
What this covers
This is a roundtable hosted by Foreign Affairs Executive Editor Stuart Reid, with three scholars who each wrote a companion essay for the magazine's series on international relations theory. Mondira Chatterjee Miller takes up power transitions, Steve Brooks economic interdependence, and Tanisha Fazal norms. The conversation moves between the theory and current cases: U.S.-China rivalry, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Gaza, and the future of the dollar.
On power transitions, Miller argues that Power Transition Theory is usually read too narrowly. The decisive variable is how a status quo power manages the international order itself, since it wrote the rules and can adjust them, while rising powers must work within them. She contrasts the accommodating U.S. approach to China in the 1990s with today's non-accommodation, and points to minilaterals like the Quad and AUKUS as a new form of order management. She also raises the flip side, Preventive War Theory, as a partial explanation for Russia's invasion. Her policy suggestion is that the U.S. build rules where it holds structural advantages, such as education, science, and technology, rather than imitate the Belt and Road.
Brooks argues that interdependence has no single effect on peace. Effects differ across trade, finance, and production networks, and across great powers and developing countries. He argues that investors do not reliably punish war, and that the dollar will stay dominant because no alternative exists, citing the pound's long afterlife as a reserve currency. His account of production complexity, including ASML's dependence on suppliers in several countries, shows why China still needs advanced economies. He also assesses BRICS as a trade-off between scale and coherence.
Fazal defines norms as standards of appropriate behavior, both prescriptive and proscriptive. She discusses China's selective use of sovereignty, the enforcement problems of international humanitarian law against states, and the Tallinn Manual on cyberspace. The group also covers the UN's very different standing in the U.S. and in the global south.
International relations theories—power transitions, economic interdependence, and norms—are not abstract but directly shape real-world policy outcomes, and their effects are more nuanced and conditional than common policy wisdom suggests.
- Power transition theory depends crucially on how status quo powers manage international order, not just how they respond to challengers
- Economic interdependence has mixed effects on peace depending on the type (trade, finance, production) and context, not a uniform causal relationship
- Norms constrain behavior through responses to violations and reputational costs rather than through direct behavioral prevention
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Economic interdependence does not have a single overarching effect on world politics—the relationship between trade, finance, and production networks and peace varies and in some cases peace-promoting effects appear only for certain types of actors (great powers via multinational production) but not others (developing countries).
“It clearly doesn't have an overarching effect on anything else. I mean it's good in some respects for some people's welfare it's harmful for others. And so a big takeaway of the article is just A that the global economy really does matter. However, it's not going to matter in a single unidirectional effect.”
Rising powers are constrained by existing international norms because they lack the ability to set norms themselves, while status quo powers have the ability to adjust rules of international order in ways that benefit and sustain them because they created those rules.
“by definition when you have a challenger they don't yet have the ability to to set the norms of order, right? So it's a right those are rising powers they're not established great powers which means that they're often constrained by the international norms that exist even when they don't want to be. And the second part of that the corollary is that status quo powers which is the great power has the ability to adjust the rules of the international order in ways that benefit and sustain them mainly because they've created the rules, right?”
International relations theories are not abstract or merely academic; they have real-world policy implications and should be taught as foundational to policy understanding.
“International relations theories are really important for understanding policy and they're not they're not they're not abstract they're not just floating around. They have real world implications”
Path dependency is a powerful force: Great Britain's pound remained the reserve currency for decades after Britain was no longer the leading economic power, suggesting the dollar's dominance will persist even if U.S. power declines.
“Great Britain pound remained as the reserve currency for decades after um, Great Britain was no longer the leading state.”
Power transition theory's core insight is that rising powers challenging the international order leads to war, but what actually matters is not simply the status quo power's response to the challenger but rather how the status quo power manages and potentially adjusts the international order itself.
“what I argue in the piece is that if you really read power transition theory carefully what matters isn't simply how the status quo power responds to the challenger leading to war but rather how the status quo power manages international order and that's the underpinning of power transition theory that we don't talk so much about”
Norms should be understood as standards of appropriate behavior for an actor with a given identity, including both positive prescriptions (how you should behave) and negative prescriptions (how you should not behave), not merely as constraints.
