
A History of Philosophy | 43 Locke on Religion, Ethics, and Politics
What this covers
This is a university lecture, with more than one voice from Wheaton's philosophy and theology faculty, that follows John Locke from his theory of knowledge into three applied areas: religion, ethics, and politics. The through-line is Locke's evidentialism, which the lecturer treats as the hinge between the epistemology and everything that follows. Along the way the lecture asks what Locke inherited from earlier thinkers and what has changed in the centuries since.
On religion, the lecture sets out Locke's view that revelation adds propositions to what reason already knows. Claims that accord with reason or exceed it may be accepted, but claims that contradict it cannot be revelation, since God cannot contradict himself. That makes revelation propositional rather than a matter of private experience. A second speaker places this in the longer British tradition of natural religion and deism, and in Locke's argument for toleration after civil war and under laws like the five-mile act. The lecture then follows the line into the evidentialist apologetics of the Lockean period, the Baconian ideal of objective science taken up by Scottish realists, and the conflict with science that sharpens in the 19th century. It also draws on Thomas Kuhn and on the creation science movement to question the certainty Locke assumed, and notes that interpreting revelation is harder than he supposed.
On ethics, Locke denies innate moral ideas and names three sources of moral knowledge: demonstration, the experience of pleasure and pain, and scripture. The lecture shows how this opens toward utility while noting that Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes got there first. Scripture still remains the final criterion.
The political section is the most contested. It covers Locke's definition of freedom as freedom of action), his Stoic rather than Thomistic natural law, and the pairing of rights with freedoms. It contrasts his contractarianism with Hobbes's, where subjects give up their rights to the sovereign out of fear. It also reads his property theory as resting on a Puritan stewardship mandate, a reading the lecture flags as disputed.
John Locke's epistemology—grounded in empiricism and evidentialism—carries systematic implications across religion, ethics, and political philosophy, establishing reason as the arbiter of revelation, moral knowledge, and the justification for natural rights and limited government.
- Revelation must be assessed by reason: propositions that accord with or go beyond reason are acceptable, but those contradicting reason cannot be divine
- Moral knowledge derives from three sources (demonstration from rationality, experience/utility, and scriptural revelation) all ultimately grounded in empirical ideas
- Political rights and freedoms flow from the fact of human rationality and the freedom to act according to desire, making government a contractual arrangement to preserve natural rights rather than a divinely ordained hierarchy
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
There are no innate moral ideas; all moral knowledge, like all other knowledge, must be derived from simple ideas of sensation and reflection.
“as you've already read, there are no innate moral ideas. There's no innate moral knowledge. His empiricism disallows that, and his argument against innate ideas is specific in this regard.”
Locke treats revelation as the addition of further propositions to those known by reason alone, making revelation fundamentally propositional rather than involving interpersonal immediacy or private experience.
“revelation uh may be regarded as the addition of further propositions to those which we know by reason alone”
Aquinas and Augustine differ in their realism about universals: Augustine treats the eternal forms in God's mind as also having real principles at work in nature (rationes seminales); Aquinas adopts a similar realist position.
“Yeah, but they are also real principles at work in nature, the rationes seminales. You see the eternal, the rationes eternae, the eternal forms in the mind of God, are God's preconceptions. But the rationes in nature are forms. You see?”
There are three means by which we acquire moral knowledge: (1) by demonstration, deducing moral knowledge from our knowledge of God and of ourselves as rational beings; (2) from sensation and reflection, through experience of pleasure and pain; (3) from biblical revelation.
“what he does suggest is that there are three means by which we have acquired moral knowledge. One is by demonstration. You remember he says there are three kinds of knowledge generally, by intuition, demonstration, and sensation. Uh, well, nothing by way of intuition, but by demonstration, yes. We can deduce moral knowledge from our knowledge of God, and knowledge of the self as rational being.”
Pleasure and pain are our moral teachers because God has conjoined morality to our happiness; therefore, moral rightness becomes a matter of practical utility.
“inasmuch as God has conjoined morality to our happiness. So that in practice pleasure and pain tend to be our moral teachers. Pleasure and pain tend to be our moral teachers. And simply in terms of the empirical probabilities which that involves we come to certain conclusions as to what we will and will not, should and should not do. Um rightness you notice moral rightness becomes a matter of practical utility.”
