YouTube1h 1m· Aug 2024· cataloged

How Does Israel’s War in Gaza End? | Audrey Kurth Cronin, Marc Lynch, Dennis Ross, and Dana Stroul


What this covers

This Foreign Affairs roundtable was recorded on August 1, 2024, just after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Editor Daniel Kurtz-Phelan hosts four guests: Audrey Kurth Cronin, Mark Lynch, Dennis Ross, and Dana Stroul. The talk begins with the immediate danger of regional escalation and then moves to the longer questions of who governs Gaza, what the war has done to Israel's standing, and what the United States can still do. Stroul describes the Biden administration's stance after October 7th as backing Israel's campaign while using diplomacy to prevent a wider war.

On escalation, much of the discussion concerns how Iran might answer the humiliation of Haniyeh's killing. Stroul asks whether it would repeat the April 13th direct attack, whether it would be a single round or several, and whether it would be coordinated with proxies. Ross names unintended consequences and botched signaling as the biggest risk, and argues for combining punishment with inducement. Cronin counters that Iran's strength partly results from American choices, namely the Iraq war and the end of the nuclear deal. She also argues that killing Hamas leaders removes anyone to negotiate a hostage deal with, and she notes that the post-Munich targeted killings came after the hostages were already dead.

The later turns concern governance and regional politics. Stroul doubts that the Palestinian Authority has legitimacy, calls its reform a generational task, and warns that without civilian-centered planning, Gaza's residents will turn to Hamas shadow governments or clans. Lynch stresses settler expansion in the West Bank, provocations in Jerusalem, and Arab regimes constrained by angry publics and weak economies. Ross points to the UAE's aid work and to the Saudi demand for something on the Palestinians before normalization. Stroul and Ross also dispute how far US leverage over Israel can go, and Ross raises the Israeli court's ruling on drafting the Haredi.

Sharpest takeaway

The panel argues that while escalation risks in the Middle East remain acute and managed so far below the threshold of full regional war, the Gaza conflict's humanitarian devastation has fundamentally weakened Israel's strategic position, made a Palestinian political solution nearly impossible, and requires urgent US-led diplomatic intervention centered on ceasefire and hostage negotiations before miscalculation or domestic political pressure triggers broader war.

  • Each party (Iran, Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraq militias) claims to operate below escalation threshold, but eroding red lines and uncertainty increase miscalculation risk
  • Israel's targeted killings of Hamas leaders, while tactically precise, eliminate negotiating partners and make hostage deals less likely while strengthening Hamas's long-term appeal among Palestinians
  • Gaza's devastation (40,000+ dead, 80% infrastructure destroyed, 100% displacement) makes viable civilian Palestinian governance nearly impossible and undermines regional Arab willingness to normalize with Israel despite economic incentives

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0.75

Netanyahu said 'civilian Palestinian administration' but didn't say 'Palestinian Authority'; the challenge is there's not a better alternative, but the Palestinian Authority as it exists today doesn't have legitimacy even with Palestinians in the West Bank.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dana Stroul

“Netanyahu did talk about a civilian Palestinian administration, but he didn't say the words Palestinian Authority. And the challenge is there's just not a better alternative now. And the other part of the conversation that we're not having right now with Israel and really in a meaningful way at a regional or international level is that the Palestinian Authority as it exists today doesn't really have a lot of legitimacy even for Palestinians in the West Bank.”

0.75

Palestinian Authority reform is a generational effort requiring consistent engagement, consistent pressure, oversight of funding, and international consensus—something that can't happen during war and becomes impossible if regional conflict escalates.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dana Stroul

“if we're truly talking about a reform effort or reformed Palestinian Authority, this is a generational effort, which will take consistent engagement, consistent pressure, oversight of funding. The United States can't do it alone. Israel can't do it alone. There has to be international consensus around it. And the longer this war goes on in Gaza and especially if we do have a conflict operation that escalates, it's very hard for me to see how there's international consensus around this long-term commitment that needs to be made both for Gaza and the West Bank, which frankly is in Israel's long-term enduring security interest.”

