how a tiny minority of split on Taiwan must you know be careful but look at their respons most recent Taiwan election where the party that they didn't like the candidate that they didn't like won the presidential election linger um giving the party that China does not like that it sees as a kind of splst pro-independence party giving them uh another term uh a third presidential term in a row which is certainly not what China wanted what do we see from the Chinese propaganda machine from State officials you know the Taiwan Affairs office it was very much a kind of lowering of the tensions it was um well yes lighting uh you know needs to be very careful and not provoke us you know we're very you know we'll be watching him but his party lost the the Parliamentary elections held on the same day uh you know his party clearly does not represent the majority opinion on Taiwan you know we still have time”
Millions of Chinese homebuyers are rationally avoiding apartment purchases because property prices have fallen 10-20% over the last year, making forward-looking purchase decisions economically irrational until the market stabilizes.
“it's really common at the moment to hear people say well you know prices are going down there's probably 10 20% down uh over the last year so why would you buy an apartment now uh because it's only going to be worth less or if you buy an apartment you know my are you wouldn't be able to sell it so you know no one's just everyone's just kind of sort of sitting still and hunkering down and saving as much of their income as they can”
Youth unemployment in China has reached record highs, statistics on graduate unemployment were stopped and then restarted with new methodology that showed lower numbers, and young people face extreme difficulty securing good jobs, with some reporting interview processes conducted entirely by AI bots.
“which obviously has been in the news outside China because the statistics particularly on graduate youth unemployment reached sort of record highs and then they stopped publishing the statistics and now they started publishing them uh with a new methodology so the number is lower”
Protests at the end of the pandemic in China were sometimes mischaracterized by Western media as anti-CCP revolutionary protests comparable to Tiananmen Square, but in reality they were often migrant workers demanding right to work, factory workers demanding exit from lockdown dormitories, or people wanting responsive government while framing complaints as patriotic and singing national anthem.
“there have even been protests which I think were sometimes mischaracterized uh in the outside uh as you know the largest protest since tanan square and so people assumed all that must be a sort of explicitly anti-communist party kind of revolutionary protest but it's complicated right you know some of the protests at the end of the pandemic were migrant workers you know protesting to be allowed to go to work and earn some money uh or they were Factory workers demanding to be allowed out of their Factory because they were frightened that people in their dormatory might have have covid uh or they were you know even you know I was at the white paper protest in Beijing which you know constantly get talked up as this kind of stunning rebuke for the party and there was a bit of that but there were also people there who just wanted the pandemic controls to be lifted and wanted the government to be more kind of responsive and accountable uh but they were very very careful uh to you know to frame their complaints as patriotic and to you know sing the national anthem or to sing you know uh to make sure that they were not challenging the party directly”
Taiwan invasion would be an amphibious operation comparable in scale to the D-Day invasion of Normandy in World War II, but more difficult because the English Channel is 23 miles wide while the Taiwan Strait is roughly 100 miles wide, very deep, and very rough.
“invading Taiwan has been described to me by one Pentagon planner as you know the largest amphibious operation uh since the Allied invasion of Normandy in D-Day during the second world war but more difficult because the English Channel was 23 miles wide or whatever it is uh the the Taiwan Straits are four times wider and very deep and very rough”
China's policy of building alternatives to SWIFT (international payment system) and increasing use of its own currency for oil purchases is both defensive (protecting against sanctions like those imposed on Iran and Russia) and part of a broader strategy of financial resilience and decoupling.
“we can see them patiently building real world things designed to try and you know increase the amount of uh you know oil that China pays for with its own currency uh or to try and increase alternative Payment Systems certainly an effort that is defensive but I do think there is also something that is not purely defensive and not purely a kind of uh sort of construction of a foress China because China feels under attack”
If you are looking to distract a discontented public, invading and trying to conquer and occupy an island of 24 million people over 100 miles of rough sea with theoretical American security backing is betting the entire Communist Party on that war—an unacceptably risky distraction strategy.
