What this covers

This 25-minute video is a solo analysis from Luke Gromen of FFTT, built around a question about the Federal Reserve: why it sold none of its long-dated Treasuries during the latest round of quantitative tightening. Gromen treats that omission as the dog that didn't bark, a Sherlock Holmes-style clue. He offers two readings. Either the Fed was afraid to sell into an inverted curve, or it knows long-end liquidity is too poor to take the supply. He pairs this with the old bond-market rule to feed the ducks while they're quacking, which the Fed's behavior breaks. He also argues that the long end, not the Fed funds rate, is the economy's real policy rate.

The second stretch widens to Treasury market stress and who is buying. Gromen notes that yields have risen since the Fed began cutting, that the MOVE index is near 130, and that the Treasury has leaned on front-end issuance. He reads these as signs of treasury market dysfunction and a worsening fiscal position. He lists the largest foreign holders as the UK, the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg, which he takes to be hot money rather than patient central banks. He lays out policy tools for adding liquidity short of QE, including the SLR, a weaker dollar and the BTFP.

The most contested material concerns what follows. Gromen describes an economic iron curtain between BRICS and the West, with deflation on one side and inflation on the other, and he concedes that fungibility between the blocs would muddy that outcome. He argues that austerity backfires because recessions widen deficits. He also floats a one-time gold revaluation to recapitalize the Treasury, and the risk that governments might take the upside from gold miners. He closes with the conditions that would change his view, including a pro-U.S. Russian leader, a China that returns to vassal status, or credible deep entitlement cuts, along with tactical gold risk around a Trump election.

Sharpest takeaway

Luke Grohman argues that structural imbalances in global monetary and fiscal systems—particularly U.S. debt unsustainability, treasury market dysfunction, and the shift toward a multipolar currency system—make significant dollar devaluation and gold revaluation inevitable, barring only extreme austerity or geopolitical reversal.

  • The Fed deliberately avoided selling long-term treasuries during QT because market liquidity is too thin, signaling both fiscal stress and inability to fund deficits at current rates
  • An economic 'iron curtain' between BRICS (surplus production, energy, creditors) and the West (deficits, debt) will force Western central banks to print money to maintain rates and reshore production, driving explosive inflation
  • Meaningful deficit reduction requires either a Great Depression-scale contraction (which paradoxically increases deficits via counter-cyclical effects) or prior dollar devaluation against gold to recapitalize the treasury

The claims · ranked26 claims · weighted by value

This asset isn't compiled yet

You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.

0.74

The 'dog that didn't bark' principle (derived from Sherlock Holmes) is useful for recognizing important negative information: when expected behavior fails to occur, it often reveals hidden information or constraints.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Luke Groman

“when you see dogs that don't bark pay attention to them they're telling you something just like they told our friend Sherlock Holmes”

0.69

Alternative policy tools the Fed and Treasury can deploy to add liquidity without traditional QE include: regulating banks into buying more treasuries via the SLR (supplementary leverage ratio), weakening the dollar to increase foreign demand for treasuries by reducing hedging costs, and running de facto QE programs for banks such as the BTFP (Bank Term Funding Program).

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“there's a lot of things they can do uh they can regulate Banks into buying more treasuries with SLR uh they can weaken the dollar all sequel weaker doll um creates more foreign treasury Demand by reducing hedging cost for treasuries um so th those are some of the things they could do um you know we saw them do btfp uh the bank term funding program or by the effing paper which was de facto QE for the banks uh there's a lot of things that they can do to basically keep these plates in the air”

0.69

The 'feed the ducks while they're quacking' principle is an old bond market saying that when demand is highest (quacking), that is when the supply-side (Fed) should sell into that demand; the Fed's failure to do so during an inverted curve (when long-end demand was high) breaks this principle.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Luke Groman

“it's old bond market saying feed the Ducks while they're quacking why didn't the FED want to feed the Ducks while they were quacking for long end paper”

0.69

The long end of the yield curve is effectively the 'real policy rate' for the US economy, distinct from the Federal Funds Rate set by the Fed, because the long end determines actual borrowing costs for households and businesses.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Luke Groman

“because they didn't want to blow out the long end of the curve which is the real policy rate of the of the real US economy”

0.68

The shift toward front-end treasury issuance by the Treasury in late 2023 reflects weak demand at the long end, and more front-end issuance is secularly inflationary because Treasury bills are more cash-like than 10-year treasuries.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“this would also fit in with why yell and shifted so much issuance to issuance to the front end at the end of uh 2023 uh as we've been highlighting more more frontend issuance all else equal is more secularly inflationary T bills are more cash-like than 10-year treasuries”

