What this covers

This is a roughly hour-long conversation (recorded 22 December 2022) between host Demetri Kofinas and Jeff Snider of Atlas Financial. The first half is a primer on why "money printing" is a misleading description of what the Fed does. Snider traces the history from Stephen Goldfeld's 1976 "Case of the Missing Money" paper, which he reads as the Fed failing to keep pace with bank innovation. He then walks through the Eurodollar system as a ledger of bank liabilities rather than cash, and the role of collateral in it. He argues collateral is prized for liquidity more than credit quality, which is why Treasuries sit at the top. The second half turns to what 2023–2024 might bring.

The range is wide. On 2008, Snider says mortgage-backed securities were treated like Treasuries until they were repriced, producing a collateral shortage. He also claims stabilization came from the March 2009 mark-to-market rule change rather than reserve injection, and that banks have been risk-averse since Bear Stearns, so the transmission from policy to lending is broken. He calls quantitative easing) and yield curve control) external attempts to steer conditions. He reads the Bank of Japan's December 2022 band-widening as a technical smoothing, not a hawkish pivot.

The more contested positions concern inflation and fiscal policy. Snider says the 2020–2021 inflation was a supply shock rather than monetary expansion, and that fiscal transfers may even be disinflationary. He credits Modern Monetary Theory) with seeing that governments are unconstrained, while rejecting its monetary analysis. He also argues that bond vigilantes have effectively disappeared, and that an inverted Eurodollar futures curve in December 2021 showed recession hedging before the Fed raised rates. A fringe thread links 1970s stagflation to Eurodollar expansion. He closes on the idea that fixing the system needs political reform, not Fed adjustments.

Sharpest takeaway

Snider argues that the Federal Reserve does not control the global monetary system; instead, an offshore Eurodollar system that evolved in the 1950s is the true source of liquidity, and conventional central bank policy tools are largely ineffective because the Fed operates outside this system rather than within it.

  • The Eurodollar system is a virtual ledger-based reserve-less currency system that developed independently of Fed control and has become the global reserve currency mechanism
  • The 2008 financial crisis resulted from a systemic breakdown in this Eurodollar system, not from excessive credit creation that could be fixed by rate cuts or QE
  • Post-2008, the Fed has attempted to influence the system from the outside through ineffective tools like quantitative easing, which cannot restore elasticity or prevent future systemic breakdown

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0.74

The Federal Reserve lost control of the monetary system beginning in the 1950s with the development of the Eurodollar market; the Fed's subsequent attempts to track and regulate monetary aggregates like M1 and M2 failed because banks innovated faster than the Fed could understand or regulate, as documented in Stephen Goldfeld's 1976 paper 'The Case of the Missing Money'.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“Yeah, and they talked about all the time. Like I said, when I go back to primary source material before Volcker, you saw all sorts of discussions and papers and everything about what the hell's going on in the monetary system. These monetary aggregates that we just came up with like M1, they no longer work. There's a famous paper by Stephen Goldfeld from Princeton, The Case of the Missing Money, 1976, where he said, 'We thought we had money figured out and what we found out is that it evolved on us. Banks evolved on us.'”

0.72

The biggest misconception about how the monetary system works is that money is government-created and that banks are merely warehouses for government cash, when in reality there is an entire wholesale interbank system involving virtual ledger entries with minimal actual cash involved.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“The first thing is everybody has this model where money is government. It's the Federal Reserve Print's money or the charging department, whoever it is. The government prints money. Banks are nothing more than a warehouse of government cash. And then, there's a fractional reserve multiplication process and voilà, we have the 19th century version banking and that's really not the case. There's an entire wholesale system out there, interbank system, and there really isn't much cash involved at all.”

0.72

The Eurodollar system developed as a virtual electronic ledger system to overcome the friction of physical cash transport across global distances, and telecommunications innovations enabled banks to exchange nothing more than ledger entry balances at the speed of light rather than trading physical pieces of paper.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“But getting back to your original question, what happened is essentially because this is a global reserve currency system and physical currency or physical money is a friction on that system because you don't want to wait for physical paces of paper or physical volume to be transported at vast distances, isn't it much easier to exchange just ledger balances at the speed of light?”

