What this covers

This is a conversation between Russell Napier, a macro strategist who writes a newsletter on the subject, and Russell Clark, who contributes his own arguments rather than only asking questions. The host introduces it as a session recorded in January 2023. It begins with how the debt built up. The end of Bretton Woods in 1971 removed the last anchor to gold and, in Napier's telling, convinced borrowers that inflation, not deflation, was coming. Michael Milken's non-bank credit in the 1980s pushed debt-to-GDP ratio levels further. Paul Volcker could tighten from a 120% starting point, whereas today's roughly 285% rules out a shock like his.

The middle of the discussion is about mechanism and politics. Napier defines monetary policy as the quantity of money rather than its price, and says governments are taking control of that quantity by guaranteeing bank lending. Clark adds indicators: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)) early-warning measure and a private-sector debt service ratio near 20%. Both argue that democracies, where debtors outnumber creditors, will choose debasement over austerity. They disagree on detail, such as how wide the gap between inflation and interest rates must be before savers panic. Japan is treated as the leading edge. The Bank of Japan (BOJ)) is struggling to hold yield curve control, and Clark argues that the popular bet against Japanese government bonds misses a third outcome, forced buying by domestic savings institutions.

The talk then widens. Topics include the tension between national repression and the euro, the frozen Russian reserves and what they imply for the dollar and the RMB, China's debt, and algorithmic trading in a thinning market, where liquid equities have fallen from about 7,000 to 4,000. Napier calls central bank digital currencies the greatest threat to liberty. The last stretch turns to portfolios, with Napier favoring sectors such as defense, infrastructure and steel that China's separation from the West could revive and that are missing from the S&P 500.

Sharpest takeaway

Russell argues that governments, not central banks, will control monetary policy in the coming decade through financial repression—maintaining inflation 4-6% above interest rates to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios—and that investors must fundamentally restructure portfolios away from overvalued US equities toward undervalued international equities, infrastructure, defense, and supply-chain diversification from China.

  • Record debt-to-GDP ratios (300%+ globally) combined with rising interest rates make debt crises inevitable unless governments intervene to suppress market-determined yields
  • Governments are already devolving monetary authority from central banks through credit guarantees and directing bank lending, replacing central bank tools with direct state control
  • A 10-15 year period of 4-6% inflation spread above interest rates is the politically feasible path to reduce debt, requiring investors to own assets that benefit from inflation while real rates stay suppressed

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0.80

In democracies, debtors (who vote) outnumber creditors, making relief for debtors (via inflation) politically more likely than default or austerity, which explains the shift from 19th century hard-money politics (when property owners dominated voting) to 20th century inflation bias.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Clark

“it's really the social political change to a more representative democracy as well that suggests that relief for debtors who all vote let's not forget is much more likely than it would have been in some periods of History where we did manage to get out of these problems without debasing”

0.80

Private sector financial stability is the binding political constraint on financial repression; governments cannot allow interest rates to reach market-clearing levels because the resulting private sector financial distress would be socially and politically catastrophic, forcing intervention regardless of central bank preferences.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Clark

“because the consequences for private sector Financial stability now that's not taking a political view it's just saying that the the consequences of interest rates at the right level would be so dire that no one's really going to let them come to pass”

0.73

Monetary policy is the quantity of money in the economy, not the price of money; the price of money (interest rates) is like an accelerator in a car but is meant to control the engine, which is the quantity of money.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“monetary policy is the quantity of money in the economy it's not the price of money in the economy the price of money in the economy is like your accelerator in Brick but it's there to control the engine and the engine is the quantity of money”

0.72

The great fallacy in finance is to assume that because something hasn't happened, it won't happen; this applies to China's debt crisis and to the single currency euro—neither has failed yet, but higher and higher balance sheet risk is being taken to defer the inevitable, until it can't be deferred.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“uh and also the the Euros on the single European currency it hasn't happened therefore it won't happen but the reason it hasn't happened is you've taking more balance sheet risk and by taking more and more balance sheet risk you can kind of stop the inevitable until the you can't stop the inevitable so to be clear I think China faces a a debt crisis but there is a very easy solution to a debt crisis as you discovered in America in 2009 it's called print money”

0.70

The end of Bretton Woods in 1971 (the last vestage of an anchor to gold) was a prerequisite for the debt expansion because it signaled there would be no deflation, only inflation, allowing borrowers to believe debts would be inflated away and safe to accumulate.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“without the end of Britain would yeah I mean that was the last vestage of an anchor wasn't much of an anchor but that was the last vestage of an anchor it also said to those who wanted to borrow that there probably wouldn't be any deflation again there would only be inflation and your debts would effectively be inflated away so there was that”