“I want to start with definitions and kind of push back a little bit of uh against the definition that you uh that you offered of norms as a constraint. Norms can be a constraint, but really I think more broadly, norms are about how you ought to behave, which also includes how you should not behave depending on who you are. So, you know, the canonical definition is that they're a norm is a standard of appropriate behavior for an actor with a given identity.”
The U.S. has begun using minilaterals—groupings like the Quad and AUKUS—as a new form of order management that blends economic and security functions, representing a shift from traditional multilateral institutions and bilateral alliances.
“I would just add uh one more thing that, you know, there are some ways that you can see the US already beginning to do this. So, for example, I think one of the ways that the United States has done this is minilaterals, right? That's a new concept. Uh you know, whether you have uh in in in the past when we talked about the multilateral world world order, it was really about liberal economic institutions, and then of course you had alliances, right? Like NATO or whatever, that was security alliances. But now you see the concept of minilaterals that are neither entirely economic institutions nor entirely security institutions, right? So, the Quad is one. Um does the Quad have teeth? Not yet. But the point is that foundation exists. Or AUKUS, right?”
Financial investors do not react in a single, common way to war—the argument that investors will punish countries for going to war is not supported by evidence, at least in the long term.
“For finance we we don't really have any story line either and there the issue is that investors don't react in a single common way to war. You know argument has been made that investors will kind of punish countries for going to war and the evidence is just not there at least for the long term.”
China's approach to sovereignty norms exhibits apparent hypocrisy: Beijing refuses any intrusions on its own sovereignty while simultaneously seeking to expand China's borders relative to the status quo regarding Taiwan and maritime regions.
“certainly when we think about sovereignty norms, there's there's a kind of um an apparent hypocrisy that oddly in ways that it at the same time acknowledges this set of norms and the importance of sovereignty norms. Because on the one hand, uh you know, Beijing would refuse any possible intrusions on its own sovereignty from another country. That would be unacceptable. But on the other hand, as you noted, there's a very clear dot desire to expand China's borders beyond the status quo with respect to Taiwan and also with respect to these maritime regions.”
The United Nations is not well-regarded in the United States but is hugely important for Global South countries, providing a forum where they can burnish reputations, build coalitions, and discuss issues that may not be important to the U.S.
“the United Nations is not very well regarded in the United States, but it's hugely important for global South countries. Um, and I think the reason the United Nations is important is because it allows countries to point to the UN as, um, the place where they can burnish reputations, right? By, for example, voting in certain ways. Um, where they can build coalitions, uh, and where they can gather to discuss issues that may not be as much of importance to the United States, but are very important to those nations.”
The United States recognizes India's desire for permanent Security Council status and supports it, while China opposes it because permanent membership for India would be disastrous for Chinese interests.
“And the United States recognizes that India wants that and supports it. And China recognizes that this would be a disaster for China, uh, and doesn't want to recognize it, right? So, you can see those things play out in the United Nations reputationally, uh, and I think that's one of the reasons why it continues to be quite important.”
BRICS faces tension between making the organization large (to gain attention and members) and keeping it coherent enough to accomplish things, creating a coherence-versus-scale tradeoff.
“the real issue is that there's a a tension between making it big in terms of lots of countries, and making it cohesive enough that it can really do anything. And right now, for whatever reason, the the, you know, countries in this grouping have decided they want to make it big, cuz they want people to pay attention to it. But the problem is in making it big, you know, you have countries like Russia and China that would be, you know, willing to take steps which would, um, make the United States and its allies mad, perhaps. But you also have other countries, you know, like India, you know, South Africa, who who don't want to do this.”
The dollar is not vulnerable to being replaced as world reserve currency because there is no viable alternative—the euro is problematic due to EU fragmentation, and China's currency cannot serve this role without open capital markets.
“I don't think it's vulnerable at all. I mean, to make a clear, you know, strong answer. Before I wasn't able to give a clear strong answer about how the global economy affects security, but on this, I can give a clear answer. It's not vulnerable at all, you know, at least probably in my lifetime. Um, because there's no alternative to it. You know, there has to be an alternative to the dollar to replace it. And right now, it's not going to be the euro, in part because um, the EU is becoming more fractious and less cohesive.”
