What this covers

This is a conversation between Graham Allison, the Harvard Kennedy School political scientist, and the investor Kyle Bass, filmed in September 2018. It starts from the historical record: in 16 cases over 500 years where a rising power threatened a ruling one, 12 ended in war. The conversation tests that pattern against China's position today. Allison takes the long view of Chinese self-understanding, which includes a word for China meaning "center of the universe," a "century of humiliation," and Xi Jinping's aim of restoring China to the top of every pecking order. He also covers the stated technology targets for 2025, 2035 and 2049. Bass brings the economic and financial side.

The range is wide. Allison revisits the 25-year bet that a richer China would become a responsible stakeholder and more like the US, and he notes that 40% of world growth since 2008 has come from China. Bass describes a "dual-world" Chinese economy, with a domestic RMB system that can restructure loans at will and an external one that depends on hard currency. He also cites estimated intellectual property theft of $200–300 billion a year, and contrasts how fast China can build a railroad with US permitting. The two also discuss how data and AI might have changed the fortunes of a command economy.

The most contentious stretch concerns triggers and remedies. Allison names Taiwan, North Korea and Hong Kong as flashpoints, recounts the 1996 Taiwan Strait standoff and the missile buildup it provoked, and warns that cyber retaliation could start an escalation ladder. He then turns to the Cold War, where wise observers called war inevitable and it did not come. He says that outcome rested on strategic inventions that once seemed naive, such as the Marshall Plan and NATO's Article V. Bass pushes back, arguing that the postwar conditions behind those measures do not exist now.

Sharpest takeaway

Allison argues that the US-China power shift follows the historical pattern of the Thucydides Trap—where rising powers and established powers enter rivalry that frequently escalates to war—and while war is not inevitable, it requires imaginative strategic invention comparable to Cold War measures to avoid catastrophic conflict.

  • Of 16 historical cases where rising powers threatened ruling powers, 12 ended in war and 4 in peace, establishing the trap as a real structural pattern
  • Current US-China competition involves incompatible values, interests, and self-images that make external incidents (Taiwan, North Korea) act as escalation triggers neither side can control
  • Strategic escape requires radical new frameworks like NATO and the Marshall Plan were in their time, not merely defending the status quo

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0.80

In the last 500 years, there have been 16 cases where a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power; 12 of these ended in war and 4 did not, establishing a pattern Thucydides described as the fear instilled in an established power by a rising disruptor causing conflict.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“in the Thucydides's trap case project we looked at the last 500 years. We found 16 times a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power. 12 of them ended in war, for and not war.”

0.79

China has a dual-world economy: one RMB-based and domestic where they can restructure any loan, print money, and pretend things didn't happen; the other apparatus to trade with the rest of the world is in dollars, euros, or yen, and no one will take RMB as a settlement currency, making China dependent on hard currency inflows.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Kyle Bass

“They have a world that's RMB based that's domestic. To your point, they can restructure any loan. They can print some more money. They can pretend things didn't happen. The trees can fall in the woods and we won't hear them to a certain extent. But then their apparatus to trade with the rest of the world is in dollars, euros, or yen, no one will take RMB as a settlement currency.”

0.75

China has set specific dates and targets for technological dominance: by 2025 China will dominate its domestic markets in 10 major new technologies including driverless cars, AI, and quantum computing; by 2035 China will be the dominant force in technology and innovation everywhere; and by 2049 (100th anniversary of the People's Republic) China aims to be ambiguously number one with an army that can fight and win.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“2025, China's going to be-- dominate its domestic markets in 10 major new technologies, including driver-less cars, AI, quantum computing. In 2035, China is going to be the dominant force in technology and innovation everywhere. In 2049, which is the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, they mean to be an ambiguously number one.”

0.74

World War I was sparked by an incident as inconsequential as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a minor figure in the Austro-Hungarian empire, which became a trigger that burned down the whole of Europe and created a war so devastating historians had to create a new category called 'World War.'

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“In that case, a incident is inconsequential apparently as the assassination of a minor figure, the Archduke of the Austro-Hungarian emperor became the spark that created a fire that burned down the whole of Europe. So in this series of cases, each one is interestingly different, but as Henry Kissinger said, there's a lens here for piercing through the noise and news of the day to get the underlying dynamic what's happening in relations between a rising China and a ruling US.”