0.69

The first mechanism by which governments are taking over monetary control is by guaranteeing bank lending (as with the US Payment Protection Program in COVID and increasingly in Europe), which gives governments direct control over bank credit and money creation independent of central bank interest rate policy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“if you guarantee Bank lending and say to the banks the government says to the banks you lend to these guys you can't lose money and the banks lend money they create money the normal mechanism is that the Central Bank tries to control the growth in bank credit and money through adjusting interest rates uh the size of reserves changing Capital adequacy rules but now the government has jumped in and the government is riding these horses that are the commercial Bankers”

0.69

The private sector debt service ratio—the percentage of cash flow devoted to debt service—is approximately 20% or above in most developed countries, and history since 1998 shows that when this ratio reaches that level and interest rates rise, the private sector faces heightened risk of financial distress.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Clark

“I'm looking at that plus another data point which is these private sector Debt Service ratios I mean the history the data we we got good data back to 98 and what it says is if the private sector Debt Service ratio is around 20% or above and rates go up then the private sector's got a problem not guaranteed problem but there's a an heightened risk of a problem and that is where we are that is where we are across the most of the developed world”

0.69

The risk of China holding RMB reserves is now theoretical but proven real: Russia could have held RMB reserves but they became worthless when sanctions were imposed because they lack dollar value, showing that political risk to RMB assets is material.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Clark

“now that risk which was theoretical I think has clearly come to the four for manyan investors and reduces significantly reduces the prospects that they would seek to own those government bonds”

0.69

Global total debt to GDP (consumer debt plus non-financial corporate debt plus government debt) reached an all-time high at the same time interest rates reached a 5,000 year low in summer 2020, creating a structural crisis where rising rates would trigger a debt crisis requiring extreme government action to prevent market-determined interest rates.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“to GDP is reached an Al time high and I mean the Consumer Debt plus the the uh non Financial corporate debt plus the government debt to GDP reached an alltime Global high at a time when interest rates reached a 5,000 year low uh now it may be a 10,000 year low but I can only get data going back 5,000 years so uh but anyway in the summer of 2020 it was a 5,000 year low”

0.69

Japan is the leading edge of financial repression because the Bank of Japan is losing control of its central bank balance sheet trying to enforce artificial yield curve control during higher inflation, entering a negative feedback loop where more money creation produces more inflation, requiring even harder efforts to keep yields down.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“the Japanese are already losing control of the central balance sheet you know if you try to enforce this artificial yield curve using your central bank balance sheet in a period of higher inflation then you can lose control and that's what's happened and they were doing it in a peri of low inflation and then you get into a horrible uh negative feedback loop you create more money and you probably get more inflation you have to try harder to keep yields down and that is where they already are”

0.69

The Bank for International Settlements 'early warning indicator' based on the trend of debt-to-GDP growth relative to its historical trend has predictive capacity and currently signals a problem across developed economies.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Clark

“the biggest question in finance of my entire career is when is too much debt too much debt because it's been going up and up and we never really had a good answer to it uh the best objective uh test I've seen on this is put together by the bank of international settlements have' created I think called the early warning indicator and their early warning indicator is the trend is the current rate of growth in de to GDP relative to Trend so BWI people can Google it come to their own conclusions but it's got It's got you know obviously they're back tested and it's got some you know it's got some predictive capacity”

0.68

The separation from China creates huge investment opportunities in sectors that previously struggled to compete with China (steel, manufacturing, defense, infrastructure) and are not currently in people's portfolios or the S&P 500, as these sectors will benefit from government subsidized credit for decades.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“once again this creates huge opportunities for investors in certain types of companies that have really struggled to compete with China and I find themselves being the answer to many political problems of the West having once been the problem uh you know if you make steel in America guess what it's a lot greener than making steel in China but it's not green uh so you you can even argue there's a green agenda behind this if you want to if you want to clean the economy up buy American Steel buy Japanese steel but don't buy Chinese steel so I think there's a huge number of forces here to create huge opportunities obviously I'm not saying just in the steel industry but in many industrial sectors that are not in people's portfolios and are certainly not in the S&P 500”

0.68

Financial repression requires maintaining a 4% spread between inflation and interest rates (not 6% or higher) to avoid frightening asset holders into exiting ('stampeding horses'), which would increase money velocity uncontrollably and force governments to suppress velocity through capital controls.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Clark

