
Does the Fed Have Any Idea What It’s Doing? | Jeff Snider & Brent Johnson
What this covers
This is a live Q&A recorded on March 23, 2023, in the days after the Silicon Valley Bank failure and the latest FOMC rate hike. Demetri Kofinas hosts Jeff Snider and Brent Johnson, with a listener question near the end. The framing disagreement is whether the Fed is clueless, as Snider argues, or working to some method, as Johnson and Kofinas lean toward suggesting. Snider's case rests on the eurodollar system, and he reads SVB as a liability-management failure rather than a paper-loss problem: the bank was forced to sell assets on whatever terms were available as deposits fled. He also points to the unusual volatility in eurodollar futures hedging after the March 10 receivership.
Much of the middle ground is historical. Snider draws on Fed transcripts from 2007 and 2008, in which officials treated foreign dollar shortages as London's concern and mocked the Chinese central bank's oddly numbered rate cuts. He argues the Fed learned in 2008–2009 that moving the funds rate target did nothing, which is why it turned to quantitative easing (QE)) and other tools. He also notes that the Fed made money on the mortgage bonds it bought. Kofinas adds the early eurodollar-era clash between Wright Patman and the Fed over dealer repo.
The contested turns come in the forecasting. Snider holds that a Fed pivot to cuts would signal deterioration rather than relief, and that equities rallied against an inverted curve because investors keep buying risk until the damage is undeniable. He also says Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin cannot escape the dollar, since nothing replicates the eurodollar system's plumbing, and that people accept de-dollarization talk because of confirmation bias. Johnson stresses that central banks are lenders of last resort, that populist policy responses are likely, and that sanctions lose force in a multipolar world. The conversation closes on what a new monetary order might look like, including geopolitical consequences echoing the 1930s and World War II.
The Fed has limited control over the global dollar system; market signals from eurodollar futures indicate deeper systemic instability than policymakers acknowledge, suggesting a prolonged crisis ahead rather than a quick recovery.
- Eurodollar futures inverted heavily since late 2022, signaling expected systemic breakdown that markets have been pricing for months
- Fed policy tools are largely theater attempting to influence bank behavior; the decentralized eurodollar system operates beyond Fed control and primary role goes to market forces, not central banks
- Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse failures are symptom of broader monetary system dysfunction spanning multiple countries and asset classes—not isolated incidents—revealing governments lack solutions
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Cuba's sanctions were effective only while Soviet subsidies existed; after Soviet Union collapse, sanctions became powerful tools in unipolar world; in multipolar world, sanctions lose effectiveness as alternative partnerships emerge.
“But also, Cuba's a great example because sanctions had very little impact on Cuba, so long as the Soviet Union was around and was able to subsidize Castro's regime. After the fall of the Soviet Union, when you lived in this really unipolar world where the US ran the show, those sanctions were, and export controls and embargoes, those things were really powerful. There's a really interesting question here by someone”
September 2008 Fed emergency call transcripts show Fed ridiculing Chinese central bank for oddly-numbered (26.92bp) rate cuts while US system collapsed, revealing misunderstanding of how global system works.
“One of the biggest things that really got me really off, to be honest with you was you read the transcript for September, 2000, I think it was the emergency phone call about Lehman Brothers, and they were talking about the Chinese central bank lowering rates by an odd number... they were ridiculing these Chinese, how these idiot Chinese policy makers were reducing their benchmark interest rates by 26.92 basis points.”
Bank stability depends more on liability structure than asset quality; SVB's problem wasn't paper losses in treasuries but inability to manage liabilities without forced asset sales.
“It wasn't that they had all of these paper losses and treasuries in their book, it's that they actually sold them because they didn't have any other way of raising liabilities to manage to keep their assets and liabilities managed... there is a lot more risk on the liability side, and there is on the asset side.”
Why SVB didn't go into repo market is a good question; the answer is systemic: banks forced to dump assets when deposits flee are forced to accept whatever terms available, revealing system dysfunction.
“I always ask the question, or at least I have over the last couple weeks, why didn't Silicon Valley Bank go into repo?... the systemic problems are usually on the liability side, and we only notice the assets when banks are forced to sell them when they don't want to, or really when they shouldn't.”