0.68

The Federal Reserve did not sell long-term treasuries during the most recent quantitative tightening round, which Grohman argues is a 'dog that didn't bark'—suggesting either the Fed was too afraid to sell while the curve was inverted and demand existed, or the Fed knows treasury market liquidity at the long end is so poor that selling would have deepened market dysfunction.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“the fact that they didn't sell long-term treasuries in this round of quantitative tightening is a case of the dog that didn't bark”

0.68

If the Fed cannot sell long-term treasuries without triggering market dysfunction and debt spiral dynamics, this implies a secular inflation problem: the government has a real fiscal problem and is unable to fund itself at market-clearing rates without central bank support.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“the implications of this I think are are very important we've started to see them uh this would also fit in with why yell and shifted so much issuance to issuance to the front end at the end of uh 2023 uh as we've been highlighting more more frontend issuance all else equal is more secularly inflationary”

0.68

If a new monetary system emerges with gold as a reserve asset, and gold must remain flat to rising versus oil over time (as a proxy for gold miner margins), and if monetary systems typically last 40 to 80 years, then gold miners would theoretically have expanding margins for 40 to 80 years.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“if new monetary system is gold as a reserve asset and gold has to be flat or rise versus oil over time and monetary systems typically last 40 to 80 years and all El equel are we saying that gold miners will have expanding margins uh with gold oil ratio gold going up flat to up versus oil is a proxy for uh uh gold minor margins for8 40 to 80 years kind of sounds that way to me um in theory yeah all else equal I I agree with with Chris saying it kind of sounds that way to me”

0.68

In a scenario where an economic 'iron curtain' forms between BRICS (with majority of world energy, commodity production, people, factories, creditors, and surpluses) and the West (with majority of deficits and debt), the BRICS side would experience deflation because it has excess production it must consume domestically rather than export, requiring central banks to stimulate to create domestic demand.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“one side of the economic Iron Curtain is likely going to be deflationary the bricks they're going to have deflation because you're going to have a whole lot of production and people and they're going to have to consume a lot more of their own production they're not used to consuming that and so you're going to need central banks effectively fighting deflation by stimulating to create domestic demand”

0.63

The largest foreign buyers of U.S. treasuries are now the United Kingdom (a twin-deficit nation with its own fiscal problems), the Cayman Islands (population 68,000, owning $419 billion in treasuries, roughly 70% of China's holdings), Luxembourg, and other tax shelters—suggesting these are hedge funds and hot money rather than patient central banks buying long-duration paper.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Luke Grohman

“the biggest marginal foreign buyers of us treasuries have been the United king Kingdom which is a twin deficit Nation with a fiscal problem of its own in other words those are hedge funds uh in all likelihood or or hot money uh the number four they're the number three the three biggest CRS Japan China UK number four is the Cayman Islands population 68,000 they now own uh proud owners of $419 billion of treasuries they own about 70% as much treasuries as many treasuries as China does interesting there too would suggest it's probably hedge funds would also support this more paper issued at the short end because that's where the demand is uh number five is Luxembourg very small country most Americans probably couldn't find it on a map tax shelter again hedge funds profit sensitive investors uh not patient central banks buying long-term papers”

0.62

Macroeconomic experts like Daren Miller and Kirol Sakov understand that at current US debt and deficit levels, aggressive austerity is impossible without prior debt restructuring, and that the counter-cyclical deficit expansion problem makes traditional cutting infeasible.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Luke Groman

“I've seen dren Miller talk about it I've seen kirol sakov talk about it I've seen others talk about that once you get to where we are on debt the GDP and deficit the GDP there's there's you're too far gone you can't cut aggressively”

0.62

In theory, meaningful deficit reduction is possible, but only if Trump and Musk are willing to allow a literal Great Depression-scale economic collapse without FDIC bailouts, meaning deposits above $250,000 would be lost and the banking system would fail.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“could they do it in theory yes but only if they are willing to stand aside and allow a literal Great Depression in the United States uh crash the economy crash the banking system no bailouts for anybody you got over 250 250,000 in a bank Mr company Mr individual bye-bye it's gone we warned you no FDIC bailout for you”

0.61

The U.S. is currently running a deficit of 5-8% of GDP; if the government cuts 5% of GDP in deficit spending, it will trigger a recession; recessions paradoxically increase deficits by 6-8 points of GDP through automatic stabilizers, so cutting 5% would result in a deficit higher than the baseline.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“us is running 5% of GDP def or 8% of GDP deficit let's say say you take 5% of GDP out of that it means you got to take 5 point of GDP out now you take five points of GDP out now you're basically going to have a recession um you know recall that a 3% annual decline in GDP is what we saw in the great financial crisis so in a recession paradoxically deficits go up 6 to eight points of GDP so if you cut enough deficits that you trigger a recession say that number is 5% you're immediately going to have to add back six to eight points of GDP of deficit so you're going to you're going to cut Five Points of GDP and end up with a deficit that's higher than when you started if you if you trigger a recession”