“that's why I go for four because if it's six or eight I don't I think you're going to frighten the horses and what we've learned from the history of inflation is there's two bits of that money and velocity controlling money is not that difficult controlling velocity that's a biggie”

0.68

Monetary policy is developing a new system and the big call today is identical to the big call at Bretton Woods' end: if you don't get the monetary system call right, most of your asset allocation will be wrong.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“the monetary system is absolutely crucial to this uh and that's why we live in important period we are developing a new monetary system it is forming from the chaos and we've all got to try and work out what it is and there's no point in forcasting the business cycle in my opinion if you can't have a strong view on what this new monetary system is going to like and that was your big call when Breton Woods ended that's your big call today and if you don't get that big call right I think most of your asset allocation will be wrong”

0.68

When the US froze US dollar-denominated Russian reserves in 2022, the story was not the US action (which was expected) but that Europe, Switzerland, and Singapore also froze reserves, demonstrating that everyone will weaponize the dollar when geopolitical interests demand it, which actually supports rather than undermines the dollar's reserve status.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“the important news was not that the US seized the reserves of Russia that wasn't the story the US is quite good at seizing people's reserves nobody was nobody was surprised at that action the surprise was Europe seized those Reserve Switzerland seized those res reserves my understanding is that Singapore sees those reserves that's the story that doesn't undermine the dollar that supports the dollar and in a bizarre way because it's not as if if I'm a reserve manager I can think oh let's just put all the money into Euros because the Europeans would never do that let's put all that money into uh Switzerland because the Swiss would never do that so in some strange ways that the dollar was hanging out there”

0.68

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are the greatest threat to liberty because if adopted at scale (replacing commercial bank deposits), the central bank would control the entire flow of credit through the system without needing to be in the lending business, creating a command economy.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“this is the greatest threat to Liberty in the world today and that that's that's a big statement given the threats to Liberty there are out there but a central bank digital currency in which all of us decided to hold rather than Commercial Bank deposits would have the central bank then allocating those deposits back to the commercial Banks to land out very unlikely the commercial the central bank would want to be in the lending business but you never know maybe it would but anyway if we didn't want to be in that business and now it completely controls the flow of credit through the entire system one Central Bank uh it's kind of shocking and scary”

0.68

The bond market is the disciplinarian of governments; the question is not whether the bond market will discipline government, but whether the government will discipline the bond market (by suppressing yields), and governments will choose to discipline markets rather than accept market-determined rates.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Clark

“so yeah it's the bond markets that bring discipline and then the question is do the bond markets discipline the government or does the government discipline the bond markets everybody thinks wor way around”

0.66

Michael Milken in the mid-1980s developed a way to create non-bank credit by mobilizing debt capital from pension funds and life insurance funds outside the banking system, which allowed debt-to-GDP to get far more out of kilter than under bank credit alone (which creates money but is naturally constrained by reserve requirements).

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“it really began of course with Michael milin in the mid 1980s uh and milin showed that you could go to outside the banking system you could go to the savings Institution and you could mobilize debt capital from Pension funds and life funds and you could mobilize that to gear up...the beautiful thing about Bank credit is as it expands it creates money that's the nature of the fractional Reserve banking system so Bank DEA GDP maybe shouldn't get too far out of kilter but when you adding non-bank credit then you can get way out of kilter”

0.66

Volcker was able to tighten monetary policy to fight 1970s inflation because debt-to-GDP was only 120% starting from a much lower level, whereas today's 285% makes a Volcker-style shock impossible—high debt requires accommodative policy, not restrictive policy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russell Napier

“people say you know when is po going to do a voker well maybe when he's a debt GDP ratio of 120% he's starting at 285 so uh that's a bit of a challenge”

0.65

Financial repression is the policy of stealing money from all people slowly by maintaining inflation above interest rates, and it is very unlikely in a democracy that we choose the tough way out, which is austerity; therefore, debasement (financial repression) rather than default is the chosen path.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“I like to call Financial repression stealing money from all people slowly...it's very unlikely in a democracy that we choose the tough way out which is austerity uh maybe even default I mean we defaulted leman's defaulted I don't remember that working out particularly well for economic growth uh that's a private sector default Greece defaulted on its sovereign debt I don't think it's a land flowing with milk honey and red Cena so uh you know I think that the soall debasement which is not hyperinflation it's just keeping inflation that bit above rates is in a democratic system that is our chosen path”

