
US Dollar, Deficits, & Safe Assets: Entering a New Global Economic Order? | Markus Academy | Ep. 142
What this covers
This is a one-hour Markus' Academy conversation with Markus Brunnermeier of Princeton's Bendheim Center for Finance. It begins with the geopolitical shift from a multilateral order toward bilateral bargaining, then moves to the dollar's role, deficits and tariffs, and trade chokepoints. The argument rests on Mutual Interdependency as Stabilizing Force. Countries once held choke points over one another, and that Balance of Choke Points encouraged cooperation inside institutions. Russia cutting gas to Europe is offered as a case where mutual restraint failed. A move to bilateral dealing is also said to favor large countries and blocs over small ones that rules used to protect.
The middle section is about what makes a safe asset. Brunnermeier uses a Service Flow Framework for Asset Valuation, in which an asset can hold value with zero cash flows because it lets agents with offsetting income shocks retrade and share risk. He also stresses that safety is partly a self-fulfilling coordination outcome. From there he sets out the Exorbitant Privilege as Three-Tiered System: lower rates through convenience yield, room to run debt that need not be fully repaid if growth outpaces interest rates, and fiscal space during crises. The talk covers Robert Triffin's dilemma under Bretton Woods and the 1971 collapse of fixed rates. It also covers a proposal to create euro-area safe assets by pooling and tranching sovereign bonds.
The more contested material concerns tariffs and the dollar. Tariffs without retaliation improve the terms of trade but cut foreign wealth and safe-asset demand, which erodes the privileges. With retaliation, everyone is poorer. A strong dollar may also cause a Dutch-disease problem for US tradable sectors, especially if increasing returns to scale let China lock in an advantage. The closing section treats chokepoints analytically, looking at elasticity of substitution, universal inputs, and the remedies of reshoring, multisourcing and strategic storage. Along the way he argues that transitions between orders follow a J-curve with tipping-point risk, and that a Five-Pole Stability Model would be the most stable multipolar end state.
The global order is shifting from a multilateral, interdependence-based system toward bilateral bargaining and national resilience, creating transition risks to a multipolar world; the US dollar's safe asset status—which generates exorbitant privileges—faces erosion, with implications for financial stability, exchange rates, and the architecture of global trade.
- Mutual interdependence and multilateral institutions are being replaced by bilateral bargaining as countries prioritize national resilience over global integration
- The US Treasury's safe asset status delivers three exorbitant privileges (convenience yield, ability to run permanent deficits, flight-to-safety benefits in crises) that are invisible in current accounting but critical to global financial architecture
- The transition period carries tail risks (J-curve effects, tipping points) that could destabilize the system before reaching a new stable multipolar equilibrium
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
A safe asset's value comes from both cash flows (interest payments) and service flows; the service flow arises from the asset's ability to facilitate insurance and risk-sharing through retrading between agents with negatively correlated income shocks, allowing the asset to have positive value even with zero cash flows.
“Now a safe asset gives you potentially a cash flow but it also gives you a service flow. So the asset pricing equation for the safe asset is the present value of the cash flows plus the present value of the service flow... And let me illustrate what a service flow comes from. And for this purpose I have uh two people A and B... they have negatively correlated uh cash flow assets and they ideally should write an insurance contract with each other, some derivative contract or insurance contract with each other. But let's suppose there's a financial friction, they cannot write this contract. So what else can they do? They can hold the same asset which pays no cash flow. And when the shock occurs, then Beth sells some of the zero cash flow asset to Alan in exchange of this positive cash flow asset.”
A strong dollar can create a Dutch disease effect for tradable sectors: safe asset demand appreciates the dollar, making imports cheaper and domestic manufacturing less competitive; if tradable sectors have increasing returns to scale and learning-by-doing externalities, this dynamic allows competitors like China to capture long-term advantages in these industries.
“if you have some global safe asset demand like a reserve asset demand that benefits US in the short run US citizens demand more goods they are wealthier... the wages so the non-tradable goods becomes more scarce so there will rise in value the wages will also rise and there's something like a Dutch disease analogy kicking in so the manufacturing for the tradable sector shifts uh to China and if then there is increasing returns to scale and this learning by doing so more increasing returns to scale over time then actually in the long run China can take an advantage from that”
A safe asset is safe because it is perceived to be safe; safe asset status depends on coordination—when people agree an asset is safe, it remains safe, and this is partly a self-fulfilling equilibrium.