Israel is violating international humanitarian law and norms in its war in Gaza, but international law is harder to enforce against states than non-state actors because international law was designed by states for states and states resist constraining themselves.
“There's no doubt that Israel is violating international humanitarian law and norms, uh, in its war in Gaza. Um, I will say that it's it's interesting, I think, to think about this also with respect to Hamas, because you asked, "Why is Israel allowed to violate international law?" And I want to unpack that question a little bit. Um, first by saying that international law was and is designed principally by states for states. And so, what that means is that it can be harder to hold non-state actors accountable, although it's also clear that Hamas has violated international law and norms. But it also means that international law, by design, is always going to be a little bit weak because states don't want to constrain themselves, right?”
Contemporary U.S.-China relations show non-accommodation of China's rise, contrasting with the accommodative stance of the 1990s, illustrating that responses to rising powers vary.
“But that's not always the case, right? So, uh you can what you see now is definitely not an accommodation of of China's rise.”
International order consists of multiple issue areas bound together by rules and norms; understanding order requires recognizing its structural composition.
“international order consists of different issue areas that come together, and then they're bound together by rules and norms, which, you know, Tanisha has been been explaining.”
Products and technologies vary dramatically in complexity, from simple goods anyone can make, to moderately complex ones like solar panels with ~20 parts, to very complex ones like cars with 30,000 parts, to extraordinarily complex ones like semiconductors and commercial aircraft.
“one way to think about this would be to think about um products and technologies as having four different kinds, um various levels of complexity. At the lowest level of complexity, it's something so simple that basically anyone at any time can do. You know, any country can make it. The next level of complexity would be uh something like solar panels, which has like 20 parts, and you can look online about how to make them. They're not very complicated. Um they can be made very easily. Um The third level of complexity would be something like cars. Cars have 30,000 parts, um much more complex than solar panels. Um But, one thing about cars is that um they're not things you need to make perfectly. You know, we all have driven in cars or um been in cars that the brakes don't work exactly right, or there's a knocking in the engine. And, you know, so anyway, so that's the third level. The the highest level of complexity would be something like um commercial jet aircraft or semiconductors.”
Power transition theory has an underexplored flip side: declining powers may start wars to prevent further decline (preventive war theory), which Jack Levy developed, and this may partially explain Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
“It does, actually. It's the flip side of power transition theory and um Jack Levy uh has has written on it a long time ago. So, the the flip side of power transition theory is essentially saying that, look, it's not Okay, let's So, let me restate power transition theory, right? You have a status quo power, you have a rising power, the rising power wants to set the uh rules of international order, the status quo power wants to stop it, and therefore you have war. Now, the flip side of power transition theory is that you have war because a declining power wants to maintain its position, right? And so, Jack Levy's theory uh is really about preventive war. And what he says is that, essentially, um the declining power has a preventive motivation for war because its military power, its potential is is declining relative to that of another power, um and so, the goal is to fight a war now while the circumstances are still favorable uh than do it later uh when when, you know, the status quo has declined completely.”
To manufacture very complex technologies like commercial aircraft or advanced semiconductors, China requires access to the United States, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and similar technologically advanced economies—alternatives like Russia, India, or China's other partners cannot provide necessary inputs.
“if you want to make a very complex technology, like a commercial aircraft or advanced semiconductors, um you need access to the United States, to Japan, to Taiwan, to South Korea, and so forth. India, Russia just will not cut it. You know, they are just not technologically advanced enough. They do not have the kind of firms to supply those kinds of things.”
BRICS aspirations typically exceed its actual results, with the gap between what the organization talks about doing and what it actually accomplishes being substantial.
“One thing to think about is, um, for any, you know, grouping like BRICS, it's going to have aspirations, things it would like to do, and then later it's going to have results. And in often times the situation is the results are much less significant than the aspirations.”
The Tallinn Manual is a non-binding document created by international lawyers convened in Tallinn, Estonia to think through how existing international humanitarian law applies in cyberspace.
“There are also a lot of efforts to rethink international law in light of these new technologies. So, on the international law front, for example, there's the Tallinn manual, which is um it's not a treaty, it's a group of international lawyers who were convened in Tallinn, Estonia, to think through how uh internet existing international humanitarian law could be applied in the cyber space.”
