
The Economics of Religion with Larry Iannaccone 10/9/2006
What this covers
Larry Iannaccone of George Mason University joins Russ Roberts to explain why conventional sociology got religion wrong. Rather than treat religious behavior as irrational or the product of brainwashing, Iannaccone applies economic reasoning to show that religious commitment operates within a competitive market. The conversation traces how this framework resolves a century-old puzzle: sociologists predicted religious decline in open, pluralistic societies, yet America grew more religious after disestablishing state churches, while countries with state religious monopolies saw attendance collapse. The economic answer is that religious freedom produces entrepreneurship and innovation, much like any other market.
The discussion ranges across how costly sacrifice and stigma—dietary restrictions, distinctive dress, time-consuming rituals—actually solve a real problem: preventing free riders from depleting group resources without contributing. These mechanisms generalize far beyond religion. Iannaccone shows the same group-binding devices appear in the military, sports fandom, political movements, and even intellectual atheist circles. The conversation also addresses the sociology and psychology of recruitment, examining evidence that cult members are typically normal, educated people rather than the brainwashed deviants of popular stereotype, and explores the empirical relationship between education and religiosity, which rises through college and only declines at the doctoral level. A closing exchange considers moral ambiguity: the mechanisms that bind devoted groups can serve either noble or terrible ends.
Iannaccone argues that religion is best understood not through brainwashing or irrationality but as rational choice operating in a competitive market, where costly sacrifice and stigma solve free-rider problems and let groups produce collective goods that markets and contracts cannot.
- Religious freedom and competition (a 'religious market') produce more and arguably better religion, contradicting century-old sociological predictions of decline.
- Seemingly irrational sacrifice and stigma function as screening devices that exclude free riders and enable production of non-contractible collective goods.
- The same group-cohesion mechanisms generalize beyond religion to cults, sports fandom, the military, political movements, and even atheist intellectual circles.
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Religions help people by both providing direct group support (e.g., the congregation helping raise children) and indirect support helping people keep themselves in line against short-term temptation, recognizing that people are not always perfectly rational—self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, though nominally secular, are imbued with transcendent/spiritual principles that bind the group and help people achieve concrete goals like sobriety.
“In so far as people know that they are not always perfectly rational... religions are very clear. They have a very extensive vocabulary for this sort of thing. Uh temptation is one of the main words.”
The same group-cohesion mechanisms that explain religion—the human need to belong to something larger and to feel one's group is superior, sustained by costly commitment devices—generalize to sports teams, political parties and movements, and especially the military, which deliberately uses cult-like methods (shaving heads, uniforms, songs, extraordinary costs) not all of which improve combat ability, to forge devotion to the small unit.
“the insights from the economics of religion adapt themselves readily to the attachment people feel in to sports teams, the attachments that people feel and obtain from being part of political groups”
Many valuable things—both abstract (love, concern) and concrete (mutual aid)—can only be produced in highly committed, cohesive groups, but such groups are vulnerable to free-rider problems where members take resources without contributing.
“there are a lot of things that people value that can only be produced in groups. And not just any old group, groups that are highly committed one to another, groups that are very cohesive.”
Costly, visible 'sacrifice and stigma'—prohibitions on dress, grooming, diet, and behavior (e.g., the Hare Krishnas' shaved heads, pink robes, and chanting)—function as efficient screening and monitoring devices: they exclude half-hearted free riders and signal genuine commitment, because such costs make it impossible to hold a normal secular job, so members forgo outside benefits to gain group benefits.
“the things that we associate with sectarianism make it possible for those sects to produce real goods and services that the rest of us can't get.”
The more dysfunctional a society's economy and government, the more cult-like groups arise, because where civil society, markets, and the state fail to provide collective resources, religious groups step in to supply them.
“the more dysfunctional the economy, by the way, and the more dysfunctional the government, the more those the more such things there are. And so, that's one reason why we see more of these cult-like groups where the where civil society, the economy, and government are are so dysfunctional.”
The economics of religion is a field that applies the insights and methods of modern economics to the human side of religion, and is explicitly not about money, church financing, or evaluating the truth of theology.
“The economics of religion is a new field that uses the insights and methods of modern economics to analyze the human side of religion.”
Contrary to the stereotype of the sophisticated, highly educated atheist, the demographic group most likely to be atheist is relatively young, single, low-education males who are socially and economically alienated; on average atheists are less educated and less well off than the general public because a large fraction are marginalized people 'not very anything else.'
“The group most likely to be atheistic are relatively young, single, males with low education, and rather alienated socially and economically from the rest of society.”
After the US Constitution's First Amendment disestablished state churches, intellectuals predicted religion would collapse, but the opposite occurred: church membership grew from about 13% around the Revolution to 30-40% by 1850 and 60-70% today, as established churches declined while entrepreneurial upstarts (Baptists, Methodists) grew and made converts.
“around the time of the revolution, it appears that about 13% of the population were members of churches. By 1850... the number was closer to 30 or 40% of the population. And today, it's closer to 60 or 70%”
Religions should be analyzed as a market in which each denomination is a competing firm, and where there is religious freedom normal economic processes operate: unresponsive religions decline while creative, entrepreneurial ones thrive, and more freedom yields more innovation and in a fundamental sense more and better religion.
“when you're looking at religions, you want to think of them as constituting a market where in effect each denomination is a separate firm and they have to compete with each other.”
For nearly a century sociologists predicted that an open religious environment would produce pluralism that undermines faith and causes people to walk away, but the economic religious-market theory predicts and the evidence confirms the opposite, so the economic theory has 'the mild advantage of being right.'
