
What this covers
Patrick O'Shaughnessy interviews Tom Digan, co-founder of Ladder, and Greg Stewart, its CEO, about how the app reached 300,000+ paying members and nearly $100M in ARR. The story begins with "Ladder 1.0," a managed marketplace for one-to-one personal training that proved operationally heavy and hard to scale. It moves through a coach-led group program tested as an MVP: one coach, her Instagram audience, 100 sign-ups at $100 a month, and a cohort renewing above 90%. The middle stretch is about survival: a restructuring, large creditors settled at around 20 cents on the dollar, and a founder's first check written to signal conviction.
On product, Ladder defines itself against content libraries, borrowing motivational mechanics from social networks and Duolingo and anchoring decisions to workout completions as a Northstar Metric. Members, Stewart says, would pay about a dollar for the library, because they are buying a decision, and YouTube is a bigger competitor than Peloton. Nutrition waited five years on a deck until a survey of about 5,000 members showed demand, and the team applies a push vs pull test to new ventures. Digan's claim that GLP-1 drugs are a tailwind is one of the more contested forecasts.
The TikTok section is the most tactical. The team set aside Facebook-style playbooks, changed budgets seven to ten times a day, and mined app store reviews for members' own words. They credit a reading of Crossing the Chasm for narrowing their message, and they kept creative in-house. Stewart also argues against following investors' product advice prescriptively.
Ladder's founders argue that consumer fitness apps win through engineering-first product iteration driven by member data, owning the creative and growth engine in-house, and enduring a long, near-death build rather than through a single insight.
- Ladder beat content-library fitness apps by building around completion behavior and motivation mechanics, guided by repeated member feedback rather than investor prescriptions
- Early survival depended on cash-flow visibility, creditor negotiation, and insider rounds, not product traction
- TikTok growth came from owning creative and iterating fast in-house, not from agencies or inherited Facebook playbooks
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Consumer companies die when founders guess at what customers want; the only reliable approach is to talk to users deeply and extract information from them to build solutions, and building in isolation is a losing strategy.
“It's not like I think it should be like that's how consumer companies die because they just freaking guess and it doesn't match what the consumer is looking for.”
Brands in fitness usually apply Facebook and Instagram paid-media rules to TikTok, but TikTok is a different platform with a different algorithm, so the team ignored received playbooks and tested from scratch, changing budgets seven to ten times a day against advice to wait out the learning phase.
“everybody is taking this mental model over here and applying it and not trying to figure it out from scratch of like if it works, do it again.”
The team's pre-TikTok reading of Crossing the Chasm, which narrowed the message to a specific customer segment, was the most important step in their growth work because they had been trying to tell one story to everyone and the message was not landing with anyone.
“Not trying to be all things to all people, especially early on. You can go after a big market problem, but you don't have to start there.”
GLP-1 drugs are a tailwind rather than a threat for Ladder, because the science indicates that people on these drugs need a strength training plan to limit muscle loss, and the company added a survey question asking members whether they take GLP-1 medication.
“all the science would support that you need a strength training plan alongside your GLP-1 to, you know, you're at risk of so much muscle loss.”
Ladder's product prioritization is anchored on a single northstar metric, workout completions, and every proposed feature must show a thesis for increasing them, because the business is solving for members actually finishing workouts rather than for one-time payment.
“That's our northstar. Like we're solving not for getting you to pay one time. We're solving for you to actually complete workouts with ladder.”
Ladder distinguishes between pushed and pulled opportunities for new ventures: it should only build new products when its members are pulling for them with clear, critical-mass demand, as with nutrition, which sat on a deck for five years before members made it clear they wanted it.
“I think about new ventures, new business as push versus pull. Are we being dragged into this area by our members?”
Nutrition was built only after a survey of about 5,000 members showed that roughly a third tracked macros, 90% of those used an app, and most used MyFitnessPal and disliked it; members wanted one integrated system linking inputs (food) and outputs (exercise).
“We have a third of our members who are tracking macros. And of of that third, 90% are using an app. And of that 90%, most are using My Fitness Pal and they hate it.”