The lithography machine made by Dutch company ASML, which manufactures the most advanced semiconductor chips, contains a laser with approximately 457,000 parts, and ASML itself supplies only about 15% of the parts—the other 85% come from the U.S., Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.
“the um machine that is used to make the most advanced semiconductor chips, the um lithography machine, which is made by the Dutch company ASML, um that machine, um just the laser within it has roughly 457,000 parts. Just the laser, and that's just one part of it. You know, and so, that machine, which is made by a Dutch company, the Dutch company actually only uh itself supplies about 15% of the parts that goes into that machine. The other 85% are coming from the rest of the world. And when they're coming from the rest of the world, really what we're talking about is um the United States, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, not India, you know, for the most part. Not Russia, not China.”
The United States WTO integration strategy toward China in the 1990s (known as 'responsible stakeholder' strategy via Robert Zoellick) was explicitly designed to integrate China into the liberal international order with the expectation that economic engagement would eventually lead to democratization.
“if you remember Robert Zoellick's famous phrase, that if the United States were to just integrate China into the liberal international order, China would be a responsible stakeholder, and, you know, and then the underpinning of that was eventually democratized. That was very much an accommodation.”
The US should respond to China's rise by rethinking and creating new rules in issue areas where it has structural advantages (like education, science, and technology) rather than attempting to replicate what the Belt and Road Initiative offers, which is not the US's strength.
“How does the United States respond? Well, here the the question is about rethinking, right? Some of the issue areas and order that the United States created...the United States is still a global leader in education. It has the edge in science and technology. China is catching up, but it hasn't yet. So, could the United States create something in a different issue area that doesn't involve replicating what the Belt and Road offers.”
International norms regarding civilian protection, hospital safety, and infrastructure targeting are most visibly enforced through global public opinion rather than through legal mechanisms, particularly reactions from the Global South.
“if we think about international norms as a standard of behavior that actors are supposed to abide by, actors of a certain identity are supposed to abide by, I think where we're seeing the strength of international norms regarding civilian targeting, regarding, um, protection of life, regarding protection of institutions like hospitals, issues like infrastructural uh, targeting, is in the court of global public opinion. And I think that the very strong response that we've seen in the global court of public opinion, particularly from the global South, but not only, um, regarding Israeli conduct, is actually a sign that these norms, um, maintain a certain sense of robustness, even if, uh, as Oona Hathaway wrote in a relatively recent Foreign Affairs article, the law has failed.”
Norm strength must be assessed not only by direct behavioral violations but by responses to those violations—the strength of the norm depends on whether violations are met with significant responses.
“if we want to assess the strength of a norm, uh we need to look not only at direct behavior, which is, you know, did Russia violate a norm in invading Ukraine? Yes. But also at to responses to the violations. And I think this is here where you sort of get a much better sense of sort of the spectrum of norm strength. Uh and if there had been no responses to Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, then I think we would be gauging the strength of the norm, you know, lower than if if we uh if if there had been a response.”
Whether a norm can survive if a great power pulls back from it depends on how the rest of the world responds—this is an open question not yet resolved.
“And I think that, you know, there are lots of norms around warfare in particular that I don't I think here we wouldn't necessarily see those norms valued, but particularly by a Trump administration. There would be other considerations that they would prioritize, but then the question then is, can the norm survive the US pulling back from it? And that is That's an open question, and I think it really does depend on how the rest of the world would respond.”
Russia paid an extremely high price for invading Ukraine, and this response demonstrates the power of norms—the strength of norms lies not in whether they are violated but in the costs imposed on violators.
“There has been a response, but it's not certainly not been as strong as you might have expected. Um so, the bottom line here for me and the argument that I'm trying to make in the article is that norms matter, um but the ways in which they matter can be subtle.”
If the U.S. cuts off China unilaterally, China is harmed only slightly more than the U.S., but if the U.S. acts with its allies to cut off China, China is harmed five to eleven times more than the U.S. depending on the scenario, meaning ally coordination is essential for the strategy to work.