0.74

Military policing and law enforcement-centric delivery of humanitarian aid is not what militaries are trained to do; the US learned this the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Militaries are trained to kill, not protect civilians and deliver humanitarian aid.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Dana Stroul

“Military policing, law enforcement-centric delivery of humanitarian aid is not what we generally train warfighters to do. We train warfighters to shoot and kill, not to protect civilians and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.”

0.74

An effective strategy toward Iran must operate through both punishment and inducement—Iran must understand the price of continued aggressive behavior, but also understand that they have something to gain if they change their behavior; this is the classic approach to affecting state behavior.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Dennis Ross

“We effectively have to be in a position where Iran has to understand what the price is as they measure it, but they also have to understand that they have something to gain if they if they change their behavior. I mean it's a kind of classic example of how you use all your tools to try to affect uh someone's behavior.”

0.71

Without immediate planning for a civilian-centric approach in post-conflict Gaza, the long war is lost even if Israel succeeds militarily, because civilians will seek security elsewhere (Hamas shadow governments, mafia clans) and will entrench opposition to any Palestinian-led civilian administration.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dana Stroul

“we know that without immediate planning for a civilian-centric approach in a post-conflict environment, you lose the long war anyway. Even if Israel succeeds in what it has defined as its military objectives, eliminating top Hamas leadership, eliminating and collapsing most of the Hamas battalions across Gaza and neutralizing the terror tunnels and strategic tunnels under Gaza. If there isn't an immediate plan for civilians, they're going to look somewhere else for security, and it's already happening on the ground. There's reports of Hamas shadow governments, of mafia-like business clans that are already offering support. Whoever has the most weapons and the most cigarettes gets to make the decisions at a very local level. And that will take root in such a way that this idea of a de-radicalized civilian administration that's Palestinian-led will be really difficult to get to.”

0.69

When the US has tried to exert leverage on partners through halting weapons sales (with Egypt, Saudi Arabia), it has never produced the complete behavioral change sought because partners often view their actions in existential terms.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dana Stroul

“when we have tried to exert leverage with something like financing, funding, or halting a weapon sale, and this isn't the first time we've done it. We've halted weapon sales when we we were concerned about Egyptian behavior. We've halted weapon sales when we've been concerned about Saudi behavior, and it has never produced the complete change in behavior that we have sought because many times our partners have viewed their actions in existential terms.”

0.69

October 7th and the Gaza devastation have magnified long-standing problems (settler expansion, Palestinian governance failure, regional divisions) but did not create them, and everything that has happened in Israel's prosecution of the war has ramped up these factors by approximately a thousand fold.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Lynch

“And so I think that's the real crux of of the problem that we face right now. And I think that October 7th and the devastation of Gaza has magnified many of those problems, but as everyone knows, it didn't create them. Uh this has been going on for quite a long time. But everything which has happened in Israel's prosecution of the war on Gaza has basically ramped up all of those factors by a faction by a factor of a thousand”

0.69

Arab regimes are primarily focused on their own survival and are extremely attentive to public opinion pressure regarding Gaza; they fear both foreign military escalation and domestic instability including uprisings and protests.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Lynch

“Arab regimes are primarily interested in their own survival and they've been very very attuned to the ways in which uh their public opinion is extremely upset about what's been happening in Gaza and they're not only looking at the risk of war, they're also looking at the risk of domestic instability, uprisings, protests and the like.”

0.69

Israeli politicians are taking provocative actions in Jerusalem and the West Bank that have historically triggered large-scale protests in places like Jordan and other Middle Eastern states, creating additional escalation tinder independent of Gaza and Lebanon dynamics.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Lynch

“don't only look at uh at Gaza and Lebanon. The last thing I want to point out is you've got to keep an eye on what's happening in Jerusalem and the West Bank more broadly, but especially Jerusalem, where Israeli politicians are taking very provocative actions which are also the type of thing that in places like Jordan and other parts of the Middle East have traditionally set off large-scale protests.”

