
The Strategy Gap in Iran, With Max Boot | The President’s Inbox
What this covers
This episode of The President's Inbox pairs host Jim Lindsay with CFR's Max Boot to ask what the U.S. and Israeli campaign against Iran, Operation Epic Fury, shows about American military power. Boot grants the tactical record: precision strikes have hit more than 15,000 targets and badly degraded Iran's naval, security and ballistic missile capabilities. His argument is that those gains have not become strategic ones. He counts the lack of a roadmap as the central failure, and he points to Iran's remaining stock of highly enriched uranium, a clerical regime still in power, and its demonstrated ability to close the waterway as evidence that this is not a victory.
The middle of the conversation is about geography and hardware. Boot explains why the Strait of Hormuz has long been seen as a problem with no obvious military answer. It is only 20 to 30 miles wide, warning times are short, and the Navy is far smaller than in the 1980s, when escort operations still cost the U.S. damaged warships. He also covers the cost curve of air defense, where Patriot missiles costing about $3 million are used against Shahed drones costing a small fraction of that. He ties this to thin magazine depth after post-Cold War downsizing, and notes Zelenskyy's remark about Patriot use in the war's first days. Energy gets a separate treatment. The U.S. is largely self-sufficient, yet it still feels price spikes in a global market, and strategic reserve releases are small against the missing Gulf volumes.
The conversation turns more contentious on motive and consequence. Boot forecasts that Trump will end the bombing because of economic pressure rather than military success. He argues that Iran's pain tolerance and staying power may decide the outcome. He reads the repeated rejection of Ukrainian drone expertise as American hubris, and he expects China and Russia to study the weaknesses the war exposes. He closes with the normative view that the U.S. should fight only wars it has to fight.
Operation Epic Fury reveals fundamental limits of American military power: while the U.S. excels at tactical strikes, it lacks a coherent strategy, cannot reopen the Strait of Hormuz with available military assets, faces severe munitions depletion, and faces an adversary with greater pain tolerance and staying power, making this war of choice strategically incoherent and economically destabilizing.
- U.S. objectives are ill-defined and constantly shifting (regime change vs. military degradation vs. reopening shipping lanes), preventing strategic coherence
- Iran has demonstrated ability to close the Strait of Hormuz despite massive U.S. air superiority, exploiting narrow geography and U.S. Navy size limitations
- The conflict is depleting U.S. munitions stockpiles faster than they can be replenished, creating vulnerabilities against China and Russia while leaving no clear exit strategy
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The difficulty lies in translating narrow tactical military gains into larger strategic outcomes, and the administration has no clear roadmap for achieving this translation.
“I think the difficulty lies in trying to translate those very narrow tactical military gains into some kind of larger strategic outcome. And it's far from clear that the administration has any roadmap for how to get from here to there.”
The U.S. is not reliant on Persian Gulf oil for domestic use as it was historically, and is now an oil exporter and largely energy self-sufficient, but this doesn't protect the U.S. from oil price spikes because it's a global oil market where supply and demand apply.
“It is definitely true that we are not reliant on the Persian Gulf for U.S. oil as we were in the past. We're largely energy self-sufficient. We're an oil exporter now, but it's a global oil market. And so if you take 20% of the oil off the market, prices are going to spike.”
The big takeaway from the war is confirmation of a lesson repeatedly played out since the end of the Cold War: the extreme difficulty of translating U.S. tactical military success into long-term strategic or political success.
“My big takeaway from this is to basically confirm the lesson that we've seen repeatedly played out since the end of the Cold War, which is simply the difficulty of translating U.S. tactical military success into long-term strategic or political success.”
The U.S. military faces an unfavorable cost curve in air defense: Patriot missiles cost approximately $3 million each while Shahed drones cost $25,000-$50,000, making it unsustainable to use expensive air defense systems against cheap drone swarms.
“if you're using patriot missiles to take down shy heads- Three million a piece. Yeah, three million a piece. And the shy heads are probably 25 to 25,000 to $50,000. So that's not something you can do for long.”
