
Is MSTR a Ponzi? | Lyn Alden & Andy Constan
What this covers
This conversation between Lyn Alden and Andy Edstrom examines whether Bitcoin treasury companies like Micro Strategy operate as legitimate investment vehicles or function as concealed Ponzi schemes. The debate centers on how these firms generate returns, given that Bitcoin itself produces no operating income—only price appreciation. Both participants agree on the core structural problem: preferred dividends must be funded from new share issuance rather than cash flows, creating a perpetual dependence on capital markets access. The disagreement lies in whether this dependency, under careful management and favorable leverage structures, constitutes a viable business model or an inherently unstable one destined to fail.
Edstrom argues that the model is "Ponzi-adjacent" by definition—past investors receive returns solely from new investors' capital, making it mathematically dependent on perpetual growth and market access. He assigns roughly 50% probability that Micro Strategy enters permanent impairment within a decade, with particular concern about how the company's marketing conflates Bitcoin appreciation with recurring earnings. Alden counters that treasury companies have a genuine edge through access to superior long-duration leverage (non-callable preferreds, extended-maturity debt) that allows them to weather Bitcoin cycles without forced selling, justifying an MNAV premium above one. Both agree the actual failure mode is not bankruptcy but MNAV compression below one combined with lost issuance access, which would impair shareholders regardless of Bitcoin's price. The discussion also branches into whether the original NAV premium rationale—investor inability to access Bitcoin directly—has disappeared with futures and ETF proliferation, and whether stablecoins will materially increase dollar demand or merely redistribute existing dollar holdings.
Bitcoin treasury companies operate on a 'Ponzi-adjacent' model where preferred dividends depend on continuous new capital issuance rather than underlying asset income, creating structural fragility that will test itself when capital markets tighten; separately, stablecoins' macro impact is real but limited—they'll primarily convert existing dollar demand and physical currency into digital form rather than generate fundamentally new demand for dollars and treasuries.
- Treasury company preferred dividends have no income source except new equity/debt issuance; absent appreciation of Bitcoin, this fails
- MNAV premium harvestable only while markets remain willing to buy; once tapped out, model reveals its dependency on asset price, not cash generation
- Stablecoins reallocate existing dollar demand across borders and payment rails rather than creating net new demand—the supply must ultimately come from US financial system or physical currency
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Stablecoins increase the surface area of secondary-market FX trades by reducing the frictions and gray-market premiums of obtaining dollars in markets like Egypt, Argentina, or India, which first collapses the gray-market premium and then can increase total demand for dollars — the way the browser increased demand for the internet — giving the dollar a non-trivial new tool to take market share from weaker local currencies.
“what stable coins do is they increase the surface area of where these FX these secondary market FX trades can even happen.”
Stablecoins should be analyzed across three distinct functions — payment rails, transactional balances held instead of checking accounts, and a long-term savings vehicle for US dollars — and the strongest use case is a new dollar payment rail outside the US, with weak justification for stablecoins as a domestic US savings vehicle.
“there is a very good use case, particularly outside of the US, for a new payment rail in US dollars.”
Once a preferred dividend gets cut or paused, the first market reaction is that the common stock falls (because common equity is expected to fund the dividends and, more importantly, debt payments), and a preferred that will likely never pay its dividend again trades at practically zero.
“if dividends get paused, the first thing that happens is the common stock goes down because there's an expectation that the common stock will be used to fund the dividends or much more importantly... to fund debt payments.”
The MNAV (market value of Bitcoin net of enterprise value) premium can be harvested by management through ATM stock issuance: when MNAV is high, the company sells shares above the Bitcoin value per share, then uses proceeds to buy more Bitcoin, creating a 'flywheel' where higher MNAV enables faster Bitcoin accumulation.
“If you can buy $2 of Bitcoin for $1...buy $1 of Bitcoin by selling $2 of value in your shares...Michael Sailor is doing it all day long. He's harvesting the MNAV.”