0.74

In Chinese culture, the Mandarin word for China means 'center of the universe,' and in their historical story they are the sun while every other country is a tributary that circulates around them, and they have been custom to ruling everything they could see for 4,000 years.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“In China, as you know, the Mandarin word for China means center of the universe. In their story, they are the sun, every other country is a tributary that circulates around them. And they are custom in this story for 4,000 years to ruling everything they could see.”

0.74

The dominant theory for 25 years was that as China becomes richer it will become more like us, become wealthier, become more democratic, and take its place as a responsible stakeholder, which was the theory of the case for the US government to encourage China's growth and for leaders of global finance and production to integrate supply chains with China.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“the recognition, that just accepting the way things were and have been for the last 25 years, which each successive president has ultimately done with a theory or vision that said, as China becomes richer it will become more like us. So it will become wealthier, they will become more democratic, they will take its place as a responsible stakeholder. So there was theory of the case, and that theory of the case was a theory of the case for the US government to try to encourage China's growth.”

0.74

The key question is not whether war is likely but what the US and China do about it, and the analogy Allison draws from is the Cold War, where wise observers in the 1950s-1960s said war between the Soviet Union and US was inevitable, even nuclear war, but that did not happen.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“So the question is, what do we do? So if you, the analogy I, or one that I take some inspiration from is the Cold War. So there were many wise cats that said in the 1950s and 1960s that was inevitable that there would be a war, even a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States. And people today can't believe it because of what Russia has become.”

0.74

The Marshall Plan, announced by Secretary of State George Marshall in June 1947, proposed that the US—exhausted from WWII and spending half its GDP on war—should tax itself 1.5% of GDP annually for several years to send money to Europe to rebuild countries like Germany and Italy that had recently been fighting against the US.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“In June of 1947, so year after-- year and a half after the war, Marshall came to Harvard. Gave the commencement speech. And he said, I have an idea. We've just been fighting this war. We were spending half of our GDP. We've now given that up. We're back to the building American at home. We have to mobilize all the troops and come home. But I have another idea. The poor Europeans were devastated and the Soviets are aggressive, we should tax ourselves 1.5% of GDP a year for the next several years. And send the money to Europe and help rebuild countries like Germany and Italy. Those guys were just killing us two years ago.”

0.74

Bass has a nuanced view of the Marshall Plan period because the US had just won the war, had eliminated the productive capacity of almost two continents, ran trade surpluses with every trading partner in 1946, and World War II killed about 3% of the world's population, conditions that do not exist today.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Kyle Bass

“Well, for number one, we had won the war. GA: Right. KB: Right. And we both sides deficit spent going into the war, right? 1946 was the US's highest level of debt we've ever had. GDP is about 106%. To the victor went to spoils. And to the loser went to defeat and default. Right? And so when we talk about importing that idea to today I shudder to think about it because we had eliminated the productive capacity of almost two continents... And we ran trade surpluses with every single trading partner in 1946... And World War II killed about 3% of the world's population.”

0.74

Allison, as a 'red-blooded American,' still likes the idea that the US should be the biggest economy in the world, but recognizes that there are four times as many Chinese as Americans, so if Chinese are only one-quarter as productive as Americans, they will have economies as big as ours, and if they are half as productive, they will have an economy twice as big as America's.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“I look at this and I think I still like the idea that we should be the biggest economy in the world. So that's what I would like. And then I look at it and say, but there's four times as many Chinese as we are. So if they are only one quarter as productive as we are, they're going to have economies big as ours. I mean, they seem to be pretty smart and pretty determined and pretty hungry, what if they were half as productive as we are? Just half. Well, now they've got an economy twice as big as ours.”

0.70

Kennedy's administration in 1961 believed the Soviet Union would have an economy as large as the US by the 1970s, which was what all economists predicted at that time, yet the US was able to sustain competitive strategy even facing apparent peer competition.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“When John Kennedy became president in 1961, he believed that by the '70s the Soviets would have an economy as big as we did. And that's what the economists all believe.”

0.69

The US Navy in the Pacific is viewed by Americans as the natural arbiter of events, while China views the US as operating in their backyard and believes they should be the person who decides who builds an island in the South China Sea.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“we think that it's natural that the US Navy is the arbiter of events in the Pacific. They think we're operating in their backyard and that they should be the person that decides who builds an island in the South China Sea.”