Adversaries like China and Russia will exploit lessons about U.S. weaknesses revealed in the war, particularly lack of magazine depth, lack of preparation for asymmetric warfare, and lack of drone warfare readiness.
“Some of the weaknesses that we're talking about, including the U.S. lack of magazine depth, the U.S. lack of preparation for asymmetric warfare, in particular for drone warfare, these are all takeaways that adversaries like China and Russia are going to go to town on. They're going to try to exploit those to the greatest extent possible.”
Strategic oil reserve releases have not had a massive impact on oil prices because the volumes from strategic reserves are paltry compared to the amount of oil not coming out of the Strait of Hormuz.
“They did do a release about a week ago. I don't think it's had a massive impact because I think the volumes you're talking about from the strategic oil reserves are putty paltry compared to the amount of oil that's not coming out of the Strait of Hormuz right now.”
A Pentagon report from July stated the Department of Defense only had 25% of the Patriot missiles it said it needed, and since then there has been rapid drawdown of Patriot missiles, so overall stocks are even lower than the July assessment.
“the Pentagon Release Report, I think was last July, which said that the Department of Defense only had 25% of the Patriot missiles that it said it needed. And of course, since then, we've had a rapid drawdown in Patriot missiles, so I assume our overall stocks are even lower in terms of what we think is ideal than it was just three weeks ago.”
President Zelenskyy noted that the U.S. expended more Patriot missiles in the first few days of the Iran war than Ukraine has had since the beginning of their conflict in 2022, implying that more weapons to Ukraine could have saved lives and infrastructure.
“As President Zelenskyy pointed out, the U.S. in the first few days of this conflict employed more Patriot missiles than Ukraine has had since the beginning of their conflict in 2022. So imagine if we had sent more of these weapons to Ukraine, how many lives might have been saved, how much civilian infrastructure might have been saved, and how much the end of the war might have been hastened.”
During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, when the U.S. tried escorting tankers through the Gulf, one U.S. warship was heavily damaged by an Iranian mine and another was heavily damaged by an Iraqi Exocet missile, demonstrating the hazards of naval operations in contested waters.
“The last time we tried escorting tankers through the Gulf was during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. And at that point, we had one U.S. warship heavily damaged by an Iranian mine, another one heavily damaged by an Iraqi exoset missile.”
Many drones used against Ukraine are Shahed drones designed by Iran and now built in Russia, and these same Shahed drones are now being deployed against U.S. bases, embassies, and civilian infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region.
“so many of the drones that have been used to attack Ukraine are shy head drones that were designed by Iran, now being built in Russia, and it's precisely the same shy head drones, which are now being deployed against U.S. bases, embassies, against civilian infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region.”
U.S. and Israeli precision targeting capabilities have been highly effective tactically, destroying over 15,000 targets and significantly degrading Iran's military forces, naval forces, security forces, and ballistic missile production capabilities.
“from a very purely narrow sort of tactical military perspective, I think the war has been very successful. I think the difficulty lies in trying to translate those very narrow tactical military gains into some kind of larger strategic outcome. Pete Hegseth had said that they had hit over 15,000 targets between the U.S. and Israel, heavily degrading the Iranian military forces, their naval forces, their security forces, their ballistic missile forces now going after missile production sites.”
Iran has successfully closed the Strait of Hormuz to general traffic while allowing its own oil exports and shipments to China to pass through, using relatively few drones and missiles to create blockade conditions.
“they basically managed to close it to traffic that they don't approve of. They're able to get their own oil out, get oil to China, but everybody else has basically been blockade. And it doesn't take much to do that because it's such a narrow waterway. So very few drones, very few missiles are wreaking havoc.”
The U.S. military has long recognized that closing the Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of the world's oil flows presents an extremely difficult problem with no obvious military solution, which is part of why previous presidents avoided war with Iran.
“Well, I think the U.S. military has long recognized this is an extremely difficult problem. And I think this is part we're seeing part of the reason why previous presidents did not go to war with Iran because they're very aware of the risks of a conflict. The principle one being the closure of the Strait of Hormuz through which, as you noted, 20% of the world's oil flows. And there's not an obvious military solution to this problem.”