MNAV-based valuation of treasury companies is recursive and inherently fragile: the higher the MNAV, the faster they can increase Bitcoin-per-share via issuance, which creates a flywheel that works powerfully on the way up but can unravel very quickly when sentiment changes — unlike valuing a company on operating cash flows.
“the problem with that is it's recursive because the higher their MNAV is the more the faster they can increase their Bitcoin per share. Uh and so that flywheel is really good on the way up but can also just unravel very quickly when sentiment changes.”
Treasury companies have an edge over other pools of capital because they can use better forms of leverage — long-duration debt and non-convertible preferreds that are not callable during a bear market — allowing them to ride out cyclicality without making short-term (1-year/18-month) bets on price, which is why an MNAV above one is justified.
“the thing about treasury companies is they can do it with better types of leverage than most other pools of capital have access to.”
Stablecoin growth does not create net new demand for dollars; it is largely a transfer from people who already hold dollars (or T-bills, money market funds, or bank deposits) to people who want dollars, and the only genuinely new demand for physical dollars comes from converting the ~$1.2 trillion of physical Benjamins circulating outside the US into stablecoins.
“does that growth create new demand for dollars? It doesn't. It doesn't at all. It's just a transfer from people who have dollars to people who want dollars.”
Stablecoins that disintermediate bank deposits will have a tightening (deflationary) impact and reduce demand for dollars in one sense, because bank deposits currently fund a purpose, and a disruptive technology that shrinks bank deposits removes that funding — partially offsetting the easier-access demand boost.
“whenever a disruptive technology like this causes bank deposits to um shrink that's which it will that will have a tightening impact and less demand for dollars offset by this easier access to dollars that creates more demand.”
There are no Ponzi schemes that don't fail; a Ponzi scheme is only declared one after it fails (as with Bernie Madoff), so Micro Strategy will never be declared a Ponzi scheme as long as the underlying Bitcoin keeps appreciating and it retains capital market access — making the 'adjacent' qualifier the key distinction.
“There are no Ponzi schemes that fail. Sorry, that don't fail. Ponzi schemes fail and that's when they become known as Ponzi schemes. Bernie Maidoff was never a Ponzi scheme until he failed.”
A Bitcoin treasury company that pays preferred dividends and interest with no operating income to cover them, relying entirely on new issuance proceeds, is by definition a Ponzi scheme — because past investors are paid returns from new investors' money.
“There is no hope of paying the preferred dividends without new proceeds from issuance. And that's a Ponzi scheme. Full and that's it.”
The failure mode for a treasury company is not bankruptcy or liquidation but permanent impairment: if MNAV compresses below one regardless of Bitcoin's price and the company loses access to satisfactory issuance, it must either sell Bitcoin to pay dividends or shut off dividends, washing out preferred holders and the common equity — and this can happen at any Bitcoin price.
“I would consider a failure mode to be that if the company doesn't necessarily liquidate but they have permanently impaired the preferred holders uh and the common equity holders uh that that would be a failure mode”
Bitcoin is the first asset that can compete with equities in long-term returns while not being a security, which gives corporations a vehicle for holding 'rainy day' savings that can appreciate — unlike gold, which underperforms high-quality equities over the long arc of time and is hard to justify holding in size on a balance sheet.
“Bitcoin is the first asset that can actually compete with equities long-term in returns.”
The transmission to actual dollar supply runs through policy: a stronger dollar (from stablecoin-driven foreign demand) gives the Fed and Congress more leeway to enact growth-oriented monetary and fiscal policies (QE, lower rates, larger deficits) because inflation pressure is lower, so foreign stablecoin demand creates currency pressure and bank-deposit/de-banking pressure that can lead to easier monetary policy and ultimately more dollars.
“the stronger the dollar is, the more leeway they have to enact policies that are growth, growth of credit, either base money or broad money or both.”
An international (non-US) fully-backed stablecoin sourcing its dollar exposure from foreign dollar bank accounts or offshore T-bill holdings that never touch the US system is effectively a digital eurodollar; converting eurodollar supply into stablecoin form does not change net dollar demand much and tends to hit physical dollar demand and pressure banks losing deposits.