Ladder declines adjacent revenue opportunities such as data services or GLP-1 origination, and decides on new ventures by testing whether members are pulling the company into an area, which means checking whether a problem is clearly valuable to members and relevant to the core business.
“new ventures, new business as push versus pull. Are we being dragged into this area by our members?”
Early-stage startups need to sell the team and the founder's conviction, not the product, because the new product did not yet have visuals; the founder demonstrated conviction by writing the first check, which signaled skin in the game and helped trigger a follow-on round.
“the only way to get this going is to write the first check and then ... lead with that conviction showing that you were you know had skin in the game here.”
Most fitness apps are content libraries whose creators are the face of the business, and they compete by producing ever more content; Ladder instead borrowed the motivational mechanics of social networks and Duolingo and pointed them at completing workouts, which makes the product not dependent on a never-ending content machine.
“these apps are mostly just content libraries and the motion is just constantly creating more and more content. ... we took that mentality of how do we use software to create an experience”
Joining the venture was attractive because it preserved a team that had worked together for years; the founder's first priority was keeping that group together, since its members could not afford to start from scratch with zero salary.
“That was my number one focus is like keep this group together. It's special and I wanted to hold on to it for for dear life.”
Creditors can be negotiated down sharply when they believe there is a real chance of receiving nothing; the team settled with large creditors at around 20 cents on the dollar by treating the process like a sales cycle, closing one creditor at a time.
“Like when when you get them to really believe and it was true that there's a chance you get zero, there's a door to negotiate. Like we were negotiating with big creditors at 20 cents on the dollar.”
The Ladder team set up an experimental MVP by tapping a single high-performing coach and letting her sell a group program to her Instagram audience; the functionality barely worked, but 100 people signed up at $100 per month quickly, proving demand before the product was built.
“We had like a 100 people sign up at 100 bucks a month very fast.”
Coach-led group programs generated organic community: members found each other through the app, formed friendships, and met in person, and the renewal rate for that cohort was over 90%, which was stronger evidence of value than the product's polish.
“that group like the renewal rate was like 90% plus like people paid again.”
Growth came from a deliberate approach: the team ran experiments across SEO, Instagram-native creators, and TikTok, reasoning that consumer attention was moving to short-form video before brands had arrived there, so the early advantage lay in being first with brand content on that platform.
“the consumer was very interested in engaging with short form video. ... yet the brands weren't their spending yet.”
Winning on TikTok depended less on video production and more on knowing the customer deeply: the team mined app store reviews to learn the exact words prospective members used, then built hooks and content that spoke to that segment.
“It's not like, hey, we magically figured out TikTok. We did, but our edge was we knew our customer inside and out.”
In the coach-led MVP, users who did not know each other found one another, met in person, and formed community. The team concluded that social accountability and community were valuable product features not present in the original version.
“They had never met each other before. And that was like magical. We're like, we have this community elements and social and they're happy.”
Building a consumer business is fun because the founder sees daily impact on users and the feedback loop is fast, but it is also much harder than people expect: there are no growth hacks, and a company must be excellent at both product and growth to survive.
“There is no like quick fixes. There is no growth hacks are not a real thing. You have to be black belt at building products for the consumer and growth.”
Ladder 1.0 (everything before 2020) was a different company that shared only a name: a managed marketplace for one-to-one personal training, which proved operationally complex and hard to scale because it becomes call-center-like and tempts operators to automate away the human the customer is paying for.
“as you scale that business, it starts to look more like a call center and you'd be inclined to start to automate away the very human you were selling”
Founders should not follow investor product advice prescriptively; a single piece of feedback is just one data point because each user has a unique persona and problem, and testing investor suggestions with users often showed they did not want them.
“don't listen to anyone person on on product that everyone has a unique use case persona problems solutions that they're looking for. So no one person is the source of truth.”
Early nutrition product logic was to give tracking away for free to win trust with people who already track macros, rather than convince new people to start tracking, because trust built through the tracking job creates the base for later prescriptive advice.
“So we made a conscious decision not to charge for it. ... We're going to go get the people who are already doing it. We're going to do it better and we're going to win their trust.”
A user-wide survey asking how likely members were to switch from their existing app rose from about 20% to 85% over weekly beta cycles, and the team launched when the number hit 85%, treating it as the signal of readiness rather than continuing to build the MVP forever.