“The other thing is the safe assetlogology. A safe asset is safe because it's perceived to be safe. So which asset turns out to be the safe asset? We have to coordinate on it and then delete then as we all agree upon this is a safe asset. um then it is actually the case that it you know remained a safe asset.”
The multilateral order was founded on mutual interdependencies where countries had choke points against each other, creating a balance of power that incentivized cooperation within international institutions rather than bilateral conflict.
“There were common rules for all the countries for small countries and large countries common rules. And the foundations of this multilateral common order was a mutual independencies. We were all dependent on each other and because we were so dependent on each others we had an incentive to really work within this common framework. So we had essentially numerous choke points against each other”
In just-in-time global value chains, countries are mutually vulnerable because disruptions in one location harm all participants; transitioning to 'just-in-case' national resilience requires countries to reduce these interdependencies and build redundancy.
“just in time deliveries or just in in time global value change that made us all vulnerable to some dangers in some other country and this way we could support uh a common framework because we all dependent on each other a lot. Now we go away from a common framework... So rather than having just in time uh arrangements, you would like to have a just in case just in case something goes wrong. So you have less of a global resilience.”
Transitions between stable world orders typically follow a J-curve pattern with overshooting, uncertainty, and risk of hitting a tipping point that could derail the entire system rather than smoothly reaching a new stable equilibrium.
“typically transition is not very smooth as is indicated by this blue line here. It's much for following a J curve. there's some overshooting and then you might hopefully come back and there's a lot of uncertainty whether everything goes smooth in particular you might actually if the Jacob is most pronounced you might hit a tipping point and then actually rather than you know coming back to the new more stable environment with five poles for example it could also derail the whole system”
The US enjoys three exorbitant privileges from being able to issue the global safe asset (US Treasuries): permanently lower interest rates due to convenience yield, the ability to print and never fully repay Treasuries if real growth exceeds real interest rates, and the ability to expand debt and conduct fiscal stimulus during crises when safe asset demand surges.
“the entity in this case US Treasury issuing safe asset has some exorbitant privileges and they come in three flavors... the permanent structural uh privileges and advantages for United States issuing being able to issue the safe asset a global safe asset the US Treasury of course you always have to pay less on an interest on it... the second uh permanent is benefit is that you can print this bubble US treasuries you never have to pay them back if the real interest rate is lower than the global growth rate, the global GDP growth rate... if you stay the beacon of stability... whenever there's a crisis it can easily expand uh its debt level and start some fiscal stimulus”
The shift away from multilateralism toward bilateral bargaining reduces incentives for global resilience and shifts geopolitical power from small countries (protected by rule-based systems) to large countries and large trading blocs that have more leverage in bilateral negotiations.
“Now we go away from a common framework much more to a bargaining uh framework where rather than multilaterally coming together to a common many countries coming together to common for up with common ground rules there will be bilateral bargaining between two countries. It's less rule-based but much more transactional and in such a world you want to focus on the resilience of your own country... And because of that we will have a geopolitical or power shift from small countries which are protected from a rulebased system to large countries or large trading blocks.”
Imposing tariffs without retaliation improves the terms of trade and reduces demand for safe assets as foreign wealth declines, thereby reducing US trade deficits and eroding exorbitant privileges; but with retaliation, the world becomes poorer and these benefits are undone.
“imposing tariffs typically improves the terms of trade so assuming that there are some goods with home buyers uh where you know you really want to consume more your home goods which is produced at home you have some biased and taste bias for that so if you are terms of telling improve the foreigners wealth declines. So there's also the demand for safe assets. The dollar save assets is reduced and that reduces US trade deficits... if you now move to a world with retaliation where the other party the other country retaliates you undo these effects but of course the world is a poorer place”
Substitution elasticity is not instantaneous but depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution—how quickly an economy can adapt; rapid adaptation (high inter-temporal elasticity) reduces the cost of waiting for alternatives to be developed, while slow adaptation creates vulnerability even when long-term substitutes are available.
“so you think it's assistive substitution which is uh the critical point so you can think if it's a leont I cannot substitute much uh if the perfect substitutes on the other extreme I can easily substitute and between there's a copless utility or production function now that's then the question is substitution over what time horizon because you might also say oh in the short run it's very difficult to substitute one imper good for another input good but if you give me a year or two I can actually stretch it much but how costly is to wait for one year or two that depends on the inter temporal elasticity of substitution”
Understanding choke points requires analyzing strategic interactions, not just random shocks; choke point exposure is a choice made by trading partners, making the whole system more systemic and strategic than traditional economic risk frameworks suggest.