“the international ones can still exist to be fully backed. It's just that their source of of dollar exposure is either foreign dollar bank accounts or foreign holdings of tea bills that don't touch the US system.”
MNAV is context-dependent and should gradually compress toward one as a treasury company gets bigger, because trees don't grow to the sky; jurisdiction matters too, as MetaPlanet enjoys a large tax arbitrage in Japan that US-based companies lack, supporting higher MNAVs from a smaller base.
“MetaPlanet is smaller uh is in a jurisdiction where there's a really big tax arbitrage uh which is different than the United States. um so that they're actually tax advantage there.”
No Ponzi scheme in history has been identified as such before its failure; all cases like Bernie Madoff are only recognized as Ponzi schemes retroactively after collapse.
“There are no Ponzi schemes that fail. Sorry, that don't fail. Ponzi schemes fail and that's when they become known as Ponzi schemes. Bernie Maidoff was never a Ponzi scheme until he failed.”
A Genius Act compliant fully-backed stablecoin is legally prohibited from paying interest and can only hold money-equivalent government-backed instruments (Treasury bills, bank reserves, and repo), which fundamentally constrains what such stablecoins can be.
“they can only own for one they are illegal. It's illegal for them to pay interest”
If MicroStrategy's preferred stock dividends are paused due to capital access constraints or MNAV compression, the first immediate market response would be shorting of common stock because dividend cuts signal deteriorating capital structure.
“if dividends get paused, the first thing that happens is the common stock goes down because there's an expectation that the common stock will be used to fund the dividends or much more importantly, preferred are a small class of investors, much more importantly to fund debt payments.”
Bitcoin treasury companies can access better forms of leverage than retail investors or hedge funds—particularly long-duration debt that won't be called in a bear market—allowing them to accumulate Bitcoin per share in a way that generates returns beyond just Bitcoin appreciation.
“they can do it with better types of leverage than most other pools of capital have access to...which gives them an edge.”
A properly regulated stablecoin must comply with the Bank Secrecy Act and can only hold treasury bills, bank reserves, and repo—it cannot pay interest and cannot hold anything else, which severely limits the addressable market.
“they can only own for one they are illegal. It's illegal for them to pay interest uh and two they can only own what I consider um money meaning treas um treasury bills, bank reserves and repo”
Stablecoins present a risk to the US banking system by disintermediating bank deposits, which are used to fund loans and other bank functions; as deposits shift to stablecoins, banks lose funding capacity and deposit-funded lending may contract.
“whenever a disruptive technology like this causes bank deposits to um shrink that's which it will that will have a tightening impact and less demand for dollars offset by this easier access to dollars that creates more demand.”
Newly minted stablecoins must ultimately be backed by US dollars that come from the US financial system (Federal Reserve, Treasury, banks), meaning the supply is constrained by the availability of these dollars in the system.
“you cannot get a newly minted stable coin created without physical without US dollars.”
A Bitcoin treasury company could in principle generate genuine income (not appreciation) by providing liquidity on the Lightning Network while retaining custody of its Bitcoin, as Block Inc. is doing at reportedly high Bitcoin-denominated ROI — but the scale is not there for the next five years because Lightning's payment volume is still macro-small.
“you can use bitcoin on the lightning network uh while retaining custody of it to facilitate payments. Basically, you provide liquidity.”
Strategy's marketing materials comparing its P/E (treating Bitcoin appreciation as GAAP earnings) to mega-cap companies with decades of recurring earnings is fraudulent, because if the market falls they would be the biggest loser in history that quarter, yet they market it as recurring earnings deserving a multiple.
“They are marketing to investors as recurring earnings that deserve a multiple. That is fraudulent.”
Michael Sailor's strategy of selling $2 of share value to buy $1 of Bitcoin (harvesting the MNAV via ATM stock sales) is genius and should be done all day, but it makes the common stock investors the suckers, because once MNAV expansion ends, returns to old holders come only from new common stock holders' capital — which is a Ponzi scheme.