0.57

Treasury and Fed bond yields have risen since the Fed began cutting interest rates, which Grohman interprets not as 'buy the rumor, sell the news' but as the beginning of acute treasury market dysfunction driven by private sector balance sheet strain and a worsening fiscal crisis.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Luke Grohman

“www bond yields have been moving up since the Fed rate cut is this say buy the rumor sell the news type action or are we beginning to see the start of Treasury Market dysfunction uh yes we're seeing this the start of Treasury Market dysfunction which is ultimately just a polite way of saying fiscal crisis getting acute again there's a fiscal problem there's too much debt there's not enough private sector balance sheet and any time they the FED does anything whether that is overtighten or over stimulate the long end starts to get spooked by private sector balance sheet moves away from it and you start creating treasury market dysfunction”

0.57

Gold is headed toward $3,000 and higher on a secular basis, driven by the structural need for dollar devaluation and the shift toward multicurrency and gold-settled international trade.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Luke Grohman

“I think Gold's headed to $3,000 and higher and certainly on a on a secular overtime basis”

0.57

Gold could experience tactical weakness if Trump is elected, because gold was sold when Trump won last election; however, Grohman does not plan to change his positioning because he believes the long-term structural case for gold remains intact.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Luke Grohman

“I think it's going there to play Devil's Advocate I think if Trump gets elected we could see gold fall a bit only because I think gold got sold on him winning last time and I think that's the wrong thing to do is sell gold on him winning uh but I but I think tactically we could see that for for a relative cup of coffee so be aware of that I'm not selling or changing any of my positioning I don't care because I the I I see the likelihood of how this end game game is likely to play which is has to be in my view significant dollar devaluation”

0.56

A one-time gold revaluation to $220,000 per ounce would inject $5 trillion into the Treasury general account as free, unencumbered capital with no offsetting debt, enabling Treasury buyback of bonds at favorable prices before austerity is implemented.

causalhigh valuefringenovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Luke Grohman

“they going to struck treasury revalue gold to say $220,000 an ounce that would deposit $5 trillion into the treasury general account free and clear no offsetting debt on the other side of the Ledger”

0.52

A structural risk to the thesis that gold miners will benefit from gold revaluation is that governments may not allow miners to keep the full upside of gold's price appreciation; instead, governments might impose a quid pro quo where the first $6,000 of gold's price goes to miners but any appreciation beyond that accrues to the sovereign as seigniorage.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“the risk to that thesis structurally makes sense the risk to it in my opinion would be that with gold going back into the system as a reserve asset will governments allow miners to keep the full economics of all of the upside of gold's price or will there be essentially a quidd pro quo whereby the first $6,000 of gold's price acrs to the miners every ,000 after that goes to the Sovereign in seniorage since we will be dealing with a a a reserve asset”

0.52

To analyze which emerging markets are best positioned for U.S. dollar inflation, one should evaluate: (1) how competitiveness vs. U.S. markets changes if the dollar weakens; (2) competitiveness in global markets vs. U.S. firms if the dollar weakens; (3) U.S. dollar-denominated debt levels (easier to service with weaker dollar); (4) whether nation's assets in dollars appreciate as dollar weakens; (5) whether nation has dollar-denominated commodity exports or gold reserves that rise in value; and (6) whether nation has industrial capacity to benefit from U.S. reshoring.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“you know what's what's the what happens to that nation's competitivness versus US markets um in the US if the Dollar's a lot weaker so do they lose access to the US market are they are they going to be overtaken by a us firm or are they not uh competitiveness in global markets versus US firms if the dollar is a lot weaker and that and that company uh competes against us firms who make a lot of it of the competing product in the US their their cost will be cheaper the US's costs uh what is that nation's US dollar denominated debt levels uh all else equal Debt Service gets a lot easier with a weaker dollar that's good for that country uh what happens to that nation's Assets in dollars uh do they go up a bunch as the dollar weakens the stock market goes up a bunch that's possible uh do they have Dollar denominated commodity exports oil other uh Commodities do they have a lot of gold reserves that would go up a lot in dollar terms in a dollar weakness scenario uh who has uh industrial capacity to sell in and and and reshore right so uh if the dollar gets weaker can Japan benefit from helping the us reshore if the dollar gets weaker we're going to reshore well we buy a bunch of stuff at first from Korea Germany and China”