“for global trade what matters a lot is the choke points... It is the strategic choice of your counterparty and that makes the whole system much more systemic. So it's not just some random shock you face some risk you face. It is the strategic choice of your counterparty and that makes the whole system much more systemic.”
Universal inputs (inputs needed for all final products regardless of consumption choice) create choke points even if final product substitution is high, because reducing the supply of universal inputs harms all downstream producers and consumers simultaneously, regardless of their substitution possibilities
“you might also have um a choke point even if the substitution here is not leont is not zero...there's some universal inputs. So whatever you produce whether it's an EV car or diesel car or whatever you do there's always this black um line. And you always have the same input some microchip or some oil or some input you always need independent which you know consumption good you want to consume then actually then this elasticity here matter as well...So what do I want to say? So generally you would say if you have a production chain what matters upstream is less relevant. what matters downstream is much much more relevant except if there's some universal inputs um which are needed no matter how you switch it downstream then the upstream elasticity substitutions matter as well”
Elasticity of substitution is the critical parameter for understanding choke points: for direct production (inputs → outputs without chains), the relevant elasticity is between direct substitutes; but in production chains, the downstream elasticity (final consumer's substitution between products) matters more than upstream elasticities, except when universal inputs are required across all products.
“The question is how can we make uh you know understand choke points... The first thing if you have some direct production uh say you just take inputs and produce something uh that's it and there's no production chain you might think oh good measure of a choke point is the elasticity of substitution how easily can you substitute... What elasticity of substitutions matter. Is it the consumption elasticity of substitutions which matter here or is it this production elasticity of substitution mattering?... what matters is very much the elastic substitution the further downstream you go the more relevant the elasticive substitution becomes.”
The global order is shifting from a multilateral rule-based framework with mutual interdependencies—where countries are bound by common institutions and rules—toward a bilateral bargaining system where countries prioritize national resilience and transactional dealings
“We had initially a common framework which was very much a multilateral framework...There were common rules for all the countries for small countries and large countries common rules. And the foundations of this multilateral common order was a mutual independencies...Now we go away from a common framework much more to a bargaining uh framework where rather than multilaterally coming together to a common many countries coming together to common for up with common ground rules there will be bilateral bargaining between two countries. It's less rule-based but much more transactional”
A five-pole multipolar world is more stable and peaceful than bipolar or multipolar configurations with even numbers or larger numbers of poles, because odd numbers prevent the pivot-switching instability of even splits while avoiding the free-rider problem of larger multipolar systems
“if we move from a uniolar world to a multipolar world typically it will be five poles okay and the five poles are more stable and peaceful...First of all, why is it not an even number? And the problem with an even number is if you know 2x two and if one switches from uh one to the other one, then there's total imbalance immediately. So each power is very pivotal...The other question is why not then three but three essentially doesn't work well because then you have a two and one arrangement...So then there's another odd number is five. That's a magic number. And why not seven or nine or 11? So if you have a larger number than these then typically you have a free rider problem.”
Russia's invasion of Ukraine and cutting of natural gas supplies to Europe violated the traditional 'balance of choke points' equilibrium where countries do not activate mutual choke points because retaliation is mutually costly; this event demonstrated that the assumption of mutual restraint can break down
“with the invasion of Russian, Ukraine and Russia cutting off the gas to to Europe, I you know people thought before and there they would never do it because it hurts them as well as as it hurts uh Europe. uh this whole thinking is is not put into question. Okay.”
The European Union can create safe assets through ASPIS/SBBS (sovereign bond-backed securities) where multiple European bonds (German, French, Italian) are pooled, senior and junior tranches created, with the senior tranche protected by the junior tranche and thus safe even if individual member defaults.
“for the European Union you can think of the ASPIS or what the European Commission calls the SBBS the sovereign bond backed securities where you know you don't have one European bond in in Europe you have a German bond or a French bond Italian bond and all this and they're all different bonds. You could say I pool part big chunk of these bonds and draft them in a senior bond and in a junior bond. So that means that you know the junior bond is protecting the senior bond. If there were a default in one of these bonds then the junior bond would be hit first and only after the junior bond is wiped out the senior bond is touched.”