“If you can buy $2 of Bitcoin for $1, more relevantly, buy $1 of Bitcoin by selling $2 of value in your shares. You should do that all day long.”
Andy assigns a roughly 50% probability that Strategy enters the failure state (preferred shares washed down, significant markdown, MNAV below one) within the next decade, while Lyn assigns a high chance of temporary impairment in a bear market but less than ~25% chance of permanent failure.
“failing in the way Lynn described a wash down a significant markdown in the preferred shares and um a uh MNAV below one in the next 10 years I think it's 50%.”
The original NAV premium of Micro Strategy up to its ~$500 peak made sense because before Bitcoin futures and ETFs, many investors literally could not buy Bitcoin, so a stock wrapper was genuinely valuable; now that liquid futures and ETF markets exist, that justification for the NAV premium has disappeared.
“the idea prior to Bitcoin futures and prior to um ETFs that you could buy Bitcoin in a stock was a genius idea and made complete sense that it should trade at a premium because no one you can't buy it.”
Corporations treat their accumulated cash as a rainy-day asset that should not take risk, not as an earning asset, because if they buy Bitcoin and it falls at the same time their business weakens, that is a disastrous correlated outcome — so operating companies are unlikely to and are not good at betting on Bitcoin for shareholders who can buy it themselves.
“god forbid Bitcoin fall, they take risk, they buy Bitcoin and Bitcoin falls at the same time their business weakens, that's a pretty disastrous outcome for them.”
The biggest vulnerability that stablecoin demand poses to the rest of the world is its depreciating force on weaker local currencies, since easier digital access to dollars accelerates de facto dollarization at the expense of those currencies — which their governments are unlikely to be happy about and may act against.
“I believe 100% that the biggest vulnerability to stable coin demand from the rest of the world is on the depreciating force on the um those currencies.”
The market does not reward unprofitable companies that adopt a Bitcoin treasury strategy, viewing it as a distraction and a risk; the ideal candidate is a cash-flow-positive value stock with no growth prospects, where Bitcoin competes with buybacks, dividends, and debt paydown as a use of excess capital.
“the market certainly does not like uh unprofitable companies uh companies that are lo losing money to adopt a strategy because they view that as a distraction and a risk”
The defining feature of a Ponzi scheme is that prior investors are paid returns from proceeds of new investor money, with no underlying income to cover those returns.
“a Ponzi scheme is a situation where prior investors are paid money, paid return from proceeds of new investors money. And that's all it really is.”
Corporate cash reserves should be held in assets that can appreciate long-term if the company wants to avoid complete decapitalization via buybacks and dividends, and Bitcoin is one of the first assets other than equities that can credibly serve this role.
“Bitcoin is the first asset that can actually compete with equities long-term in returns. And so prior to this, when corporations had excess capital, they generally decapize themselves. They would give it back to shareholders. Uh they would they would pay it in dividends. They would pay it in in buybacks.”
If Bitcoin and MNAV remain elevated or recover quickly, MicroStrategy will never be identified as a Ponzi scheme because the structure works; only if it fails will the 'Ponzi-adjacent' label apply retroactively.
“And so it's possible that Bitcoin rallies forever. It's possible that there's never a down case where and they continue to create recurring earnings. And in that case, Micro Strategy will never be declared a Ponzi scheme.”
An investor can replicate Strategy's leverage without paying the MNAV premium by buying long-dated (e.g. 2-year, 80% in-the-money) call options on a Bitcoin ETF, since a deep market for long-term ETF calls already exists.
“There's a deep market for um long-term ETF calls. Now go and buy a 20% an 80% in the money call for 2 years and you get all the leverage that master has without paying the mnav premium”
Pierre Rochard's 2014 concept of a speculative attack predicts that as Bitcoin grows, pools of capital will inevitably find ways to short fiat currency and go long Bitcoin, and treasury companies are an effective vehicle for this because of their superior leverage access.