0.65

The number of liquid equities in the world has declined from ~7,000 to ~4,000, while the number of mutual funds has grown to 122,000, creating a structural mismatch where mutual funds require daily liquidity redemption but liquidity is declining, which is unsustainable.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“there are 122,000 mutual funds in the world uh well you used to be a stock broker how many liquid equities are there in the world I think it's quite a few less than 122,000 right so oh yeah oh yeah from I you went from um it's down something like from 7,000 to 4,000 on that kind itude if those aren't the right numbers and then you go back to the 1950s and you realize that there really weren't very many mutual funds at all so what happen the answer is liquidity you can run a mutual fund the whole point of a mutual fund is you deliver you liquidate and deliver cash the next day and you can only do that in a very liquid Marketplace”

0.65

The 'widowmaker trade' of shorting Japanese Government Bonds assumes only two outcomes: status quo (unsustainable) or yields rising to market-clearing levels; but the third outcome—forced savings institutions to buy JGBs via moral suasion—is the most likely and will force those investors to sell other sovereigns' bonds, triggering global forced financial repression.

forecasthigh valuefringenovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russell Clark

“most people when they scenario scenario analysis for the jgb and the bank of Japan's policy can only come up with two options one option is the status quo and I agree with people that the status quo is is not cannot be sustained...everybody would then say well there is only one other option then allow the price of jgbs to fall allow yields to rise...now the problem with that one was what do they sell”

0.64

Algorithms are trained on 30 years (or less) of data and base relationships between macro data and financial securities on that period, but when relationships break down in a new monetary regime, algorithms may suddenly recognize the breakdown on the same day and move in the same direction, creating a flash liquidity crisis.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“they are basing their the relationships between macro data and financial securities on 30 years of data or maybe 20 maybe 10 but but not 100 and then suddenly these relationships that we're discussing begin to break down the most important of all being that there is no effective market price for the risk-free rate I wonder if what happens is that one day the algorithms sort of get this new data they realize that the relationship is broken down and they all move in a different direction on the same day”

0.64

Financial repression comes one country at a time, which is incompatible with the single currency in Europe: if France declares yield curve control unilaterally, you have one mandated yield curve and 19 other market-determined yield curves in a single currency zone, which is incompatible with monetary union.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“Financial repression comes one country at a time imagine what happens in Europe if one country does it unilaterally you know France declares a yield curve control so you've got one mandated yield curve in a single currency and 19 other yield curves I mean it's it's it's it's not the end of The single currency overnight but it's just incompatible with the operation of a single currency so this is really big stuff and it's and it really is ex exacerbated if you do it in stages well everybody does it at the same time”

0.64

The UK discovered a critical level: when government bond yields reached 4.5%, the Bank of England had to begin buying bonds and the government fell, showing that 4.5% is the level that cannot be politically sustained ('the level which cannot speak its name').

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“the United Kingdom as we discovered in September October isn't that far behind either and I think we discovered what level rates can get to in the UK it's four and a half percent because at four and a half percent the central bank was buying and we uh destroyed the government that kind of give you some idea of a level which uh the level which cannot speak its name”

0.63

Governments are not currently paying attention to the fact that central banks are losing the ability to control monetary policy and that state control is replacing central bank control, despite 30 years of learning to 'follow the Fed'.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“I don't think the Market's paying any attention to it whatsoever because because you say Bob you know we've learned for 30 years watch the FED follow the fed and you know we know what the fed's target is we know what they're saying but nobody's really focusing on do they the power to deliver it”

0.62

Gold becomes more interesting as a reserve asset because central banks worried about sanctions can hold gold in their own country, whereas dollar and euro reserves are within the long reach of Americans or Europeans; the Chinese are working on a way to take gold in payment internationally.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“the thing about gold is you can hold it in your own country as well so if you have you know Euro reserves or dollar reserves they're are going to be within the Long Reach of the Europeans or the Americans uh but gold sitting in the ground in your own country isn't and you have to find someone who'll take it in payment uh but the Chinese are working on that”

0.62

Bitcoin cannot be controlled by governments but governments will prefer stable coins (government-issued digital currencies backed by short-term government debt) because they provide instant settlement at low cost while remaining under public sector control, making stable coins the likely competitor to Bitcoin.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“there are a lot of people that believe that this is the first money that can't be controlled by human beings and a lot of this scenario would Point people towards wanting to own Bitcoin as well as gold what's your view of the role of these um particularly Bitcoin because the others have a different role but um is there any role for Bitcoin in the future does it does it does it provide some uh benefit economic benefit by transmitting value instantaneously at low cost uh no not Bitcoin but stable coin does I think I think people need to think about this carefully governments not be that in favor of Bitcoin because it can happen surreptitiously but also it's a private sector control of money and the whole point about a financial recession is to have more public sector controled money”