“if you were looking to distract a discontented public then uh invading and trying to conquer and occupy an island of 24 million people which has a kind of theoretical American Security backing over a 100 miles of Rush of rough sea that's a that's a big distraction that's like betting the entire Communist party on that war and so that is that is I think uh a reason to assum assume that until they feel they have no choice or until they are confident the Americans would not come uh then it would be an unbelievably risky thing to do”
Taiwan has no indigenous oil, gas, or energy reserves; it imports all its energy and much of its food, so a sustained Chinese blockade preventing cargo ships from delivering goods would create an energy crisis for the island within weeks.
“Taiwan has no oil and gas of its own it has no energy stocks of its own it Imports you know all its energy and and a lot of its uh food and stuff so you know that could get very rough that could get uh nasty”
Local government officials in China have not been paid on time for months because city governments are bankrupt from spending on pandemic controls like pop-up quarantine hospitals, and some officials have been forced to pay back performance-related bonuses from previous years.
“my brother-in-law is a policeman and he hasn't been paid on time for months now he eventually gets paid but he's never been paid on time because the local city government is bankrupt uh they spent just so much money building you know pop-up quarantine hospitals or you know quite a lot of low-level officials have been made to pay back performance uh related bonuses going back you know two three years and that's painful”
The host asks whether the 'peak China' theory is now mainstream among analysts, as it's becoming common to see China as having already peaked economically and demographically, with slowing growth and not overtaking the U.S. in the century-long power competition.
“I think that now it's sort of mainstream to see China in that way that it has already peaked and it's probably not going to overtake the US economy and that it's Grove is going to slow down and that it's not really going up anymore but rather it's starting to decline and it's probably not going to be the Chinese Century as we maybe thought”
Rennie rejects the claim that Xi Jinping would use Taiwan invasion as a distraction from economic troubles, arguing that the military risk is too high and the domestic propaganda machine is not preparing public opinion for war—if war were imminent, we would see intense nationalist propaganda, which we do not.
“I think that you're definitely right to notice that that is a kind of a a theme I'm not hopefully not an obsession of drum tars but yeah there is a lot of there is a lot of realworld policy um that seems to support the rhetoric from xiin ping on down about the need to harden China's kind of defenses to become more self-reliant to become more resilient to be less dependent on the outside world for choke hold Technologies or uh food or energy”
A four-star U.S. Air Force general stated 'my gut tells me that we will fight in 2025' regarding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and H.R. McMaster (former National Security Advisor and thoughtful military strategist) suggested that as the Chinese economy slows and policy mistakes become obvious, the CCP will amp up nationalism around Taiwan.
“a fourstar uh US general who said that my gut to quote him my gut tells me that we will fight in 2025 talking about Chinese invasion of Taiwan potential invasion of Taiwan and um using that quote after making an episode asking whether Chinese people want that what does your gut tell you about all of this... Al McMaster he used to be National Security advisor uh and is a kind of very thoughtful former General who wrote some interesting books of history about kind of failures of strategy uh in previous American uh Wars Vietnam um so McMaster we played this clip of McMaster talking in Congress about how as the Chinese economy slows and the policy mistakes by the party look obvious then you know they're going to to amp up the nationalism they're going to whip up the nationalism Above All Around Taiwan”
Some proportion of young Chinese who grew up during China's rise and only knew prosperity are experiencing loss of confidence in the government and future bright prospects for the first time, because the pandemic controls revealed that the government does not know what it's doing and the contrast with earlier successful pandemic response created disappointment.
“there's definitely no doubt that for the first time uh in in in the lives of some young Chinese the economy is not booming away that things are not improving every year and that if you're you know if you're in your 20s that's a real shock because you've only known a China That's Rising so that is a big deal uh and we should take it seriously”
Xi Jinping's ideological project involves appeals to recapture the essence of revolutionary-era China—simplicity, purity, sacrifice, willingness to suffer for the nation—through rhetoric about martyrs, red faith, red fire, and revolutionary DNA, using language that has quasi-religious/metaphysical character.