0.69

Xi Jinping's grand strategy, made explicit when he became president, is to make China great again by restoring China to its natural place at the top of every pecking order where it was until the century of humiliation when Westerners arrived with technology.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“China's grand strategy, as Xi Jinping said explicitly when he became president, is to make China great again. He made this great rejuvenation of the great Chinese people long before Trump took up this banner. And by making China great again, for him and everybody else in this system, this means restoring China to its natural place at the top of every pecking order where it was until the century of humiliation when the Westerners showed up with their technology.”

0.69

Building a railroad in the US may take five years and $50 billion due to permitting requirements, whereas in China the same railroad can be built in five months because they don't need the permitting process, illustrating the different governance trade-offs.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Kyle Bass

“to build a railroad here it may take five years and $50 billion. And in China they can build one in five months because they don't need the permitting.”

0.69

We cannot simply cling to the status quo everywhere, because if power has changed dramatically, alliances become more important than before, and with China becoming twice as big as the US, the US needs allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia, plus possibly India, to maintain strategic parity.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“We can't simply cling to the status quo everywhere, not if the fundamental-- so if power changed dramatically, we may have to understand our alliances are more important than we thought, because if you're now twice as big as I am, if I have two other guys here that are about my size, and I only have three to two. Japan and South Korea and Australia and maybe in principle India”

0.69

Because once the US responds to Chinese cyber attacks against its own cyber capabilities, neither side can stand down, and this escalation ladder historically ends in full-scale war that neither side initially wanted.

forecasthigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“I then respond against your cyber capabilities, because if I don't, you could make it impossible for me to do so. So one thing leads to the other. And historically that kind of escalation ladder has ultimately ended in a full scale war that the two parties didn't imagine that they wanted, but neither could stand down at the stage of the process.”

0.69

If the Soviet Union had possessed Google and Apple's technology (big data search and collection capabilities), combined with AI decision-making, it might have been more successful in managing its command economy, according to insights from Eric Schmidt.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Graham Allison

“He says, if the Soviet Union had had basically Google and Apple, had the technology of both the big data search and collection of data about everything, they might have been more successful.”

0.68

The scale of Chinese intellectual property theft is estimated at between $200-$300 billion per year, which amounts to $2-$3 trillion over a 10-year period of stolen intellectual property, and the US's greatest asset is its intellectual property and supremacy in education.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Kyle Bass

“The scale from all of them is kind of-- they're congruent with one another between 200 and 300 billion a year. It's hard to quantify. But that amounts over a 10 year period that $2 or $3 trillion worth of true intellectual property from-- one would argue that the US's greatest asset is our intellectual property, our kind of supremacy and education.”

0.66

In 1996, China responded to Taiwan's independence moves by conducting missile tests that bracketed the island, making it impossible for ships to supply Taiwan since it is an island that depends on ships coming, and Clinton responded by moving two carriers to force China to back down, which they did, but they were humiliated and immediately began building a missile force to sink US carriers.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“in 1996 the Taiwanese were making a move towards independence. China responded by missile tests that bracketed the island, which therefore made it impossible for anybody to bring a ship and supply, because they are an island, ultimately they depend on ships coming. So in 1996 I was in the Pentagon at the time. Clinton decided we would move two carriers up to basically force them to back down. We did. They backed down. They were humiliated. And they immediately began building a missile force on land that would be able to sink our carriers, which they've done very successfully.”

0.66

NATO required the US to make a commitment in Article V that an attack on one of the Europeans was an attack on the US, which would have seemed crazy to people who heard it because George Washington and every other president had warned against entangling alliances with Europeans.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“George Washington and every other president said beware entangling alliances. You get into an alliance with these Europeans and they'll drag you into a war you'll want to quit. In NATO we made a commitment in Article V that an attack on one of the Europeans was an attack on us. What? KB: And Japan. GA: What? OK, you would say that's crazy. That turned out to be a brilliant idea that was part of the success of the Cold War strategy.”

0.66

The Cold War strategy was developed over the 1940s-1970s and consisted of four or five pillars that included initiatives that seemed slightly crazy, naive, or unrealistic when first suggested, but were followed consistently across the political system for four decades until victory.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Graham Allison

“what was developed was a strategy with four or five pillars that became the Cold War strategy over the period of the '40s and then in the '50s and '60s and '70 that we basically followed, strangely enough, even in the political system, as you had said before, that alternates with parties and alternates with presidents for four decades to a point of victory. In the Cold War strategy, the key pillars of it each included initiatives that seem slightly crazy or naive or unrealistic when people first suggested them.”