Countries can reduce choke point vulnerabilities through three strategies: (1) reshoring—bringing production back domestically; (2) multisourcing—sourcing inputs from multiple countries and continents to reduce single-source dependency; and (3) strategic storage—maintaining reserves of critical inputs to insure against supply disruptions
“if we don't have this we want to reduce the choke points and how can we reduce the choke points one is we do reshoring we're less dependent on the others so bring the production back you can bring it back to to France so called French shoring or you can also do some multisourcing where you know you source not only for one country but you can also get some resilience from the fact that you can actually source from different countries potentially from different continents. Over time you can also have strategic storage”
The concept of 'choke points' is central to understanding global trade interdependencies: a choke point is a node where one country can impose costs on others by restricting supply or access; the elasticity of substitution—both contemporaneous and intertemporal—determines the severity and duration of the shock when a choke point is activated
“threat points and choke points. Okay. So the way you can think about the global world order essentially before the recent events uh you can think of we all were mutually interdependent and what does it mean to be mutually independent? We had threat points against each other. We had choke points against each other”
A 'safe asset' is an asset (such as US Treasury bonds or US dollars held by foreign central banks) that retains value and liquidity during crises and economic shocks, allowing holders to overcome both personal and aggregate economic crises
“A safe asset I I would argue uh is for example can be a currency that's like the US dollar if it's held by foreign governments and it's a reserve currency or by foreign central banks. The safe asset, the classic safe asset is some government debt in form of the US Treasury...A friend in indeed is a friend in need. That's you know when you need it, it is around. It's available. You can sell it and it can overcome your personal shocks. You might overcome also your some aggregate crisis shocks for the whole economy.”
A very strong US dollar—driven by global safe asset demand—may create a structural disadvantage for US tradable goods sectors via a 'Dutch Disease' mechanism: high dollar values make domestic manufacturing non-competitive, shifting production to lower-cost countries like China; if these sectors have increasing returns to scale and learning-by-doing benefits, China gains long-term comparative advantage
“if you have some global safe asset demand...US citizens demand more goods they are wealthier...So goods which can trade internationally and other goods which are purely domestic...you consume more from importing. So you create some trade deficit but this also means uh the wages so the non-tradable goods becomes more scarce so there will rise in value the wages will also rise and there's something like a Dutch disease analogy kicking in so the manufacturing for the tradable sector shifts uh to China and if then there is increasing returns to scale and this learning by doing so more increasing returns to scale over time then actually in the long run China can take an advantage from that”
Imposing tariffs reduces global safe asset demand (as foreigners' wealth declines and desire for precautionary reserves falls) and erodes US exorbitant privileges: convenience yield, ability to issue new Treasuries indefinitely, and flight-to-safety bonuses all shrink
“imposing tariffs typically improves the terms of trade so...if you are terms of telling improve the foreigners wealth declines. So there's also the demand for safe assets. The dollar save assets is reduced and that reduces US trade deficits...it also erodess this exorbitant privilege. The first one convenience yield. The second one is safe asset status from printing further and further US treasuries and also potentially the third one when in times of crisis”
The transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order follows a 'J-curve' pattern with an initial period of high uncertainty, overshooting, and potential tipping points that could destabilize the entire system rather than converging to a new stable equilibrium
“typically transition is not very smooth as is indicated by this blue line here. It's much for following a J curve. there's some overshooting and then you might hopefully come back and there's a lot of uncertainty whether everything goes smooth in particular you might actually if the Jacob is most pronounced you might hit a tipping point and then actually rather than you know coming back to the new more stable environment with five poles for example it could also derail the whole system”
The 'Triffin Dilemma 1.0' (from economist Robert Triffin under Bretton Woods) described an inherent contradiction: as world GDP grows faster than US GDP, demand for dollar reserves increases, but gold reserves cannot grow, creating tension that eventually forces a run on gold and the end of fixed exchange rates, which occurred in 1971
“Robert Griffin who said during the Bretonwoods system when you know exchanges were fixed to the dollar so all the other currencies had a fixed exchange rate to the dollar and the dollar was convertible to gold and he argued that as the world economy is growing uh more than the US economy is growing then actually there will be a tension in the system because more and more you or currency is needed and they're all back to the dollar and the dollar is back to gold. Everything is growing except the gold is not growing and that creates a tension and this leads to some fragility and ultimately might lead to a run on the dollar or a run on gold”
Historical examples support the five-pole model: after the Thirty Years' War (1648), Europe organized as a five-pole system with Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, England, and Sweden (later replaced by Russia and Prussia); after the Napoleonic Wars (1815), five poles again emerged with Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Prussia (Germany), and Russia.