“they argued that a free market... an open religious environment would result in tremendous pluralism... and people would basically lose their faith. Well, it's not a bad theory, it's just it's wrong.”
Careful sociological and psychological research from the 1970s-80s found that the vast majority of so-called cult members were normal—reasonably well-educated, healthy, young, with normal backgrounds—contradicting media stereotypes of brainwashed, ignorant, drug-controlled deviants, and most left after a short time none the worse for wear.
“what those folks found was that by almost every measure, the vast majority of so-called cult members were normal in every respect. They were not... on average poorly educated and ignorant.”
The economic approach to religion assumes the same people who are treated as rational in standard models of consumption are the religious majority, so it is statistically and methodologically inconsistent for economists to treat religious behavior as irrational.
“Those people who you in your normal models of consumption of apples and oranges and automobiles, who you insist are being rational, those are the same people who are going to church.”
It would be irrational for an individual to burn up resources alone, but in a group context collective sacrifice can be efficient because it separates members from the outside world and suppresses temptations that would undermine the group, while producing non-contractible goods like open-ended mutual aid (e.g., Mormons or Jewish communities providing meals after a birth).
“It never makes sense in an economic context for me, a perfectly rational person, to take a resource and just burn it up... But in a group context, strange as it may seem, this can be efficient.”
Cross-country data from the 1960s-70s show a striking inverse relationship between religious regulation and religiosity: the most religiously free/competitive countries (like the US) have the highest church attendance and belief, while state-monopoly countries (like Sweden, where ministers were civil servants) have extremely low attendance—roughly 3% weekly versus 30-40% in the US.
“you got this very striking inverse relationship... the countries that were most religiously free... those countries had the highest rates of church attendance, they had the highest rates of belief”
The rare cases of cult violence (Jonestown, Waco) are largely caused by heavy-handed, sudden government intervention that throws a cohesive group into disarray, and absent that outside force such violence is rarely observed.
“the few cases of violence turn out to be cases where the government intervenes in a very overt and heavy-handed way and frankly causes a blowup.”
There is a small but statistically significant positive association between religiosity and education—religiosity rises with education through college—and it only tails off at the PhD level, where the evidence suggests relatively irreligious people are drawn into PhD training rather than the training making people irreligious.
“there is a small, but statistically significant, positive association between religiosity and education... as you go up the the ladder of education, people are actually more likely to be members of churches”
Abstract debates about whether rationality assumptions are useful are themselves useless; the pragmatic track record—Nobel-winning extensions of economics into family, addiction, crime, and public choice—shows that applying rational-choice principles to traditionally non-economic domains yields powerful new insights.
“abstract arguments about the usefulness of rationality strike me as incredibly unuseful... I'm not sure that I've ever seen anything useful come out of the abstract discussion of what must in principle work.”
Religions excel at providing resources for those with the greatest needs (the young and the elderly) through institutions like rest homes, orphanages, and childhood education, and through norms that obligate care, which provides an indirect empirical test of the theory since these groups are needier but no less rational than others.
“Religions, as this sort of theory would predict, excel at providing resources for the young and and the old. And they don't just do it in... casual indirect ways. They create institutions.”
The economic approach is distinguished from sociology, psychology, and anthropology by its unflinching assumption of maximizing/rational-choice behavior, stable preferences, and the concept of markets and market equilibrium, which leads economists to ask why an apparently strange behavior (like joining a cult) is rational rather than attributing it to brainwashing or inexplicable tastes.
“The economic approach uh to almost quote my our mentor Gary Becker differs from sociological, psychological, other approaches in its unflinching attention to maximizing behavior, rational choice on the one hand, to the stability of preferences on the other hand, and the notion of markets and market equilibrium.”
Successful religions bind material and spiritual/social goods together so they reinforce each other—communal meals are primarily about relationship and presence rather than calories—and these goods (like real affection) cannot be bought, only given and received, which is what makes religion distinctive.
“You can buy things that look like love, but you can't buy the real thing. The real thing can only be uh given and received.”
Religiosity varies by profession even among the equally educated and wealthy: business people, doctors, and physical scientists (physicists, biologists) tend to be more religious, while academics, lawyers, economists, and especially anthropologists and psychologists tend to be less religious—reflecting selection into fields rather than effects of the work itself.
“Anthropologists, psychologists turn out to be quite irreligious compared to other groups. Physical scientists, physicists, biologists tend to be fairly religious compared to other professors”
Highly educated 'staunch' atheists—particularly the Objectivist followers of Ayn Rand—exhibit social attributes closely matching those of cults: a devout in-group bound by a sense of superiority and a negative attitude toward outsiders (believers), conviction they alone possess the truth, distinctive speech, and self-isolating ways of confronting others.
“Look at the followers of Ayn Rand, the objectivists. You have never seen a group... whose social attributes are more consistent with what we call cults than the Objectivists. And they are rabidly anti-religious.”
Group devotion is a morally neutral tool that, like the military, can be harnessed for sublime or heinous ends—to defend what is good or to attack it.
“It is a tool. And like all other tools, it can be put to various very different ends.”
Football fandom produces an emotional high that, unlike religion, is empty and non-transcendent because it is part of a zero-sum game that inevitably involves suffering on the other side.
“the high I get from sports is kind of empty. Uh it's it's not transcendent. It's part of a zero-sum game where it it inevitably involves other suffering on the other side of the of the stadium.”
Anytime people hear the word economics they tend to think of money.
“anytime people hear the word economics, they tend to think of money.”