0.71

The US dollar as commonly understood is not a domestic national currency but rather a denomination within the Eurodollar system, a global virtual currency system operating since the 1950s where banks worldwide transact in US dollar-denominated electronic liabilities that are claims on dollars, not actual dollars.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“That's maybe the biggest misconception of all is that the US dollar is a domestic national currency when it's really the US dollar denomination applies to this Eurodollar system, which spans the entire world.”

0.69

Pre-crisis, mortgage-backed securities were treated as best-quality collateral alongside US Treasuries despite their actual credit risk, and when these assets were repriced correctly during 2008, it created an epic collateral shortage that precipitated the worst parts of the financial crisis.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“Some of the worst mortgage bonds out there were treated as if they were treasuries. So you had a list of best quality collateral that was extensive for all the wrong reasons. And one of the biggest problems of the financial crisis that the Fed could never figure out and really isn't set up to solve that problem is we had a collateral shortage of epic proportions because once those mortgage bonds were valued more properly, that herded everybody into the treasury market where treasuries were available, which there aren't enough to go around.”

0.69

The Eurodollar futures curve inverted in December 2021, months before the Fed began raising interest rates, indicating that markets were hedged against recession due to the supply shock resolving, independent of Fed policy; this shows the recession is driven by business cycle dynamics rather than Fed policy error.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“Look at when the yield curve inversion and the Eurodollar futures inversion began. Eurodollar futures inverted in December of 2021, before the Fed had even started raising rates, months before the Fed started raising rates, let alone any idea that the Fed was going to get incredibly hawkish.”

0.69

The transmission mechanism from Fed policy to the real economy is broken and has been since 2008; banks do not lend freely even when reserves are abundant because they are risk-averse and prioritize safe, liquid assets (Treasuries) over credit creation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“when they're less likely to lend to the government, but we're not going to create loans for small and medium sized businesses because we can get stuck with those.”

0.69

Foreign banks have always been able to access dollar funding through US-based subsidiaries, and the distinction between onshore and offshore dollars has been blurred since the Eurodollar system's inception due to seamless transfer of funds between subsidiaries and parent banks.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“banks very early on realize that they could transfer money easily between subsidiary and parent. So, there was a seamless integration between what we would think was a domestic US-based system, dollar system, and this external Eurodollar system.”

0.68

Government fiscal transfers and direct payments, while they may appear to be inflationary, may actually be dis-inflationary if they primarily flow to unproductive sectors or if they represent redistributions rather than net monetary expansion in a period of deflationary monetary dynamics.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“Well, that's the thing here. Is it necessarily inflationary? I would argue that if the government gets more involved, even to the point of cutting checks, that might actually be more dis-inflationary as we've seen in Japan or as we've seen in the United States over the last 15 years.”

0.68

Modern Monetary Theory's core insight about the absence of fiscal constraints is correct—that politically-unconstrained governments can spend without vigilante constraints—but MMT's monetary analysis is wrong; what matters is the behavior of the private credit system and collateral availability, not government deficit spending itself.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“MMT on its face gets the monetary part wrong. No surprise there. But really what it comes down to is the idea that federal fiscal authorities are unbound by vigilantism. They're able to spend and create money and deficits and whatever the case may be as necessary to manipulate and control the economy. And I think that has definitely gotten received a lot of favor in political circles”

0.68

The 2020-2021 inflation was caused by a supply shock from the rebound in demand following COVID lockdowns combined with supply chain disruption, not by monetary expansion, and this is why inflation was always going to be transitory regardless of fiscal stimulus.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“What happened with consumer prices in 2021? Was it because the federal government and the Federal Reserve got together and printed money out of thin air, or was there something else?... the answer is that it wasn't money printing, it wasn't the helicopter stuff, it wasn't the Federal Reserve's QE. It was nothing more than a supply shock, essentially, very simple economics. The rebound in demand globally, not just in the US but US in particular, rebound in demand happened much faster than the ability of supply to service it.”

0.68

The Fed lacks the structural ability to prevent systemic breakdown of the Eurodollar system; fixing the fundamental problems requires political reform of how the system operates, not just monetary policy adjustments by the Fed.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“But the Federal Reserve as it is currently constituted cannot fix this issue. So it is a political question as well as a small e economics question.”