Fed transcripts from 2007-2008 show central bankers repeatedly saying foreign dollar problems were 'not their concern' and treating eurodollar shortages as London problems, not systemic problems.
“If you read through the transcripts, which I have, I've read through all of them, what you find is that time and time again, especially in 2007 and early 2008, they kept saying, 'This is not our problem. You have a dollar problem. That's not mainly.'”
In 2008, despite popular perception that mortgage bonds plummeted in value, the Fed actually made money on the mortgage bonds it purchased, demonstrating that the real crisis was about liquidity management and liability structures, not asset values.
“despite most popular perceptions, those mortgage bonds that plummeted in value, they were all money good. The mortgage bonds the Fed bought, they made money on those. What happens is banks don't have the liquidity or the liquidity management to be able to get through a systemic event.”
After SVB was taken into receivership on Friday, March 10 (Monday the 13th), the euro dollar futures market experienced unprecedented swings and volatility in hedging activity that persisted through the following weeks, indicating continued market concern beyond the immediate SVB response.
“The Monday afterward, which was what the 13th, I think it was, Monday the 13th, we saw moves, stuff that I never thought we'd ever see. And again, it's hedging. So these massive money participants in the global system suddenly were in so much demand for hedging instruments that they were willing to pay through the roof for essentially insurance on these massive portfolios.”
Banks and governments are not immune from populism; throughout history, populist responses have been common to banking problems, and current crisis will likely trigger more populist policy responses.
“The idea that banks and governments are somehow immune from populism... Banks more than anything. But banks are one of the most... They're not an immune from populism. They're one of the most affected by populism, I would argue. You go back through history, there's been a number of problems that have come up with banks and populist answers or responses were taken.”
Wright Patman, head of House Banking and Currency Committee, raked Fed chairman McChesney Martin over the coals for supporting dealer repo in early eurodollar days; government questioned Fed's role but did not ultimately suppress the market.
“The story I was thinking of was Wright Patman, who was head of the house banking and currency committee at the time, raking McChesney Martin over the coals for having the Fed support dealer repo. And that was the early days of the Euro dollar market.”
The Fed's pivot to rate cuts will not be a positive sign; it will occur because conditions have deteriorated so badly that cuts become necessary, meaning rising rates beforehand failed to prevent systemic breakdown, making any recovery weak and prolonged.
“Why would the guy who wants to continue hiking rates to become Paul Volcker suddenly stop involuntarily and start cutting rates? That's not a friendly environment at all. But I don't think a lot of people think two, three steps ahead.”
Forward guidance by central banks has become much less effective, if not completely ineffective today, due to institutional credibility loss and the fractured media ecosystem making centralized communication difficult.
“I feel like it's become much less effective, if not completely ineffective today. And I think there are all sorts of interesting reasons as to why, I think it's a combination of institutional credibility, or lack thereof, and also the fractured media ecosystem that is making centralized communication and messaging much more difficult in general for governments and institutional actors.”
Equities rallied from September 2022 to March 2023 while curve remained inverted because investors typically buy risk until absolute clarity that things are going wrong emerges.
“until it becomes obvious that this kind of thing is happening, most people are predisposed to buy shares and take risk. And so up until just the last week and a half, most people thought, well, what does this UK stuff have to do with me? There's some Swiss dollar auctions and credits? What does that have to do with US equities?”
There is no way to hide from global systemic crisis; only varying degrees of damage, with less-developed countries typically taking worst damage first.
“There is no hiding from this. There's really just varying degrees of damage.”
The Fed found in 2008-2009 that cutting the federal funds rate target had no effect on monetary conditions; this is why they had to develop four-letter tools (QE, TARP, etc.) as alternatives.
“It didn't work in 2008, did it? In fact, that's why the Fed had to keep coming up with all these four letter tools, was because they realized way too late in the process that just cutting the federal funds rate target had no effect whatsoever.”
Central banks exist fundamentally as lenders of last resort; if they refuse to save the system, Congress will replace the chairman with someone who will try.
“The whole reason that central banks exist in the first place is to be the land lender of last resort. Now whether you think they should or shouldn't, it doesn't really matter. When the system comes into question, they will try to save it. And if they don't try to save it, the Congress will yank the chairman out and put a new person in who will try to save it.”
Similarly, in 2008-2009, Fed QE and interventions did not immediately spark market recovery; markets continued declining until the hole they were filling became smaller.