“I have a new book uh won't talk about, but it actually models in terms of what would happen if if the US and its allies were to cut off China if it were to invade Taiwan. I'm not advocating for this, but we just modeled it. And what it basically showed is um it makes no sense for the US to be cutting off China unilaterally. Um if we cut off China unilaterally, then they're hurt, you know, just a little bit more than we are. However, if the US were to with its allies cut off China, then China is damaged in this massive disproportionate way. Depending upon the scenario, China's harmed either five times more than the United States or 11 times more than the United States.”
Recognizing that selective decoupling is effective only in extreme circumstances brings together previously opposed camps—globalists who favor trade and China hawks who are concerned about security—around a coherent strategy of conditional engagement.
“it turns out um you can bring those two perspectives together if you recognize that you should cut off only in their extreme uh circumstances.”
China rejects the term 'international community' because it connotes Western norms and instead prefers 'community of shared future for all mankind' as a framework that reflects Chinese interests.
“Xi Jinping has been kind of shopping around an alternative term. He doesn't like the term international community because I think that for him it connotes all the norms that are kind of packaged in the Western order. Um instead he wants he prefers the term community of shared future uh for all mankind.”
Policymakers should send China a clear message that maintaining substantial access to the global economy depends on avoiding territorial conquest and significant revisionism, but this message cannot work if the U.S. has already cut off access—there must be something to take away.
“if I was a policymaker, you know, putting myself in their shoes, I'd want to be telling China a very clear story, which is look, if if you don't, you know, invade Taiwan and were engaged in significant revisionism, there is a benefit, which is you will have substantial access to global economy. On the other hand, if you were to engage in very significant revisionism, then that access to global economy would be significantly curtailed. But you can't say that if you've already cut them off. You know, you you have to have a basis for uh doing that and a basis for in kind of encouraging China to be acting in a way which is um supportive of of the norm that um Taneisha has been talking about.”
In the U.S.-China context, the U.S. often criticizes Chinese initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative as violating the rules-based order, but the BRI does not actually violate the rules of the multilateral order—it was created within and respects those rules.
“if you look at the Belt and Road Initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative doesn't violate the rules of the multilateral order, right? It is a multilateral institution. It rose by those norms. It was created by those norms. So, the BRI itself is not a violation of the international order.”
China is the world's largest absolute emitter of greenhouse gases but wants to be counted as part of the Global South, shifting responsibility for climate crisis to Global North industrialized countries; this stance creates tension with countries in the Global South who increasingly believe China should be held responsible for its emissions.
“China is of course on in absolute terms the world's biggest emitter, not in per capita terms. That's us, the US. Um but but very much wants to kind of count itself as part of the global south and shift responsibility for the climate crisis to the global north. Um but at the same time, I think you're you're starting to see some movement from a lot of people and countries in the global south that are a little bit uncomfortable um being grouped with China in this regard and really feel that China along with countries like the US and Western Europe um should be held responsible for uh for the emissions that they've produced already and, you know, frankly, the climate crisis writ large.”
Technologies are changing so quickly that international law struggles to keep pace, but international norms may have more success in establishing general principles ahead of rapid technological change.
“I think that um you know, there there are a lot of efforts to rethink international norms in light of these new technologies. There are also a lot of efforts to rethink international law in light of these new technologies. So, on the international law front, for example, there's the Tallinn manual, which is um it's not a treaty, it's a group of international lawyers who were convened in Tallinn, Estonia, to think through how uh internet existing international humanitarian law could be applied in the cyber space. So, I think there So, but I think that the challenge here is that the technologies are changing so quickly. It's certainly very difficult for the law to keep up with them. Um and so, I think there maybe is a little bit more success on the norms front in terms of thinking through general principles.”
BRICS does matter and provides value not by achieving its original transformative goals but by creating modes of cooperation among countries (China, India, Russia) that would otherwise lack institutional frameworks for cooperation on shared interests like drug trafficking.
“BRICS does matter. It provides a mode of cooperation for China and India and Russia that wouldn't exist if that institution was not there. Right? So, whether it's on things of common issue areas like trafficking, drug trafficking, right? Um, you know, that's that's something that's of mutual interest to those countries. There isn't conflict around that. And so, sharing intelligence and drug trafficking is something that can be done through the BRICS.”