The U.S. Navy today is much smaller than in the 1980s when it had around 500 ships, and it currently lacks enough destroyers available for Strait escort duty because those ships are committed to other assignments including aircraft carrier strike groups.
“the U.S. Navy is just so small. It's much smaller than it was in the 1980s when we had a Navy around 500 ships. It's much smaller than that today. And they just don't have a lot of destroyers sitting around available for escort duty. If you were using destroyers for escort duty, you'd be pulling them off other assignments, including being part of these aircraft carrier strike groups that are operating in the region as well.”
One obvious lesson from the fighting that favors the U.S. is the potency of U.S. airpower and intelligence capability and ability to act upon them, which could have some deterrent effect on future adversaries.
“I mean, I think one obvious lesson will be in our favor, which is simply the potency of U.S. airpower and our ability to generate tremendous intelligence and to act upon. And I think that to some extent could have a deterrent effect on future adversaries.”
The Strait of Hormuz is 20-30 miles wide at its narrowest point, creating very dangerous waters for naval forces because Iranian drones, missiles, or mines provide very little warning time and operators may not have enough time to activate defensive systems before impact.
“the Strait of Hormuz is about 20 to 30 miles wide at its narrowest point. And so that becomes very dangerous waters for any Naval force trying to operate in there because if the Iranians are launching missiles or drones or there's also, they also have mining capabilities, you have very little warning time, very little time to react and perhaps not enough time to activate defensive systems.”
Oil prices have skyrocketed to near $100 per barrel and the U.S. stock market has faced major uncertainty due to Iranian actions closing the Strait of Hormuz, suggesting Iran is successfully raising the economic costs of the conflict.
“You're seeing the price of oil skyrocket, flirting with $100 a barrel this weekend. You're seeing major uncertainty in the U.S. stock market. I think the Iranians are making their point, that they're able to inflict damage and to raise the cost of this war.”
Wars are often determined not by who can inflict the most pain but by who can tolerate the most pain and maintain staying power, as demonstrated repeatedly in U.S. military history.
“Yeah, I think that's a very astute point. I think it's really a test of staying power and willingness to hang in there. And we've seen this repeatedly in U.S. military history where we inflicted massive pain on adversaries like North Vietnam and the Taliban, but we still lost those wars because they were able to take everything that we dished out and to keep on fighting for year after year, decade after decade.”
The U.S. should only go to war if it has to, not because it feels like it; wars should only be fought when there is genuine necessity, requiring much more caution in military force exercise, especially in major conflicts.
“we should really only go to war if we have to. We should not go to war because we feel like it. We should only go to war when we need to. And I think we should be much more cautious in the exercise of military force, especially in such a major conflict.”
The repeated rejection of Ukrainian drone technology offers represents American hubris—a recurring feature of American military and foreign policy for over a century where U.S. government leaders believe America is the 'biggest, baddest kid on the block' and don't need to learn from others.
“This is another study in American hubris, which has been sort of a recurring feature of American military and foreign policy for more than a century ever since we've been a great power. There's kind of a tendency in the halls of the U.S. government to think we're the biggest, baddest kid on the block and we don't have anything to learn from anybody else. And that's an illusion of which we have been repeatedly disabused in war after war.”
The U.S. lacks magazine depth (munitions stockpile adequacy) because of defense industrial base downsizing after the Cold War ended, creating vulnerability to sustained high-intensity conflict that burns through years of production in weeks.
“This is another huge U.S. vulnerability, which is once again being revealed, which is our lack of magazine depth, our lack of munitions. And this is a byproduct of the downsizing of the defense industrial base after the end of the Cold War.”
If Trump ends the bombing soon, it will likely be primarily because of the economic pressure that Iran is exerting through Strait of Hormuz closure, not because of military victory.
“The economic pressure. If President Trump ends the bombing soon, I think it'll be primarily because of the economic pressure that Iran is exerting.”
No other countries are likely to send their navies where the U.S. Navy, the world's most powerful navy, is afraid to go, so Trump's appeals to allies and adversaries to help reopen the Strait will likely be ignored.