“Pier Rashard wrote about this back in 2014, the idea of a speculative attack... it's inevitable that we'll see some pools of capital find ways wherever they can to short fiat currency and and be long Bitcoin.”
Bitcoin treasury exposure makes sense mainly for large pools of capital that for various reasons cannot directly own Bitcoin or even the Bitcoin ETFs, since they can instead buy treasury-company equity or bonds to gain price exposure; it should not be recommended as a substitute for individuals selling their own Bitcoin.
“there's larger pools of capital that just v variety of reasons can't own Bitcoin. Sometimes they can't even own the Bitcoin ETFs. uh and so they can go out and buy companies”
MicroStrategy's use of convertible bonds in prior cycles gave them lower ongoing obligations (near-zero coupons) compared to preferred stock, reducing the pressure if they couldn't refinance, but preferred stock with mandatory dividends increases quarterly obligations and acceleration of capital access requirement.
“they primarily relied on converts uh which gave them the advantage that on a quarterly basis they had very little obligation because they were either zero or near zero coupon...Uh now preferred are interesting because uh it's more of a bend and not break model which is they have higher quarterly obligations uh but those obligations are less immediately catastrophic”
Unlike an ETF, which can be leveraged through standard options (80-20 in-the-money calls for 2 years), there is no structural advantage to corporate Bitcoin leverage that justifies an MNAV premium when the same leverage is available in capital markets.
“There's a deep market for um long-term ETF calls. Now go and buy a 20% an 80% in the money call for 2 years and you get all the leverage that master has without paying the mnav premium”
Stablecoins could create marginal new demand for dollars and Treasury bills if easier access leads to stronger dollar appreciation, which in turn encourages the Fed to pursue looser monetary policy, creating more base money and broad money growth.
“to the extent around the margins that the dollar is strong, it can actually increase the number of dollars that are out there because the entities that are capable of doing that are more likely to allow that to happen.”
As a long-term savings vehicle within the US, stablecoins offer no advantage over bank deposits or money market funds because these already provide access to treasury bills and offer higher yields.
“as a savings vehicle, I don't get it. I mean, as a savings vehicle within the US, I I totally agree.”
MicroStrategy's marketing materials present mark-to-market Bitcoin appreciation as recurring earnings equivalent to operating company earnings, comparing their price-to-earnings ratio to major S&P 500 companies with decades of stable earnings, which is fraudulent because the earnings are entirely cyclical and depend on Bitcoin price, not operations.
“they are marketing to investors as recurring earnings that deserve a multiple. That is fraudulent.”
Operating companies that hold cash reserves want them to function as low-risk rainy-day savings, not as appreciating assets that could be exposed to both market risk and business cycle risk simultaneously.
“I think they think that that cash is literally a rainy day asset and shouldn't take risk because god forbid Bitcoin fall, they take risk, they buy Bitcoin and Bitcoin falls at the same time their business weakens, that's a pretty disastrous outcome for them.”
There is no competitive advantage for an operating company to hold Bitcoin on its balance sheet versus individual shareholders doing it themselves, because the corporation is not demonstrably better at Bitcoin than anyone else, and corporations generally should return cash to shareholders rather than making speculative bets.
“the question is why should corporations be doing that for their shareholders under what their the corporation has? ...what is the competitive advantage for a comp an operating company?...where's the edge?”
The key risk factor for MicroStrategy is not a single year of Bitcoin decline or a temporary bear market, but sustained MNAV compression lasting multiple years, during which the company cannot issue equity at satisfactory prices to cover dividend obligations.
“I've never been worried about the downside case. I've been worried about he no longer has access to issuance at what he deems satisfactory levels of in issuance and thus he can't pay the preferred shareholders.”
Bitcoin's 2017 bull run and peak near $20k made sense because there were no alternatives for investors to access Bitcoin (no ETFs, limited exchanges), creating a genuine scarcity premium; post-ETF and futures, this premium should not exist.