0.61

Every time the world has a recession, it looks like 'the whole world's going bankrupt' and governments have to reduce rates to zero and provide guarantees, which itself is an asset test that there is too much debt—recessions are a recurring signal of debt overhang.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“it's also worth pointing out that every time we have a recession looks like the whole world's going bankrupt this is a pretty good assd test that perhaps there's too much debt uh you know we have to get rates to zero we have to provide private sector gu guarantees on private sector just the Aid test is that you know recessions create so much damage that we've got too much debt”

0.60

Equities as a whole (including gold) can defend investors from inflation, but the S&P 500 cannot because valuations are in a bubble at 28x Shiller PE while the world equity index (excluding US) was at 24% above 2000 prices by 2020—emerging markets at 1.6x book with 13% yield and UK at 1.6x book offer inflation protection that overvalued US equities do not.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“the S&P did not defend you from inflation in the 1970s very clearly uh but the reason was that in 1966 the Schiller PE the cyclically adjusted PE was 23 and a half times and by 1982 I think it had got to seven now if your valuation is going to call from 23 and a half to seven guess what it's highly unlikely that equities are going to give you a positive return relative to inflation so the secret of Defending yourself from inflation is don't buy equities on 23 and a half times PE Sher PE so that rules out the S&P will stop cuz it's on 28”

0.59

The conflict between the US and China is not primarily military but involves capital flow restrictions and trade restrictions; both sides realized conflict was escalating too quickly and are slowing it, but the direction toward two distinct systems (Chinese-affiliate and American-affiliate) is inevitable.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“most people watching this will be Familiar of what happens when when another par Rises up and you've only got one great power and that is conflict now to be clear that doesn't mean conflict on the battlefield it just means conflict and now we have clear evidence of that conflict in trade conflict actually in capital flows as well uh America bringing in lots of legislation to restrict the flow of capital to certain companies in China but let's not be let's be clear about this it's trying to act to restrict the flow of capital to China full stop is there some rachal that stops this and then you kind of look at the last two months in China and think maybe because you can see some sort of backing away from some of this more confrontational stuff by Xi Jinping uh my view is that that is a matter of speed rather than direction that perhaps both sides realized this was going too quickly uh and both sides want to slow it down”

0.59

China's debt-to-GDP ratio rose from roughly half of America's in 2007 to higher than America's today due to China's 'biggest debt explosion in human history' after 2009, and while China faces a debt crisis, the solution (printing money) is straightforward and available, but requires accepting higher inflation and a flexible exchange rate.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“if you go back to 2007 which is when it turned out America had too much debt let's put it that way and we rolled into 208 209 China's debt to GDP ratio was roughly half America and now it's higher so something's fundamentally changed here uh and that is that after 2009 China launched the biggest debt explosion in human history that was their answer to the crisis of 2009”

0.59

The risk that renminbi reserve accumulation will accelerate is low because even if Saudi Arabia or other countries begin accepting renminbi for oil, if they then sell the renminbi on international markets, it makes no difference to the dollar's reserve status—the dollar remains strong until reserve managers actually choose to hold renminbi.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“the real question about Cy is not what it transacted Remnant be it's will it hold Remnant B you know okay so it gets them but if it sells them on the international marketplace not you know it's not making any difference to the dollar whatsoever so let's see if they're about to have a vault fast and after uh well nearly eight years of being able to own R&B in the reserves I decide that they suddenly want to own them then I'm going to have to come back and rethink this but I think the the most likely thing is that they don't want to own them and they get their RB and they sell them”

0.57

The UK government's restrictions on mortgages (ban on foreclosures), subsidized energy credit, and war spending all act against central bank monetary policy, demonstrating an active 'war' between government and central bank where government is already winning because it can override central bank actions.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“here in the United Kingdom we had got massive the government what ran out on Ukraine and gave lots of subsidies on energy they've now told the banks not to foreclose on any of the mortgages and we're putting out lots of subsidized credit all of that acts against monetary policy all that acts to mitigate monetary policy so there's this war already going on I think perhaps the general feeling in investors is the central bank will win and of course I'm on the other side of that saying the government will win it has to win because the consequences of it not winning socially politically could be dire”