“And even in the 2008 and nine, from when they first started the to do injections in QE, the market didn't take off right away.”
The 2007 crisis began in August with fund blowups and bank trouble; Federal Reserve cut rates by 50bp and sparked equity rally to record highs in October 2007, showing Fed interventions don't prevent subsequent crashes.
“The same thing happened in 2007. We had the crisis begin on August 9th, all this stuff... The Fed comes in and cuts the federal funds target by 50 basis points, and that it sparked a rally. Shares actually got to a record high in October, 2007. This was after the whole thing began.”
History shows economic deterioration from 1930s Great Depression preceded World War II; World War II was consequence of economic failure, suggesting current deterioration could have similar geopolitical consequences.
“History shows that these things don't end well. There was a reason why World War II followed the 1930s.”
Banks reliant on wholesale funding (money market, repo) rather than deposits faced crisis in 2008; today's crisis targets deposits, suggesting the problem source has shifted from funding markets to retail withdrawal.
“Think back to 2008, that was not a depositor crisis, that was a wholesale crisis. And so banks, especially the bigger banks that were super reliant on wholesale funding, wholesale liabilities, they're the ones that got into trouble. And it may be the exact opposite this time around, because the bigger banks have access to deposit funding.”
The eurodollar market developed in the 1950s-60s outside of government regulation and became self-reinforcing; it is not primarily the result of US military/political force but rather private market choice for efficiency.
“The euro dollar market developed on its own out the side of government regulation, and it became a self-reinforcing force, for lack of a better way of saying it... It got away from them back in the fifties and sixties and kind of started to develop on its own.”
Xi Jinping and Putin will try to minimize their exposure to the US dollar, but they will never be able to get away from it completely because there is no alternative infrastructure that can replicate the eurodollar system's functions.
“Xi Jinping, Putin, all those, they're going to try to minimize their exposure to the US dollar, but they're never going to be able to get away from it.”
The cyclical pattern shows that when government private system interventions fail, government steps in again creating a vicious reinforcing cycle, similar to Japan's lost decades example.
“it's almost like the Japanese example where every time it fails, the private system fails, the government steps in. That doesn't work. We got more private failure, the government steps in again, and we're in this reinforcing cycle, this repeating cycle, this vicious cycle where the government does more and more and more.”
People often dismiss de-dollarization and alternative currency proposals from Russia and China without evidence because they already believe the dollar is dying; confirmation bias makes them take anti-dollar rhetoric at face value.
“If you already believe the dollar's dead, then you take Russia and China at their word when there's absolutely no evidence you should... It's the dollar is dead meme personified.”
Federal Reserve staff are economists believing economies are isolated islands; they lack geopolitical knowledge to make decisions affecting global system, making them institutionally parochial.
“Guys, we have to keep in mind that the people who run these central banks and who staff these central banks are economists. They're not politicians. And as economists, they believe that economies are islands. They're mostly Keynesians, so they believe the US economy is the US economy.”
People expect Fed pivot to be market positive because they've been conditioned to believe Fed friendly policy (low rates, QE) is what drives stock gains; this ignores that pivot occurs during crises, not good times.
“If you think that the FED being friendly is the reason stocks went so far up in 2021, and if you think that QE is the reason why stock share prices bottom in 2009 and went forward, if you think Jay Powell is your friend... it sounds terrific. The Fed pivot, that sounds awesome... when you really need to stop and think about, why would the guy who wants to continue hiking rates to become Paul Volcker suddenly stop involuntarily and start cutting rates? That's not a friendly environment at all.”
Fed pivot occurs because there's a hole in the economy; Fed tries to fill it with liquidity, but you can't know the hole's size, so results are uncertain even if official outcome is eventually positive.
“The whole point of them pivoting is there's a hole in the economy and they're trying to fill the hole. And if you hear the word QE, okay, they're throwing liquidity into the hole, that's great, but you don't know how big the hole is.”
Withholding dollar assistance from countries like Brazil, Turkey, Thailand when they face dollar stress hurts all parties, not just those denied: financial stress spreads to US regardless of withholding.
“It's so excited, right? because you're basically arrogantly believing that if I don't help out Brazil, that's a problem for Brazil when it's actually a problem for Brazil and you. It's a problem for everybody.”