“Hfred Munla in particular explains historical examples where this happened. So for example after 30 years war after 1648 there essentially the end of this Vienna Madrid Habsburg empire where you know Austria Hungary on the one side but also Spain and Benilocks countries today's Benilux countries were part of the Habsburg Empire and that emerged into some five polar world from a European perspective there was also Hungary Spain as two different poles France England and Sweden And later on Spain was replaced by Russia and Sweden was replaced by Prussia. But it always remained a five polar world.”
Globalization was adopted as a response to technologies with huge fixed costs and low marginal costs, which require large market size to exploit increasing returns to scale, driving worldwide specialization and integration.
“One which is going on for quite some while is a shift in technology. We have much more technologies where they're increasing concerns to scale. your huge fixed cost low marginal cost and for these technologies and for these products market size matters. So one way to respond to that is to move to a global market. So globalization was the answer. Uh you can actually scale up things much more but then you also specialize much more specifically particular product but you do it at a global scale in order to exploit the increasing returns to scale.”
A safe asset is an asset held by foreign governments, central banks, and citizens for precautionary and reserve purposes that can be readily sold in crisis to overcome personal or aggregate economic shocks—the analogy is 'a friend in need is a friend indeed.'
“A safe asset I I would argue uh is for example can be a currency that's like the US dollar if it's held by foreign governments and it's a reserve currency or by foreign central banks. The safe asset, the classic safe asset is some government debt in form of the US Treasury... So what is a safe asset? Uh that's a good friend analogy is that it's a good friend. A friend in deed is a friend in need. That's you know when you need it, it is around. It's available. You can sell it and it can overcome your personal shocks.”
The Triffin Dilemma 1.0 (under Bretton Woods) arose because under fixed exchange rates backed by gold, increasing global demand for dollars and dollar-denominated reserves was not matched by increasing gold supply, creating fragility and eventually leading to currency runs; Nixon ended this in 1971.
“goes back to the Belgian economist Robert Griffin who said during the Bretonwoods system when you know exchanges were fixed to the dollar so all the other currencies had a fixed exchange rate to the dollar and the dollar was convertible to gold and he argued that as the world economy is growing uh more than the US economy is growing then actually there will be a tension in the system because more and more you or currency is needed and they're all back to the dollar and the dollar is back to gold. Everything is growing except the gold is not growing and that creates a tension”
Safe assets provide both cash flows (like interest payments) and service flows (like convenience yield); the asset pricing equation for safe assets includes the present value of both cash flows and service flows, not just cash flows.
“Now a safe asset gives you potentially a cash flow but it also gives you a service flow. So the asset pricing equation for the safe asset is the present value of the cash flows plus the present value of the service flow.”
In direct production without supply chains, the critical measure of choke point severity is the elasticity of substitution—how easily one input can be replaced with another.
“The question is how can we make uh you know understand choke points...The first thing if you have some direct production uh say you just take inputs and produce something uh that's it and there's no production chain you might think oh good measure of a choke point is the elasticity of substitution how easily can you substitute if something goes away how easily can I substitute with something else so for a firm if one input good goes away how easily can I substitute with some other input good”
China cannot currently offer a global safe asset because it maintains capital controls that prevent opening its bond market to foreign investors; removing these controls would be necessary for Chinese bonds to function as an alternative safe asset.
“China of course can also open up um its um bond market. But then for this it has to remove its capital controls. Right now it can't offer a safe asset for the rest of the world.”
Current geopolitical events (such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and cutting gas supplies to Europe) challenged the assumption that mutual interdependence prevents countries from imposing harm on trading partners, revealing that geopolitical considerations can override economic interdependence logic.
“Now with the invasion of Russian, Ukraine and Russia cutting off the gas to to Europe, I you know people thought before and there they would never do it because it hurts them as well as as it hurts uh Europe. uh this whole thinking is is not put into question. Okay.”
The shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order will involve emerging central bank digital currencies (CBDCs); many countries initially skeptical of CBDCs have recently revived their development due to geopolitical changes and the desire to reduce dependency on the US dollar.
“on top of the US dollar there of course there will be new digital currency evolving I talked about uh crypto and other digital currencies they don't have to be all in a crypto space and there will some new currencies, potential reserve currencies emerging as well. And you see a revival already now in the form of CBDC's many countries which didn't you know thought initially to do some central bank digital currencies step back and slow down but now with the geopolitical changes many many countries are now reviving their ideas to come back to uh uh CBDC center bank digital currencies.”
The first permanent exorbitant privilege for the US is that it pays lower interest rates on Treasury issuance compared to other borrowers due to the convenience yield associated with safe asset status.