0.69

Arab states want to cooperate with Israel and participate in the American regional order, but face severe domestic political constraints because their populations are deeply upset about Gaza's scale and magnitude of killing, making it very difficult for them to provide political and financial support for reconstruction.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Lynch

“And even I would say that the Arab states that everyone is counting on to finance and fund reconstruction, again, I don't think that many of them have particular scruples about any of this. They clearly want to cooperate with Israel. They want to be part of the American um, regional order, but it's very very difficult for them to do so when their people are as upset as they are, as they right they are, about the scale and magnitude of the killing that they see.”

0.69

Israeli actions in the West Bank and Jerusalem—settler expansion, confiscation of territory, and breakdown of administrative red lines in the Old City—move in the opposite direction from what would be needed for a two-state solution, suggesting Israel has no intention of pursuing a two-state path.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mark Lynch

“you're seeing the settle the radical wing of the settlers running amok with the support of the Israeli state. You're seeing the large-scale confiscation of territory. You're seeing the breakdown of red lines in in uh, in the administration of Jerusalem in the Old City. And basically what you're seeing is everything is going in the opposite direction of what we would need to to seeing if we wanted to have any kind of hopeful idea that out of this emerges a two-state solution.”

0.69

Iran's increased strength is partly a consequence of American policy, specifically the war in Iraq and the end of the Iran nuclear deal; understanding this context is necessary for developing effective Iran policy.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“Very quickly, um I I would like to point out that one of the reasons why Iran got stronger was because of American policy with respect to the war in Iraq. So let's not forget that. Um and and of course the um uh end of of the Iran deal as well we could talk about but we will not”

0.68

The post-1972 Munich Olympics response (targeted killings of those responsible) differs from current strategy in one critical way: in 1972, the hostages were already dead, whereas now hostages are still alive and captive.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“I see in all of this is the, uh families of the hostages. It's quite clear that a kind of a grapes of wrath style continued targeted killing, as happened in the aftermath of the 1972 Olympics Munich massacre, is what the policy is. And, uh the difference between taking out all of Hamas's leaders, including Haniyeh in in Iran, and what happened in the aftermath of 1972, uh Munich Olympics massacre, is that the hostages were dead then.”

0.68

There haven't been the right channels between the IDF and the UN humanitarian delivery and NGO community in Gaza, and Arab partners haven't been trained in law enforcement, civilian-centric, humanitarian-delivery approaches—training that should be happening now but we're still stuck on political conditions.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dana Stroul

“We've learned the hard way that there haven't been the right channels with the United Nations humanitarian delivery and NGO community in Gaza. And we have a problem that a lot of the training our Arab partners have done hasn't been law enforcement civilian centric humanitarian delivery, etc. That training should be given should be taking place now. And we're still talking about the political conditions around such a mission.”

0.68

Arab regimes' economies are disastrous, they are already as repressive as they can be, and with summer heat due to climate change—people thirsty, hot—it is very easy for things to spiral out of control in places like Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, creating conditions where regimes might take unexpected actions contrary to their rational self-interest.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Lynch

“all of these regimes outside of a few Gulf states are living on the edge. Their economies are disastrous, they they're already about as repressive as they can get and they they really are. This is the summer, it's hot because of climate change, you know, people are thirsty, they're hot, they're it's really easy for things to spiral out of control in a place just Egypt or Jordan or Iraq or or any place else.”

0.65

The Israeli Supreme Court ruled 9-0 that the ultra-religious Haredi must be drafted into the military, with 78% of Israeli public support for this decision; this will eventually impact the Likud party politically because no party can remain on the wrong side of this issue.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dennis Ross

“I would flag for you, the Supreme Court made a decision, 9-0, that the Haredi, the ultra-religious, have to be drafted. Now, 78% of the Israeli public supported that decision. Of the of the nine Supreme Court justices, three are observant, religiously observant. They wear kippah. They're conservative. 78% of the Israeli public supported this decision. Now, that in time is going to have an impact on Likud. Because basically, you cannot be on the wrong side of that issue. It's going to express itself politically.”