Locke defines human freedom as the freedom to act in accordance with one's choice—the power to do or not to do what one desires—rather than as freedom of will or free choice.
“he defines human freedom as the freedom to act in accordance with one's choice. The freedom to do or not to do what I desire. Freedom of action.”
Locke's natural law theory is in the Stoic tradition (concerned with what is logically implicit in the general characteristic of being human, which is rationality) rather than the Thomistic tradition (which identifies teleology and natural inclinations as metaphysical realities).
“he has then is a theory of natural rights, a kind of natural law. Okay? A kind of natural law that I think is more in the Stoic tradition. What is appropriate to rational beings uh rather than in the Thomistic tradition where you have a teleology and certain natural inclinations and so on and so forth.”
Propositions that accord with reason or go beyond reason (but do not contradict it) may be acceptable as revelation; but anything contradicting reason cannot be revelation, because God cannot contradict himself.
“propositions that are in accordance with reason may well be acceptable as revelation. Uh propositions that go beyond reason, uh but are not contradicting reason, uh would likewise be acceptable candidates as revelation. But anything which goes contrary to reason, contradicts reason, could not be revelation. His um point being simply that what we know of what God has made by natural reason uh cannot be contradicted by what God has said uh by special revelation. God does not contradict himself.”
Civil society is a contractual arrangement in which lives are brought under the rule of reason in order to preserve and enhance natural rights, provide justice, and ensure people's needs are met so they can exercise their rights properly.
“The civil society is a contractual arrangement. A contractual arrangement in which our lives together are brought under the rule of reason in order to preserve and to enhance our natural rights. In order to provide for justice. In order to ensure that people's needs are met so that they can exercise their rights properly.”
An evidentialist approach to Christian apologetics emerged from the Lockean period in British apologetics, attempting to find points within scripture confirmed by historical evidence to ascertain the truthfulness of scripture.
“And what you got in British apologetics um coming out of the Lockean period was an evidentialist approach to apologetics that I mentioned last time. So, the attempt would be to find uh points within the scripture that we confirmed by historical evidence. So on and so forth. In other words, attempts to ascertain the truthfulness of what the scripture says.”
According to Kuhn's structure of scientific revolutions, science is not the objective empirically-certain enterprise it was thought to be in Locke's day; it is ambiguous in what it actually says, despite scientists' intentions to describe reality.
“And others again will say, "Well, wait a minute. Science isn't that objective anyway. It may be attempting to tell us about reality, but there is all sorts of presuppositions at work in scientific work and drawing on the Coonian revolution, you know, the structure of scientific revolutions maintaining that while science might intend to tell us about reality, it's much more ambiguous in what it's actually saying than individual scientists often recognize."”
Revelation must at minimum not contradict what are the assured conclusions of science; this requirement sets up a tension between science and religion that will intensify in the 19th century.
“Um is there any justification why scriptures are employed in the Bible and not Um is there in Locke, you mean? Yeah, I mean is it just because he was raised in the Puritan tradition No, um I don't know that he he goes into that at any juncture. Um, you know, he's not writing apologetics. Because I mean he states it as a source of revelation, but Yeah. Yeah. Why that over something Yeah. Um, I'm asking myself if Locke does not give an argument for the claim that the Bible is revelation, how would a Lockean argue for it? You see. And I think the Lockean could argue in um at least two ways.”
In the creation science movement, there is unqualified realism about science; creation scientists are not saying science cannot tell us about reality, but rather that evolutionary science is not true science while creation science is.
“Um if you um follow at all the creation science business remember the creation science controversy over revolution. Um what you have in the creation science movement, it seems to me, I don't follow it closely but from what I read, it seems to me that um in the creation science movement there is a a very unqualified realism about science. And so they're not um saying, "Now science doesn't tell us about reality." They're saying "True science does but evolutionary science isn't true science. Creation science is true science." You see. So, what you get there is a conflict between two realistic readings of science.”
Locke advocates for constitutional government with constitutional checks, division of powers, and moral limitations on the sovereign's power—including moral limitations on the use of force in war and revolution.