“I think there is evidence again looking at XI Jin Ping's kind of most authoritative speeches including you know his address to the 20th party Congress uh or some of his speeches immediately afterwards which the Communist Party kind of Cannon is a kind of is like a kind of papal bull it's it's you know it is the the highest level of authority there you could see a sort of an appeal to purify and strengthen the Communist party and below it the entire of China by somehow recapturing the essence of an older simpler more sort of expeditionary revolutionary China and that doesn't mean Revolution it's sort of revolutionary sense because he's a very conservative leader but you see these constant appeals to a kind of a an imagined kind of age of Purity and simplicity where you know the very early pioneers of the Communist Party were willing to risk their comfort and their lives kind of riding mules up into the mountains to save The Peasants to lead the revolution that they didn't have any possessions there was no money there was no corruption they were serving the people”
Ideology has returned to everyday life in China in a way that was not true in the late 1990s; the party is being reframed as a visible guiding moral force and vanguard of the 'best and purest' working selflessly for the people rather than as a distant bureaucratic apparatus.
“ideologies return to kind of everyday life and the promise is that the party is a kind of Vanguard the best of the best the purest of the pure um kind of working sleepless nights uh for the good of the kind of the people”
Xi Jinping's vision is of a 'campaign-footing' China—metaphorically with 'rucksack on back and straw sandals on feet, marching up a cliff into mountaintops'—where the party is purified, expeditionary, and on a moral mission, contrasting with the corrupt party of 'fat cat officials in tinted-windowed Audis leaving drunken banquets' that he inherited.
“that's the vision of the party that xiin ping constantly promotes and you know the party that he doesn't like is you know a corrupt fat cat local official in a kind of tinted windowed Audi kind of heading away from a kind of drunken banquet with his capitalist friends that's the party that xiin ping uh clearly believes uh is very unpopular that if the party remained uh seen as that party you know he has said himself uh that you know when he took over the party had lost its way that it was not popular it was out of touch with the masses it was seen as decadent Elite and all of those things”
Former Prime Minister Li Keqiang died of a heart attack while swimming in Shanghai in early March 2023 after two terms of loyal service to Xi Jinping without challenging him, yet his death immediately became censored content and he became an 'un-person,' suggesting top-level anxiety about popular grieving for an alternative political figure.
“the last prime minister Le kachang uh who stepped down the beginning of March 2023 after you know two terms of absolute loyal Service never challenging Xi Jinping uh really never actually fulfilling the hopes that some liberals had of him that he might be a kind of liberal reformer he was really in many ways a a sort of a disappointment but he retires in good standing uh and then he dies of a of a as far as we know heart attack swimming in Shanghai”
When mourners at Li Keqiang's memorial praised him for acknowledging that people suffered during the pandemic and that some remained very poorly paid, they were implicitly criticizing Xi Jinping's refusal to acknowledge people's pain.
“when you spoke to at least some of the Chinese laying flowers you couldn't help but kind of infer from the way that they were praising Le kachang that there was a kind of veiled critique of Xi Jinping that they would Praise Him for being uh willing to admit that the party uh had not fulfilled all of its promises to raise everyone's incomes that he was often praised for being willing to acknowledge that some people at the bot of Chinese Society remained very very badly paid or that the pandemic had been brutal for many families and that it had been financially frightening something that you would never ever hear from xiin ping or from the sort of the immediate kind of propaganda machine around him”
The Communist Party frames controversial policies by claiming the vast majority of patriotic citizens support them and only a tiny minority misled by hostile foreign forces disagree, such as with claims about Taiwanese reunion and party support.
“a lot of the framing of social questions by the Communist party is about how the vast majority of law-abiding patriotic citizens support this or that policy and only a tiny minority who have been misled by often you know hostile foreign forces are you know in disagreement and they would apply that to uh you know you know they say that the vast majority of Taiwanese would like to be reunited with the mainland the vast majority of Chinese support you know the Communist Party they're very proud of these kind of data points this is a majoritarian utilitarian system”
Elite Chinese (Beijing liberals, foreign-educated technocrats, professionals) are more fed up and willing to criticize top leadership than at any time in recent history, expressing skepticism that the leadership knows what it is doing.