0.64

Iran faced public humiliation on the day of its new president's inauguration due to the Israeli killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, exposing operational security failures in both Hezbollah and Iran that make it politically difficult for Iran not to respond.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dana Stroul

“But the regime in Tehran has been publicly humiliated on the same day as the new Iranian president's inauguration, and it exposes both Hezbollah's operational security and Iran's operational security that they can't keep their people safe. Hard to see how they don't respond.”

0.63

The Saudis now require something on the Palestinians as a condition for normalization—something they did not require before October 7th—showing that the humanitarian devastation of Gaza has shifted their red lines.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Dennis Ross

“But that's their priority. And what they're They're now, uh and I spent plenty of time talking to them, they require something on the Palestinians that was not the case before.”

0.63

The key question is whether Iran will respond with another direct state-on-state attack like the April 13th precedent, and whether it will be a one-off response or multiple rounds, coordinated with proxies, and whether it targets civilians or military objectives.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Dana Stroul

“We're likely to see something similar to April 13th. Again, that threshold has been crossed of this direct state-on-state attack. I'm looking for whether or not there's another direct state-on-state attack. Is it a one-off, or are there multiple rounds? Is a way that Iran signals uh its uh displeasure and rejection of Israeli actions to make this time a coordinated attack with other proxies? Could it be an Iran attack together with Hezbollah, together with the Houthis, together with the militias in Iraq and Syria? Is it only directed at Israel, or is it also directed at US forces? Is there collateral damage and civilian casualties, or is it more military targets”

0.61

The greatest single risk in the current moment is unintended consequences or failed execution of attacks that one side carries out, where signaling efforts miss their targets despite good intentions.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dennis Ross

“there's a I'd say two things to start with. Uh one, the greatest single risk right now is the unintended consequences or a a failed execution of attacks that one or the other side wants to carry out.”

0.60

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh leaves Hamas with no one to talk to, eliminating potential negotiating partners and making it impossible to reach a hostage deal without a political avenue for negotiations.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“The assassination of Haniyeh leaves them with no one to talk to. So, the other side that I would say greatly alarms me with respect to this development is that it, um seems to have no emphasis on the fate of the hostages. Uh there doesn't seem to be a plan, a political avenue through which to get a deal, and getting a deal is the only way to get the hostages back.”

0.60

The UAE is actively engaged on the ground in Gaza with a hospital ship, field hospital, and four bakeries feeding half a million people daily, driven partly by motivation to validate the Abraham Accords, demonstrating Arab state willingness to invest seriously in Gaza reconstruction.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dennis Ross

“In the case of the Saudis, when the Saudis the Saudis clearly still want to do the normalization deal. Why? Not because of normalization with Israel, because they wanted a defense treaty with the United States, because that ties to what they see as their most important priority, the internal transformation of Saudi Arabia, creating the security that guarantees they won't be threatened by Iran in a way that that could disrupt that or threaten that. But that's their priority. And what they're They're now, uh and I spent plenty of time talking to them, they require something on the Palestinians that was not the case before. Now, if if Bibi wants a legacy that is not October 7th, he will have to he'll have to make some fundamental decisions that that will not allow this government as it is to to endure.”

0.59

The idea that US leverage on Israel is the only relevant variable in the conflict omits that the rest of the region, Arab states, have also failed to compel Hamas to agree to a ceasefire and to prioritize civilian lives, making this not a one-for-one equal thing but a more complex negotiation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dana Stroul

“And number two, the idea that this is about what leverage the United States can exert on Israel without acknowledgement that the rest of the region has also failed to compel Hamas, a terrorist organization, to agree to the ceasefire, to prioritize civilian lives, which it also hasn't done. It's not a one-for-one equal thing, but the idea that it's about what the United States can exert in terms of leverage on Israel without without recognition, I think, sufficiently that we're we are um trying to negotiate with a terrorist organization which celebrates a loss of lives is is unequal here”

0.57

After October 7th, the Biden administration's position was supporting Israel in its military campaign in Gaza while using diplomacy and other tools to prevent a full-scale regional war.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Dana Stroul

“After the Hamas attack on October 7th, the President Biden here was quite clear that the US position was going to be supporting Israel in its campaign in Gaza, but setting the theater and using diplomacy and other tools to prevent the full-scale regional war.”