“I think the odds that other countries are going to send their navies where the U.S. Navy, the world's most powerful navy is afraid to go, I think the odds of that happening are pretty remote.”
Missiles expended in Operation Epic Fury are not available for dealing with China or Russia, creating enormous opportunity costs in the form of depleted munitions reserves that should be reserved for peer competitors.
“the missiles that we're expending in this conflict, this war of choice with Iran, that means they're not available for dealing with China. They're not available for dealing with Russia.”
Objective measures of war success suggest Operation Epic Fury is not a U.S. victory: Iran retains nearly 1,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium, maintains a hostile clerical regime in power, and has demonstrated ability to close the Strait of Hormuz at will.
“the way the world will look at this objectively is if Iran still retains nearly a thousand pounds of highly enriched uranium, if Iran still has a very hostile clerical regime in power, and if Iran has shown an ability to close the Strait of Hormuz at will, none of that is going to look very much like a victory for the U.S., however hard Trump tries to spin it.”
Iran is militarily too weak to engage in conventional warfare with the U.S. or Israel, so instead expands the battlefield horizontally by striking multiple neighboring countries to inflict pain and increase economic costs of the conflict.
“Well, the Iranians know that they're much too weak militarily to go toe to toe with the United States or Israel. And so instead of engaging in a conventional military battle, what they're trying to do is to expand the battlefield in order to inflict pain on the U.S. and its regional allies and to increase the cost economically from waging this conflict.”
Presidents normally try to win international support and assemble coalitions for military action because if something goes wrong they can work with other countries to rectify the situation, but Trump's approach is unilateralism on steroids.
“this is why presidents normally try to win international support to assemble coalitions for military action because they know that if something goes wrong, they will then be able to work with other countries to rectify that situation. But President Trump's MO seems to be to be unilateralism on steroids. He goes in coordinating with nobody except for Israel.”
The Iranian regime knows the only way the U.S. can be certain of overthrowing them is by marching troops into Iran, and they are confident the U.S. will not take that step, giving them strategic confidence in their ability to survive.
“And so they know that the only way that the U.S. can be certain of overthrowing the Iranian regime is by marching onto Iran. And the Iranian regime is pretty confident, and I think rightly so, that we're not going to march onto Iran.”
Operation Epic Fury is a war of choice, not a war of necessity, with no clear objective metric for success or failure, revealing fundamental limits of American military power.
“This is a war of choice. This is not a war of necessity. There doesn't seem to be any kind of objective metric by which you can judge the success or failure of this endeavor. This is really, I think, revealing the limits of American military power.”
The U.S. Navy has no dedicated mine sweepers in the Persian Gulf, as the mine sweepers previously stationed there for decades were recently sent home to Philadelphia to be scrapped for iron.
“just a few months ago, the dedicated mine sweepers that the U.S. had stationed in the Persian Gulf for decades were sent home to Philadelphia to be scrapped for iron. And so we don't have dedicated mine sweepers in the Persian Gulf either as we used to have.”
Limited numbers of U.S. ground troops could theoretically be used for discrete tasks like seizing Kharg Island or securing Iran's uranium stockpile, but these operations are very risky and the Trump administration is concerned about U.S. casualties, making large-scale ground force deployment very unlikely.
“I think it's possible that they may use very limited numbers of ground troops. Really, special operations forces are a small number of Marines for very discreet tasks. I mean, one of those theoretically could be the seizure of Kharg Island, which I think would be a risky operation. There's also talk about potentially using special operations troops inside Iran to try to secure Iran's stockpile of nearly 1,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium, but they haven't done either of those operations so far because I think they're very risky. And I think there's a huge concern in the Trump administration and rightly so about U.S. casualties.”
President Trump's stated objectives for Operation Epic Fury are inconsistent and shifting, ranging from regime change to unconditional surrender to inciting internal revolution to finding an Iranian negotiating partner, while the Pentagon focuses narrowly on degrading military capabilities.
“Sometimes you hear from President Trump that he is after regime change. He talks about seeking unconditional surrender. He also talks about inciting a revolution in the streets of Iran, but at the same time, he also has engaged in wishful thinking about finding an Iranian Delcy Rodriguez with whom he can make a deal. And if you listen to what the Pentagon is saying, they're not talking about any of that. Their focus is it seems to be exclusively on degrading Iran's military capabilities.”