“it was 85% one day, and it was like, we're ready. ... there's a point where you could just you could keep building the MVP forever”
Owning creative in-house, rather than handing it to an agency, was critical because iteration cycles on short-form video are so fast that agency turnaround makes learning impossible, so Ladder hired full-time creators and built a mini-agency of its own coaches.
“you have to own the creative and this was like not typical for brands in our space ... the iteration cycles are so fast. You can't just hand it off to an agency”
Members would pay about a dollar for Ladder's full content library because they are paying for a decision rather than for choice, so the library is not valuable to them, and YouTube, not Peloton, is the biggest competitor because it is where people search for workouts.
“We said, 'What would you pay for the whole library?' And it was like a dollar because it's not valuable to them.”
Lauren, a high-ticket in-person trainer, grew an online following on Instagram but capped her income because her constraint was human time; this observation led the team to build a group-coaching concept where one coach serves many clients through a shared program.
“You've capped how big this can get. You the constraint is human human time.”
Competitors in fitness apps copy the content-volume model, while the more powerful lever is to apply engagement mechanics from social networks and Duolingo to a specific action, since social networks sell attention and Duolingo drives language learning.
“nobody was spending time thinking about how to use these incredible levers to deliver an experience that actually increases the odds of you continuing on.”
Product teams should ruthlessly prioritize by doing one thing very well, then doing it again, rather than pursuing many interesting opportunities at once, because each new product or platform splits focus and can destabilize the existing business.
“And don't do 10 other things just because it's interesting or you can do it. Just do the one thing and do it really well and then do it again.”
TikTok is structured like a media company or TV rather than a social network, so content must be educational or entertaining enough to reach the right viewer through the algorithm, and a new account can grow without existing followers.
“It's not Instagram. It's like TV. People are consuming content for entertainment and it's not a social platform. It's a media company.”
AI let Ladder build a customer-support tool called Mave AI that now handles 90% of incoming support volume, with the same or better quality and speed, and it was built by the company itself with a single support-team member.
“We built Mave AI, M A I V. And we built a customer support tool from scratch. It's purpose-built for our company that manages now 90% of the flow”
AI let Ladder build products it could not have built before: it used AI to synthesize thousands of survey responses, then to create TikTok hooks, then to build Ladder Pulse, which reads every member chat and surfaces the most urgent questions so coaches can respond without scrolling for an hour.
“we built a product called Ladder Pulse that automatically you come in, reads every single chat that's come in, tells you, 'Here are the three most burning questions.'”
Raising money from friends and family was a mistake in hindsight because it tied personal relationships to financial risk and created obligations that compounded the pressure to keep doubling down.
“I should have learned that lesson and said I need to not raise money from friends and family.”
In the early survival phase, the team's first priority was building visibility into cash flow, since the financials were so opaque that money was leaking into places no one had tracked; only after that could they negotiate with creditors.
“mission number one was like figure out the cash flow and we got we got visibility into that”
The long-term goal is to become the system of record for health and fitness, because every major consumer category has a clear winner (Uber in transportation, Airbnb in short-term housing, Spotify in music) and health and fitness does not yet have one.
“There's a category winner in every category. Transportation, it's Uber. In short-term housing, it's Airbnb, Spotify, and music. There's no clear winner in the health and fitness category.”
Capital markets were not funding customer acquisition cost in consumer companies, so Ladder used a revenue-based financing arrangement from General Catalyst's Customer Value Fund that pays for acquisition monthly and lets payback occur over time, turning growth spend into an underwritten, controlled bet.
“the capital markets aren't funding CAC in consumer companies ... General Catalyst has solved that where they're financing our investment growth every month”
Ladder's vision includes expanding user reach to 100 million people working out daily, which requires drawing in people earlier in their fitness journey, because the current product assumes users already value programming, pay for it, and are comfortable using a phone during a workout.
“how do I get 100 million people to be working out with ladder every day. ... they're inhibitors to broader fitness.”
The team's first TikTok account grew from zero to about 250,000 people in roughly 45 days through organic content alone, without paid promotion, after one video reached about a million views and the team repeated its format.