“he therefore wanted a kind of constitutional government, a government with constitutional checks, division of powers, moral limitations on the power of the sovereign, um moral limitations on the use of force in war, revolution, so forth.”
Divine moral laws given in scripture constitute the supreme and final criterion of what is morally right, according to Locke.
“divine moral laws given in scripture is the final criterion the supreme criterion of what is morally right.”
Locke's opening toward utilitarianism was not original; both Bacon and Hobbes valued knowledge for its practical utility, and Hobbes grounded his ethics and politics in the utility of avoiding the war of all against all.
“Locke gain unwittingly is opening the path towards utilitarianism. Which is going to be developing shortly. He's not the first incidentally. Um if you hark back to Bacon and Hobbes uh you recall that they valued knowledge for its practical utility. And um Hobbes whole approach to ethics and to politics was in terms of uh the very important um utility of avoiding that war of all against all and uh making possible survival and peace.”
Rights and freedoms are correlatives: if one has a right to life, others should grant the freedom to live; if one has a right to property, others should grant the freedom to own property.
“these are correlatives. Uh if I have a right to life, you should grant me the freedom to live. Uh if I have a um right to property you should grant me the freedom to own property. Um freedoms and rights are correlated.”
Hermeneutical problems in interpreting revelation are now understood to be much more complex than Locke and his contemporaries recognized.
“But um and then there are problems that we have to recognize here as well with um hermeneutical questions that are much more complex than they were thought to be back in Locke's day.”
Locke's contractarianism differs fundamentally from Hobbes's: in Hobbes, one surrenders all rights to the sovereign out of fear for one's life; in Locke, the sovereign works to preserve and enhance those rights—a vastly different arrangement.
“A contractarian basis for government. Uh vastly different obviously than feudal monarch rights, divine right of kings, but a very different kind of contractarian arrangement than what you get in Thomas Hobbes. Where it's out of fear of your life that you surrender all your rights. In Locke, it's not a matter of surrendering rights to the monarch. It's a matter of the um the monarch uh working to preserve and enhance those rights. It's a very different kind of arrangement.”
John Locke's evidentialism—the principle that beliefs should be proportioned to evidence—is the crucial connection point between his epistemology and his applications to religion, ethics, and politics.
“the evidentialism which we uh highlighted last time. Uh that is to say, his insistence uh that we should proportion our beliefs to the evidence.”
The Baconian ideal in science—purely objective empirical science—was accepted in the 18th century not only by Locke but by Scottish realists, who then influenced Christian thought in Britain and America in the 19th century.
“for instance, that Mark Noll has been writing um realize that he talks of the as historians do of the Baconian ideal in science. That is to say the purely objective kind of empirical science which was accepted in the 18th century not only by Locke but by Scottish realists that we'll be talking about later on.”
Natural religion—religion based on reason and natural knowledge alone, independent of revelation—was already actively developing in Britain before Locke, particularly since the Renaissance, and deism was both a continuation of that tradition and accelerated by Lockean epistemology.
“you have to say, though, that even before Locke, uh, there was quite, um, uh, quite actively, um, developing in, um, in Britain, uh, what was known as natural religion. Um, sometimes in a platonic context, but ever since the Renaissance, it had been developing. Uh, that is to say, religion on the basis of natural knowledge alone independently of revelation. Uh, so, deism was on one hand a further development of that, and on the other hand, it was a development that seems to have been spurred by Lockean epistemology.”
In late 17th-century England, Locke advocated for religious toleration and freedom of belief using rational argument, at a time when England had endured civil war with religious dimensions and when a five-mile act forbade dissenters from worshipping within five miles of certain population centers.
“This is at the end of the 17th century, uh, when, um, England had gone through its civil war, which was a mixture of religious and political conflict. Uh, the Catholic-Protestant conflict in England continued, uh, way on through the 17th century with, uh, James II, uh, who was finally ousted from the throne, you remember, in a bloodless revolution in 1688... Um, and... there was that, um, tension all the time. There wasn't much tolerance. Um, in fact, it was in that period that, um, a five-mile act was passed, uh, forbidding, um, dissenters, that's, uh, non-Church of England, um, worshipping within five miles of a community of a certain size.”