Trump stated he would know 'in his gut' when Operation Epic Fury is over because there is no objective metric by which to judge success or failure, allowing him to claim victory regardless of actual outcomes.
“President Trump said last week that he would know in his gut when it's over because there doesn't seem to be any kind of objective metric by which you can judge the success or failure of this endeavor.”
General Dan King, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, tried to warn about dangerously depleted U.S. weapons stockpiles before Operation Epic Fury started, and Pentagon briefings indicated a conflict with Iran would dangerously draw down weapons stocks.
“General Dan King, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs tried to warn about right before the war started. There were a bunch of news leaks about Pentagon briefings about how a conflict with Iran would dangerously draw down U.S. weapons stockpiles. And I think we're seeing that come to pass.”
Several days into Operation Epic Fury, the Pentagon suddenly took great interest in drone warfare and what Ukrainians learned in their four years of drone warfare experience, suggesting the U.S. military was not prepared for asymmetric drone threats.
“several days into the war, the Pentagon suddenly took a great deal of interest in drone warfare and what the Ukrainians had learned in their four years of both waging drone warfare and being the victim of drone warfare.”
The U.S. has taken weapon stocks from bases around the world and is drawing on stocks held by allies to resupply Operation Epic Fury, creating vulnerabilities for allies like South Korea facing nuclear-armed North Korea.
“we are taking weapon stocks from bases around the world to apply here in the war against Iran... we're also asking for a drawing on stocks held by our allies. My sense is, for example, in South Korea, they're a bit unnerved that we may be creating a vulnerability for South Korea facing nuclear armed North Korea by the way this war is going and how the United States is in essence scavenging for munitions around the world.”
The Pentagon moved a THAAD battery (one of the most powerful missile defense systems) from South Korea to the Middle East, leaving South Korea more vulnerable to North Korean threats.
“The Pentagon, for example, just moved a THAAD battery, which is one of the most powerful missile defense systems we have. They just moved a THAAD battery from South Korea to the Middle East, leaving South Korea more vulnerable.”
The Trump administration and Pete Hegseth tend to blame the U.S. military for strategic failures, attributing problems to 'woke generals,' and there may be backlash against the military after the Iran war where many things have gone wrong.
“I think there's been a tendency on the part of this administration, in particular, Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth, to blame the U.S. military for those failures to blame so called woke generals. And it wouldn't surprise me, by the way, to see a backlash from this administration against the military after the Iran war where a lot of things have gone wrong.”
Ukraine offered the United States access to its anti-drone technology following an unfavorable Trump-Zelenskyy Oval Office conversation, but the U.S. (either the White House or Pentagon) turned down the offer.
“in the aftermath of the rather unfortunate Oval Office conversation between President Trump and President Zelenskyy, that Ukraine offered the United States access to its anti-drone technology and the United States. I'm not sure whether it was the White House or the Pentagon turned it down.”
Trump is now begging other countries to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, despite previously insisting the U.S. had already won the war and telling allies like the UK that there was no need to send ships, reflecting panic about inability to solve the problem.
“A week ago, he was telling the UK, 'No need to send your ships. We've already won the war.' But now I think he's starting to panic and say, 'Oh my goodness, there's no way we can reopen the Strait of Hormuz. And I'm hostage to the world oil market.' So now he's begging other countries to come in there.”
Oil price spikes in the U.S. are invalidating two of Trump's biggest campaign selling points: that he would keep the U.S. out of Middle East wars and that he would lower gasoline prices.
“what makes this, I think particularly horrifying from a political standpoint for Trump is two of his biggest selling points are A, I'm going to keep U.S. out of Middle East wars, and B, I'm going to lower the price of gasoline, and both of those are being invalidated by this conflict.”
Max Boot supported the Iraq war and regrets doing so, informing his view that the U.S. should be much more cautious about military force exercise.
“For me, the big takeaway as somebody who supported the Iraq war and regrets doing so is we should really only go to war if we have to.”