US government should use dollar swap access as carrot for emerging market allies; those becoming important great powers should receive swap lines, following Paul Tucker's geopolitical insight.
“I think that they will use this dollar swap line as a method via which to do that [maintain or get new allies]... those idiots, don't they know that India's going to be a great power?”
There is no solution in sight to underlying structural problems; even after immediate crisis passes, structural issues remain unresolved, requiring another cycle of crisis.
“there's no solution in sight. So even when we get past the immediate crisis, whenever that happens to be, where does that leave us? That leaves us in the same freaking boat that we just left.”
Bitcoin and digital currency adoption timeline is uncertain (25-50 years possible) but eventual; the timing mistake of anti-dollar crowd is compressing timeframe in their heads and allocating portfolios accordingly.
“I agree that it's going to happen, but it may be 25 years, it might be 30 years, it might be 50 years... this is part of the reason why I've pushed back so hard on the anti dollar crowd is a lot of the arguments are correct. The timing is just completely wrong.”
The idea that Xi Jinping and Putin can simply mandate their currencies replace the dollar is ridiculous because markets operate independently of government mandates; people in other countries mock their own politicians as much as Westerners do, and the market won't automatically shift to yuan or rubles just because governments declare it.
“those people laugh at their politicians the same as you laugh at your politicians, and the market is not just going to take what the government says and automatically do it. Now, in some places the government is more able to force them to do their bidding than others, and some economies are more strict, some are more loose. But the idea that Z and Putin can just say, 'We are going to now conduct a third of the world's trade in Yuan,' and everybody's going to say okay, and there's not going to be chaos is completely ridiculous.”
The US raised rates aggressively and 'blew itself up' in the process, but the US was not hit first by the consequences; other countries (UK gilt crisis, Bank of Japan, ECB, China) experienced severe stress before the US, demonstrating the Cantillon effect where central banks and their preferred constituencies benefit first from monetary expansion.
“the whole Cantillon effect, right? Whoever's closest to the money benefits the most, and they get hit the last. Well, the idea that the US got hit first here is completely incorrect. For God's sakes, the Bank of England had to save the gilt market eight months ago. The Bank of Japan had to come in and save both the yen market and the JGB market in the same week back in September, right? The ECB nine months ago when they first started raising rates, in the meeting where they first raised rates, they also set up a facility to buy periphery bonds”
Market forces are ultimately stronger than government forces; even if governments suppress crypto for 25-30-50 years, market adoption will eventually win and governments cannot prevent system transition.
“Market forces are stronger than government forces. And now, I know that there's people out there listening to this right now, and they're thinking in the back of their head, Bitcoin, or some other other digital ledger that's being used. And in the next two years, this is going to... I agree that it's going to happen, but it may be 25 years, it might be 30 years, it might be 50 years. It's A long term Problem. It will win. The markets will win.”
Sanctions do have demonstrable economic impact on targeted countries (Venezuela, Iran, Russia, Cuba); the idea that sanctions 'don't work' is contradicted by GDP data showing severe contraction in sanctioned economies.
“all you have to do is look at the GDP growth of Venezuela, Iran, and Russia for the last 10 years. Those economies that have been sanctioned Cuba... have not performed greatly... Venezuela has a lot of energy as well, and they went from having one of the highest standards of living in the Western hemisphere to one of the lowest in about five years.”
Credit Suisse has been troubled for years, if not decades; its failure was not surprising except in timing—the fact it finally happened suggests the tide of market recession is forcing evaluation of weak institutions.
“How long have we been talking about Credit Suisse being a troubled bank? I can't remember a time when it wasn't a troubled bank, right? It goes back forever. So what happened over the last 10, 12 days that may the Suisse authorities say, 'Today's the day we have to step in.'”
The problems in the international monetary system are not localized to the US; they span UK gilt market, Bank of Japan, ECB, and emerging markets, representing country-level systemic issues.
“The Bank of England had to save the gilt market eight months ago. The Bank of Japan had to come in and save both the yen market and the JGB market in the same week back in September, right? The ECB nine months ago when they first started raising rates... they also set up a facility to buy periphery bonds to keep their yields down.”