Locke's property theory, while emphasizing the right to acquire through labor, is grounded in a stewardship mandate rooted in his Puritan heritage—the creation mandate to subdue and have dominion while taking enough for oneself and leaving enough for others.
“his is his translation of that creation mandate uh that he was aware of in his Puritan heritage. The creation mandate implies in the settling of um of lands that have never been tilled, you see, that uh we have a responsibility to subdue and to have dominion, to steward, to take enough for yourself and leave enough for others. It's the stewardship mandate.”
Locke talks of abstract ideas emerging from complex ideas, but later revisits abstract ideas in a section dealing with the philosophy of language, recognizing that abstract ideas contain more than empirical generalization.
“um he certainly talks about abstract ideas initially uh in a section dealing with complex ideas. But then he comes back to them again later on, you recall, in a section that's dealing with the philosophy of language. In other words, um he's well aware uh that there is more to an abstract idea than simply an empirical generalization.”
B.B. Warfield, a Princeton theologian, developed a line of apologetic argument (avoiding circularity) by assessing whether Jesus tells the truth about himself, and if so, accepting his endorsement of biblical authority as revelation.
“Now, that's a line of argument developed by the Princeton theologian B.B. Warfield. You see. Um, whether it's sufficient, that's the one of the questions under debate. But basically, the Lockean um influence on apologetics was in the evidentialist direction.”
Rationality is foundational to Locke's political ethics: the basic premise for his entire ethic is that we are rational beings (as in Descartes' cogito ergo sum), and if the basic premise is rationality, rationality must be real.
“I don't know that it's more of a reality than the right to think. You see the basic premise for his entire ethic, including his political theory, is that we are rational beings. I think, therefore I exist. You know, he reiterates this. And if the basic premise is that we're rational beings, that had better be real. Nothing had better be more real than that.”
Preferences and ideas are caused by what goes on in the world of sensations; reflection is likewise caused; so willing and desiring are not free because will is influenced by ideas that are themselves caused, whereas actions can be free if they accord with one's desires.
“Uh yeah, we do indeed think reflect on our actions. We do prefer doing one thing rather than another. Uh but preferences can well be caused rather than being free. And ideas, reflection is likewise caused by what is going on in the um uh in the world of sensations. And so it's not so much wanting, desiring, willing that is free because the desire, the conative, the will is so influenced by ideas that are caused. Uh as it is rather the actions that are free. Uh so one is free uh when he is able to act in accordance with his desires.”
In the age of mechanistic science with cause-effect mechanisms as the dominant framework, Hobbes became a thoroughgoing determinist denying real human freedom, while Descartes preserved human freedom through mind-body dualism making mind an exception to causal mechanisms.
“Now um seeing this um also in regards to human freedom. Remember that this is the age of mechanistic science. Cause effect mechanisms. So that people like Hobbes had become thoroughgoing determinists. Uh there is no real freedom of will or of action. Uh Descartes on the other hand had tried to preserve human freedom by making the mind the thinking thing an exception uh to the causal mechanisms of science. His mind body dualism is what preserved freedom of the will.”
Locke likely holds that the effect of the fall impacts not the laws of thought themselves but our capacity to abide by and follow the laws of thought—our willingness, emotional, and moral capacity—introducing prejudice, blindness, and other failures of proper reasoning.
“Um, I I don't think of any particular place where he discusses it. I'd have to check um um the reasonableness of Christianity. Um, but I can hazard this in the light of the tradition out of which he comes. Um, uh that the effect of the fall is not so much on the laws of thought as on our capacity to abide by the laws of thought. You see. Not on the laws of thought. That's not us. But on our willingness, emotional, moral capacity to abide by the laws of thought. The prejudice that comes in, the blindness. So on and so forth.”
The alternative to rational mediation of religious dispute is power politics; the politicization of universities through political correctness movements represents this same pattern of resolving disagreement through force rather than reason.
“What's the alternative to some sort of, um, rational balance in that sort of situation of conflict? Well, the only alternative to rational mediation of dispute is power politics. You see, that's what's going on with the politicization of the universities in this country nowadays with the political correctness movement. You see? Well, it was going on back there in a very different context.”