“it's very clear that the idea prior to Bitcoin futures and prior to um ETFs that you could buy Bitcoin in a stock was a genius idea and made complete sense that it should trade at a premium because no one you can't buy it. There were people that literally couldn't buy Bitcoin...Now that there's a liquid futures and um ETF market, I see no value in the NAV.”
Portfolio diversification against debasement of fiat currencies requires holding non-fiat assets like gold or Bitcoin; this is a foundational principle of prudent investing that Andy learned from Bridgewater's all-weather framework.
“I am a strong believer that uh a portfolio requires diversification against debasement of fiat currencies. Um, I really learned that from Bridgewater and the teachings they've had regarding their um, all-weather portfolio”
Bitcoin's expected forward returns are no longer as explosively high as when it grew from a billion-dollar to a trillion-dollar asset, but Lyn still expects it can 5x or 10x over the next 5-10 years given a total addressable market much larger than its current size, improved liquidity, regulatory clarity, and tax treatment.
“I certainly think it can it can 5x and 10x from here and we'll see how the numbers shake out”
Block Inc. is generating substantial ROI (Lynn mentions ~9%) by providing liquidity on the Lightning network with some of their Bitcoin holdings, though the market is still too small (~billions in volume) to move the needle at macro scale.
“Block Inc. Uh they have some Bitcoin and they they also are active in the lightning development space...they're generating pretty high ROI in Bitcoin terms with Bitcoin...the scale is not there yet uh because lightning as as a payment network is still small”
Andy views MicroStrategy shareholders who bought at lower prices and sold at the peak MNAV as having benefited, but new holders buying into the euphoria are 'suckers' because the MNAV expansion phase is largely over and future returns depend on Bitcoin appreciation alone, not capital structure arbitrage.
“When I use that word, people will say, well, I own master since 10 or 20 or 30 or what 60 or whatever and it's 400 now. I win. No, you haven't performed for months since the peak. That whole MAV expansion is by and large over.”
Even if Strategy's MNAV compressed all the way to one, it would still have been a major outperformance over the past five years for those who owned it, because the company accumulated so much Bitcoin per share that holders did well even after the premium disappears.
“even if Strategies MNAV compressed all the way to one, uh it still would have like been a major outperformance over the past 5 years for those that owned it”
Treasury companies' primary income story currently relies on Bitcoin appreciation, not operating cash flows; potential future income sources like Lightning network liquidity provision are too small to matter in the near term (5+ years).
“right now it's generally not there's not really demand for for you know borrowing bitcoin in many cases other than through financial arbitrage should should bitcoin become bigger more more you know used as money uh there could be lending aspects of it that get interesting uh but right now the firmly it's more about the the appreciation”
Treasury companies are 'Ponzi-adjacent' rather than outright Ponzi schemes, because the underlying Bitcoin asset has real value and can appreciate, unlike a pure Ponzi where there is no real asset; however, the dividend-funding mechanism still requires continued market access and asset appreciation.
“as long as the Bitcoin underlying asset continues to appreciate...It'll be a Ponzi scheme when they no longer have access to financial markets to compensate their preferred shareholders, their coupon shareholders, and they can they must sell Bitcoin to do that.”
Citigroup's research projects a 2030 stablecoin market of $1.6 trillion (base case) to $3.7 trillion (bull case), but much of that supply would migrate from existing pools — American and foreign dollar bank deposits, physical bank notes, and money market funds — rather than being entirely fresh demand for dollars and T-bills.
“Their base case was 1.6 trillion in stable coins. Uh their bull case was 3.7, that was the one that the that the secretary was citing.”
Block reported generating about 9% yield on Lightning but operates in a silo where it can set fees itself, while River published roughly 1.5% on a very large Lightning node, so the realistic achievable Lightning yield is highly uncertain.
“Block came out and I think they said they were generating about 9%. um they're kind of in a silo where they can set the fees themselves”
Andy is concerned that stablecoins will not 'save the US' from fiscal or debt sustainability challenges because the new dollar demand they create is marginal relative to total US currency issuance and does not address the underlying structural drivers of fiscal deficits or currency debasement.