“What are the permanent structural uh privileges and advantages for United States issuing being able to issue the safe asset a global safe asset the US Treasury of course you always have to pay less on an interest on it so cash flow payment has to it can be lower and people are still willing to hold it”
Safe assets require rule of law; countries should be ruled by law rather than by arbitrary rule in order to establish credibility as safe asset issuers.
“And of course you also would like to uh you know that you follow the rule of the law rather than being rule ruled by law uh in in a sense.”
If the real interest rate on US Treasuries is lower than the real growth rate of the global economy, the US can permanently issue new Treasuries without ever repaying the principal, rolling them over indefinitely; this is a mathematically stable debt dynamics outcome, not a fiscal emergency
“you can actually print dollars or US treasuries without ever paying back. So it might have some public component as well...the transverity condition does not need to hold in the aggregate level in this economy. It might hold in Italy. Um that it's you know it holds but not at the aggregate level. If for example the interest rate is smaller than the growth rate of the global economy that's the real interest rate here.”
US trade deficits may be driven not by profligate consumption but by foreigners' desire to invest in high-return US assets; in this scenario, the deficit reflects capital flows seeking returns, and future US repayment (trade surplus) may be indefinitely deferred if US economic growth outpaces required returns
“a trade deficit might not be driven by US consumption but by US investment opportunities. So for example, the US offers some great investment opportunities. Let's say to Chinese citizens, the Chinese invest in US because of high expected returns. Now the Chinese pay with goods in order to get these investment opportunities that creates a trade deficit. Now um but in the future when the US has to repay the high returns to China there will be a low trade deficit in the future or there will be has to be a trade surplus. But if this is going on, if the investment opportunities keep growing with a faster growing US economy, this in the future might be far far in the future and might never really materialize.”
Historical precedent supports five-pole stability: after the Thirty Years' War (1648), the European order stabilized around five poles (Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, England, Sweden, with later substitutions of Russia and Prussia), and similarly after the Napoleonic Wars (1815), five poles re-emerged (Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Germany/Prussia, Russia)
“Hfred Munla in particular explains historical examples where this happened. So for example after 30 years war after 1648 there essentially the end of this Vienna Madrid Habsburg empire where you know Austria Hungary on the one side but also Spain and Benilocks countries today's Benilux countries were part of the Habsburg Empire and that emerged into some five polar world...there was also Hungary Spain as two different poles France England and Sweden And later on Spain was replaced by Russia and Sweden was replaced by Prussia. But it always remained a five polar world...Similarly after the Napoleonic wars in 1815 also five poles emerged again there was AustriaHungary there was Great Britain, France, Germany or Prussia out of Russia became Germany without Austria and then Russia.”
US trade deficits are mismeasured because current account calculations do not capture the service flows provided by the safe asset status of the US Treasury, specifically the convenience yield from insurance services and the ability to print dollars without repayment; these unrecorded service flows represent exorbitant privileges not counted in standard trade statistics.
“if you were to do it correctly you should include the service flow also in the current account deficit and we don't do it. So we don't include all service flows... the safe asset status from this dynamic retrading the service flow you provide this type of service is not captured in the safe asset status in the in the current account deficit and this third benefit the third privilege the flight to safety is also not captured in the current account deficit so the second and the third exorbitant privilege is not captured in the deficit”
If the US Treasury's safe asset status becomes uncertain or 'shaky,' investors will price in a 'loss of safe asset risk premium'—additional compensation beyond default risk—because there is a meaningful probability that safe asset status jumps to an alternative (German bonds, euro-denominated bonds, cryptoassets) or collapses entirely
“if the safe asset status becomes shaky if there's uncertainty about it and there could be that the safe asset status jumps from your strategy to another asset like a European safe bond the ASB or the German bond or potentially to some crypto assets or or gold...if you look at the US Treasury there's of course a term premium on it...it could be because of a loss of safe asset status that's priced as a risk and you have to pay for this risk in form of a high risk premium...this loss of sales asset risk premium is different from a default risk premium...even if there's no danger at all that the US Treasury will default...you still have this additional term risk premium coming from potential loss of safe asset”
US trade deficits can be either consumption-driven (US citizens buying foreign goods, creating future debt) or investment-driven (foreign investors seeking US investment opportunities and paying with goods); the investment-driven narrative suggests deficits may not require repayment if investment opportunities continue growing faster than global GDP.