0.57

Israel faces pressure on multiple fronts from Lebanese Hezbollah (starting October 8th with increasingly sophisticated weapons and deeper strikes into Israel), Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria (launching 180+ attacks on US forces), Houthis (threatening Red Sea navigation and attacking Tel Aviv), and direct ballistic/cruise missile and drone attacks from Iran in mid-April.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Dana Stroul

“the IDF, the Israel Defense Forces, have worked to militarily dismantle Hamas in Gaza, they have also faced pressure on multiple other fronts. So of course, the one that is very much in the news today is the pressure in Israel's northern arena, which is Lebanese Hezbollah, which started on October 8th with an increasingly sophisticated weapons and deeper inside Israel level of attacks...Then we saw Iran-backed militias and proxies in Iraq and Syria both launch drones and missiles toward Israel, but also over 180 attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria...And then the Houthis, another Iran-backed proxy group in Yemen, who have both launched a campaign to threaten freedom of navigation...but have also launched a drone attack toward Israel that hit Tel Aviv only a couple weeks ago. And then finally, of course, we have the Iran direct attack on Israel in mid-April.”

0.57

An estimated 40,000 Palestinian civilians have been killed, with most being women and children; this represents a massive legacy of the war that creates radicalization in the West Bank and damages international support for Israel, particularly among younger people.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“But we now have 40,000 Palestinian civilians. We don't really know the actual number. We but we we believe that most of them are women and children. That is a pretty big legacy of this war. And in the West Bank, there's increased radicalization. It's not as if you're going to easily get a strong Palestinian authority in that kind of a context.”

0.57

Biden has been bold in his Middle East approach: redirecting military posture from Europe/Asia to Middle East, clearly warning adversaries like Iran, directing precise strikes to protect US forces, and coordinating collective defense efforts—this deserves more recognition than it receives.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dana Stroul

“By what President Biden set out as his approach on the Middle East, which was to support Israel in what he saw as a legitimate effort to just militarily dismantle Hamas after the atrocities of October 7th, and then secondly, prevent regional war, which without question would be devastating not just for Palestinians and Israelis, but for all of the governments and all of the people of the region. When you think about what that could look like in collateral damage and loss of human life, I actually think he's been quite bold. He decided to veer away from his previous strategy of focusing military posture on Europe and Asia to reprioritize on the Middle East. He was clear-eyed in his warnings to adversaries Iran and its actors to not step in, and he's directed a very precise series of unilateral strikes to protect US forces, and work with others in Europe and in the Middle East to respond to the threats to freedom of navigation.”

0.56

The US does not currently have an effective strategy against Iran at either the nuclear or proxy level, though one is needed; Iran is enriching uranium to near weapons grade and will have 10 bombs' worth by next year, putting it in a position to divert.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dennis Ross

“Do we need to have an effective strategy against Iran and at this point do we have one? The answer is yes, we need an effective strategy against Iran and presently we don't have an effective strategy against Iran and at two different levels. Iran is now enriching to near weapons grade. They'll have by next year about 10 bombs worth of uranium enrichment to 60%. Uh that will put them in a position where they can begin to divert.”

0.55

Israeli targeted killing or assassination has been a core Israeli tactic for decades, dating back before even the founding of Israel, and has been heavily used against Hamas leaders specifically.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“the um Israelis have been very much dependent upon targeted killing or assassination, depending on your preferred term, for some years...the Israeli targeted killings, as I mentioned before, have been going on for decades, if not actually from the the founding of Israel.”