Credit Suisse was a 'dead man walking' for at least a couple of years, if not a decade, but the Swiss government forced a sale on Sunday and changed the law to ensure UBS (not a foreign or Middle Eastern buyer) would take it over, prioritizing national control and avoiding populist backlash.
“The biggest surprise for me for Credit Suisse was honestly that it didn't happen earlier. They've been a dead man walking for a couple of years, if not 10 years, but it finally came to be, and I think this populism stuff, it is part of it. And the fact that the Swiss government kind of forced the sale on a Sunday and changed the law in order to get it done, there was an element of populism in that. They wanted it to go to UBS. They didn't want it to go bankrupt. They didn't want to go to an outsider.”
Dollar swap lines are only available to major developed country central banks, not emerging markets that are actually starved for dollars; this arrogance suggests US doesn't understand systemic dollar dependence.
“Who are the dollar swap lines with? It's the major central banks. It's the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the ECB, the SNB, and the Bank of Japan. What about the PBOC? What about Banco de Brazil? What about any of the emerging markets that are really starved for dollars?”
Rather than cooperation, there will be active economic/geopolitical competition and obstacles placed by countries against each other, making future crises even more destabilizing.
“And in fact, I think not only will there not be cooperation, but I think there will be active... What's the opposite of cooperation? Active things put in place... And I think it will be done purposely.”
Eurodollar futures markets have been inverted heavily since late October into November 2022, serving as a signal that markets expected something to break in the banking and monetary system.
“Especially since late October into November, we saw curves really invert heavily, which was a sign that something was going on.”
The SVB and Credit Suisse failures are the tip of an iceberg; they represent the beginning of systemic breakdown in the banking and monetary system, not isolated incidents, with deflationary forces ahead.
“We were worried about something, and then now I think this something that we saw over the last couple weeks is kind of the tip of the iceberg. So the markets reacted to it as, that's okay, this is the beginning of something even more, exactly what we were expecting, something breaking in the banking system, monetary system, a deflationary outbreak.”
Markets have been signaling for over a year that they don't believe rate hikes were necessary to address inflation; they believe the 2020-2021 government interference created distortions that would self-correct regardless of Fed action.
“the markets were saying, 'We don't believe this is a long-term problem. You were right the first time when you said this was transitory.' So there's been a disagreement in the marketplace all along about whether we even needed rate hikes to begin with. If the Fed had done nothing over the last year, markets were pretty sure it was going to end up the same way regardless.”
No government is seriously working on central bank digital currencies at a meaningful level; white papers and policy statements exist, but insufficient time, effort, and talent are being dedicated to actually build functional alternatives to the eurodollar system.
“Your gut feeling is no government is actually seriously working on a CBDC... They are not investing nearly enough time, effort, and talent on developing something would actually work.”
Powell's personal legacy concerns (wanting to be remembered as a Volcker-like inflation fighter) may have motivated aggressive rate hikes even as systemic stress accumulated, because backing down would damage his reputation.
“I don't think this can be discounted. I've had this conversation several times, but half the people agree with me, and a lot of people don't, but I don't think you can discount Powell's personal legacy with this. He does not want to end up as Arthur Burns, he wants to end up as Volcker.”
Current situation resembles a geopolitical Game of Thrones with all major powers fighting for survival; all tools (economic, social, military) will be used by competing nations.
“To me, this is the Game of Thrones. All the big players are in there. Everybody's fighting their first of survival. The US wants to stay on top. Some of the other guys are tired of being pushed down, and all the tools will be used to win the game. And that's economic, it's social, it's military.”
Unlike historical recessions that end in recovery, modern crises end with economy worse off than before; 15 years of this pattern shows deterioration, not recovery.
“So we go through these massive contractions, we go through these monetary events, and we come out the other side in far worse shape than we went into it with. And we've already done that. It's been 15 years already.”
The design of the financial system itself is inherently unstable; central banks and governments trying to manage the economy will always fix one problem but create five others, leading to systemic consequences.
“The design of the system makes it inherently unstable. And as a result, based on the design, it is always going to be prone to these shocks, especially when you have a group of individuals trying to manage the whole thing. And they will always try to fix it and they may fix that one thing they're trying to fix, but they'll cause five other problems when they fix the one they're trying to solve.”
Powell and the Fed are not clueless but rather very misguided and extremely arrogant; they believe they can manage the global economy despite clear evidence they cannot.