0.64

Potential escalation points in US-China relations include North Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, with Taiwan being a very good candidate for a triggering incident that could escalate to real war, similar to what happened in the run-up to Pearl Harbor.

forecasthigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Graham Allison

“As you write in your book, potentially North Korea. GA: North Korea, Taiwan. KB: Taiwan. Hong Kong. GA: Taiwan's a very good candidate. Hong Kong's an interesting-- but even a trade war could escalate to a real war. And we saw that happen in the run up to what became Pearl Harbor and Japan's attack on the US.”

0.64

40% of all growth in the world since 2008 has occurred in only one country, China, which is out of sight and has never been seen before in the historical record, giving Chinese citizens and leadership confidence that the system is working and the bus is being driven successfully.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Graham Allison

“as they look at their spectacular success since 2008 relative to everybody else, 40% of all the growth in the world, the whole world, since 2008 has happened in only one country, China. This is out of sight. I mean, it's literally out of sight. We've never seen anything like this in the historical record before.”

0.64

Secretary Mattis's national military strategy document shows breathless recognition that a China has emerged that is rivaling the US in many dimensions, representing a fundamental shift in how the US military establishment understands the strategic environment.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Graham Allison

“Secretary Mattis's new national military strategy, is even breathless at some stage, which is just looking and say, what? What? And as one of my Chinese friends said”

0.62

A company like Tesla under Elon Musk has never earned a profit for a year yet sustains a huge amount of debt, which Allison notes would normally be considered reckless and would make him nervous, yet China believes because it has more instruments of control and most debt is internal, it can manage a level of debt that historically other economies would find unmanageable.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“let's take, for example, Elon Musk, type of company that never earned a profit for a year. And I'm sustaining, how much debt? Huge amount. So you would I would say, that's reckless... So I think that they believe, because they have more instruments of control and because most of the debt is internal, that they can manage a level of debt that historically other economies would find unmanageable.”

0.61

Allison is not proposing a modern Marshall Plan but rather is using it as an example of the need for equally radical ideas, with NATO being another example of a radical idea (breaking with George Washington's warning against entangling alliances) that turned out to be brilliant.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“I'm not proposing a Marshall Plan. KB: No, I know, I know. You're saying, your collective project-- GA: I'm saying-- If you thought about that idea in June of 1947... So I don't think-- my idea is not we should have a Marshall Plan now. An idea equally radical, another radical idea was NATO. So NATO-- George Washington and every other president said beware entangling alliances... In NATO we made a commitment in Article V that an attack on one of the Europeans was an attack on us. What?”

0.61

Space is another great accelerant in escalation because all American forces depend on satellites for observing what's going on, for targeting, and for communication, and all those satellites are big, fat, juicy targets that are not hard to shoot out of the sky.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“another great accelerant is space. So basically all of the American forces depend on satellites for both observing what's going on, for targeting, for communication. All those satellites are big, fat, juicy targets. So they're not hard to shoot out of the sky.”

0.61

The Marshall Plan was initially met with resistance from Americans who thought it was a bad idea, yet great leadership from Truman and Republican Senator Vandenberg (chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee) managed to implement it by 1948, showing that imaginative solutions can overcome political inertia.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“Nobody said that was a good idea. Most people said, what do you-- what? Nobody's going to be in favor of this. But lo and behold, great leadership from Truman and from Vandenberg, who was the Republican chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and people in the society managed and, lo and behold, by 1948 we were doing this.”

0.60

China's current account has turned from positive (trade surplus) to negative (trade deficit), eliminating one of its key sources of dollar inflows, while corporate borrowing in dollars has increased to $1.2 trillion in the last four years alone.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Kyle Bass

“their positive current account that they used to run, which is now negative, gave them an additional supply of dollars every year...Chinese corporate borrowing has gone to about 1.2 trillion in dollar terms in just the last four years.”

0.57

China has grown its GDP in RMB terms by 500% over 10 years while simultaneously growing its debt by 1,000%, a ratio China believes is sustainable while Western observers believe is unsustainable.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Kyle Bass

“China is they've grown their GDP in RMB terms by 1,000% over 10 years-- sorry, by 500% over 10 years. They've grown their debts by 1,000%. And so they believe it's sustainable. We believe it's unsustainable.”