0.66

Yield curve inversion, particularly in the Eurodollar futures market, represents hedging activity where market participants who believe something bad is going to happen are buying longer-dated instruments; the more inverted the curve, the more people are betting on rate cuts and the more widely shared the concern about economic deterioration.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“Yield curve inversion is a way not just to interpret the marketplace telling us something bad's going to happen, it also gives us a sense of how widely the concerns are being shared and how intensely those concerns are being shared. So the more inverted the yield curve, the more we know that more people are worried about this bad thing that's going to happen.”

0.66

Collateral is far more complicated than the mainstream analysis suggests; collateral is valued primarily for liquidity characteristics rather than credit quality, which is why US Treasury securities are treated as best-quality collateral even though they are government debt.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“In a repo transaction, my entire focus is on the liquidity characteristics of the asset you're giving me as collateral, which means if there's a dependable marketplace for that instrument, that's the best quality collateral. Doesn't matter about credit characteristics or anything else, it's all about liquidity characteristics. And it just so happens to be that the US treasury market is the deepest, most liquid, most dependable in the world. So that's the best quality collateral.”

0.65

Money printing is not the Fed buying treasuries or government spending; money printing is specifically bank balance sheet expansion through credit creation, and distinguishing between these is critical because fiscal stimulus by itself does not expand the monetary base if banks are unwilling to expand credit.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Jeff Snider

“Money printing is the monetary system itself. It is not the Fed, it's not the federal government. Where does that cash... Remember this is all ledger money. There's no physical cash, there's no gold bullion, there's no coins there. So for you, money printing is banks crediting other banks bank accounts. Essentially, it's bank balance sheet expansion.”

0.64

Higher interest rates do not necessarily tighten financial conditions in a meaningful way because the relationship between rates and credit conditions is more complicated than textbook economics suggests; what matters is whether banks are willing to expand credit and whether the collateral base is sufficient.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“It may make a difference under certain conditions, but it's more complicated than that. It may have some tightening effect in certain corners of the market like housing, but in the broader monetary system, higher rates do not necessarily mean tighter financial conditions.”

0.62

Bond vigilantism (the market discipline of profligate government borrowing through rising yields) has been effectively ended by the Fed's willingness to support Treasury markets, allowing governments to borrow unconstrained and pursue 'reckless' spending.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“bond vigilantism has been buried underneath all of these other monetary, liquidity characteristics, which has allowed the government to get away with unconstrained fiscal spending”

0.61

The BOJ's December 2022 decision to widen the yield curve control band from plus-or-minus 25 basis points to plus-or-minus 50 basis points around the 10-year target was not a hawkish shift signaling future rate hikes, but rather a technical adjustment to smooth the curve given global rate increases pressuring the JGB curve.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“But even with a band of plus or minus 25 around zero, with rates rising around the rest of the world, you look at the JGB curve and there's a real noticeable kink in it, which means that there's a lot of pressure on the Bank of Japan to target that particular spot on the yield curve, which basically they can't do forever. So all they're really doing is saying that, 'We can't continue to target at a plus or minus 25 basis point band because of all the way the curve is actually behaving.' And so they picked 50 basis points because if they let it go to 50 basis points, that's probably going to create a much smoother JGB curve.”

0.61

The quantitative revolution of the 1990s-2000s introduced complex statistical models and black box algorithms that gave bankers false confidence in their ability to model and manage risk, combining historical illusions with untested new technology in a way that bred 'super manic behavior'.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“There's another part of this too, you have to remember, concurrent to all of this was the quantitative revolution, the introduction of complex statistical models, which were employed and had played a big role in '97 and '98, Robert Merton, LT Sam and all that stuff. But that was used widely in starting in the 1990s into the 2000s, which bred this sense of invulnerability. We have all of these Ivy League mathematicians, we have these black box complicated models where we believe that we can map out every little corner of risk. And so it was the height of arrogance and hubris where you combine history with this new technology that hasn't really been tested and it bred this super manic behavior.”

0.61

The key distinction between before and after 2008 is behavioral change in the banking system: before 2008, banks believed their activities were riskless due to recency bias and the 'great moderation,' leading to unconstrained risk-taking; after 2008, especially following Bear Stearns' management being wiped out, banks became fundamentally risk-averse, changing how they operate.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“From a very high level perspective, it's really about behavior risk taking. Because of recency bias, confirmation bias in the pre-crisis era, the monetary system itself began to view its own activities as riskless. And so, if you've convinced yourself that everything is riskless, you'll do anything and it becomes a game where everything is about bigger, more and more and more because there's no risk involved with it.”