“I know there's a lot of people out there who think that the Fed is just full of morons, and I'm just not willing to go there. I know. This is the part that Jeff and I slightly disagree on. I think they may be very misguided, I think they're extremely arrogant, and I think that they think that they can manage the global economy.”
A government-issued CBDC would necessarily be centralized, which defeats the stated purpose of decentralization in digital currency projects; this is why governments cannot successfully co-opt the digital currency innovation.
“not only that, but and when they do come, they're not going to be decentralized. They're going to be totally centralized. That's the whole point of a government project, is to centralize something.”
The Fed's rate hiking campaign was driven by political pressure from inflation, not technical monetary judgment; Biden's approval ratings fell due to inflation, making politicians demand the Fed respond regardless of whether rate hikes would be effective.
“I think the rate hikes and what's been going on is because of inflation. Now, whether inflation is real, whether it's not real, whether you think it's going to continue, whether you think it's going to fall, again, it doesn't matter because the public, the people out there, and the politicians are getting calls from their constituents saying the inflation is too high. And Biden's approval ratings are down because inflation's too high, and Powell's is his chairman.”
A concern in policy circles is whether the US is overusing dollar sanctions as a weapon, making de-dollarization more attractive to targeted countries.
“one of the main debates in policy circles now is are we overusing the weapon, and the more we're use at the dollar gets.”
People have been predicting the end of the dollar for over a decade based on flawed frameworks; the PBOC governor announced a dollar replacement effort in 2009, yet 15 years later nothing has changed, demonstrating that dollar replacement theories have consistently failed.
“we've been hearing this for over a decade. I mean the PBOC governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, I forget how to say his name, but way back in 2009 said, 'We're working on a dollar replacement. You can guarantee it.' That was 15 years ago, 14 years ago.”
The Federal Reserve still has the ability to selectively bail out parts of the economy, and as the system becomes more indebted, we're moving toward credit rationing and financial repression on sovereign balance sheets.
“one of the things that I think the Fed still has the ability to do is selectively bail out parts of the economy... as the system becomes more indebted and as the governments on the last cycle in 2008 stemmed a crisis of illiquidity insolvency by taking on the liabilities of the private sector, trillions of dollars of private sector liabilities, putting them on the sovereign balance sheet, that we're moving towards a place where the crises are going to develop increasingly on sovereign balance sheets.”
Most people cannot connect Pakistan reserve shortage in February, SVB failure in March, Credit Suisse in March, and UK gilt crisis from September because they lack framework showing monetary system connections.
“What does that have to do with Silicon Valley Bank? What does Silicon Valley Bank have to do with Credit Suisse? What does any of that have to do with the fact that Pakistan was out of reserves in early February? Because you're right, we're at big level stuff that's been going on. But for most people they can't say, 'Well, there's a monetary system behind all of these things that connects all these dots.'”
Technological change is happening faster and less-understood than ever before; combined with economic crisis, this creates 'collective sense of having lost our minds,' making civilization-level problem-solving difficult.
“the technological landscape today, the changes in the technological landscape today are, if not greater, certainly I would say are less well understood by the public, and they're happening so quickly that there is this kind of collective sense of having lost our minds.”
The US dollar is a denomination, not a currency, and no one owns that denomination; it's a common language used by a decentralized network to efficiently process payment messages and settle transactions.
“There's a reason we use the US dollar denomination, and it's essentially that it's a common language... It's like if we have a broad decentralized computer network that's using all different language, it's not going to be efficient. But if we can standardize the approach where everybody uses the same language, it works really well. That's really all the Euro Dollar is.”
Private digital currency projects will eventually provide alternative to failed government systems; they're filling vacuum created by government monetary system dysfunction.
“I firmly believe that given enough time, we will be on a private digital money standard at some point... They are filling a vacuum. They're filling a need that is out there, whether we acknowledge it or not.”
The Eurodollar system adoption model (incremental, in background) will likely be replicated by private digital currencies; before awareness, system will have shifted.
“the adoption model will be sort of like the Euro dollar adoption model where it just takes incremental steps all the time in the background, that before anybody really knows it, we've slipped over to a different system anyway.”
US could allow private digital currencies to develop via benign neglect (as with eurodollar) rather than hostile regulation; this would preserve dollar dominance while preventing government overreach.