“there are two tales of the trade deficits going back. So one is that and that's very much in the media there's one tale saying oh the US is US consumptiondriven the US citizens buy some Chinese products to consume there's more future debt and then actually we have to pay it back uh in the future it's not clear that we have to pay it back because uh it might be able to run this bubbly safe asset scheme so that's you can actually run a great deficit forever measured the traditional way. The second thing is actually a trade deficit might not be driven by US consumption but by US investment opportunities.”
If the safe asset status of US Treasuries becomes shaky due to political uncertainty or loss of confidence, the asset could either jump to another asset (like European sovereign bonds or cryptocurrencies) or collapse entirely, creating instability; this is distinct from default risk and requires a term risk premium for potential loss of safe asset status.
“if the safe asset status becomes shaky if there's uncertainty about it and there could be that the safe asset status jumps from your strategy to another asset like a European safe bond the ASB or the German bond or potentially to some crypto assets or or gold or whatever... So in such a world where it either the the safe asset status jumps to another asset or you know it totally implodes there's no global safe asset. So these are the two potential outcomes.”
A multipolar world with multiple safe assets from different regions (US Treasury, European sovereign bond backs securities (SBBS), emerging market bonds) could be more resilient than a unipolar system because flight-to-safety during crises would move within asset classes rather than across borders, reducing capital outflows from emerging markets.
“if we move to a multipolar world uh perhaps it's better if the safe asset is not only provided by the US Treasury by the United States we have some other continents other poles to provide some safe assets as well... So in this sense you know the senior bond is safe... So rather than having flight to safety across countries, across borders, you have it across asset classes. But the senior bond is an emerging market bond and the junior bond is an emerging market bond. So you have flight to safety across asset classes instead of across um um across countries across borders.”
A multipolar world order of exactly five poles is more stable and peaceful than alternative configurations (two, three, even numbers, or more than five poles) because five is the only configuration that avoids both the pivotal-player problem of even numbers and the two-against-one imbalance of three, while preventing the free-rider problem that emerges with seven or more poles.
“if we move from a uniolar world to a multipolar world typically it will be five poles okay and the five poles are more stable and peaceful despite of some potential potentially shifting alliances and rivalries. And the question is why five? What's so magic about the number five? First of all, why is it not an even number? And the problem with an even number is if you know 2x two and if one switches from uh one to the other one, then there's total imbalance immediately. So each power is very pivotal.”
Current measurements of the US trade deficit and current account deficit systematically underestimate the true economic value that the US receives from issuing the global safe asset, because official statistics capture only the convenience yield component of exorbitant privilege but omit the service flows from dynamic re-trading and the crisis-period flight-to-safety premium
“if you look at the statistic there's some missing parts to it so if you were to do it correctly you should include the service flow also in the current account deficit and we don't do it. So we don't include all service flows. We include the convenience here...but the safe asset status from this dynamic retrading the service flow you provide this type of service is not captured in the safe asset status in the in the current account deficit and this third benefit the third privilege the flight to safety is also not captured in the current account deficit so the second and the third exorbitant privilege is not captured in the deficit”
A multipolar safe asset system would benefit emerging economies by replacing 'flight to safety' across borders (in crises, capital flees emerging markets for US Treasuries, hurting them) with 'flight to safety' across asset classes within emerging markets (capital flows from junior to senior tranches of their own bond systems, containing capital domestically)
“you go this flight to safety typically goes across borders. So typically it moves you know from Latin America and and all the emerging economies to the United States then actually it would move from the junior bond to the senior bond. So rather than having flight to safety across countries, across borders, you have it across asset classes. But the senior bond is an emerging market bond and the junior bond is an emerging market bond.”
With more than five poles, a free-rider problem emerges where each pole attempts to free-ride on the stability maintained by others, eventually undermining the system's viability.
“why not seven or nine or 11? So if you have a larger number than these then typically you have a free rider problem. So if you have a large number of poles each pole will actually free ride on the others. So you have a free rider problem. This actually becomes more too severe the free rider problem.”
A plausible five-pole configuration for the future multipolar world would consist of the United States, China, the European Union, India, and either Russia (if military capability dominates) or Japan (if economic power dominates), with technology's impact on warfare still uncertain
“similarly could be if there is a transition to a five polar world that we go from a US dominated world to one where US China European Union India and then the question is will it be Russia or Japan if you focus more on the military might it's probably more Russia Or if you focus more on economic might uh you might focus more on Japan and that's still open in particular as technology is changing warfare down the road significantly. It's not clear that Russia will be able to keep up with that.”