0.57

The sequence of financial repression adoption will be Japan first, then Europe, then the United Kingdom, then the United States, because private sectors' cash flow devoted to debt service is highest in Japan, then Europe (particularly France, Netherlands, Belgium), then the UK, then America.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“the reason for going in that order that you've just said there is if I look at where private sectors have got incredibly high percentage of their cash flow going to service debt most people are really surprised to find that Europe's high on that list and and much higher than America uh particularly France and the Netherlands and Belgium are also in the Euro Zone and then you've got three other countries not in the Euro Zone but in Europe Norway uh not in the EU either uh you've got Denmark and you've got Sweden so that's the reason for putting Europe second the United Kingdom as we discovered in September October isn't that far behind either”

0.56

The yuan/renminbi has been available as a reserve currency since 2014 (reserve managers were allowed to own PRC bonds), but for 8 years reserve managers have had the choice and have chosen not to own them—only Russia's Putin holds significant renminbi reserves, indicating no imminent shift in reserve currency status.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“the r has been open as a reserve currency I think since 2014 that was one of the first changes in the law was actually to a law Reserve managers to own PRC bonds uh before R&B denominated PRC bonds before the private sector every quarter we get data from uh I think it's the IMF and they tell us the composition of global foreign exchange reserves and uh we know who owns R&B denominated PRC bonds and that is Mr Putin that's it you know you can you can tell from looking at the data and it doesn't really go up very much it's tiny so for8 years any reserve manager the word who wants to own them has had the choice of owning them and have chosen not to own them”

0.55

Financial repression will last 10-15 years because debt-to-GDP needs to come down from ~300% to ~200%, which requires that nominal GDP growth exceed debt growth by roughly 400 basis points annually—a gap small enough to maintain social cohesion and velocity control but large enough to eventually reduce the debt burden.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“I I I'm certainly guessing over a decade more like 15 years because you have to bring the debt to GDP to a reasonable level uh I can't give you to two decimal places what that reasonable level is that's the problem but I think it's certainly going to be a lot closer to 200% than uh where we are today which is closer to 300% so and and then you have to just work out the gap between the two things which is growth in nominal GDP grow to growth in debt and then whatever rate you think is sustainable is how quickly this can come down so I think the Gap has to be relatively small because of the sheer social chaos if it was too big”

0.55

The last 15 years of monetary policy have been attempting to fight deflation and prevent the debt bubble from coming home to roost using central bank balance sheet expansion, but this approach must end and governments must shift to a new system.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“then the last uh whatever that is now 15 years has been F been has been trying to fight that deflation to try and make sure this debt bubble doesn't come home to roast so arguably we've been trying to stop this debt bubble from coming home to RIS for quite a long period of time but it's time to end that particular approach to it using the central bank balance sheet and go somewhere else”

0.55

Emerging markets have much lower debt-to-GDP ratios than developed countries, making them attractive both for repression scenario protection and for avoiding the worst debt-driven policy convulsions.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Napier

“Emerging Markets it isn't they just don't have that level of debt so it's another reason to to look in there and another a better look”

0.51

Inflation appeared suddenly 1.5-2 years ago due to a huge surge in money supply growth, and while money supply growth has recently declined, Russell is skeptical (possibly because published M2 data may not capture money moving further out the maturity spectrum) and expects inflation to continue declining from 10% but not to 2%.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russell Napier

“there is a school of salt as inflation is everywhere at all times a monetary phenomenon uh we did have a huge surge in money supply growth it seems to have disappeared I'm a little bit skeptical about it you know because it's you know America publishes an m to I wonder if it was publishing an M3 and an M4 whether it would have disappeared maybe there's some money sort of going further out the maturity Spectrum but anyway you do not expect inflation to come down if you've had that huge hump in money supply and it's come off”

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In a low-liquidity financial repression regime, closed-end funds will become a more functional structure than open-end mutual funds because they don't promise daily redemptions, which is how the financial system actually operated before the mutual fund innovation.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russell Clark

“if we go back to a period of repression where the amount of liquidity is a reflection of the holding Peri per that a lot of these structures really don't work anymore uh so closed down I'm also the chairman of a a UK listed closedown fund closed in funds have a better way of coping with this that's why we always had closed in funds because there simply wasn't enough liquidity to to do do this and the mutual fund is actually a progression beyond the closed end fund because we lived in a world of more liquidity and we might have to go back to looking more at closed end funds as a better way to manage capital in a low liquidity world”