0.61

During the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed did not prevent a deflationary death spiral; rather, the stabilization came from the mark-to-market rule change in March 2009, which allowed banks to use valuation flexibility on mortgage-backed securities, not from Fed reserve injection.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“I think we already had the death spiral, and I also don't think the Fed is the reason why it ended... The bottom was created by the change in market to market in March of 2009.”

0.60

The 1970s inflation was not purely a domestic US monetary phenomenon but involved the international expansion of the Eurodollar money supply, which central bankers and economists have mostly overlooked in their explanations of stagflation.

factualhigh valuefringenovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“we still need to figure that out because there's really no comprehensive explanation that fits to the facts of the 1970s either. Nobody talks about the monetary expansion or the Eurodollar... The international expansion of money that had a central role in the great inflation itself.”

0.60

Yield curve control, as implemented by the Bank of Japan and potentially by other central banks, is essentially an admission that quantitative easing doesn't work, and represents a further external attempt to manipulate financial conditions rather than solving underlying structural problems.

causalhigh valuefringenovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“Well, first of all, yield curve control, I think that's misunderstood too. And it's really an outgrowth of central banks not being able to admit that QEs don't work.”

0.59

Markets are increasingly ignoring or disagreeing with hawkish central bank actions, as evidenced by the fact that short-term Treasury rates haven't moved much despite Fed rate hikes and Powell's angry tone at press conferences, showing that markets don't believe the Fed's inflation narrative.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Jeff Snider

“Central banks are hiking rates and they say they're going to continue hiking rates, but yet these markets, they've basically ignored all of these supposedly hawkish moves in central banks, including if you interpret the BOJ YCC adjustment in the same way. So I think the bigger takeaway here is how markets seem to be more and more ignoring or even disagreeing with all of these hawkish moves.”

0.57

Long-term duration assets (like long-dated Treasury securities) are positioned to perform well in a disinflationary environment because demand for safe liquid instruments will remain strong from the monetary system's largest participants.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Jeff Snider

“As long as we're in a dis-inflationary environment... it's safe liquid instruments because that's the demand for the big money and the monetary system. The money creators themselves are interested in safe and liquid, and as long as that's the case, you kind of ride those coattails.”

0.56

De-globalization and economic fragmentation are likely to accelerate as the monetary system's breakdown continues, with world trade collapsing from current levels and island economies replacing the previously integrated global economy.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Jeff Snider

“I also think you can see how the collapse in world trade really goes into another gear and the global economy goes from being this highly interconnected system to a lot of sort of island economies that become increasingly inverted. That's the monetary breakdown. That's de-globalization fragmentation.”

0.52

The 2008 financial crisis was a paradigm shift in the Eurodollar system itself—not a one-off event—where the system suffered a monetary breakdown that proved to be durable and permanent, meaning quantitative easing and other Fed interventions could not restore the previous elasticity to the system.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“The 2008 crisis was not a one-off event. It represented a paradigm shift in the inner workings of that Eurodollar system. And no matter what the Federal Reserve tries, it can't get the horses back in the barn again.”

0.52

The reduction in bank risk-taking and the shift to risk-averse business models, while superficially positive for preventing recklessness, created a new problem: reduced credit elasticity that was actually required to operate the economy at maximum capacity, so the attempted correction turned out to be economically harmful.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“But what we don't understand is that we needed that behavior in order to operate the economy at maximum capacity. So we attempted there was this major systemic shift in risk taking that in a sense should have been a good thing, but actually turned out to be a bad thing because risk taking was required to operate the economy at its most efficient level and regulations they've added to it.”

0.52

The concept of 'lender of last resort' is different from 'market of last resort'; the Fed has rebranded itself as the latter and admitted it cannot function as the former, which means it cannot elastically expand credit supply in a crisis.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“the Fed admits this. They've called themselves market of last resort, which is kind of what they do, which is very different from lender of last resort.”

0.48

The government should not and will not attempt to micromanage the system through more intervention; instead, the system needs to be reformed at a structural/political level to eliminate QE and allow natural market processes to restore growth through innovation and de-leveraging.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“fixing the problem is not strictly a monetary issue... But the Federal Reserve as it is currently constituted cannot fix this issue. So it is a political question as well as a small e economics question.”