“I don't think it's going to quote save the US if they need to issue a ton of bills.”
Lyn recommends caution buying at high MNAVs, viewing roughly 1.2-1.8 as a reasonable band for Strategy in the current market phase (with one not yet being the right answer) and becoming increasingly disinterested above two for US-based treasury companies.
“I think something in the 1 and a half range makes sense. It could be between 1.2 and 1.8.”
Bitcoin is likely to continue delivering high returns (5-10x from current levels) over the next 5-10 years as it captures additional value from a total addressable market much larger than its current size, with improving regulatory clarity and tax treatment reducing uncertainty.
“I do expect Bitcoin to to still have high returns. not the returns that when you go from a billion dollar asset to a trillion dollar asset. Um, but I I certainly think it can it can 5x and 10x from here”
MNAV premiums for treasury companies should gradually compress toward 1x as the companies grow larger and mature, because capital markets cannot sustain permanently elevated valuations for single-strategy firms.
“generally speaking, as they get bigger, we should expect the MNAV to gradually compress uh because trees don't grow to the sky.”
Stablecoins address three separate use cases: (1) payment rails for domestic and cross-border transactions, (2) transaction balances held for payment settlement rather than interest-bearing accounts, and (3) long-term savings vehicles in USD.
“there's three things I care about, which is...payment rails...what I think people call payment rails, which are, you know, how we in our lives both domestically and c in a crossborder sense...then the next thing is okay...what is the balance of money that will be held in stable coin just for transactions...And then the third thing is stable coins as a long-term vehicle for saving US dollars.”
The real addressable market for stablecoins is primarily outside the US: in countries where there are frictions to obtaining dollars (gray markets, capital controls), stablecoins can reduce the spread between official and parallel market rates for currency conversion.
“It's the rest of the world where that becomes more interesting...I think the rest of the world is or certain parts of the world.”
Andy estimates ~$750 billion of new stablecoin demand by 2030, representing roughly a tripling of the current stablecoin market, sourced primarily from physical currency replacement rather than new macro demand for dollars.
“my own projection is 750 billion of which is a tripling of existing market um uh uh stable coin market.”
Andy assigns approximately 50% probability to MicroStrategy experiencing significant impairment of preferred and equity holders with MNAV below 1 within the next 10 years.
“a significant markdown in the preferred shares and um a uh MNAV below one in the next 10 years I think it's 50%.”
MetaPlanet, a smaller Japanese treasury company, has been able to achieve higher MNAV multiples (reaching 6x at peaks) due to Japanese tax treatment advantages and smaller base size, but this MNAV has compressed over time as the company has grown.
“MetaPlanet is smaller uh is in a jurisdiction where there's a really big tax arbitrage uh which is different than the United States. um so that they're actually tax advantage there. Uh and they started from a smaller base so they they've they've had very high MNAV and have grown very quickly. Uh it's come down in more recently.”
When companies have no good use for excess capital they often make acquisitions for the sake of acquisitions or hold cash, which can leave them more vulnerable in the future — a common criticism of tech companies in particular.
“They would sometimes make acquisitions for the sake of acquisitions because they don't know what else to do with the money. That's often a criticism that especially some tech companies tend to do.”
Bitcoin can be held by US companies without the securities limits that apply to stocks because it is classified as a digital commodity rather than a security.
“with um US stocks there's kind of a limit on how much securities you can have uh in your asset mix. Uh it doesn't apply to uh Bitcoin which is a digital commodity.”
A portfolio requires diversification against the debasement of fiat currencies, and a monetary asset like gold (or digital gold such as Bitcoin) is a necessary holding for anyone saving in fiat or with future fiat-denominated liabilities.
“I am a strong believer that uh a portfolio requires diversification against debasement of fiat currencies.”
ETFs should trade at NAV because they have no financial leverage, no preferred obligations, and no incentive to issue equity at premium multiples; thus an ETF premium would be irrational.