0.54

There is no end to the Israel-Hamas war without dealing with Iran, which is the true driver of the conflict; the US should support Israel in taking direct and significant military action against Iran's nuclear program and regional behavior to destroy the nuclear capability and punish Iranian attempts to destroy Israel.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Mark Rosen

“are they not missing the point that there is no end to this war without dealing with Iran? This is surely a war caused and supported by Iran and between Iran and Israel, and not really between Israel and Hamas. Surely it's time for the US to support Israel in taking direct and significant military action against Iran to destroy its nuclear build-up and punish Iran for their behavior of trying to destroy Israel and creating chaos in the region so that the deterrence position of both the US and Israel is reestablished.”

0.52

With each red line that is passed and overcome, uncertainty increases and it becomes much easier to misread the intended signal of a provocation, making miscalculation more likely to trigger escalation.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Lynch

“I think the other thing which Dana pointed out, which is really important, is that with each red line that gets um that gets passed and uh and overcome you it's not just that they're moving to a higher level level of conflict. It's also that uncertainty goes up and that is much easier to misread what the intended signal is of a particular kind of action or provocation or the like. And the steady erosion of the red lines really is quite alarming because I think that does help to prevent escalation dynamics in the past and right now that's really not there.”

0.52

The scale and scope of humanitarian devastation in Gaza (80% infrastructure destroyed, 100% population displaced, 40,000-50,000 dead) means that no Palestinian political figure can put a face on rebuilding and survive politically, making any civilian administration impossible to staff.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Mark Lynch

“trying to imagine what kind of civilian administration might emerge in Gaza as they're looking around at, you know, 80% of the infrastructure destroyed, 100% of the population displaced, 50,000 people dead is just, you know, it's just a guess because they stopped counting and they can't get under the rubble. Um, you know, basically nobody is going to be able to put a face on to this and survive um, it politically um, in in a Palestinian context.”

0.52

Major military repression as a counterterrorism policy has historically strained the domestic fabric of the state employing it, particularly in democracies, and Israel is experiencing very large protests, division between ultra-conservatives and secularists, and elite-working class conflict related to the war.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“Because remember that whenever you have a major military repression as your counterterrorism policy, one of the side effects throughout history, I could give you eight or 10 different examples, is that it strains the fabric of the state that's engaged in it, particularly if it's a democracy. So, that absolutely fits the bill with Israel. I very much am concerned about the degree to which there are very large protests among the Israelis, where there is uh very great daylight between ultra-conservatives and those who are more secular, where you've got um elites and working class who are against each other in Israel. You've got a very big disagreement about what the future of a Jewish democracy means.”

0.52

October 7th is still 'October 7th' in Israeli consciousness because of three factors: hostage pictures everywhere, lack of explanation for why Israeli military was slow to react, and lack of any military or political accountability, which will eventually lead to political reckoning.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dennis Ross

“I tell everybody, if you go to Israel, the one thing you discover, it's still October 7th. And why is it still October 7th? First, because you see the pictures of the hostages everywhere. Secondly, because there's never really been an explanation for why the Israeli military was so slow to react on October 7th. And thirdly, there's been no accountability. The worst day in Israel's history, by far, no accountability in the military, no accountability politically. It will come. It's a matter of time.”

0.50

A significant red line was crossed when Hezbollah launched a rocket from Lebanon into Majdal Shams in northern Israel, resulting in mass casualties of children playing soccer, and both Hezbollah and the US acknowledged this was an unprecedented escalation requiring a response.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Dana Stroul

“Hezbollah launching a rocket into northern Israel at the Majdal Shams town, as you noted, Dan, which resulted in a mass casualty event of innocent kids playing soccer that were killed. And we know that everyone perceived that to have crossed a line because Hezbollah tried to deny it, and the White House had to come out and say, 'No, this was absolutely an Iran supplied rocket launched from areas that Hezbollah controls in Lebanon.'”