0.57

Every president in the last 25 years has said they would get tough on China, but none have done it until Trump, who according to Bass agrees with his foreign policy approach on China, has actually re-leveled the playing field in economic foreign policy.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Kyle Bass

“Every president in the last 25 years just says they're going to get tough on China, but no one's done it. GA: Right. KB: So Trump is not someone I voted for. He's not a friend of mine. However, in foreign policy land and in the land of economic foreign policy, I agree with almost everything he's done. And so I'm wondering how you think about-- forget about his tweets. And how he gets there. But what he's done in re-leveling the playing field.”

0.55

The rising power syndrome emerges when a rising power thinks 'I'm bigger, I'm stronger, I deserve more say, I deserve more sway,' and perceives the current arrangements as put in place before it emerged and not accounting for its interests, causing it to demand that constraining arrangements be adjusted.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“in this dynamic, as Thucydides describes, you get a rising power syndrome in which I'm bigger, I'm stronger, I deserve more say, I deserve more sway. The current arrangements were put in place before I ever got here. Think of Uber and the taxi industry, or think of Google and everybody. So wait a minute, so we're going to change the rules and the rights. ... They were made before I showed up. They didn't take count of my interest. So I'm not really about you, I'm just about expressing myself. And these constraints seem to be constraining me, so they have to be adjusted.”

0.52

China's strategy for acquiring technology is explicitly 'RD&T'—research, development, and theft—rather than just 'R&D,' because stealing intellectual property is cheaper than having to research or develop it oneself, and China will continue doing this to the extent it can get away with it.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“They said, most companies have a strategy of R&D, so research and development. We have a strategy of RD&T, research development and theft. And actually, if you can steal intellectual property, it's a lot cheaper than having to research it yourself or develop it. ... So basically from a Chinese perspective, I think they will continue doing what they're doing to the extent that they can get away with it.”

0.52

The Chinese government should be thought of as similar to a major company like Google, Amazon, or Apple: it has a chief executive called 'the chief of everything,' has a plan like a company would, allocates resources with respect to its plan, and tries to manage and control this, giving it advantages over market economies in certain domains despite market economies being more efficient overall.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“think of the Chinese government as a first approximation. You would think of Google or Amazon or of Apple. So they have a chief executive. And he's called the chief of everything. They have a plan the way a company would have a plan. They allocate resources with respect to their plan. They try to manage and control this.”

0.52

If China's economic performance falters or enters a serious decline or crisis, the legitimacy based on driving the bus successfully is eliminated, and Xi Jinping has decided to add nationalism as a second leg to stand on, making Chinese people feel more pride in being Chinese and less dependent on economic performance for regime legitimacy.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“if they should falter, so there should be a serious decline in their performance or maybe even a crisis economically. Then the legitimacy that's based on your driving the bus so successfully, has just been eliminated. And in that case, right now you can see Xi Jinping and the regime have decided just to be comfortable and be safe and maybe even to strengthen it, we need a second leg to stand on. So the second leg is nationalism.”

0.52

The solution to the apparent mutual exclusivity of US and Chinese interests requires inventiveness about what would constitute a strategy for fundamentally adjusting the economic relationship so that it would be fair rules, fairly observed, and fairly guaranteed.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“I think being inventive about what would constitute a strategy for fundamentally adjusting the economic relationship, so that it would be fair rules, fairly observed, and fairly guaranteed.”

0.52

The fact that ideas seem radical, unrealistic, or not feasible when first proposed is not a reason to dismiss them; instead, there is a need for a surge of imagination in strategic thinking about US-China relations.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“I can just say the fact that I think we need to be thinking of and considering ideas that when you first say them or hear them you just say that's radical, unrealistic. ... And so that's why we need a surge of imagination in this space.”

0.52

China has three dimensions to assess as friend, rival, or adversary: in some domains it is a friend, in others it is a rival, and in still others it is an adversary, which Americans in the strategic and policy communities struggle to conceptualize because they need just one categorical answer.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“So basically in some domains China is our friend, in some domains Chinese is our rival, in some domains China is our adversary. And conceptually getting our head around that, for Americans and many people in the strategic community, I need to just know one or the other.”

0.52

The ruling power's response to the rising power involves saying 'what the hell is going on? Who created the environment in which you ever got to emerge? Who provided the framework? This is not simply the status quo. This is the good order,' and expecting the rising power to become a responsible stakeholder.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“And the ruling power, again, in this syndrome, looks and says, wait a minute, what the hell is going on? Who created the environment in which you ever got to emerge? Who provided the framework? This is not simply the status quo. This is the good order. And you should take your place in it, become a responsible stakeholder.”