“we took that account from zero to 250,000 people in in like 45 days. Like we weren't thinking about paid at all.”
Ladder's brand awareness lagged its product quality: it was a top-three or top-four fitness app in the App Store yet most people had not heard of it, because short-form creator content had targeted specific personas without leading with the brand name.
“we're consistently top three or four in our category in the app store and yet like the awareness is very low.”
Ladder's company-wide team of about 50 people, including 20 full-time coaches, supports roughly 300,000 paying members because AI let it avoid expanding headcount for support and analysis; one support person now oversees a tool that handles about 90% of incoming tickets.
“We have one person that touches support ... we built Mave AI ... that manages now 90% of the flow coming in”
In the MVP, renewal rates were above 90%, meaning members kept paying and doing workouts even though the product looked poor; the team concluded the promise was being delivered despite weak UI.
“that group like the renewal rate was like 90% plus like people paid again.”
Ladder's view of its competition is that YouTube, not Peloton, is the largest rival, because users search YouTube for a workout and consume it there; the company plans an on-ramp that mirrors that search-and-consume pattern.
“It's like no it's YouTube like by far like it's not even close.”
Personal training works because it bundles three things, programming (no guesswork about what to do), coaching (an expert to answer questions), and accountability (not wanting to disappoint a coach), and Ladder designed its app from the ground up to replicate that experience at scale.
“personal training, if you think about how it breaks down, it's programming, coaching, and accountability.”
Ladder deliberately has no Android app because building one would pause iOS development and split focus to chase a lower-revenue user base, which could take the business sideways for a year; the company will build it only after earning that next level of scale.
“We have no Android app. People think that's insane. But building an Android app requires basically pausing development on iOS”
Ladder's creative learning on TikTok came from treating hooks, the first few seconds and sentences, as the decisive element, and dissecting successful videos frame by frame (wardrobe, first word, gym setting, movement) to find what worked.
“What should a hook look like? ... it's a billboard that I need to get your attention very quickly.”
Tom left a lucrative hedge fund career and moved to Austin to separate himself from safety nets and distance himself from New York and his Bloomberg terminal, expecting startups to be hard but underestimating how hard.
“putting distance between New York and my Bloomberg terminal and kind of the the easy way out cuz I assumed it would get hard.”
In an era of cheap app-building with AI, differentiation shifts from features to brand, trust, and a human experience delivered at scale, so the founders believe AI cannot replicate the moat they have built.
“we're going to continue to lean in the things that the AI can't touch which is like we've built a compelling brand. We have a tremendous amount of trust”
Competitors and investors initially thought Peloton's scale made Ladder unfundable, but Peloton's post-COVID troubles and the company's own product shipping every other day gave it an effective head start, leaving it with little direct competition.
“how could you possibly compete with Pelaton? They're a $50 billion company in that moment.”
The company's growth strategy is analogous to a puzzle in which members hold the picture of their own goals and Ladder gives them each piece in sequence, whereas most fitness products hand users random pieces to pick up as they feel like it.
“our members have the vision of themselves. That's the box that they're solving for. And we give them each piece in order one by one”
The team noticed that innovation in fitness was focused on casual consumers and cardio, leaving enthusiast customers who already work out, especially strength trainers, underserved; their core pain point was planning workouts every day, which software could solve.
“all of the innovation in the space was focused on the casual fitness consumer ... Strength training in particular, there was no one selling strength training solutions.”
The company's pitch to investors shifted from 'we need cash' to selectivity, because a 2024-era General Catalyst deal gave the company more cash on hand than its Series B and let it choose the people it wants on its board rather than accepting any capital.
“this GC deal has given us a lot of leverage where we have more money in the bank than we did when we closed our series B a year ago.”
Ladder's founders say that most fitness companies are creator-founded, with the creator as the face making every decision and lacking an engineering and problem-solving DNA, which limits how they can design products around user behavior.
“they're started by creators and they're good products, they're good companies, but the creator is the face of that business.”
The original Ladder's content library had little value to members, so the company should give away content eventually and charge for a premium plan, instead of charging for an enormous library of workouts.