0.52

Once the US reaches a point where its interest expense plus entitlements exceed tax receipts (a debt spiral with rising rates, falling receipts, rising deficits), the only options are to print money to pay interest or default nominally, and both outcomes are bullish for gold.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Luke Groman

“once you get to where we are on debt the GDP and deficit the GDP there's there's you're too far gone you can't cut aggressively because you end up with deficits higher as a percent of GDP than when you started because of the counter cyclical impact so if Trump and musk are willing to basically stand aside and let all of it come down new Great Depression bank failures deposit losses then yeah in theory that that is never going to happen in my opinion so the other way they could do it is a one-time massive devaluation of the dollar probably versus gold”

0.50

The Treasury Move Volatility Index (MOVE index) has risen to 130, which is the level observed when the Fed injects dollar liquidity to ameliorate treasury market stress, suggesting we are approaching another Fed intervention in treasury markets.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Luke Grohman

“so we've seen this week the treasury uh move volatility index is up to 130 uh that's where we have been when we start seeing dollar liquidity injected um to ameliorate that”

0.48

If BRICS and West remain fungible (commodities, currencies, and dollars can flow between them), the strict deflation in BRICS and explosive inflation in West dynamic will be significantly muddied and complicated, making the outcome less clear.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Luke Groman

“all of that discussion assumes that there is no fungibility of oil or Commodities in between the two sides and and in the Cold War there was so that muddies the waters a bit um and so that is to be clear that is not a hey straight deflation in the bricks straight High inflation in the in the west if in in an economic model where you could Hive off and have no fungibility of Commodities or dollars or anything going in between the two that's what you'd have those will be the impulses uh then the question becomes how does how do the how do the flows of fungibility of oil Commodities Etc muddy that a bit and that's that to me is is less clear”

0.47

Three scenarios would force Grohman to reconsider his bullish gold thesis: (1) Putin is replaced by a pro-U.S. leader (like Yeltsin) who reverses Russia's multicurrency and gold-settled commodity strategy; (2) China geopolitically shifts and becomes a U.S. economic vassal again, buying treasuries at negative real rates; (3) The U.S. implements credible austerity of 25-35% cuts to entitlements and defense immediately and permanently.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Grohman

“if you saw some sort of geopolitical development in Russia or China that effectively forced them to stop shifting to multicurrency energy and commodity pricing with net gold settlement so basically you know somehow Putin leaves and he's replaced not with a harder liner than him but rather someone who is like yelson who basically sells Russia to the United States interests and they and starts selling uh their uh their commodity production in dollars strictly again uh that would be something that would be gold negative in my opinion if if China stops for what you has some sort of geopolitical issue and basically moves back into being a US economic vassel where they buy treasuries at significant L negative real rates um and stop uh trying to not trying stop successfully buying oil and commodities in youan Nets settled in Gold that would force me to rethink I don't think there's any chance of that happening um and you know or the last would be if the US is willing to do some sort of mili Argentina like austerity which we just touched on which again without devaluing versus gold first you would have a a moment you'd have a a month or two months or a quarter or two quarters even of of of gold weakness”

0.47

Even with revolutionary energy technology, implementing austerity would create secondary problems because the technology would be so efficient that it would require far fewer workers, and those displaced workers would still need economic support (UBI or other transfers) to prevent collapse, requiring the state to print money to finance it.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Luke Groman

“that would allow them to do Department of government efficiency it would create other problems on the other side um you so it's so efficient that you're going to need a lot fewer people working uh and those people won't get breaks on their mortgages cars student loans credit cards and so you're going to have to do Ubi print the money for it it's complicated”

0.22

An alternative scenario where Trump could implement austerity without prior dollar devaluation is if the U.S. government discovers and reveals technology for energy production (potentially from leaked UFO/UAP programs) that is better than nuclear fusion, which would create a productivity miracle sufficient to sustain the current system.

forecastfringenovelty 1/4durability 0/4· Luke Grohman

“the other way you could in theory do it is if Trump and musk know about some magic or what's functionally Magic uh productivity Miracle thing all right so if it comes out they he let's say he gets elected and it comes out oh the UAP the UFO thing that have been being leaked out or talked about uh in a number of different very serious channels is actually oh yeah by the way we have this technology for energy that is uh unbelievable and and better than nuclear fusion that would do it too that would do it too”

0.21

The question of whether HSBC's planned split between East and West operations to facilitate debt reduction is interesting, but Luke cannot determine whether this will be copied by other banks without waiting to see if it happens.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 0/4· Luke Groman

“I thought that was a very interesting headline that HSBC is looking to split basically East and West um so we'll have to see if that happens”