0.52

The best advice someone gave Bass on China years ago was to 'look at what they do and don't listen to what they say,' which Bass affirms is often better advice than listening to what people claim about themselves.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Kyle Bass

“The best advice someone gave me on China years ago was look at what they do and don't listen to what they say. GA: I agree. Watching what they do. Actually, watching what people do is often better, maybe even in the US, that is what they say.”

0.51

American companies and European companies operating in China are complicit in IP theft because they want access to China's market (the biggest market), and China requires technology transfer as a condition of market access, which is then stolen, yet companies complain to the US government privately while remaining polite publicly because they know Chinese leaders are tough and will punish them if they're too vocal.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“if a lot of it happens, actually, aided and abetted by American companies in the sense that an American company or a European company that wants to operate in China, they want access to the market, China has the biggest market. And so the Chinese extract even in this requirement to require technology to build plants. So then if I then have a big enough investment there, when they're stealing intellectual property from me, I come and complain to the US government. This is horrible, terrible, terrible. But when it comes to meeting with the leadership of China. I'm very polite because I know these men are tough guys and they will punish me if I'm too vocal in public.”

0.48

The US and China have fundamentally different foundational values: Americans believe individual liberties are the fundamental basis for building a society, while Chinese believe order and control is the fundamental way of running a country.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“we think individual liberties, the fundamental basis for building a society, they take order and control is the fundamental way of running a country.”

0.48

Allison responds to this disagreement by saying 'I don't think so,' but would be prepared to play out the political systems question in a peaceful environment, betting on American fundamental concepts of values and governance rather than China's.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“I'd say, I don't think so, but I'd be prepared to play that out in a peaceful environment betting on our fundamental concepts of values and governance rather than theirs.”

0.48

Sticking with the comfortable past and holding to the status quo is clearly unfeasible because it is what has gotten the US to where it is today and does not address the fundamental power shifts.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“sticking with the comfortable past and holding to the status quo is clearly unfeasible. KB: It's what got us to where we are today. GA: Absolutely.”

0.48

People in the economic and financial domain may be more imaginative about US-China solutions than the national security establishment, because there is a tendency in national security to stick with what is known and comfortable rather than innovate.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“And I think actually people in the economic and financial domain may turn out to be more imaginative about this than people in the national security establishment, because there's a tendency to kind of stick with the things we know and do that we're very comfortable with.”

0.48

The US has provided an international order, especially in Asia, that has enabled the 'Asian miracles' in Japan, Singapore, and ultimately China, creating the most peaceful and prosperous period in Asian history, which Americans believe should continue.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“The American story is we have been the provider of an international order, and especially an Asian order that actually has enabled the Asian miracles all over Asia. So we provided basically the economic and security framework that has enabled Japan and then Singapore and then ultimately China. Nobody more than-- this is the most peaceful, prosperous experience Asia has had in all of its history. And so we think that's a good way for things to be. And that's the way things should remain.”

0.48

It is very hard to transition from a posture of being friendly to and trying to encourage China's growth to suddenly waking up and realizing that the dragon you were friendly to when it was small is now as big as you are, and neither side can easily reverse the relationship that has been built.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“it's very hard to go from this picture of how I'm relating to you and trying to encourage you to grow, and then I look up and wake up and decide, whoa, wait a minute, this was when you were a small dragon that I was being friendly to that was almost like a pet. Now this dragon is as big as I am. I mean, what the hell happened?”

0.48

China's view is that it hasn't been hiding—Americans have had their heads stuck in the sands of the Middle East fighting wars for the 21st century, so US inattention to China's rise is not China's fault but the result of American preoccupation with other conflicts.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“as one of my Chinese friends said, he said, wait a minute, we haven't been hiding. The fact that many Americans have had their heads stuck in the sands of the Middle East fighting wars for the 21st century, that's not our fault. That's what you've been doing. We haven't been hiding here. We've just been growing trying to realize our hope to be, have wealthier citizens, have a better country, bigger”

0.47

Allison remains skeptical that command-and-control governance will be superior because he believes individual freedom is deeply part of the human soul and breast and is likely to be more creative and successful; however, looking at the record of the 21st century, American democracy has looked increasingly dysfunctional while the Chinese authoritarian model has worked better than he would have expected.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Graham Allison

“I'm too, I think, liberal in the European sense of thinking individual freedom is through much part of the human soul and the breast, and is likely to be more creative and more successful. But I would say, look at the last-- if we just take the record of the 21st century, if you were a Martian watching this game, you would be not so clear because the American democracy has looked increasingly dysfunctional. And this Chinese authoritarian model has worked better than I would have suspected.”