“I think there's going to be a path. It's not this year. It's not next year where we give the individual content away”
Using AI tools (such as ChatGPT) to synthesize thousands of app-store reviews and survey responses now lets a small team extract product themes that once took weeks of manual color-coding, enabling a faster, evidence-based product process.
“I could take 5,000 responses and really understand what's what's happening.”
Early-stage founders should identify the few people they want in the boardroom and as advisers, not just the firms that will fund them, because selectivity matters more when capital is no longer the constraint.
“who are the people that we want in the boardroom... just knowing who are the five human beings, forget firms”
Selling is a core life skill built on three principles: people must like you, they must trust you because integrity is everything, and you must be relentlessly but not annoyingly persistent.
“The three things that he taught me about sales are one to be effective in sales, you need people to like you. ... they need to trust you ... the third thing that you need to be like relentless, but not in an annoying way”
In 2019 the board removed the previous leadership after the founders realized the business needed to reset; the founder who had been the largest financial shareholder shifted from co-founder to steward, and Greg was named CEO the day after Christmas 2019.
“this is the day after Christmas 2019 came to the board and proposed that that we needed to make some pretty significant leadership changes”
Greg's deep dive into the TikTok algorithm, including troubleshooting ad tech with the platform's engineers, showed that a founder who immerses in an unfamiliar channel can become the expert the platform's own people consult.
“fast forward two years later and like the big dog engineers from China ... are in our office cuz like Greg would be calling and being like, 'The algorithm is broken.'”
An outside investor (Bill) committed capital to a round in 2020 without seeing a deck or a new product, after the founders showed urgency and their own commitment, illustrating that skin in the game can substitute for product proof.
“Bill didn't need to see a deck. We didn't have a new product yet. He knew you were involved and he was just like if you're willing to do this like you know I need I need to be involved too.”
Consumer products that succeed in building products that people open ten to twenty times a day create room for commerce and partnerships, such as supplements, apparel links, and biomarker tracking, but the company wants to reduce friction without becoming an Amazon-like marketplace prematurely.
“if we build a compelling product and brand where people are opening this app 10, 15, 20 times a day, there's a lot of opportunity”
Early in a company's life, a friend's willingness to invest in a secondary-market deal was driven less by the product than by seeing the founder's urgency; a secondary buyer was secured by marking the stake at a compromise between a 10% and 50% discount to the market.
“Bill didn't need to see a deck. We didn't have a new product yet. He knew you were involved and he was just like if you're willing to do this like you know I need I need to be involved too.”
Consumer entrepreneurs should sell their startup by leaning on personal relationships and family commitment; the founder credits his wife's acceptance of his career risk as a necessary condition for the venture to exist.
“if that dynamic wasn't true there's just no way that I could do this like there would be there would be no path for me”
The team's motivation to keep going was partly familial: the founder's wife told him this was the last startup attempt, and the sustained effort was an enormous motivator because failure would have meant no more ventures.
“she said this is the last one. Like if you if you don't figure this one out there are no more startups.”
Members want the app to hold their biomarker and DEXA-scan data, which would turn Ladder into the system of record for biomarkers and could justify partnerships with biomarker companies.
“Our members want to tell us that they got a DEXA scan and they would like this to be their system of record for their biomarkers.”
Ladder's first angel investment was a bet on co-founder Tom rather than on a validated business, made by the host before he understood venture capital or startup investing.
“Ladder was the first ever angel investment that I made, which effectively was a bet on Tom.”
In the early years the company had no product-market fit, was out of money most of the time, and had almost no customers, so the founders were operating in survival mode.
“It was hard. It was messy. We were kind of out of money the whole time. We didn't have really any customers to speak of.”
During the early 2020 pandemic period, the founders split their days: mornings handled messy financial clean-up like debt collectors, afternoons were product building, and they continuously raised money, reflecting a survival-first sequencing.
“the mornings were for the messy stuff... in the afternoons, we're actually building product”
Ladder had over 300,000 paying members, up from about 9,000 at the beginning of 2023, and was approaching $100 million in annual recurring revenue.
“we're north of 300,000 paying members today. I think at the beginning of 23, we were 9,000 paying members.”