“As long as it performs the job we want it to, we'll just let it happen. And so the question is, they don't seem to be taking the same approach with crypto.”
When people withdraw money from the banking system, it causes the system to seize up due to fractional reserve banking mechanics, generating unintended consequences that policymakers weren't prepared for.
“when people start taking their money out of the system, that causes the system to seize up. And that's basically what happened. People started to withdraw their money, that caused a bunch of unintended consequences.”
In 2020 during COVID crisis, swap lines were extended broadly to all countries showing cooperation was possible; now in 2023 the world is more fractured and cooperation less likely going forward.
“In 2020 we had, whether it was real or just perceived, a global systemic event and the whole world had to work together to overcome it. So swap lines were given to everybody... But I think this is much different now. The world is more fractured than it was three years ago.”
Powell's characterization of tightening as just a little monetary adjustment from deposit moves at regional banks understates the actual systemic scope and intensity of the problem.
“That something cannot be what Jay Powell said, which is, oh, maybe it's a little bit of tightening after some depositors move some money out of a couple regional banks. It's a little bit more involved in that. It's a little bit wider scale, and it's a little bit more intense.”
The economy was never truly booming in 2021; curve inversions in late 2021 reflected market knowledge that underlying weakness would be exposed by any shock.
“The economy was never booming in 2021. That's why the curves were behaving the way they were.”
The US did exercise some form of geopolitical advantage through the strong dollar following aggressive Fed rate hikes, and the Fed was likely aware of this benefit even if not the primary motivation.
“I would tend to agree... the dollar might have done what it would've done anyway, but them hiking rates aggressively sure as hell didn't hurt, right?... the Euro dollar market shows the US dollar as their currency de jour... the US didn't make them do it, but I'm sure they're happy that they did. And they can now use it to a certain extent, to their advantage.”
The system itself is reevaluating everything in it; Credit Suisse and SVB are being cut off because the market is assessing which institutions can survive in tightening conditions.
“the system itself is reevaluating everything in it and saying, 'You're a Credit Suisse, you're a troubled bank. Goodbye. I'm done with you. You're Silicon Valley Bank. You're screwed up your bank. You're experiencing a deposit run. You know what? We're going to cut you off too.'”
The tide of monetary tightening has been receding since last year; Pakistan, Sri Lanka, UK, Japan, and other countries all experienced monetary problems driven by this receding tide.
“the tide was coming out last year and revealing the gilt market was in trouble for a variety of reasons. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, all these major countries that are having monetary issues that stemmed for a lot of these systemic issues that go back into the 2020 and 2021.”
This is a marathon crisis, not a sprint; recovery will take 5-10 years before 'daylight' emerges, and the path will involve significant darkness and economic damage.
“I personally think it's going to be five or 10 years, and I ultimately things will get better, but I think before then, it's going to get very dark.”
Current trajectory shows tough years ahead; this is not advocacy but realistic assessment of where geopolitical and economic dynamics are pointing.
“And I think we've got some tough years ahead of us. And I'm not saying... This is not what I want to happen. I'm not advocating for this. I just want to be clear about this. I'm not advocating for this, but I think that's what's going to happen.”
The scenario that would have sounded fantastic to 2007 selves (serious economic crisis leading to conflict risk) is now realistic because structural solutions were never implemented.
“as fantastic, as that would've sounded to our 2007 selves, nowadays, it's far too realistic.”
The Chinese are developing a CBDC further along than others, but not seriously or with enough resources; they are doing so only because the private sector (Bitcoin, crypto) is eating their lunch and they want to contain the threat, not because they have a viable alternative.
“The Chinese are. Yeah. They're further along than others, but it's not a legitimate current. It's not a crypto product. It's not a digital asset. They are not investing nearly enough time, effort, and talent on developing something would actually work. And the only reason they're getting into the digital space is because the private sector has been eating their lunch time and time again.”
Governments may have strategically allowed or not minded when Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and Silvergate Bank (all cryptocurrency-related banks) failed, to discredit digital currencies and prop up their eventual CBDC narrative.
“This gets a little bit conspiratorial, but again, this is kind of one of those happy accidents or coincidences that they don't mind. When you have Silicon Valley Bank go down, and you have Silver Gate go down, and you have signature bank all of a sudden go down, even though they didn't really have to go down, and those are three big digital asset related banks, I don't think it's a total coincidence, right?”