Norms tend to be slow-moving phenomena, making it difficult to predict how norms will evolve in response to near-term political changes.
“Um, I mean, this norms tend to be fairly slow-moving phenomena. So, I think it's hard to say. I do think that um, you know, it's pretty clear that um, a Trump administration is probably, you know, just given the previous Trump administration and what we hear, um, there's going to be less commitment to, for example, the norm against territorial conquest, um, because it it seems to me quite likely that a second Trump administration would be pushing Ukraine to the negotiating table and pushing Ukraine to um, to accept having lost certain amounts of territory.”
India's desire to become a permanent Security Council member is driven not just by veto power but by the reputational recognition that permanent membership confers—recognition as a rising power and future great power.
“when India wants a permanent seat on the Security Council, sure, it comes with a veto, which is really great. But it's not just that, right? It's the reputation that it would have if it were to be a permanent member of the Security Council, a recognition that this is, uh, a rising power, this is going to be a great power, uh, and it is a state that has that has not signed the nuclear nuclear non-proliferation treaty, has not signed the CTBT, but still has sanctioned, uh, nuclear weapons, right? So, that that reputational aspect to it is hugely important, and yes, it comes with with a veto, which is also very nice.”
Hong Kong could have potentially provided a rival financial center to New York, but China's political crackdown on Hong Kong after 2019 undermined investor confidence in property rights, making Hong Kong unable to serve this role.
“Interestingly, um, before the crackdown in Hong Kong I would have been um, less confident in saying that the dollar couldn't be challenged because the other thing that you would need to um, challenge the dollar is you have to have a rival financial center to New York, which does the same kind of things that it does, has very deep liquid deep capital markets. Hong Kong could have provided that. Um, potentially. However, with China essentially taking it over, um, it can't in my view perform that role anymore because investors have learned that essentially property rights are not respected by the current Chinese government. And that's the fundamental building block that you would need to have a financial center.”
A Trump administration would likely push Ukraine to accept territorial losses and would show less commitment to the norm against territorial conquest, potentially weakening that norm.
“a Trump administration is probably, you know, just given the previous Trump administration and what we hear, um, there's going to be less commitment to, for example, the norm against territorial conquest, um, because it it seems to me quite likely that a second Trump administration would be pushing Ukraine to the negotiating table and pushing Ukraine to um, to accept having lost certain amounts of territory.”
Norm creation does not necessarily require major world-historical conflicts; existing norms and laws based on general principles can be applied to new domains through derivation of corollaries.
“I don't know that it requires it. Um I think that, you know, we do have existing norms and also existing laws that are based on principles where you can sort of derive, um, corollaries from them that could apply in these new spaces.”
Defining exactly when a power transition occurs is analytically difficult because it requires precise measurement of relative power over time, and measurements of rising/declining power and current position maintenance are themselves contested.
“one of the things that international relations theory has struggled with is to define exactly when we're in a power transition, right? Because it assumes that we can measure exactly who's a rising power, who's a declining power, and who's actually maintaining their position.”
The United States and its allies tried to accomplish many things after the Cold War using collective action, but the results were modest, suggesting expectations for BRICS should be similarly tempered; any grouping faces inherent constraints on collective action, and BRICS' diversity makes coordination even harder than for US-led alliances.
“the United States obviously has a group also. It has its allies, and the United States was very powerful and after the Cold War ended, and it tried to do a fair number of things with its group, and it got some things done, but not a huge number of things. And so, I think when we look at that experience, we should kind of temper our expectation of how much the BRICS can do, especially given that it's a much more diverse grouping than the US and its allies.”
The United States currently has greater power than China in absolute terms, though both states' relative positions are debatable and their material power is measurably changing.
“we definitely know a few things. We know that China is rising, right? Will it rise to become a great power or is it already declining? That's those are debatable questions, and we can even get into that in Q&A. But there are there are measures that show that China's material power is changing, um you know, and China's influence is changing, right? Um we know that the United States was you know, a superpower during the Cold War. Has it maintained that position? Again, that's that's that's a question that's up for debate, but we know that even now the United States power outstrips China. So, it's all relative, right?”