0.50

Most Israelis according to a May Pew poll are greatly worried the war will continue for a long time beyond what they can stand, and displaced persons from the north are living in hotel rooms with some leaving Israel entirely.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“most Israelis, according to a a poll that just came out in May from the Pew Charitable Trust, are greatly worried is going to continue to go on and on for a long time beyond what they can stand. Think about all the people who are displaced from the north. They're living in a hotel rooms. Some people are leaving Israel.”

0.50

There is a vast gap between the experience and lessons learned from post-conflict reconstruction missions (post-WWII Marshall Plan, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) and the current planning for Gaza, which largely ignores these lessons and naively assumes a Marshall Plan model can be applied despite regional divisions and Israel's isolation.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dana Stroul

“Um, it would it's been very surprising to me in watching the debate and the planning and the discussions about what a post-conflict recovery and stabilization mission looks like in Gaza that there isn't a lot of reflection on the vast experience and frankly lessons learned and mistakes that the United States has made, that the United Nations has made, and sometimes if if you listened uh very closely to what uh Netanyahu said in his address to Congress, he essentially offered a vision that's the Marshall Plan post-World War II. But there's been a lot of post-conflict experiences since World War II and the Marshall Plan, and I just don't think that's where we're going to be with respect to Gaza because of how divided the region and the world is and how isolated Israel is”

0.50

When a strictly military response is used against what is essentially a political attack, without a political plan for long-term theory of victory, this commonly produces tit-for-tat escalation that gets out of control.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“when you use strictly a military response to what is essentially a political attack, and you don't have a political plan for the long term as to what your theory of victory is or what your theory of success is, this is the kind of tit-for-tat um getting out of control that is quite common, unfortunately, with state responses to to terrorism in their counterterrorism.”

0.50

There is something 'quite interesting' about Gulf states' current mood, particularly that they have learned from recent experience that you cannot ignore the Palestinian issue without it eventually blowing up in your face and forcing you to deal with it.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dennis Ross

“One thing they learned is that you can't ignore the Palestinian issue. Uh if if you go I bet that they I would say in the last 5 to 10 years when I would go to the Gulf, I would frequently find myself explaining to them why they should care about the Palestinian issue. And I it wasn't a case I was this is not altruism. This is not an issue that that you can ignore and it's just going to disappear. At some point it will blow up in your face and you won't be able and you'll have to deal with it. So I would say one thing that is interesting right now is they know you can't ignore it.”

0.49

President Biden is no longer running for re-election and is making the Middle East/Gaza conflict the last priority of his administration, investing heavily in ending the war and creating a different political trajectory for the Middle East.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Dennis Ross

“Think about the Biden administration. President Biden now is not running for re-election. He's making it clear his priority the last almost 6 months of this administration is going to be ending the war and trying to trying to create a very different political track or trajectory for the Middle East.”

0.48

A different Israeli government will eventually have to confront the reality that you cannot freeze the Palestinian situation with Palestinians in an inferior position indefinitely—there will have to be a debate about Palestinian political status.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dennis Ross

“You're going to get a different Israeli government at a certain point. And there's going to have to be an understanding that look the the idea that you can you can freeze the situation and the Palestinians can be in this inferior position and they're simply going to accept it. It ignores reality. And there's going to have to be a debate.”

0.47

Saudi Arabia wants normalization with Israel primarily not for its own sake but because it wants a US defense treaty, which is tied to Saudi Arabia's most important priority: internal transformation and security guarantees against Iranian threat.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dennis Ross

“In the case of the Saudis, when the Saudis the Saudis clearly still want to do the normalization deal. Why? Not because of normalization with Israel, because they wanted a defense treaty with the United States, because that ties to what they see as their most important priority, the internal transformation of Saudi Arabia, creating the security that guarantees they won't be threatened by Iran in a way that that could disrupt that or threaten that.”