The Fed has been relegated to a smaller corner of the monetary system over decades and has developed sophisticated models and tools to try to influence bank behavior, but banks often don't respond in the ways the Fed expects.
“they've been left off into another smaller corner of the actual monetary system when being thrown off to the side over many, many decades, has forced them to develop a different way of looking at what they do, as well as how this system works... they believe they have all these sophisticated models that say, if we do this, then we can get the banks to do this, and then the economy will end up just fine.”
The Fed and monetary authorities are important players but not the biggest player in the market; the eurodollar market itself is the biggest player and drives everything.
“I don't think they mind if it happens. So there's part of are they managing it or are they allowing it to happen, or are they just watching it happen and not trying to stop it?... the Fed and the monetary authorities, they are important players, they can affect outcomes, but they are not the biggest player. And the biggest player is the market itself. And the biggest player in the market is the Euro dollar market.”
The eurodollar system resembles a telecommunications network more than a currency system because it's fundamentally about processing payment messages and settling terms efficiently, which is why it remains indispensable despite 15 years of malfunctions.
“it looks a lot like the telecommunications network rather than a currency system because it's basically about processing payment messages back and forth, settling payment terms, sorting them out, processing them as fast as possible... it is still indispensable, because there is nothing on the horizon that is even close to being able to replicate all of its functions.”
Large spikes in discount window borrowing indicate problem: many participants cannot access wholesale funding and are forced to use Fed facilities, meaning the hole is much larger than Fed understands.
“That's the way you look at the discount window, the primary credit, or the FHLB advances, if you see a huge spike in discount window, that's not a positive sign. That means that there are a lot of people out there who are not getting wholesale funding that they need, and there's probably a lot more who can't even show up at the discount window or get any funding.”
If Fed swap lines don't work (as history shows), they are primarily signal of Fed incompetence when used, and should be distributed based on systemic need (emerging markets) not geopolitical preference.
“there is an arrogance here. Because even with these dollar swaps, which in my opinion, they don't ever work, just like the discount window or everything else. It's a sign that something's wrong when they're being used.”
The US government is not seriously pursuing crypto suppression using benign neglect like it did for eurodollars; instead, it is actively enforcing against digital currencies, suggesting fear rather than confidence.
“So the question is, they don't seem to be taking the same approach with crypto.”
Markets are pricing approximately 75-80 basis points of rate cuts to December and another 115 basis points to December of next year, indicating wide expectation of rapid cuts once the Fed pivots.
“Then from there, it just goes shooo. So you've got 75, 80 basis points to December, another 115 to the following December.”
A trucking logistics company owner felt market turns in March 2022 and early March 2023, consistent with eurodollar futures inversions; real economy operators experience credit cycle changes before they become obvious in aggregate data.
“I owned a trucking logistics company and feel like the canary in the coal mine. I feel the ups and downs and the pain and the first economic cycle changes. I felt the turn in the middle of March, 2022.”
Money market funds feel safer than regional banks holding deposits above FDIC limits because precedent of bank failures (SVB, Signature) shows region to have higher risk than institutionalized money markets.
“I use a regional bank, and I've felt... I've said this before, I've felt safer in money market funds than any money I have at a regional bank that's over the FDIC deposit limit because of the precedence that have been set.”
Snider is working with a digital currency stablecoin project (ECO), indicating he puts his own capital behind belief in private digital currency future.
“just to be clear, full disclosure, I'm actually working with a digital currency stablecoin project too, so I actually believe in this stuff.”
Small and regional banks will continue to consolidate and fail over the next 10-20 years; in the past 20 years, the number of US banks fell from 14,000 to 4,000, and Brent believes it will continue toward 500 or fewer, regardless of Fed intervention.
“I think the small and regional banks are going to continue to fail. And if you look over the last 20 years, we used to have 14,000 banks, and now we have 4,000, I think 10 for years from now, there'll be 500, or whatever it is. I think that trend is going to continue.”
The market tide receding in March is notable because it's when the tide is naturally at its lowest point; the fact that crises emerged at lowest tide shows how little margin exists for error.
“And let's not forget it was in the middle of March, which is when the tide is at its a low point anyway.”