The elasticity of substitution between goods interacts with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; even if substitution is difficult in the short run, it may be easier if given time, but the cost of waiting (inventory costs, opportunity costs) depends on the intertemporal elasticity.
“because you might also say oh in the short run it's very difficult to substitute one imper good for another input good but if you give me a year or two I can actually stretch it much but how costly is to wait for one year or two that depends on the inter temporal elasticity of substitution so you have the elasticity of substitution across goods interacting with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that's what Samson called the luchalier principle u you know it's very product specific and it depends on the product specific interal elasticity of substitution as well”
The US dollar may appear overvalued by purchasing power parity standards, but it should remain strong because the exorbitant privilege from safe asset status outweighs currency weakness concerns in most circumstances.
“In most circumstances, it, you know, you don't want to push it down. You really want to enjoy the exorbitant privilege and you would like to have a strong dollar.”
Three potential world orders could emerge: a unipolar US-dominated system (continuing the current order), a bipolar system (either with China isolated or the US isolated), or a multipolar system, most likely with five poles based on historical precedent and stability dynamics.
“We don't know where it will go but there's three potential avenues we can go. We can stick with a uniolar world... We can move to a bipolar world... and finally uh there's a multipolar outcome”
China cannot currently offer a safe asset to the rest of the world because it maintains capital controls, preventing full convertibility and open access to its bond markets; removing capital controls would be required for Chinese bonds to be recognized as global safe assets
“China of course can also open up um its um bond market. But then for this it has to remove its capital controls. Right now it can't offer a safe asset for the rest of the world.”
Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are being revived by many countries as part of the geopolitical shift, whereas earlier there was less enthusiasm; the geopolitical changes and uncertainty about the global financial architecture have driven renewed interest in CBDCs as a potential tool for financial sovereignty and reduced dependence on the US dollar system
“on top of the US dollar there of course there will be new digital currency evolving I talked about uh crypto and other digital currencies they don't have to be all in a crypto space and there will some new currencies, potential reserve currencies emerging as well. And you see a revival already now in the form of CBDC's many countries which didn't you know thought initially to do some central bank digital currencies step back and slow down but now with the geopolitical changes many many countries are now reviving their ideas to come back to uh uh CBDC center bank digital currencies.”
Technologies with large fixed costs, low marginal costs, and increasing returns to scale require large market sizes to exploit these returns, creating pressure for globalization in order to achieve the necessary scale; this is a foundational driver of the post-WWII globalization wave
“One which is going on for quite some while is a shift in technology. We have much more technologies where they're increasing concerns to scale. your huge fixed cost low marginal cost and for these technologies and for these products market size matters. So one way to respond to that is to move to a global market. So globalization was the answer. Uh you can actually scale up things much more but then you also specialize much more specifically particular product but you do it at a global scale in order to exploit the increasing returns to scale.”
The feasibility of preventing US safe asset status collapse through fiscal backing (raising taxes or cutting spending) depends on political capacity, which is uncertain and may be low; some observers suggest a 15-20% value-added tax (like Europe) could stabilize the system, but political willingness is questionable
“But for this you have to be able you have to have the fiscal capacity to really raise the taxes without political uprising uh or cut expenditures such that you can really uh protect the high value of the government bonds and you know that's questionable but whe that's feasible whe the fiscal capacity is there some people observer political observer says your US could implement a value added tax of 15 20% like in Europe Europe uh and then prop up this uh this US treasuries again but it's not clear whether that's politically feasible”
The safe asset pricing framework implies that as perceived risk increases (measured by the equity risk premium or volatility), the value of safe assets increases because they provide insurance; hence safe assets have a negative correlation with risky assets—they are negatively correlated with the market (negative market beta)
“So they have to pay even less cash flow because they have this negative cap beta uh on it. So the required return and cash flow return is even lower. So expressed differently the person or the entity in this case US Treasury issuing safe asset has some exorbitant privileges”
The analytical framework combining geopolitical shifts, safe asset dynamics, and choke point analysis provides a comprehensive method for understanding recent global developments and predicting future implications.
“With this I hope I gave you a little bit an overview what economic analysis and political analysis putting it together can yield and of course that's built on research I've done and many others have done and build many others research uh to structure the thoughts how to make sense of the recent developments and how to help us to predict a little bit what is coming up uh depending what the political moves are but what the implications on the financial side on the global financial side, the global financial architecture and also how one should think about global trade in a world where people withdraw from the multilateral global system to a more fragmented system and potentially multipolar system.”