“the elite the kind of the Beijing liberal Elites the foreign educated uh technocrats or or foreign educated professionals uh the people who you know I could meet at a you know sort of a reception where kind of people like me and diplomats mixed with Chinese Elites they're definitely very fed up uh and and more willing to kind of grumble uh than than has been the case for a very long time and to Grumble about the kind of the people at the top just not knowing what they're doing”
Current propaganda movies in China depict Chinese soldiers suffering unimaginable torments, young people risking everything for the motherland, and people digging tunnels through mountains with bare hands—imagery meant to mobilize willingness for sacrifice and hardship.
“some of the propaganda movies that we see at the moment their depiction of kind of Chinese soldiers suffering unimaginable torments or young people kind of risking everything for the motherland or their kind of focus on getting School groups and universities and companies to visit sites where you know people dug tunnels through mountains with their bare hands and all of those kind of themes”
In a city that canceled bus services as a marker of financial distress, people denied pandemic-related problems when asked directly about lingering effects one year later, but immediately cited pandemic impacts when asked about current confidence or customer spending.
“I set out reason need to go to a city uh which had canceled its bus services for a while which is a kind of marker of uh Financial pain and that was a very interesting trip because it was more or less a year after the end of the pandemic if you asked sort of people on the street or in shops or in businesses or schools or whatever Point Blank do you think people are sort of still feeling the after effect of the pandemic a year later uh they would say no no it's a year ago now we're not going to start blaming something a year ago you know we're glad it's over we're just going to put it behind us but then when you ask them how they felt about their kind of confidence or their customers confidence they would say oh no things are very bad right now no one's very confident no one's spending and you'd ask them why and then their explanations were very often banned up with a pandemic”
Journalists can infer what the CCP leadership is worried about by observing what the censorship apparatus immediately removes from the internet—rapid, comprehensive deletion of a subject indicates top-level concern about that topic.
“you can infer almost like a sort of photographic negative you can infer what they are potentially worried about at the top by the things that the senses immediately sort of delete and so you know if something is starting to become a a subject of discussion and then the senses really kind of flood the internet and suddenly every trace of that subject disappears very quickly then as a kind of negative you can see okay well that must worry them something has you know the order has gone out and that subject has kind of disappeared”
Police presence at Li Keqiang's memorial sites was overwhelming and visible, with plainclothes officers following foreign journalists and disrupting interviews to prevent coverage of the spontaneous mourning.
“the other thing that you could also notice as a foreign journalist on the streets of her next to the house with these vast crowds laying these uh kind of crysanthemum yellow and white crysanthemum flats these bouquet of morning flowers was there were police everywhere and very quickly as a foreign journalist you would be kind of followed uh plain clo people would be listening in plain close people would kind of interrupt your interviews would follow you into a home to stop you interviewing people and so the machine did not like mourning for shim for for for for for Leach Chang”
Not all Chinese are discontented; many are still proud of their country's 50-year rise and willing to give the benefit of the doubt to leadership, so generalizations about Chinese opinion must be treated carefully because it's a large and diverse country.
“there are a lot of people who are still very proud of their country's rise and you know it's been rising for the kind of 50 years that they've been alive or the 40 years that they've been alive and that that makes them very uh willing to kind of give the benefit of the doubt to the leadership”
Senior Chinese Communist Party scholars and officials receive internal memos setting the party line on specific policy questions and can be identified by their ability to discuss party positions before they become public.
“there are certain Scholars who you learn over time uh partly because they can kind of uh tell you things before they become public in terms of the kind of the party line you realize that they are you know among those Scholars who receive the internal memos setting the party line on a given question so you learn that they are worth talking to”
The reason Rennie remains in Beijing despite believing some scenarios could get very bad is that he doesn't think war is imminent—if he thought invasion was imminent next year, he would probably be thinking about getting out.
“so there's you know there's room for uh kind of Gloom on that front but the idea that it's imminent and certainly the idea that the Chinese Communist Party would think it as a useful distraction to launch the Taiwan Invasion I think it's too big too risky too dangerous and you don't hear them getting public opinion ready for that even over the kind of the medium term so that's why I mean if I thought it was going to be you know War next year I'd you know I'd be I probably wouldn't be sitting here in Beijing I'd be um thinking about getting out”