0.47

Alan Greenspan's famous 'irrational exuberance' speech was not warning about a stock market bubble; rather, Greenspan was saying that the Fed couldn't track the monetary system and therefore wouldn't even know if stocks were in a bubble, meaning the Fed was hoping interest rate adjustments would be a predictable influence on monetary behavior.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“You're hoping, as Greenspan did throughout the 1990s, and if you read any of his speeches, including the famous, irrational, exuberant speech, what he said was, he wasn't saying the stocks were in a bubble. What he said was, we can't track the monetary system so we wouldn't even know if stocks were, and nobody heard that. Everybody heard the rational exuberance and said stock bubble. What he was saying is that we're outside the monetary system looking in, and we only hope that this moving the federal funds rate around is enough of a predictable influence on monetary behavior that it leads to the best sorts of outcomes.”

0.47

Central bankers cannot answer the question of whether there is true inflation in the system because they don't understand how the monetary system works, which is why they resort to incomplete concepts like inflation expectations; this fundamental ignorance undermines their ability to implement effective policy.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“Central bankers... They don't understand, they can't regulate, they can't monitor the money system. So if the issue is are we experiencing inflation, then the question is very simple, is there too much money in the system? But central bankers can't answer that question, which is why they're left with all their garbage, inflation expectations.”

0.45

Global economies are in much worse structural condition than they were in 2019, masked by consumer price inflation in 2021-2022; when this inflation subsides, the true weakness of the global economy will become apparent, with China particularly vulnerable.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Jeff Snider

“When we get past the consumer price illusion of the last couple years, we may be surprised to find the economies in much worse shape globally than we thought it was. Much worse than it was in 2019.”

0.45

Recent collateral market stress events including the UK gilt market crisis in September 2022, the repo shortfall from Italian bonds, and the fragility of collateral chains suggest that a much larger and more generalized monetary crisis could spread quickly from smaller breakdowns.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Jeff Snider

“I think back to September, UK, London, Gilt market. That wasn't about the UK. That was a breakdown on the monetary system, which actually spilled over into Switzerland and it was a breakdown in collateral chains. Gilts, once they started to go up in value, repo market. They have a massive repo shortfall from Italian bonds, which are enormous part of the European repo system. So there are any number of prospective breakdowns in the monetary system that have already happened sort of in smaller scale.”

0.44

The shift from quantitative easing to quantitative tightening will likely lead to fiscal stimulus as the primary policy tool, potentially including direct government payments and permanent fiscal transfers resembling Modern Monetary Theory-inspired policies.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Demetri Kofinas

“I think we're moving from this period of QE. Well, we went from QE, now we're in a period of QT. But I think from QT, we go to fiscal stimulus and my sense is we go to a future where government spending has become an even bigger part of the economy.”

0.44

The current conversation and deep thinking about monetary systems and finance represents significant progress, as it contrasts sharply with the pre-2008 era when almost nobody was willing to discuss these questions.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“People are actually thinking about money and finance in a way that they probably haven't in many generations, and I think that's a good thing and I think that will lead us toward an ultimately successful resolution.”

0.42

Despite near-term pessimism about the economy, the long-term outlook (specifically the 2030s) is optimistic because human ingenuity and pent-up innovation will eventually break through current constraints and generate a burst of global activity similar to the 1950s.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Jeff Snider

“While it might be near term pessimistic, I'm a long-term optimist. You don't keep human beings and human ingenuity down for very long, and very long is a term of art here. It could be a couple decades because we've seen that happen repeatedly... I really believe the 2030s are going to look like the 1950s. You'll see a burst of global activity we haven't seen in a very long time because we have so much pent up innovation that hasn't been taken fully advantage of.”

0.39

The reason Snider focuses his research on studying primary historical sources (FOMC transcripts, BIS reports from the 1960s) rather than secondary interpretations is to build his own coherent model from evidence, following the template of Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary History.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Jeff Snider

“I need to do all the research on the history. So rather than read other people's interpretation, books and whatnot, I go back and I read old transcripts from FOMC meetings or I read old research from the BIS”

0.37

A recession in 2023-2024 is probable as a base case; the most likely recession triggers are either substantial uptick in unemployment forcing Fed to pivot away from inflation concerns, or a monetary system breakdown creating financial volatility sufficient to demand Fed intervention.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Jeff Snider

“Yeah, I think that's probably the base case. And I would be more concerned about the monetary aspects too, because we've already seen them.”