0.47

A strategy of 'escalating to de-escalate' involves demonstrating vulnerability and capability simultaneously: for example, China could shut down US financial markets for a day to show the US how vulnerable it is, calling the US president to demonstrate the capability without declaring responsibility, to deter further escalation.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“if I'm trying to remind you how vulnerable your whole society is. Suppose I say, OK, look, why don't I just close down your financial markets for a day, just for a day. And then you can explain whether there was an accident or make whatever story you want. I'm not going tell I did it. KB: I'm just letting you know I can. GA: I'll call you up and tell you, watch and see what happens tomorrow. And I hope this doesn't go any further. And so that's called escalating, so I've got pretty far up the ladder.”

0.43

If a US carrier is sunk in a Taiwan Strait incident with 5,000 people killed, the US President would face a situation where the Defense Department would call for destroying all Chinese missiles that could do that again, which means attacking facilities on the Chinese mainland.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“So now imagine that's the way the game gets started. So now we've-- they've sunk the carrier. 5,000 people died. That's a big event. So now you're the president. What do you do? So the Defense Department would say, our policy calls on destroying all the missiles that could do that again. That means attacking the Chinese mainland.”

0.43

Americans have become accustomed to being at the top of every pecking order for 100 years, termed the American Century, and the idea of another country being as big and strong as the US, or even bigger or stronger, strikes many Americans as an affront to who they are.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“Americans are accustomed to being at the top of every pecking order for 100 years. I mean, we call it the American Century. So the whole very idea of another country that would be as big and strong as the US or maybe even bigger or stronger, that strikes many Americans as an affront to who we are.”

0.43

Henry Kissinger taught Allison that the core American strategy is to overwhelm international problems with resources, but in 1945-1950 the US had half the world's GDP, in the Cold War it had 25%, and today it has 14%, and in five years will have 12%, making it impossible to simply overwhelm problems.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“Henry Kissinger taught me this, my old professor, many, many years ago. He said, really, in the end, our core strategy is to overwhelm problems, this is internationally, overall problems with resources. And in 1945, '50, we have half the world's GDP. KB: That's right. GA: Into the Cold War we have 25% of the world's GDP. Today we have 14% of the world's GDP. So a party with 14%, or in five years, 12% doesn't have the market power to deal with problems by simply overwhelming them with resources.”

0.43

Because the policy frame shifted from China-as-partner to China-as-adversary, American investment in Chinese technology is now considered investment in an enemy or adversary, and the US now prefers Chinese economic performance to be worse rather than better, reversing the previous assumption that mutual enrichment was desired.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Graham Allison

“So there's just been this flip. And the impact of that in every space, whether it's-- OK, so, therefore, an investment in American technology is by a enemy or adversary. So I better-- a supply chain that is dependent upon-- that's on my enemy or adversary, provided by-- the Chinese economic performance. Before, did we want it to be better or worse? We were thinking better is better because it was going to make them more-- blah, blah, blah. Now, I would say, in Washington they would prefer it to be worse.”

0.19

Allison has been pursuing the question of how to escape Thucydides Trap without giving up anything vital for either the US or China, visiting China every month and Washington every week since the book was published 15 months prior.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Graham Allison

“I've been, since the last 15 months, since the book was published, basically pursuing avidly in China every month and in Washington every week and here in Cambridge and everywhere else I can the question, how to escape Thucydides's trap without giving up anything vital for either the US or for China?”

0.17

After reviewing all the work and thought Allison has done, Bass believes there is some percentage probability that Allison thinks could lead to war and some percentage probability that they may not enter war, asking for a specific numerical probability that Allison assigns to war.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Kyle Bass

“And we come away thinking there is some percentage probability that Graham Allison thinks could take us to war. And there's some percentage probability that he takes it, say, we may not, we may get into these four areas of peace. If you were to give me the probability of war after all the work you've done and after all the thought you've put to it, what is that probability if you put it into a number for me?”