0.47

Decapitation strategies tend to succeed only with small, hierarchically structured, cult-of-personality groups that are young (less than 10 years old), none of which describe Hamas, which is highly networked, older, territorially associated, and therefore unlikely to end through decapitation.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Audrey Kurth Cronin

“I've studied 457 different terrorist groups. Uh the ones that it seems to succeed with decapitation tend to be small, hierarchically structured, characterized by a cult of personality. Usually, they're young, less than 10 years old. None of those things describes Hamas. Hamas is a highly networked, older, territorially associated group. Very different from any of the groups in any of my case studies that have ended through the use of decapitation strategies.”

0.46

Had Israel only conducted the Shakur killing (in Hodeidah), they would have likely already succeeded in demonstrating Israeli military potency through the combination of a 2,000 km precision strike and securing a high-value Hamas target, without requiring the additional escalatory step of killing Haniyeh in Tehran.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Dennis Ross

“And in a sense, had they just stopped with the targeted killing of Shakur, my own view is they would have already succeeded in that. Combination what they did in Hodeidah, you know, to carry out an attack 2,000 km away on very short notice, and again with, you know, a very interesting kind of operation, that sent a message.”

0.45

If Netanyahu wants a legacy that is not October 7th, he will have to make fundamental decisions that cannot be reconciled with the survival of his current government coalition, creating a political choice between legacy and political survival.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dennis Ross

“Now, if if Bibi wants a legacy that is not October 7th, he will have to he'll have to make some fundamental decisions that that will not allow this government as it is to to endure. Now, some might argue, well, he's he's made it clear that political survival is more important than that, but I still I wouldn't discount the possibility that he might yet have an interest in that”

0.43

Dennis Ross looks for circumstances and conditions that can be worked with rather than accepting despair, because accepting that nothing can be done creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Dennis Ross

“I'm sort of congenitally geared towards saying, 'All right, rather than accepting that nothing can be done, I'm looking for what actually can be done.' Uh we can easily despair because if you look at circumstances and they produce that. But if we despair and decide nothing can be done, then we create a self-fulfilling prophecy. So I start with the premise of as hard as this is, what is it that that we can be looking at that gives us something to work with?”

0.39

On Saturday (referring to Majdal Shams), Hezbollah tried to deny responsibility for the attack because they understood it crossed a line and feared Israeli response; Israel responded in a limited way to signal that a line was crossed while still attempting to avoid broader escalation.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dennis Ross

“That's what I think we saw on Saturday. Uh Dana put it well. Hezbollah tried to run away from their own attack because they understood this kind of was was not the intent and they feared what the Israeli response was going to be. Israel chose to respond in a way that was designed to still demonstrate it unmistakably, you crossed the line. We will cross a line. We will attack within the in Beirut, but we'll do it in such a targeted limited way that we're signaling you what our intent is.”

0.39

Netanyahu has historically claimed 'total victory' as an objective, but has rarely defined it; when speaking to Congress, he defined it as 'dismantle military capabilities and remove Hamas from control of Gaza,' both of which are actually achievable objectives that Israel may not be far from achieving.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dennis Ross

“In a strange way, if you're going to find a way to end this war, uh especially since you for a long time BB has said total victory. Now, total victory is a slogan. It's not an objective. When he was speaking to the Congress, for the first time I actually heard him define it. He said, 'We have to dismantle their military capabilities, and they can't be in control of Gaza.' Now, the irony is that's actually something that both those are actually achievable. And they may not be that far from achieving them.”

0.39

A 3-month window may exist while the Israeli Knesset is out of session when Netanyahu has less political pressure from coalition partners, making this an opportunity for ending the war before domestic political constraints reassert themselves.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Dennis Ross

“I wouldn't discount this as a possibility, especially in this 3-month period when the Knesset is out of session, and Bibi has less to worry about in terms of whether or not his government could be brought down.”

0.39

Dennis Ross notes that within the administration, there is shared belief that the Middle East will be where they have a legacy, and this is what the president has identified as its priority.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Dennis Ross

“This is you know, one of the things I can tell you that they're saying within the administration this area this foreign policy is going to be where we're going to have a legacy. And this is what the president has identified as its priority.”