“an ETF should trade at does trade at zero m well at NAV”
Andy worked as a derivatives trader for most of his 39-year career and ran global equity derivatives, a hedge fund, and most recently provided macro research to hedge funds, giving him deep expertise in capital structure arbitrage and valuation.
“I've been uh in traditional finance for 39 years. starting my career at Solomon Brothers as uh which was one of the big investment banks uh where I ran a where ultimately when I left I ran a global equity derivatives business and have been a derivatives trader all my life.”
Bitcoin treasury companies should only be appropriate for investors with high conviction bullish views on Bitcoin; the strategy is not suitable for those with mixed or neutral Bitcoin views.
“I certainly wouldn't recommend a Bitcoin treasury strategy holding for those who just aren't particularly high conviction long-term bulls in the assets.”
Lynn has been covering MicroStrategy since their Bitcoin accumulation treasury strategy began in August 2020 and has maintained a cautiously optimistic long position with active trimming at euphoric MNAV levels.
“I've been I've been covering Strategy uh since they started their Bitcoin accumulation treasury strategy in August 2020. I've also been long since then. It's been a small part of my analysis compared to everything else I do.”
Andy projects stablecoin market growth of roughly $750 billion (a tripling of the existing market), while Lyn thinks the figure could reach a trillion when small business demand across Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia for effectively a dollar bank account is included.
“my own projection is 750 billion of which is a tripling of existing market um uh uh stable coin market.”
By becoming a larger company partly through its treasury strategy, Micro Strategy was able to retain good executives it would otherwise have lost, since as a no-longer-growing software company in a competitive market nothing it did (buybacks, holding cash) excited the market.
“by becoming a larger company uh in partially through their treasury strategy they were they were able to keep and retain really good executives.”
There may exist demand for non-backed interest-bearing stablecoins outside the US framework, where international issuers back stablecoins with foreign dollar holdings and offer yield to users, but this risks leverage and systemic vulnerability.
“I don't think it's out of the question to think maybe a Tether International type company spins off and does stable coins that are purely based outside of the US still backs them with a dollar and does offer like a share of the um yield that they're making on those treasuries.”
Andy began actively analyzing MicroStrategy treasury strategy only after the stock moved above $500 in late November 2023, using capital structure arbitrage methodology, whereas he had made passing comments on MNAV in prior bear markets.
“I really only became pretty active in thinking about master when uh m uh micro strategy when it hit when it went above 500 in late November 202 uh 24 23 3 24 um and at the time it was real so I've spent my entire career doing arbitrage and in particular capital structure arbitrage”
Andy does not own Bitcoin because he is uncomfortable with its correlation to risky growth assets like the NASDAQ and what he considers speculative excess, having bid $84,000 and passed.
“I'm still not comfortable with its correlation to um risky growth assets like stocks, NASDAQ in particular, and what I consider some measure of speculative excesses.”
When MetaPlanet had a 6x MNAV, Lyn would not personally buy it at that level despite liking the company and management, illustrating that what counts as a 'high' MNAV differs by company.
“back when MN when MetaPlanet had like a six MNAV. I was like I like the company like people running it. Wouldn't personally buy it at like 6 MV.”
Andy is uncomfortable buying Bitcoin personally due to its high correlation with risky growth assets like NASDAQ stocks and what he perceives as speculative excess, even though he considers it a valid long-term hedge.
“I'm still not comfortable with its correlation to um risky growth assets like stocks, NASDAQ in particular, and what I consider some measure of speculative excesses. Um and so I don't own any.”
Ethereum-based treasury companies (holding Ethereum instead of Bitcoin) are emerging and may face similar structural dynamics to Bitcoin treasuries, including MNAV compression and dividend sustainability questions.
“I think that's a totally reasonable thing. And for one, I don't even look at these other Bitcoin treasury companies at all. Um though I'm starting to pay attention to the the Ether one, uh Ethereum one, Ether, I don't even know the name of these things.”